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THE JACOBITE ISSUE

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The Jacobite Issue

Lawrence Bartlam Smith

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SPAIN AND BRITAIN 1715-19: THE JACOBITE ISSUE

by Lawrence Bartlam Smith

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London

London School of Economics and Political Science

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD 4

NOTES 5

INTRODUCTION: 6

Purpose of this study - Spain and James post--Utrecht - Spain and Britain post-Utrecht.

Chapter

1 SPAIN AND THE FIFTEEN: 19

A European-wide approach for support for James brings Spain into the picture - The first serious approach to Spain:Louis XIV's initiative - -The initial Spanish plan for financial support and alliance with James III - Backpedalling - - Spain's first two financial contributions to the Jacobite rebellion - Anglo-Spanish rapprochement, and Spain's gradual disengagement from the project to assist James - Spain and the question of asylum and pension for James.

2 SPAIN AND JACOBITISM : AN INTERLUDE 92

Coolness between Madrid and the Chevalier - A Red Hat for Alberoni : James's role.

3 SPAIN AND JACOBITISM : THE TIDE TURNS 113

Jacobite hopes of Spain - Alberoni's use of Jacobitism - Ormonde's approach to Spain - -the Oxford Plot.

4 SPAIN AND THE NINETEEN: THE MAIN SPANISH EXPEDITION AGAINST BRITAIN 163

Spain's strategy in 1719 - Spain's military contribution - Best-kept secret of the Nineteen - -Collapse of the Spanish attempt.

5 SPAIN AND THE NINETEEN: THE SPANISH EXPEDITION TO SCOTLAND 207

The journey to Scotland - Two Spanish defeats: Eilean Donan and Glenshiel - Repatriation.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 240

FOOTNOTES 249

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 344

FOREWORD

I should like to thank the University of London for its awards of a postgraduate studentship and grants from the Central Research Fund which enabled me to visit archives in Spain.

My thanks are due to the Staff of the Archivo de Simancas and the Archivo Histórico Nacional, and to the librarian of the Archivo de la Casa de Alba in Madrid for their help and endless patience with my elementary Spanish during my research for this work.

I am endebted to Miss Dulcie Parker for permission to use the papers of her father, the late Sir Alwyn Parker, one-time librarian of the Foreign Office.

May I also thank my supervisor, Professor Ragnhild Hatton, for her comments and advice, and my mother for her encouragement to complete this thesis.

NOTES

(A) MONEY

The principal unit of currency used in Spain was the peso (or piastre) of eight reales (the 'piece of eight'), equivalent to the French écu (of three livres), and known in English as the crown: the rate of exchange was approximately 4 pesos to the pound. The Spaniards also used the doblone (or pistole), worth approx. 4 pesos and roughly equivalent to a pound.

(B) DATES

Unless otherwise stated all dates are in the new style (N.S.): old style (O.S.) indicates that the writer used this method of dating. Old style dates are given thus: 10 January 1719 O.S. Both styles are used to link the date in England with that on the continent: e.g. 26 August/5 September 1715.

INTRODUCTION

(i) Purpose of this Study

A peace treaty between England and Spain was signed at Utrecht on 13 July 1713, part of the general agreements concluding the War of the Spanish Succession. The Utrecht settlement also granted international recognition of the Protestant Succession to the English throne whereby upon the death of Queen Anne, daughter of James II's first marriage, the next in line to the throne, a Roman Catholic, James Francis Edward Stuart (born in 1688), son of James II's second marriage, and all other heirs being Catholic were to be excluded in favour of the nearest Protestant heir, the Dowager Electress Sophia of Hanover, or, should she die before Anne, her son George Ludwig, the Elector.

James, known in English non-Jacobite historiography as the Pretender, was not prepared to accept the Utrecht settlement, and felt free to challenge the Hanoverian succession. Jacobitism, both as a British and European phenomenon thus persisted, if anything in a more European-wide context than in the period 1688-1713. While the British aspect of Jacobitism has between 1713 and the aftermath of 1745[1] been exhaustively studied, the European aspect has been relatively ignored,[2] and in particular Spain's connection with the Pretender and the Jacobites from 1715-19 has not received a modern treatment based on all available sources. The purpose of this study is to examine Spain's use of the Jacobite issue as a factor in her relations with Britain between 1715 and 1719: the price demanded of James by the Spanish government in return for its support; the practical details of Madrid's involvement with Jacobitism (the amounts of money paid by Spain and the extent of military support committed)

and the political use made of the Jacobite issue by Spain, in particular by Alberoni, chief minister to Philip V from 1716-19. Madrid's first collaboration with James occurred when it provided financial support to the Jacobite rebellion of 1715; four years later Spain attempted to invade the British Isles to place James on the throne. The total defeat of this attempt by wind and weather as well as by Britain's preparedness and determination to oppose it eliminated Spain from the ranks of those powers prepared to support the Pretender openly. Between these two dates Spain's use of the Jacobite issue had varied from periods of near indifference to open collaboration according to the state of Madrid's relations with the government in London. After 1719 Spain's involvement with Jacobitism became more discreet, and Madrid was only willing to assist James when his cause appeared to stand a chance of success as in the 1745 rebellion.

For practical purposes, Spain's use of the Jacobite issue in the period 1715-19 falls into two categories: her financial support for the rebellion in 1715-16, and her open commitment to an attempt on James's behalf in 1719. For many years historians tended to regard the question of foreign backing for the Fifteen* as having been centred upon France. Spain's financial assistance to the rebellion was only briefly touched on by Lémontey, Wiesener, Armstrong, Bliard and Leclercq, all of whom were, owing to lack of knowledge and accessibility of archival material in Spain, compelled to rely on relevant material in the archives of France.

*Each Jacobite rising is normally referred to by abbreviating the year in which it broke out: thus that of 1715-16 is known as the Fifteen, the 1719 attempt as the Nineteen, and that of 1745-46, as the Forty Five.

Knowledge of Spanish participation in 1719 was general, although the accepted view of this tended to be slightly distorted since only the smaller of Spain's two expeditions to the British Isles actually reached its destination in the Scottish Highlands, thereby attracting the lion's share of attention from historians. Memoirs of those Jacobites who had taken part in or were closely involved with the abortive Spanish-backed expedition - principally the Earl of Mar, James's chief adviser,[3] and James Keith who fought in Scotland in 1719 - appeared in the nineteenth century, although the historical accuracy of such works suffered from their having been written to absolve the protagonists concerned from blame for the collapse of the Stuart restoration attempt.

Historical knowledge of the Nineteen was, however, vastly improved with the publication in 1895 of a considerable number of relevant documents relating to the Spanish-Jacobite attempt edited by W. K. Dickson. The primary material reproduced here fell into two categories: firstly, the letter-book kept by the Duke of Ormonde, commander of the main expedition, and secondly, a selection of papers relating to both Spanish expeditions from the Stuart Manuscripts at Windsor Castle and, to illustrate the British government's precautions, from the Public Record Office and British Museum Department of MSS. This substantial piece of nineteenth century scholarship has, owing to the wealth of primary material reproduced, become the principal source for further studies of the Spanish-backed Jacobite attempt of 1719.

Spain's role in the Fifteen has, on account of its obscurity, lacked a comparable publication of sources. The first substantial research into Spanish archival material to illustrate the

financial support given to James by Madrid in 1715 was carried out by Maria Josefa Carpio in her doctoral thesis España y los ultimos Estuardos, published in 1952. Although this work contained some original material which revealed the amounts of money supplied by Spain to the Jacobite cause at that time, it is marred by large gaps in the narrative and an ignorance of British history and source material (understandable in view of the difficulties of pursuing historical research in Spain in the early 1950s); it is, moreover, weak in its treatment of Spanish involvement in 1719, relying greatly on earlier works by Spanish authors.

A more analytical treatment of a European aspect of Jacobitism (centred upon James's attempts to gain support from Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia), obtained from British, French and Swedish sources, was provided by Claude Nordmann in 1956. This pointed the way to a whole new dimension of research into the role of Jacobitism in relation to Britain's relations with other European powers, and Edward Gregg in his Ph.D. thesis 'The Protestant Succession in International Politics 1710-1716' (1972) has deepened and enlarged this field.

Anglo-Spanish relations in the years 1715-1719 have been well covered in Basil Williams's biography (published in 1932) of James Stanhope, the virtual prime minister of Britain from 1718 until his death in 1721. England's commercial relations with Spain, the main source of friction between the two countries, have been fully explained and analysed by Jean McLachlan (1940). The most recent contribution to Anglo Spanish relations in the reign of Philip V is supplied by Miguel Martin who in a

Ph.D. thesis (1962) and a later article (1976) has emphasised the importance of Spain's policy towards Italy in determining her attitude to Britain.

Recent research, of which the most notable example is Henry Kamen's War of Succession in Spain, has gone far to illuminate the huge potential of material in the archives of Spain. Antonio Meijide Pardo made good use of the army papers at Simancas to shed new light on a little-known aspect of Britain's military operations during her war with Spain (1718-20), the Royal Naval expedition to Galicia in north west Spain in the autumn of 1719, an affair which in some respects closely resembles the Spanish government's own attempt upon the British Isles earlier that year.

To determine the full scale of Madrid's financial support for James in 1715-16 I have studied all relevant material in Simancas and the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid, and for the Jacobite side of these transactions the documents from the Stuart Manuscripts in the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle.[4] For the British government's knowledge of Spain's collaboration with Jacobitism and Whitehall's attitude to this, I have drawn upon material in the Public Record Office and the British Museum which also provide information regarding the measures taken by the government in London against the threat of a Spanish invasion in 1719 and the defeat of the Spanish-Jacobite incursion in Scotland. Spain's side of the Nineteen (not as well documented as one might wish) came principally from the military section at Simancas. Other manuscript collections consulted in Spain were the Archive of the House of Alba in

Madrid and the MSS section of the Biblioteca Nacional which contained an important collection of letters written by Alberoni in 1718 providing clues to why Spain decided to commit herself to full scale support of an attempt to place James upon the throne of Britain.

(ii) Spain and James post-Utrecht

Prior to 1713 the question of Spanish assistance for the Jacobite cause had not arisen. At the time of James II's exile in 1688 he, his second wife, Mary of Modena, and their son James obtained a palace of residence at Saint-Germain-en-Laye near Paris and financial support from Louis XIV who, upon James II's death in 1701, recognised his son James as King of England, Scotland and Ireland.[5] Louis' policy of providing the exiled Stuarts with a home and recognition of their royal status, plus intermittent French support for Jacobite attempts to install James upon the throne of Britain (as long as this course of action did not conflict with France's own interests) continued until the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Following French reverses in the War of the Spanish Succession, however, Louis was quite prepared to abandon James as part of the price for a satisfactory peace settlement.[6] As a result of the peacemaking at Utrecht (1711-13) James, known to the French as the Chevalier de Saint Georges (his nom de guerre from his period of service in the armies of France) and to his followers as 'James III', was compelled to leave French soil and in February 1713 set up residence at Bar-le-Duc in the Duchy of Lorraine, leaving his mother to preside over a much reduced

court at Saint-Germain. By the Utrecht agreements Louis XIV had to recognise the Protestant Succession to the English throne. James had to accept that France, being determined to avoid a renewal of war with Britain, was no longer prepared to connive with the Jacobite leadership in its attempts to recover the English throne, and he would have to look elsewhere for assistance.

After France the most obvious choice for the Chevalier to approach was Spain. Links between the two countries were close. The Spanish king Philip V was Louis XIV's grandson and in 1714 French influence, exercised through the Princess des Ursins, camerara mayor (chief lady in waiting) to Philip's first Maria Luisa (herself a second cousin of James*), remained considerable. This did not mean that Louis was prepared, let alone able, to force his grandson to support the Stuart claim to the throne of England. If the Jacobite leadership wished to explore the possibility of obtaining assistance from Madrid, it would have to exploit both the merits of the Stuart cause to Spain and, negatively, the detrimental effect of those policies pursued by the British government which irked Philip V and therefore might incline him to support James.

In the years following his father's death in 1701 the Chevalier himself developed a considerable personal rapport in his correspondence with the Spanish king and his first wife, María Luisa, both of whom felt great sympathy towards a fellow Catholic monarch deprived of his rightful throne.[7] The significance of this was not lost on the Stuart leadership which, aware of Spain's potential as a source of assistance for their cause, did not

* Her mother Anne-Marie of Orleans (1669-1728), wife of Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, was a cousin of James's.

neglect the pursuit of the Chevalier's interests south of the Pyrenees. From 1705 an Irish-born officer in the Spanish army, Toby Bourke (known to Spaniards as Tobias del Burgo), acted as the Jacobite representative in Madrid;[8] and, to reinforce the impact of James's direct correspondence with the Spanish king and queen, the Stuart cause was preached to Philip by one of his physicians, John Higgins, a native of Limerick who after the collapse of James II's Irish campaign (1691) had fled first to France and then to Spain.[9]

Another factor appeared to favour the possibility that the Spanish government might provide troops in the event of a Jacobite attempt to place the Chevalier upon the English throne. During the War of Succession many Jacobite sympathisers in the armies of France, either exiles or naturalised Frenchmen like James's half-brother, the Duke of Berwick, a Marshal of France, had served the cause of Philip V against the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne, 'Carlos III', the Archduke Charles (who in 1711 had succeeded his brother Joseph I as Emperor). By the time hostilities ceased there were seven regiments in the Spanish army - five of infantry and two of dragoons, comprising in all 5,200 men plus officers[10] - which were Irish in name if not fully in composition, and the Stuart leadership hoped that in the event of a Jacobite rebellion the Spanish government would allow troops from this Irish contingent in its army to serve in the British Isles.

But distant kinship with the Spanish queen (who died in February 1714), personal influence, considerations of monarchical and religious solidarity, and even the presence of a sizeable

body of Jacobite exiles in the Spanish army were not in themselves sufficient to persuade Philip V to become an active backer of the Stuart cause. This would only happen if the adoption of such a policy appeared to Madrid as the most profitable way of striking a blow against Britain.

(iii) Spain and Britain post-Utrecht.

Following the Utrecht settlement there were two areas of tension underlying relations between England and Spain which the Jacobite leadership hoped to exploit to James's advantage. The first arose from Philip's disappointment with the peace settlement. By the terms of this Spain had to relinquish the Italian provinces of her empire. Milan, Sardinia and Naples, along with the Tuscan ports or stato dei presidii* went to the Emperor; Sicily passed to Victor Amadeus II of Savoy though with the proviso that in the case of the extinction of the Savoyard male line it should revert to Spain; Gibraltar and Minorca were retained by Britain. The peace settlement also compelled Spain to award to Britain the Asiento contract to supply Spanish America with four thousand African slaves per annum for the next thirty years; moreover, in what was for Philip a bitter personal blow, he (a grandson of Louis XIV) had to renounce his claime to the throne of France.

Philip considered himself badly treated by the terms agreed at Utrecht: he was not prepared to accept the dismantling of Spain's Italian Empire as final, and thus did not formally renounce his claim to the territories he was compelled to cede in a treaty with Charles VI. Philip's hostility towards the British

* Porto Longone (on Elba); Orbetello, Piombino, Porto Ercole. Porto Santo Stefano, Monte Argentario, L'Ausedonois and Talamone on the Italian mainland.

government as a result of the peace settlement was not primarily due to Britain's acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca; the cause lay in Spain's policy towards Italy. To persuade Philip to evacuate his troops from Porto Longone, the last of the stato dei presidii in which a Spanish garrison had been stationed, Britain, in a secret clause[11] to the Anglo-Spanish peace agreement in July 1713, had supported the continuation of Spain's sovereignty over the territory of Siena (then ruled by Cosimo III de Medici, Duke of Florence); in addition, Queen Anne had promised to act in concert with Philip V to preserve what was vaguely referred to as 'the equilibrium (and)... liberty of Italy'.[12]

To Philip this secret article was of particular importance. Not only had Britain recognised Spain's claim to Siena; it could (Madrid believed) also be argued that this recognition encompassed the presidii which, prior to their annexation by Spain in the mid sixteenth century, had been part of Siena. Most important of all, Philip believed that as long as he did not formally renounce his claim to the territories ceded to the Emperor, Queen Anne's reference to the need to preserve an equilibrium in Italy might be interpreted as a recognition of Spain's right to recover Naples and Sardinia.

Philip's ambitions for recreating a Spanish empire in Italy were given an added impetus by his second marriage (in December 1714) to Elisabeth Farnese, the niece of Franceso Farnese, Duke of Parma. After him and his younger brother Antonio, both of whom were childless, she was the heiress to the Duchy of Parma; moreover, through her great-grandmother, Margherita de

Medici, she had the best claim to Tuscany should the ducal family become extinct upon the death of the childless Giangastone, son and heir of the reigning Duke, Cosimo III.

The importance of Elisabeth Farnese's claims cannot be overestimated. She did not particularly care for Spain and hoped to move back to Italy in the not unlikely eventuality of Philip's predeceasing her. Since there were three sons surviving from their father's first marriage, Luis (born in 1707), Felipe Pedro (born 1712) and Ferdinand (born 1713), any children Elisabeth might have would seem to stand little chance of succeeding to the Spanish throne. She was therefore determined to secure Parma and Tuscany - to which she was the rightful heir - in order to provide for herself in widowhood and for the future of her children. In this aim she was assured of the support of her husband and of the Parmesan representative at the Spanish court, the abbé Julio Alberoni, who hoped to use Elisabeth's ambition to achieve Spain's aid in the removal of the Imperial presence from the Italian peninsula and in the process to strengthen the position of both his native state and of himself. Upon the new queen's arrival in Spain, her first act was to expel the Princess des Ursins who, at the end of December 1714, was unceremoniously dispatched back to France.[13] Those members of the Spanish government whom Elisabeth considered too subservient to French aims either followed in the Princess's footsteps, or were compulsorily retired as Italians and those prepared to serve the new queen's ambitions gained influence and place.

The other area of friction in relations between England and Spain arose from the thorny question of Anglo-Spanish trade. To

the British government, the whole question of commerce with Spain and Spanish America as regulated at the end of the War of Succession by the Asiento Treaty (26 March 1713) and the new Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty (signed on 9 December 1713) needed urgent reappraisal.[14] Although the Asiento Treaty had seemed a considerable coup at the time of its conclusion on account of the belief, widely held in Britain, that it would serve as a cover for substantial illicit trade with the Spanish Empire, it transpired that the treaty's terms were so hedged in Spain's favour that it was restricted to a contract solely for the supply of slaves. The Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty likewise proved detrimental to Britain's trading interests with Spain. This was largely due to two errors made by the British plenipotentaries at Utrecht, John Robinson, the Bishop of Bristol, and the Earl of Strafford, which had resulted in a substantial increase in the duties payable on British goods entering Spain and the abolition of the post of juez conservador, an official responsible for protecting the interests of English merchants in Cadiz, Malaga, Alicante and each Spanish port in which they traded. On account of these errors, therefore, Britain's trading position with Spain and her empire in 1714 was more unfavourable than that existing in 1700 prior to the War of Succession.

These potential flashpoints between England and Spain may have held out a hope from the Jacobite point of view that Anglo-Spanish relations would soon deteriorate to a point at which Philip V would be prepared to assist the Chevalier for political reasons as a means of striking a blow against Britain. This

was by no means certain at the beginning of 1715. Philip had no reason to doubt that Britain would provide the degree of backing he expected for his policy of recreating a Spanish presence in Italy; similarly London had not abandoned attempts at a peaceful solution of its commercial grievances with Spain. After Queen Anne's death (1/12 August 1714) and the succession of George I, with the replacement of a Tory administration by one composed of Whigs, it became a firm objective of British policy to obtain a renegotiation of the commercial treaties with Spain to secure the removal of their most harmful clauses, in order that Anglo-Spanish trade might be restored to what was from a British point of view the beneficial state as had prevailed before 1700. Accordingly, in February 1715 the Whig government sent Paul Methuen as Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain to endeavour to persuade Madrid to accept a renegotiation of the trading agreements between the two countries.

Chapter 1

SPAIN AND THE FIFTEEN

(i) A European-wide approach for support for James brings Spain into the picture.

An initial attempt on the part of the Jacobite leadership to obtain Spanish support for the Chevalier's cause was made in the summer of 1714. The only part of mainland Spain which had not submitted to Bourbon rule by this time was Catalonia. The post of commander of the joint Franco-Spanish expedition to reconquer the province was, with the approval of Louis XIV, given to Berwick, the Chevalier's half brother. On 22 June, the day of his departure for Spain, he wrote to James expressing his intention to solicit Spanish money and troops for use in a future descent upon the British Isles.[1]

It is impossible to tell whether this suggestion had been inspired by a hint from Louis XIV or was the Marshal's own idea, but there is a strong probability that the latter was the case. Louis was hardly likely to approach his grandson, Philip V, on James's behalf when the Jacobite leadership on both sides of the English Channel had no definite plan for a rebellion in the British Isles, as was demonstrated by the movement's failure to take advantage of Anne's death at the beginning of August.[2]

Berwick's suggestion was probably unprompted, an attempt to reassure his half-brother that no potential source of aid would be neglected. The time for an appeal to Philip V (irrespective of whether Berwick actually made one during his stay in Spain from June to November 1714), was, however, quite inappropriate. Philip was chronically short of money, and any spare resources he

possessed needed to be employed in the reduction of Majorca and Ibiza which, after the fall of Barcelona on 7 September, were the only remaining portions of Spanish territory still owing allegiance to the Habsburgs.

After Berwick's return from Spain in November 1714 the Jacobite leadership in Paris decided to begin serious preparations for a rebellion in the British Isles with the help of the Chevalier's sympathisers in England and Scotland, and also with likely Tories, driven into opposition since George I's accession by his employment of Whigs. Through the dowager, Lady Jersey, a Jacobite of long standing who corresponded from Paris with members of fashionable English society on James's behalf, an approach was made to Viscount Bolingbroke, one of the leading Tory politicians in England, asking him to take charge of the Chevalier's affairs in the country and to contact those believed to be sympathetic to the Stuart cause.[3]

The message from James's adherents in England and Scotland (the latter under the leadership of the Earl of Mar) was not encouraging since the consensus of opinion was that the Jacobites were only prepared to rise in conjunction with a pre-arranged landing by James at the head of a substantial force of foreign troops.[4] This alerted Bolingbroke, who as early as September 1714 had been corresponding with the Princess des Ursins and Patrick Lawless, a Jacobite activist in Madrid, in letters passed for security reasons through d'Iberville, the French ambassador in London,[5] to the necessity of obtaining support for the Pretender from foreign governments.[6] Three European powers stood to derive considerable benefit from the overthrow of the Hanoverian

dynasty in Britain and its replacement by the Stuarts. Spain could hope for the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca, France the substitution of a potentially hostile George I by a client king whose entire life had been spent within her sphere of influence, while the removal of George as King of England would be in the interest of Sweden as a means of striking a blow against his position as Elector of Hanover, a declared enemy of Charles XII, and moreover was hoping to use his role as British ruler to employ the Royal Navy to ensure victory for the anti-Swedish coalition of Prussia, Denmark, Russia and Hanover.[7]

The Jacobite leadership on both sides of the channel therefore made a series of loosely co-ordinated approaches to all three governments. Although a Jacobite agent, Sir John Forester, was sent from Paris to the Spanish court in February 1715 with the approval of the Marquis de Torcy, French foreign minister,[8] the conspirators placed their greatest hopes of support upon France and Sweden. Berwick importuned the former with requests for assistance. A series of interviews with Louis and his ministers in February 1715 met with little response since these were understandably reluctant to commit themselves until success seemed assured, but permission was obtained for the clandestine purchase of arms and other initial preparations for an expedition to the British Isles.[9] The approaches to Charles XII were initially handled from England. Jacobite hopes of Swedish help - which d'Iberville wryly called 'le vieux chanson des Jacobites'[10] dated back before 1707.[11] The possibility of obtaining support from Sweden appealed also to the Chevalier's protestant adherents since

they saw in Charles an ideal guarantor of James's position vis-a-vis the Church of England; they hoped in particular that co-operation between the two might help to undo the damage caused by James's refusal to change his religion. In February 1715 three Tories, representing forty Jacobites, approached Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister in London, with an offer to supply Charles with £200,000 in return for his supporting a Stuart restoration. Notwithstanding the scepticism of the Swedish chancellor Müllern, negotiations on this issue between Gyllenborg and the Duke of Ormonde, one of the Chevalier's most influential adherents in England, as representative of the English Jacobites continued [12].

Despite the appearance of a concerted plan to secure foreign assistance for a rebellion in the British Isles in support of James, there was in fact little attempt on the Jacobite side to co-ordinate their approaches to France, Sweden and Spain. Independently of Ormonde's overtures to Sweden, Monteleón, the Spanish ambassador in London, had late in 1714 approached Gyllenborg suggesting that negotiations be opened for an alliance between the two countries.[13] After some reflection, Charles XII and Baron George-Heinrich von Schlitz (known as Görtz), who acted as an adviser and roving plenipotentiary for the Swedish King decided at the beginning of February, 1715 to send Ernest August Vellingk, Charles's chamberlain, as Sweden's envoy to Spain with the objective of negotiating a subsidy treaty between the two countries.[14] The Spanish government for its part proposed to send Toby Bourke, James's representative in Madrid, as envoy extraordinary to Charles XII.[15]

As soon as Berwick heard of this in early March, he tried to link the Spanish approach to Sweden with the Jacobite overtures to Charles XII by proposing to the Chevalier that Bourke should carry an appeal from James to the Swedish King.[16] This suggestion was not taken up, however, largely on account of the delay in Bourke's departure for northern Europe[17] (he finally left Madrid in the middle of June)[18] and the opportunity of the Chevalier making an approach to Charles XII through Bourke was therefore missed.

In June 1715 there took place a series of conferences at the Royal Chateau of Marly under the chairmanship of Berwick to review progress in the preparations for the rebellion[19] and, in particular, to obtain a sufficiently large sum of money to purchase arms for use in the British Isles and to enable the Chevalier's partisans in France and the Low Countries to cross the Channel.

Through the resources of supporters both in England and on the Continent the Jacobite leadership had netted a sizeable amount of money for these purposes. Contributions had begun to arrive the previous year when James Brydges, a former paymaster-general of the British Army, had sent £5,000 to James and £2,000 to Queen Mary via 'Mr. Johnson', alias Roger Kenyon, a Jacobite agent.[20] In 1715 John Talbot Stonor of Stonor House, Oxfordshire had collected a total of £3,490 from anonymous well-wishers.[21] Further donations had followed. The Duke of Marlborough, Berwick's uncle, supplied £4,000;[22] the dowager Lady Petre gave £3,000 in three instalments;[23] the 'D of N' (probably the Duke of Norfolk, a Roman Catholic) £12,000; Sir John Webb of Hatheron Manor in Gloucestershire (whose daughter Mary had

BIBLIOTECA NACIONAL MADRID

recently married Berwick's nephew Lord Waldegrave) provided £500,[24] and a 'Mr. Smith' sent the same amount via a Benedictine monk, Thomas Southcoat.[25] This sum of £20,490 raised by Jacobite supporters in England was augmented by donations from exiles and sympathisers on the continent: 2,500 livres (£200) from Sir George Skiddy, 8,000 livres (£650) from both Robert Gordon in Bordeaux and Mr. (Thomas*) Arbuthnot in Rouen. Contributions had also been received from sympathetic Catholic rulers: 25,717½ louis d'or (£25,700) were supplied by James's host, the Duke of Lorraine, and Pope Clement XI, who had given the Jacobite cause 49,344 livres (£4,000) in March 1714 followed this with two more donations, 35,483 livres (£3,000) on 3 February 1715 and 106,481 (£9,000) on 24 May. The total value of these donations to the Jacobite cause came to 763,963 livres in French currency (approximately £64,000 in sterling).[26]

This was insufficient for the rebels' needs. Here Louis XIV's government stepped in: Antoine Crozat, a wealthy French banker, had offered to advance 100,000 crowns (écus) to the Jacobite cause in return for the promise of a title from James provided the loan was guaranteed by Louis XIV: this, despite France's continued refusal to supply money direct to the Chevalier, Torcy was prepared to do.[27] Aware of his half-brother's financial dilemma, Berwick expressed a hope at Marly that Spain might make more contribution towards the expenses of the planned rebellion[28] although even at such a late stage assistance from this quarter was not regarded as a serious possibility by the Jacobite leadership.

* Although this man's christian name was not stated he was probably Thomas Arbuthnot, a Jacobite sympathiser living in Rouen.

A further item under discussion at Marly was the question of the use of foreign troops in the enterprise which the Jacobite leadership hoped to obtain from Sweden. The forces they had in mind were those stationed at Gothenburg under the command of General Hugo Hamilton, a Scotsman in Swedish service,[29] which were being held in readiness to assist in the defence of Stralsund along with its neighbouring island of Rügen, Sweden's last outpost off the North German coast, which were being besieged by a coalition of Danes, Prussians and Saxons. Notwithstanding the fact that the Swedish troops could be of greater and more immediate use to Charles XII than to James, the Jacobites hoped that they could be diverted to the British Isles and land in the area of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.[30] On 7 July, Berwick saw Baron Erik Sparre, Sweden's ambassador to France, who thought, mistakenly as it turned out, that his master might be prepared to allow the Swedish army's use in an invasion of the British Isles in return for an acceptable sum of money. James was advised to write personally to Charles XII in this vein while Berwick with Torcy's approval proposed that half of Crozet's loan be remitted to Sweden.[31] This was duly done before clarification of Charles's attitude had been received, and the money was conveyed to the Hague by a Swedish Lieutenant Colonel named Grubbe on the first stage of its journey to the Baltic.[32] The Jacobites failed to realise that their hopes of support from Sweden were unfounded. James's Catholicism was to prove a decisive obstacle to Charles's assisting the Jacobite cause, and despite the optimism of Berwick, Sparre and Bolingbroke, since July the Chevalier's chief adviser or 'Secretary of State', the

Swedish King firmly adhered to a policy of non-intervention towards James, and subsequently returned the 50,000 crowns.[33]

By the summer of 1715 these attempts by the Jacobite leadership to obtain assistance from France and Sweden had not yet been successful. Despite this, no serious approach was made to Spain. In June Berwick expressed a hope that Philip V might make some contribution towards the expenses of the projected rebellion within the British Isles,[34] but even at this comparatively late stage in the preparations for the uprising, Spanish assistance was not regarded as a serious possibility in leading Jacobite circles.

This failure to approach Spain may have had one particularly serious consecuence in British domestic terms for the forthcoming rising. In order to consolidate the Hanoverian regime's position against the Jacobite threat, the Whig-government had since the beginning of 1715 adopted the strategy of politically discrediting those who were suspected of being the most senior Jacobites in England, thereby (it was hoped) demoralising James's supporters throughout Britain. In March 1715 Bolingbroke, threatened by impeachment, fled to France.[35] The Whig administration hoped that the other two public figures who were under a similar threat, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, Bolingbroke's political rival,[36] and Ormonde, would do likewise. Oxford refused to be intimidated into flight and was therefore committed to the Tower in July. On account of Ormonde's widespread popularity,[37] George I's government was reluctant to move against the Duke in this way: instead, the Whig Ministry aimed at putting pressure on him to flee the

country, thereby demonstrating his guilt and at the same time depriving the English Jacobites of one of the key figures in the planned rebellion.

The British government's choice of intermediary with Ormonde was the Spanish ambassador, Monteleón, a close friend of the Duke. In July James Stanhope and Viscount Townshend, Secretaries of State for the Southern and Northern Departments respectively, approached Monteleón suggesting that he pass the message to Ormonde that if he wrote a letter of submission to George I and then retired to the continent, no further action would be taken against him.[38] The Whig Ministry appear to have believed that the Spanish ambassador was ignorant of the attempts to obtain foreign support, financial and military, for the Jacobite rebellion[39] and would therefore pass Stanhope's message to Ormonde who (the British ministers expected) would regard Monteleón's role as intermediary as an indication that no Spanish or French assistance would be forthcoming. This belief was not entirely correct. On account of Monteleón's friendship with Ormonde and his discussions concerning an alliance between Spain and Sweden, the Spanish ambassador must have possessed some knowledge of what was being planned in pro-Stuart circles to obtain foreign support for the forthcoming attempt to overthrow the Hanoverian regime. In the summer of 1715, however, the Jacobite leadership on both sides of the Channel had made no serious approach to Spain, and as a result there was no reason for Monteleón - who had little cause to believe that Philip V might play a substantial part in backing the attempt to restore James - to demur when asked to play the role of intermediary

between the Whig administration and Ormonde. Had the Spanish ambassador realised the true purpose behind Stanhope's overture - to destroy the Duke's standing in England and wreck the planned Jacobite rising - he would scarcely have acted as the British government's tool in this way.[40]

In the event the Whig Ministry's message to Ormonde passed through Monteleón proved the final straw for the Duke: on 20/31 July (the day on which detailed information about the Jacobite plan of campaign reached London from the Earl of Stair, British ambassador in Paris[41]) he fled to France. Ormonde's flight at a critically late stage in the run up to the rebellion (due now to begin in mid-September) dealt a serious and possibly fatal blow to the planned rising. The Duke had failed to give any advance warning of his departure and the burden of command fell upon his brother, the Earl of Arran, Lord Lansdowne and Sir William Wyndham, the M.P. for Somerset and protégé of Bolingbroke, all minor figures who were in ignorance of both the extent of the Jacobite conspiracy and even of their own allotted roles in it.

ii. The first serious approach to Spain: Louis XIV's initiative

On 7 August, Ormonde arrived in Paris.[42] There he saw Torcy who transmitted a request to Louis XIV for three thousand troops, arms for twelve thousand more and £100,000 sterling. Louis refused the request for troops outright, but promised to supply arms for twenty thousand and the vessels to transport these across the channel with the maximum secrecy so that his action could be disavowed if necessary.[43] The request for money likewise drew a negative response. Louis, however, saw a

solution which would provide the Jacobites with financial support while ensuring that France avoided the risk of war with Britain associated with any direct French involvement in the preparations for a rebellion against George I. He proposed to write to his grandson, Philip V, requesting Spain to supply a sum of money to the Jacobite cause.[44]

On 11 August Torcy, accompanied by Berwick, approached the Prince of Cellamare, Spanish ambassador to France, with this proposition.[45]

The discussion opened auspiciously enough from the Jacobite viewpoint with Cellamare expressing Spain's fears that the British government were tacitly supporting attempts by the Emperor to obtain Sicily from Victor Amadeus along with Parma and Tuscany to the detriment of what Philip V regarded as his wife's legitimate claims.[46] This provided Torcy with an opening to broach the possibility that Spain might financially support an uprising by the Chevalier's supporters within the British Isles. He suggested to Cellamare that the best means of depriving Charles VI of Britain's backing for Habsburg expansion in Italy lay in both France and Spain encouraging and supporting the proposed Jacobite rebellion which, by forcing George I's government to concentrate on internal matters, would at the very least deprive it of the ability to play a role in European affairs.[47] When Cellamare concurred,[48] Torcy went on to propose that the only way to get the planned Jacobite rising off the ground was for Spain to make an outright donation of a large sum of money - estimated by Berwick as 400,000 crowns (écus)[49] at current exchange rates roughly the equivalent of the £100,000 requested

by Ormonde - to enable James's partisans in the British Isles and on the continent to take up arms in his cause.[50]

Although Louis was determined to avoid any direct French involvement in this scheme to enlist Financial support for the proposed Jacobite rebellion, he did not want his refusal to make a direct contribution to become known to James's adherents lest this result in a collapse of their morale. Thus the story was spread among the Chevalier's supporters in Paris that on account of France's financial exhaustion which allegedly precluded a direct donation by Louis, he intended to request Philip V merely to loan the money in question to the Jacobites and be repaid by France at a later date.[51] Louis also realised that he would have to offer his grandson some form of political inducement to contribute to Jacobite finances. In return for Spain providing the money, Louis was prepared to promise French recognition and diplomatic support for the Spanish claim to Naples and Sicily and that of Elisabeth to Parma and Tuscany.[52]

Cellamare immediately took this up. In view of the importance placed by the French government upon Spain's proposed contribution to the rebellion,[53] he suggested a secret offensive and defensive alliance between Philip, Louis and James in support of Spain's Italian claims. Berwick well nigh jumped at the proposal, stating that the Chevalier could refuse nothing in return for such generosity on Philip's part.[54] Torcy, on the other hand, displayed a marked lack of enthusiasm for any commitment however secret on the part of France which, besides delaying the start of the planned rebellion, could if discovered lead to France's becoming involved in a new European War. He therefore refused to go beyond Louis' offer of diplomatic support

for Spanish policy in the Italian peninsula.[55] Cellamare observed that this attitude on the part of the French government did not preclude a dual alliance between Philip and James which could be highly beneficial to the interests of the former, since he envisaged that Louis would adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Jacobite rebellion.[56] Berwick proposed that Spain should be asked to supply the insurgents with arms shipped direct from a port on the Cantabrian coast to Britain. Cellamare deemed this suggestion totally impracticable owing to the risk of its provoking a complete breach between Spain and England.[57] Notwithstanding his objections, however, it was appended to the letter written by Louis XIV to Philip V containing the request to provide the Jacobites with money.[58]

Louis' letter was sent to Madrid along with Cellamare's dispatch to Grimaldo on 12 August,[59] accompanied by others from Torcy and Berwick supporting the request for a sizeable Spanish financial contribution to the forthcoming Jacobite rebellion.[60]

Cellamare, Torcy and Berwick were aware of the need to preserve the maximum secrecy in the matter of the approach to Spain. The decision was therefore taken to conduct negotiations on the issue solely in Paris. Torcy promised that the Duke of Saint Aignan, the French ambassador in Madrid, would be kept in ignorance of Louis' request to Philip.[61]

It was also suggested to Cellamare that the safest method of sending the money to France for disposal by the Jacobite leadership (if Philip gave an affirmative answer) was to dispatch it in several small instalments,[62] in the hope (presumably) that

this would be the way most likely to confuse Lord Stair, the British ambassador in Paris, whose network of informers had substantially penetrated the ranks of James's supporters from Saint-Germain downwards.[63] Secrecy was enjoined also on the Chevalier at Bar. Although he was kept fully informed of the negotiations with Cellamare in Paris, the approach to Spain was out of his hands and James felt constrained to ask Bolingbroke's permission whether he should mention the matter in a letter to Philip V.[64]

iii. The initial Spanish plan for financial support and alliance with James III

Cellamare's account of France's proposition that Spain should financially assist the forthcoming rebellion in support of the Catholic Stuart cause along with the enclosed letters from Louis, Torcy and Berwick[65] reached Madrid at six in the evening on 20 August. Grimaldo, the Spanish minister for foreign affairs, informed Cellamare of Philip's affirmative reply to the French request to provide the Jacobites with money in a letter of 21 August. Philip promised to supply James with 400,000 pesos (crowns)* in return for a tripartite offensive and defensive alliance between France, Spain and the Chevalier to support Spanish claims in the Italian peninsula: if the French government was prepared to offer diplomatic but not military help, Cellamare was to press ahead with a dual offensive and defensive alliance between Philip and James.[66]

Spain's contribution towards the Jacobite rebellion would therefore be solely financial and, as Cellamare had predicted, Berwick's request for arms was turned down.[67]

* £100,000

With all due speed, Grimaldo's letter containing the news of Philip V's affirmative response to Louis' proposal was dispatched from Madrid at midnight on 21 August,[68] reaching Cellamare at Versailles at noon on Friday, 30 August.[69]

The speed of the Spanish decision indicated that the request to support the Jacobite rebellion may not have been totally unexpected in Madrid. The representations made by Berwick and Lawless, who after Bourke's departure to Charles XII became James's representative in the Spanish capital, had not passed unnoticed, and Louis XIV's offer of recognition and diplomatic support for Spain's Italian claims had finally persuaded the Spaniards to assist the Chevalier. By what was for Spain a stroke of luck, the need to decide whether to provide a subsidy for the Jacobite rebellion coincided with a change in Britain's diplomatic representation in Madrid. This seemed to offer a chance that Philip's decision might escape the attention of George I's government. The retiring British ambassador, Paul Methuen, was excluded from court while the issue was under discussion by the simple expedient of having his final audience with Philip postponed (it finally took place on 26 August,[70] several days after the decision to back the Chevalier had been taken) his replacement, George Bubb, was young (twenty-four years of age) and, it may have seemed to the Spaniards, inexperienced.[71]

The form of Philip's contribution to the forthcoming Jacobite attempt to overthrow George I was given considerable thought. Initially the Spanish government favoured sending this entirely in gold specie, since the alternative methods of transferring

money from Spain to France, either as silver bullion or bills of exchange, seemed to pose too great a threat to the secrecy so essential to the project.[72] Philip personally preferred to send the 400,000 pesos in a combination of bills of exchange and gold specie, and after consideration it was decided to do this.[73]

On 26 August Grimaldo informed Cellamare that the Bishop of Cadiz, secretary to the Hacienda (Finance Department). was sending bills worth 9,000 doblones (£6,000) in what was described as the initial instalment of Spain's contribution to the Jacobite rebellion by the same post.[74] The Bishop of Cadiz in his turn authorised Cellamare to supply the Jacobites with a sum of 100,000 pesos≠ [75] stored in Paris,## [76] hitherto intended as a

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≠ £25,000

This had come from a consignment of gold and silver bars and coinage with a total value of 134,000 pesos (£34,000) which arrived from Spanish America at St. Malo in June 1715. The gold had a current value of 61,187 pesos 4 reales (£15,000), the silver (in 15 bars) 22,812 pesos 4 reales (£5,800). These had been sent by the acting viceroy of Peru, the Archbishop of Charcas, under the care of his chaplain, Juan de la Peña along with 50,000 pesos (£12,500) in coin from the presidente (Governor) of Chile, Juan Andrés de Uztariz, with Francisco Seco, provincial of the Chilean Franciscans, as custodian. From the amount in coinage were deducted 2260 pesos (£550) for the captain of the ship bringing the money and bullion from Puerto de la Concepcion in Chile to St. Malo, and a further 340 pesos for the cost of conveying it overland to Paris where it arrived on 19 August. The remainder was handed over to Antoine Boucher whom Cellamare described as paymaster to the city of Paris (Pagador de rentas de la Casa de la Ciudad de Paris) On 24 August he was paid 31,000 pesos £8,000) for the purchase and subsequent storage of items from the furniture collection of the late Dauphin, Philip V's father, on behalf of Gaspar Hersan, master of the wardrobe at the Spanish court, while the remainder of the money (100,400 pesos - the gold and silver untouched plus the remaining coinage) was left in Boucher's custody.

payment by Philip V to his uncle Maximilian Emanuel, the Elector of Bavaria,[77] who as a result of Madrid's decision to supply this to the Stuart cause would be compelled to await payment of the money expected from Spain.

The decision to supply James with 400,000 pesos in several instalments of bills of exchange and specie, a somewhat slow process, was not wholly consistem with what Grimaldo described as Philip V's declared intention to dispatch the money to the Jacobites in one amount as soon as possible.* [78] This apparent discrepancy between Philip V's instructions and the words of his foreign minister arose in part from the need to preserve secrecy (and, possibly, Spain's inability to supply so large a sum immediately). It also indicated that the Spanish government wanted to see how events progressed before the Jacobite leadership received the full amount of Spain's financial contribution. At the crux of the Spanish decision to assist James lay the proposal for an offensive and defensive alliance in support of Spain's Italian policy, either triple or, if France baulked at providing military assistance, dual between Philip V and the Chevalier. The government in Madrid were under the impression that the Jacobite leadership had a definite plan of campaign for the rebellion well in hand and, most importantly, were assured of support from France. Neither of these was the case. The Spaniards did not realise that the other two parties to the scheme for assisting James, the French government and the Jacobite leadership, saw Spain's proposed contribution to the rebellion in

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* prontamente y de una vez.

a different light. To Paris the appeal to Philip was viewed as a vitally important escape route, an attempt to find sufficient money to launch the insurrection with the minimum involvement on France's own part. The Jacobite high command (whose membership had failed to reveal the full extent of the dissaray of their plan of campaign to Torcy and Cellamare) saw in the Spanish money their last hope of achieving success,[79] and were therefore resolved to promise anything to obtain finance as quickly as possible. Philip on his part was determined to insist upon a precise commitment of an offensive and defensive alliance with James before one peso was handed over.

The price Spain demanded of James in return for financially supporting the Jacobite rebellion was only vaguely referred to in Cellamare's initial instructions of 21 August: these merely specified the need to secure the Chevalier's support for the recovery of the Italian territories claimed by Spain and for Elisabeth's claims to Parma and Tuscany, while the Spanish ambassador was told to use his judgement as to what might be reasonable for inclusion among the remaining articles.[80]

Bolingbroke, who was not directly involved in the negotiations with Cellamare and had therefore to receive information of what took place from Berwick, James's representative in these, feared that the Chevalier might be tempted to make concessions to Spain, such as the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca, which might prove damaging to his cause in the eyes of his English adherents.[81] This fear was understandable. As soon as Cellamare informed Berwick (on 1 September) of Philip V's insistence on an alliance with James before supplying the Jacobites with money,

the Marshal resolved to ask for the necessary powers from his half brother in order that this might be concluded at the earliest opportunity.[87] Berwick, being a naturalised Frenchman, may have possessed little sensitivity for English susceptibilities, and as a result might have been prepared to commit the Chevalier to restoring Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain.[83]

Bolingbroke need not have worried about this particular point, however, since it was not mentioned in the draft of a treaty between Philip V and James III put forward by Spain which Grimaldo sent to Cellamare on 16 September.[84]

The Spaniards were chiefly concerned with obtaining James's agreement to support their Italian policy, and the offensive and defensive alliance with the Chevalier previously referred to with this as its objective was one of only two points insisted on by Spain.[85] The other price which Madrid intended to exact from James in return for supporting the rebellion was an undertaking to restore the Catholic religion in Ireland and subsequently in the rest of the kingdom.[86] The inclusion of this point illustrates the importance in Spain's eyes of the religious issue in inclining Philip V to the Jacobite cause yet also a total unawareness on Madrid's part of the impracticability of such a step. Even if James had merely tried to legalise the Catholic religion (and the condition laid down by Spain did not specify that Catholicism would have to become the established Church), this would have had a disastrous effect within a domestic British political context. Fortunately for James, perhaps, the question of

a treaty with Philip V in 1715 was a secret from its inception, and on account of Spain's rapidly changing relations with France on the one hand and Britain on the other, the project was destined never to materialise.

iv. Backpedalling

No sooner had the news of the Spanish decision to provide financial support for the Jacobite rebellion reached Cellamare at Versailles on 30 August,[87] than a process of events began which caused the Spanish diplomat himself and subsequently the government in Madrid (who relied on Cellamare's reports for first hand information as to the prospects of success for the forthcoming rebellion) to backpedal on Spain's commitment to the cause of James III.

After receiving news of Philip's affirmative response, Cellamare's first task had been to ascertain the French attitude to the conditions laid down by Madrid to determine whether the offensive and defensive alliance upon which the Spanish king was so insistent should be triple involving the participation of France, or dual between Philip and James.[88] Before this could be done the design suffered a serious blow with the death of Louis XIV on 1 September before he had given any precise commitment to support the Jacobite rebellion. Louis' heir was his great grandson (also named Louis), a child of five, and during the minority effective political power in France would be held by the Regent who, should the sickly Louis XV die without issue, would be the next in line to the throne. Although Philip V as the new

king's uncle possessed the best claim to be Regent, he was legally barred by his renunciations of 1700 and 1712, and accordingly the office went to the Duke of Orléans, nephew of the deceased king. This arrangement did not suit Philip V for two reasons. He had never regarded his renunciations as binding and still cherished the hope of eventually succeeding to the throne of France even if this necessitated his forsaking that of Spain. His other dissatisfaction arose from the long standing animosity between himself and Orléans, arising from an incident in 1708 during the War of the Spanish Succession in which the latter's conduct in approaching the British with a proposal that he might replace Philip as the Bourbon candidate for the Spanish throne had lain him open to suspicion of treachery.[89] When Cellamare was appointed ambassador to France in May 1715 his instructions had enjoined him to work among the French aristocracy for the creation of a party favourable to Philip's interests against those of Orleans. He had, moreover, been instructed by Madrid to make a formal protest at the terms of Louis' will if these seemed unfavourable to the interests of the Spanish king.[90] Against this inauspicious background Cellamare had to ascertain the attitude of the new French administration towards co-operating with Spain in James's support in the manner envisaged by Philip V.[91]

On 1 September, the day of Louis' death, the Spanish ambassador communicated Spain's decision to Torcy (who, significantly, displayed a marked lack of enthusiasm for the project in the changed circumstances)[92] and Berwick.[93]

The manner in which Cellamare presented Madrid's plan for assisting the Stuart cause demonstrated his realisation of the potential threat to the possibility of joint Franco-Spanish co-operation in James's support caused by Louis' demise. Although he assured Berwick that the money promised by Spain would be supplied, Cellamare pointed out that the receipt of this by the Jacobite high command in Paris was dependent on two contingencies: the precise commitment from the Stuart court required by Philip V (the offensive and defensive alliance) and what Cellamare described to Berwick as 'the difficultys of the bankers'.[94] The latter condition was a fabrication on Cellamare's part intended to allow a clearer picture to emerge from the confused position in France after Louis' death before Spain parted with any of the money intended for James. Since a portion of the Spanish donation to the Jacobite cause - the 100,000 pesos previously intended for Maximilian Emanuel - was already in Paris, there should not have been any undue delay in the receipt of this by a representative of the Chevalier once an alliance between Philip and James had been concluded. Cellamare's evasion indicated that in the wake of Louis' demise he anticipated that the Orléans administration might not be so ready as its predecessor to collaborate with Madrid in supporting the forthcoming Jacobite rebellion in Britain.

One of these difficulties in the way of Franco-Spanish collaboration, the antagonism between Orléans and Philip V, became more acute during the first week of September 1715. On the 2nd of the month, Orléans obtained the consent of the Paris Parlement to a virtual overthrow of the terms of Louis XIV's will

(which had put in a Regency Council to rule alongside Orléans himself) and his own installation as sole regent with the powers of king. Cellamare had, moreover, been so intimidated by this coup that he did not even dare make a timid protest at the course of events.[95] The struggle between Philip V and Orléans had become a serious factor in Franco-Spanish relations, and for some time this was to put a stop to any effective joint co-operation in support of James.

Despite this cloud on the horizon, Cellamare believed that Spain's project for assisting the Chevalier (henceforth known in Spanish diplomatic correspondence by the code name of dependencia reservada*) still stood a chance of success. It would (he told Grimaldo on 2 September) be highly regrettable if the omens for the Jacobite rebellion appeared auspicious, and yet it were to fail for lack of the money promised by Spain.[96]

Cellamare therefore proposed that the Spanish government continue to remit the instalments of the 400,000 pesos already promised to Paris to be kept in his custody along with the 100,000 pesos hitherto earmarked for the Elector of Bavaria, and that these sums should be handed over to the Jacobites once the French Regent exhibited an attitude which Spain deemed in keeping with the spirit of collaboration between Paris and Madrid as envisaged by Louis XIV.[97]

The deterioration in Franco-Spanish relations in the wake of Orléans' accession to power[98] was not the only factor tending to delay Spain's scheme for financially supporting the Jacobite rebellion. In his haste to dispatch money to Cellamare the Bishop of Cadiz had on 26 August sent bills of exchange for

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* literally 'secret dependency'.

3,000 doblones (not the 9,000 referred to by Grimaldo) which could only be exchanged by London bankers.[99] The task of converting these in the British capital and handing over the cash to Jacobites in such close proximity to George I's government involved an unacceptable degree of risk. Cellamare had therefore to ask Monteleón to have them converted into bills exchangeable with French bankers and then returned to Paris.[100] The delay caused by this was not altogether unwelcome to Cellamare in view of his determination not to supply the Chevalier with any money until Spain had received both a definite commitment from James and, more important, an assurance of at least tacit support from France which at this stage seemed unlikely.[101]

For the Stuart court and its advisers the matter was far more serious. On 26 August/6 September Mar, seeing that a rebellion in the West Country as planned by the Jacobite leadership was impossible on account of the disarray caused by the British government's discovery of the overall strategy for the rising,[102] raised the Chevalier's standard at Braemar. The Jacobite rebellion popularly known as the Fifteen had begun, and there could be no going back whether Philip V supplied the Stuart cause with money or not.

Before the news from Scotland reached Paris, Cellamare had supplied Madrid with a realistic assessment of the effect of Louis' death upon the Jacobite plan for a rebellion. On 16 September he wrote to Grimaldo advising that no money should be expended on the Stuart cause until the participation of France was confirmed.[103] This conclusion, evidence that Cellamare was

advocating a policy of disengagement from the dependencia reservada as previously conceived, arose partly from his realisation that owing to James's meagre resources, the proposed rising in the British Isles stood virtually no chance of success without French support. Cellamare's main concern lay, however, with the effect of France's attitude to the rebellion upon the role previously allotted to Spain. While Louis XIV had lived, the Spanish government had been assured of at least benevolent neutrality from France even if she had refused to give a commitment of military support to Spain and had therefore not joined the tripartite alliance proposed by Cellamare. The Spanish ambassador feared that the new French government's attitude towards the Chevalier would be less favourable than that of its predecessor on account of Orléans' tendency to seek a rapprochement with George I to counteract the challenge to his position emanating from Philip V. Cellamare therefore advised his government to freeze their plan for financially assisting the Jacobite rebellion until Spain was assured of a favourable attitude on the part of the French Regent.[104]

Cellamare's failure to produce any of the money promised by Philip V to the Chevalier was causing considerable frustration in Jacobite circles, and from mid-September onwards the Spanish ambassador was subjected to sustained pressure from the Stuart court and its supporters in Paris to release Spain's financial contribution to the rebellion. The first approach came from Berwick on 19 September.[105] The message he brought was discouraging. Orléans had told him in guarded terms (and Queen Mary outright) that they could only count on whatever

French assistance had been definitely promised by Louis XIV before his death.[106]

Since the late king had been careful to avoid any precise commitment to the Jacobites, the disarray among their leadership was understandable. Berwick therefore proposed to Cellamare that Philip V assume the role of sole foreign backer of the enterprise and hand over the money hitherto promised.[107]

This approach, containing a disquieting disclosure about the attitude of Orléans, was counter productive from the Jacobite point of view since it was likely to reinforce Cellamare's determination to call a halt to the policy of financially supporting the Stuart cause. The Spanish ambassador therefore firmly rejected Berwick's suggestion, pointing out that the news of Orléans' lukewarmness if true, had completely changed the nature of Spain's role in the conspiracy as envisaged by the Spaniards themselves, and he would have to await instructions from Madrid before embarking on any new course of action.[108] Berwick, undaunted, saw the position solely from the Jacobite point of view and asked if he might receive the portion of the Spanish subsidy which was (correctly)* rumoured to be in Paris while the Jacobites collected the remainder in Bilbao. Cellamare's answer was firmly in the negative (and he gave Mary a similar reply the following Sunday), although to soften the blow he ended the interview with Berwick somewhat unwisely by confirming that his government still intended to support the rebellion once the

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* i.e. the 100,000 pesos previously intended for Maximilian Emanuel

current uncertainty involving Orleans' attitude had been overcome, and Madrid's contribution would be sent to the French capital following the receipt of satisfactory assurances from the Regent.[109]

The Jacobite high command in Paris did not let up their pressure to persuade Spain to hand over the subsidy. In an interview with Bolingbroke on or before 21 September, Cellamare attributed the delay to the fact that his orders forbade him to distribute the money without the Regent's consent, a tacit admission that this was not forthcoming.[110] To gain time he offered to write to Madrid requesting a revocation of these orders and, perhaps inspired by Berwick's offer to collect the money in Bilbao, to suggest that this be conveyed to a port in northern Spain such as Pasajes (near San Sebastian) to be sent direct to the British Isles from there.[111] Coming immediately after Bolingbroke had received the news that Charles XII had refused the use of Swedish troops this was too much for James's Secretary of State who, exasperated at Cellamare's prevarication, wrote to the Chevalier: 'I expected at last some evasion or other and this is as gross an one as could be fallen upon'.[112] Bolingbroke's political flair did not, however, desert him at this critical juncture and Cellamare's suggestion that the money might be conveyed direct to Britain from Spain gave him an idea. A ship was ready at Le Havre to take James to Scotland, and Bolingbroke proposed that instead it should sail immediately to a port in Spain while James proceeded overland from Bar to a pre-arranged rendezvous on the northern Spanish coast, collect the money and then sail direct to join Mar.[113]

This scheme would serve as a test of the Spaniards' good faith. If Cellamare was honest about the cause of delay and his government still intended to supply the money, it could be collected at Pasajes or whatever place was chosen (thereby removing the need to obtain Orléans' approval) and then be conveyed to where it was most needed. However, if, as Bolingbroke suspected, the Spanish government wished to avoid their commitment now that a question mark was posed over French participation, the threat of James's presence in Spain to publicise Philip's involvement in the plot to the British government might induce Madrid to supply sorely needed financial succour. Either way this seemed to offer the best means of turning Cellamare's verbal assurances of support into something more concrete.

James's reply was surprisingly sanguine. He expressed his general disillusionment about foreign offers of assistance and was mainly concerned with joining the Jacobites in Britain at the earliest opportunity. He accepted Bolingbroke's proposal to go to Spain provided that a definite rendezvous could be arranged with the Spanish government, but unlike his Secretary of State, he was not at that stage prepared to present the Spaniards with a fait accompli: he would only venture south of the Pyrenees with Philip's approval.[114]

These Jacobite attempts to put pressure on Cellamare to provide the money promised by Spain failed conspicuously to have the desired effect. On 23 September he wrote to Grimaldo urgently seeking fresh instructions as to the course of action to pursue in these changed circumstances.[115]

The Spanish ambassador made little attempt to disguise his view that the best course open to Philip V was to revoke Spain's initial plan for financial support and alliance with James III, stressing his apprehension that Madrid should become still further involved in what was becoming a hopeless enterprise.[116] Cellamare was worried about the full extent of what Mary and Berwick had revealed to the Regent concerning Spain's involvement in the plot, fearing that, if the reports of Orléans' partiality towards the government in London were true, the dependencia reservada (if communicated to the British government) could be construed as a warlike act. To clarify the position Cellamare decided to make a direct approach to the Regent, preparing to remind him that the initial request for Spain to participate in the preparations for the Jacobite rebellion had come from France.[117] In the meantime the Spanish diplomat resolved to keep up his determination not to hand over any of the money to the Jacobite leadership until the receipt of fresh instructions from Madrid.

Cellamare's interview with Orléans, the first since the Regent's accession at which the Spanish ambassador had discussed the problem of support for James, took place on the morning of Sunday, 29 September.[118] Orléans revealed that he had received evidence of George I's desire for a firm and lasting peace with both France and Spain, and as a proof of this he believed that Stanhope had communicated a similar message to Monteleon, hinting at the Whig government's desire for a speedy solution of the commercial grievances at issue between the two countries. The Regent then went on to stress the benefits which would

accrue to both France and Spain from a long period of peace with Britain and he stated his belief that in these circumstances it would be folly to open hostilities with George I using the Pretender as a proxy; if the Hanoverian regime exhibited any signs of hostility towards France and Spain in the future both governments could reserve the right to support and encourage future Jacobite conspiracies. In the light of these considerations Orléans counselled that the Spanish offer of assistance for the Fifteen ought to be suspended for the time being. He considered, however, that James should not be informed of the reasons behind the change of attitude in order that his trust in the word of the rulers of France and Spain might not be dissipated.[119] This said, the Regent ended the interview by assuring Cellamare of his continued support for Spanish policy in Italy. The ambassador was not too happy at the idea that France and Spain should forsake the Chevalier, even temporarily, but he realised that the plan for supporting the Jacobite rebellion as interpreted by his government would have to be drastically altered if not stopped altogether since, if Philip decided to keep his word and assist James, he would be acting on his own and could expect no co-operation from France.[120]

To the Spanish government the course of events in Paris was disquieting and called for quick action to retrieve the situation before Madrid drifted into a position of being the sole backer of the Fifteen and ran the attendant risk of a rupture with Britain. Further confirmation of Spain's trend away from support for the Stuart cause came from Monteleón who was ignorant of the role which his government had been asked to play in financially

supporting the Jacobite rebellion. In early September he reported the existence of 'false' rumours to the effect that Spain was assisting the Pretender along with a warning from unidentified sources that, following the death of Louis XIV, London had determined upon a policy of conciliation with Paris while allowing relations with Madrid to worsen to the point at which hostilities between England and Spain were inevitable.[121] Monteleón, unaware of the deep suspicion still existing between Britain and France,[122] disbelieved Stanhope's assurances of George I's belief in Philip V's desire for good relations.[123] He accepted without question the accuracy of these and other reports of the supposed British hostility towards Spain, and informed Madrid that not only were Stanhope's assurances meaningless but that the British government intended to seek a pretext for reopening hostilities with Spain in order to execute a scheme for an expedition against Havana first mooted during the war of Succession.[124]

This pressure on Spain to move towards some form of rapprochement with George I had its effect in Madrid. The main driving force behind the subsequent change in Spanish policy towards Britain was Alberoni. Although possessing no official position in Spain other than that of Parmesan envoy he had, owing to the support of Elisabeth Farnese, become extremely influential. Unlike many of his contemporaries Alberoni had no illusions as to James's chances of success in a rebellion. After a meeting with the Chevalier in 1708 he had summed up the latter's position with the cryptic comment "Un Re senza trono e como un droghiere senza succhero'.[125] This did not mean that Alberoni had no intention

of ever exploiting the Jacobite cause, and events were to show that he was prepared to use it against Britain. This eventuality had not, however, occurred in 1715, and he correctly reasoned that the Jacobite scheme for a rebellion had to face too many obstacles to stand any chance of success - shortage of money and supplies, poor leadership, an absence of adequate forward planning, internal feuding and finally despair in the Jacobite camp at Louis XIV's death since the Chevalier's partisans had hoped that he would authorise French participation in the proceedings.

Alberoni, under pressure from the Duke of Parma,[126] had come to the belief that Spanish and Parmesan interests could best be served by seeking a rapprochment rather than a confrontation with Britain. As far as London was concerned, the chief obstacle in the path of an improved relationship between England and Spain lay in the outstanding commercial grievances. The Asiento and Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaties of 1713-14 had failed to restore commerce between the two countries to the mutually beneficial state prevailing before 1700, and to Alberoni it therefore seemed sound policy to conciliate George I's administration by offering to smooth out these differences and in return hope for British support or at least benevolent neutrality in Spanish designs directed against the Imperial presence in Italy. This view was not widely accepted in Spain since it ran contrary to the thesis that held Britain responsible for Spanish losses at Utrecht. In 1715 Alberoni was not in a position to adapt Spain's policy to fit his design having to contend with the influence of Cardinal del Giudice who, as Inquisitor-General and Philip's chief minister,

adhered to the consensus that Spain should employ her resources against Britain and continued to have a considerable influence over foreign policy. In his conflict with this view,however,Alberoni was assured of the Queen's backing. On the night of 30 September he made the first approach to Bubb through an intermediary, Ripperda, a Dutch agent and subsequently the Republic's ambassador in Madrid, for a peaceful solution of the commercial differences between the two nations.[127]

The approach from Alberoni brought great relief to the British ambassador. He and his government had feared that Spain would take advantage of the Jacobite rebellion to mount some manifestation of her hostility towards Britain,although he was not sure as to the form this might take. Bubb's estimate of the Spanish government's meagre financial resources[128] led him (as it had his predecessor, Methuen) to believe that Madrid would mount indirect action against George I,possibly the harrassment of the British merchant community in Spain[129] .Other Britons in the country feared that Philip V might exploit the opportunity provided by the Jacobite rebellion to launch an attack on Gibraltar[130] .Insofar as the Whig Ministry and its diplomatic representatives in Spain feared any Spanish contribution to the Fifteen,this was expected to take the form of permission being given for troops from the Irish contingent in Philip V's army to serve under the Chevalier[131] rather than financial backing for the rebellion itself,

although Bubb doubted whether Madrid possessed either the will or the means to participate in a military offensive against Britain, however indirectly[132]. Alberoni's offer of a peaceful solution of the commercial grievances felt by London thus came as a great relief to Bubb, although he did not overlook the possibility that men and arms might be shipped to the Jacobite rebels from Spanish territory[133].

Alberoni's overture to Bubb indicated that Philip V was veering away from the previous decision to assist the Jacobite rebellion, at least for the time being. If, however, Spain did decide to pursue her involvement with James, this would be well camouflaged by the negotiations between Bubb and Alberoni for a revised Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty.[134]

In accordance with this anti-Stuart shift in Spanish policy, on 7 October Grimaldo dispatched fresh instructions to Cellamare,[135] informing him that in view of the risk of a renewal of hostilities which could follow England's discovery of Spain's role in the Jacobite rebellion, Philip had revoked the earlier directives of 21 August and 16 September. The plan for a dual alliance with James was abandoned; Cellamare was to cease all communication with Berwick, Mary and the other Jacobite leaders and, most important, to assure Orléans that whereas Philip V had originally intended to acceed to his grandfather's request and assist James, now, in the light of the changed circumstances after Louis' death, he had no intention of taking

the least step which could be construed as a threat to the peace of Europe.[136] Monteleón in London was at the same time instructed to use all the means at his disposal to discredit the reports of Philip's alleged assistance to the Pretender.[137] As a further indication that Spain had, for the time being at least, turned away from a policy of supporting Jacobitism, Cellamare was instructed on 28 October to hand over the sum of 100,000 pesos earmarked for James to Monasterol, the Bavarian envoy in Paris.[138]

The Spanish government's approach to Britain and Madrid's decision not to provide the Chevalier with financial assistance were unknown to the leadership of the Jacobite movement. The leading figures at the exiled Stuart court in Paris had not abandoned their attempts to bring pressure to bear on Cellamare to persuade Madrid to hand over the money destined for the rebellion. Events within the British Isles had given an added impetus to these attempts to compel Spain to provide the rebellion with a level of financial support which might, in the words of Bolingbroke, be 'the salvation of ... (James's) cause'.[139] For the insurgents in Britain the situation was becoming critical. Mar was slowly strengthening his position to Scotland, and a potentially serious threat to George I's government was posed by a rebellion in the border counties of northern England where Lord Derwentwater, a distant cousin and boyhood companion of the Chevalier,[140] and Thomas Forster, a Protestant M.P., had taken up arms in James's name. The next move on the part of the Jacobite High Command was for Ormonde to sail from Normandy to the West Country where, if everything had proceeded according to plan, Lansdowne and Wyndham would have used their money and influence to provoke a rising in James's favour centred upon Bath.[141]

The Chevalier for his part had now come round to Bolingbroke's idea that the Spanish money was a prerequisite for success and had therefore decided to go to Spain in the hope that his presence would persuade Philip to hand over the money, and sail to the British Isles from there. On 10 October he wrote informing Bolingbroke of his intention to make this lengthy detour, at the same time leaving instructions for the disposal of the money which the Jacobites believed (correctly) to be in Cellamare's custody should Philip order its distribution after the start of his own proposed journey to Spain.[142]

Had James carried out this course of action he would, theoretically, have placed Madrid in the position of either making a public disavowal of him, rendering any future assistance extremely unlikely, or of publicly recognising the Chevalier and supplying the money for the rebellion, thereby risking war with Britain. This eventuality would not have been unwelcome to Bolingbroke who, Cellamare and Orléans feared, wanted to create an open breach and possibly war between England on the one hand and France and Spain on the other,[143] since he believed this to be the only way of putting James upon the English throne: that this was Bolingbroke's attitude seems clear from his advice to James at the beginning of November 1715: 'Your Majesty must not expect a revolution now...You must depend upon a war.[144] In view of Spain's overture towards Britain, there was little doubt that in the event of James's coming to Spain, Philip V would be the Pretender. The possibility that an appearance compelled to disavow/by the Chevalier on Spanish soil might be counter productive was appreciated by Berwick who held the view that James would be best advised to take the shortest route to the British Isles.[145] The Marshal's opinion now counted for little

in Jacobite circles since he had put himself beyond the pale as far as James was concerned by his refusal, under the Regent's orders, to accept the commission as commander-in-chief of the rebels in Scotland. But further argument in favour of a speedy journey to Britain, thereby sparing Philip V from having to choose between James III and George I, came from Orléans himself.

Since his accession to power the Regent had adopted an equivocal attitude towards Jacobitism. He had angered James's supporters by trying to reach an accord with Britain, and had confiscated the arms and ammunition intended for the rebels' use on board ship at Le Havre under pressure from Admiral Byng. But he had also angered the government in London by underhand negotiations with the Jacobite leadership[146] and his refusal to expel Bolingbroke and Ormonde from Paris.[147] Orleans' position was weak and he was reluctant to commit himself one way or the other: in the words of Bolingbroke: 'This prince (Orléans) has all the irresolution of temper possible, and is, perhaps, the man in the world the least capable of saying no to your face.'[148] On the one hand the Regent could not afford to alienate the British government which provided a counterweight to Philip V's hostility. On the other, if reasons of policy inclined him towards George I, sentiment made him partial towards James whose cause enjoyed widespread sympathy throughout France.[149] Moreover, the Regent desired to be on the winning side of the conflict in the British Isles, and the news from Scotland led him to believe that Mar was victorious and that the rebellion stood a good chance of success.

On the night of 17 October before Ormonde left Paris for Normandy en route for the West Country, Orléans granted him a secret interview on condition that this was not revealed to Bolingbroke (since the Regent feared that he hoped to embroil France in a war with England). In the interview Orléans tried to excuse his earlier lukewarmness towards the Jacobite cause by stressing the weakness of his own position; and Ormonde set out from Paris the next day with what he believed were assurances that arms and ammunition would be made available, and that Claude Leblanc, the Intendant of Dunkirk would act in concert with him in arranging the clandestine embarcation of supplies.[150]

Orléans and the Marshal d'Huxelles, the successor to Torcy who had lost office in the reshuffle which had followed Louis' death, then passed the message to James that he might sail from any part of the French coast except for Normandy and Picardy.[151] These assurances persuaded the Chevalier to leave for Britain by the shortest route, and on 28 October he set out from Bar under cover of a hunting party, all plans for travelling via Spain laid aside. After several narrow escapes from capture by Stair's agents[152] James reached St. Malo on 8 November where, to his surprise, he found Ormonde.[153] The Duke had sailed according to plan for the west of England only to find that the conspiracy had been discovered,* and he had felt compelled to return to France.

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* Owing to the treachery of his secretary, Sir John Maclean.

In Paris meanwhile the Jacobite leadership kept up their pressure on Spain to hand over the money promised in the late summer. Cellamare, who had managed to comply with his recent instructions to avoid James' chief supporters, was unable to ignore Queen Mary when, at Bolingbroke's instigation,[154] she requested a meeting ostensibly to offer her condolences on the death of the ambassador's wife.[155] This interview took place on Sunday, 27 October. Mary told Cellamare that whereas the Jacobites had hitherto believed that a large amount of money would have been required to launch the rebellion, now a much smaller sum would suffice. In response to the ambassador's enquiry whether this view was based solely on the reports emanating from Scotland (which he took to be more a favourable omen than a proof of success), Mary confidentially informed him that the Jacobites now proposed to start a rebellion in England under the leadership of Ormonde for which purpose the Duke was believed to have left Paris the previous Thursday on the first stage of his journey.* She assured the ambassador that details of this were known only to the Jacobite leadership: this was not the case, however, since the supposedly highly confidential information had, unknown to Cellamare and also to Bolingbroke, been communicated to Orléans. Nevertheless, Mary's disclosure made a great impression on the Spanish ambassador who requested Grimaldo to inform Philip V of these new circumstances as a matter of urgency;[157] clearly Cellamare believed (as he had indicated in early September) that the rebellion seemed to stand a good chance of success, and it

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* This was inaccurate since, as noted above (p.56) Ormonde had left Paris the week before. The discrepancy in dates may, however have owed more to the general confusion in the Jacobite camp rather than a deliberate desire to mislead Cellamare.

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would be highly regrettable if it were to fail on account of Spain's refusal to supply the money formerly promised. In the meantime pressure from James' supporters in France continued to be applied to the Spanish government: Fr Honoré Galliard, a priest active in Jacobite circles, appealed to Guillermo Daubenton, Philip V's Jesuit confessor who was believed to be highly sympathetic to the Chevalier's cause, to use his influence to obtain the financial assistance expected from Spain.[158]

Accurate details of the rebellion's progress were unknown in Paris. By November, according to reports in the French capital, the Jacobite forces under Mar had captured Edinburgh, compelling the Hanoverian government's troops to retreat to Newcastle; it was soon claimed moreover that the rebels had been joined by James in person, a piece of inaccurate information which even Stair temporarily believed.[159] Orléans was persuaded by these rumours that the time was now ripe to approach Cellamare with the proposition that Spain should financially support the Jacobite insurrection. On Wednesday, 13 November the Spanish ambassador was invited to dinner with Marshal Villeroy at the château of Vincennes. On arrival he was told by his host that Orléans wished to speak to him about a matter of the greatest secrecy. Since the Regent did not want to request an interview with Cellamare lest this arouse the suspicions of Stair, the ambassador was instructed to visit Orléans the following morning as if he himself desired the meeting.[160]

On arriving at the Regent's residence at the appointed time, Cellamare was taken to a small private room where Orléans was waiting. The Regent repeated much of what he had told Ormonde the previous month. He stressed the weakness of his own position which precluded him from antagonising the British government, but as a counterbalance he alluded to his actions favouring the Jacobite rebellion: collaboration with Ormonde and his allowing arms for the rebels to leave the ports of northern France. The Regent also claimed to believe that James stood a good chance of overthrowing George I. He therefore proposed that both France and Spain should co-operate in a policy of openly assisting the Jacobite rebellion with Philip V making a financial contribution, since in Orléans' opinion the time was ripe for Spain to supply the money initially promised in late August.[161]

In this interview with Cellamare, the Regent had carefully omitted any precise details of what his government proposed to do to support the Fifteen. By avoiding any definite commitment to assist the Jacobite insurgents within the British Isles while putting pressure on Spain to provide that financial assistance which France baulked at giving, the Regent was merely continuing his policy of trying to keep his options open with both Hanoverian and Stuart courts. Cellamare suspected this. He replied to Orléans' proposition somewhat warily with a statement of the Spanish position with regard to supporting James.[162] Philip V had always intended to follow the lead taken by France in assisting the rebellion; Louis XIV had made the first

approach and the Spanish king had merely taken his cue from his grandfather: later on, however, when what were euphemistically described as 'difficulties' had arisen, he had followed the Regent's lead and abandoned all participation in the scheme to finance the Jacobite rebellion. In the light of this new attitude on the part of Orléans, Cellamare proposed to request fresh instructions from his government as a matter of urgency to ascertain whether Philip wished to follow France and assist the Chevalier.[163] The Regent approved of this (but advised Cellamare not to send a message to Madrid by express courier lest this arouse Stair's suspicions that something important was afoot), and closed the interview referring to his hope that Spain would act in co-operation with France in support of such an important enterprise.[164]

Cellamare was none too easy about this latest twist in the scheme for encouraging the Jacobite insurrection. In his comments on the interview, he warned Grimaldo that Orléans could not be trusted; this latest volte face served to illustrate his fickleness. More seriously, the Regent had given no precise details of France's own role in the revised project; he had made no mention whether the Spanish money should be supplied unconditionally or in return for a treaty in support of Philip V's Italian policy, nor had he intimated the French attitude towards such an agreement. Nevertheless his proposition could not be ignored:at its most optimistic interpretation the interview of 14 November could be construed as implying a favourable attitude on the part of France consistent with that required by Philip in September as a precondition of Spain's supplying the Chevalier with money.

Clearly Cellamare needed new instructions as to whether the 100,000 pesos being kept in his custody in Paris should be handed over to the Bavarian envoy (as Grimaldo had instructed on 28 October[165]) or be given to the Jacobites.

v. Spain's first two financial contributions to the Jacobite rebellion

When Cellamare wrote to Grimaldo on 18 November reporting his interview with Orléans the previous week, he was unaware that Philip V had been prompted to act in support of the Jacobite rebellion following the arrival in Madrid on 11 November of his diplomatic representative's dispatch of 28 October reporting Ormonde's intention to open a second front in England.[166] On 16 November the Bishop of Cadiz, secretary to the Spanish department of finances, was requested to provide an exact statement of the amount of money at Cellamare's disposal in Paris, which was stated (accurately) to be 100,000 pesos.[167] Two days later (18 November) Grimaldo countermanded the previous instructions to give this sum to Monasterol. Instead it was to be handed over to a representative of the Chevalier along with thirteen bills of exchange worth 20,000 pesos which were enclosed with the dispatch, while the Bavarians were to receive the equivalent in French money of the 8,000 doblones initially sent from Madrid at the end of August once Monteleón had completed the laborious process of exchanging them for bills drawn upon Parisian bankers.[168]

Cellamare was instructed by Grimaldo to perform the handing over of Spain's financial contribution to the Jacobite rebellion with the utmost secrecy; in particular, it was

emphasised that Orléans was not to be informed.*

This involved a radical departure from Philip's insistence hitherto that Spain would only supply the Chevalier with money if assured of France's tacit support for the insurrection, and reflected Madrid's belief in the accuracy of wildly optimistic Jacobite propaganda;[169] only if Philip seemed certain that he was backing a winner in James would he have been prepared to bypass Orléans who, with his knowledge of the earlier stages of the Spanish-Jacobite plot, was well placed to reveal the full extent to which Philip had contemplated aiding James to the British government if he felt himself slighted. There was now no mention of any advance commitment on the part of the Jacobites; the Spaniards intended to supply the money to ensure the final success of the rebellion and then present their bill upon its conclusion when 'James III' was firmly ensconced on his rightful throne. If James was victorious then Philip would have scored a considerable diplomatic victory: not only would he be portrayed as the sole backer of the successful insurrection but, by ignoring Orléans at such a crucial stage, would have succeeded in isolating his rival and removing the Hanoverian regime which had been the Regent's main buttress.

Upon receiving these fresh orders Cellamare approached Queen Mary (whom James had placed in charge of the distribution of any money supplied by Spain during his absence[170]) through Berwick[171] to discuss the best means of handing over so large a quantity of coinage, silver and gold bullion, and bills of exchange without arousing the suspicions of Stair and Orléans.[172]

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* The Spanish government were not yet aware of the Regent's change of attitude as indicated in his interview with Cellamare on 14 November.

The Spanish ambassador feared that the transfer of so much money simultaneously would give rise to rumours of Spain's involvement in the preparations for the 'Fifteen and threaten to jeopardise the secrecy surrounding the project which had hitherto been reasonably well adhered to. It was therefore decided to hand over the gold specie, money and bills of exchange in Cellamare's custody at the earliest opportunity, but to allow a little time to elapse before Mary took delivery of the silver bullion which, for ease of distribution, was being coined at a Parisian mint.[173] Accordingly, Cellamare handed over 100,000 pesos (écus)* consisting of the gold (worth at current prices 61,187 pesos 4 reales), and a portion of the coinage remaining from the consignment sent from Chile in the early summer plus the thirteen bills of exchange (worth 20,000 pesos)≠ sent by Grimaldo on 18 November[174] and in return Cellamare obtained a receipt dated 13 December in Mary's handwriting for this first instalment of Spain's subsidy to her son.[175]

News of the Spanish decision to supply the money reached James on 12 December[176] when he was journeying across France after deciding, following a request from Mar, to sail to Scotland from Dunkirk. As Jacobite propaganda had given out that the Chevalier was already in Scotland he was precluded from writing a formal letter of thanks to Philip V, a task which was performed by Mary[177] in terms which Cellamare thought over effusive.[178] Neither the Jacobites in France nor Cellamare and his government were aware that on 13/24 November two battles had been fought both dealing a fatal blow to the rebellion: the first at

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* £25,000
≠ £5,000

Preston where the northern rebels had been defeated and the second at Sheriffmuir near Stirling where Mar was decisively checked by a British army commanded by the Duke of Argyll. The Spaniards had been wide of the mark in believing that the rebellion was on the verge of success and that Philip had a potential diplomatic victory on his hands; instead they were pouring money into a venture which was doomed to collapse before James even left France for Scotland.

On 30 November[179] news of Orléans' change of attitude towards French support for the Stuart cause reached Madrid. This persuaded Philip to increase the size of his contribution to the Jacobites, and on 2 December Grimaldo instructed Cellamare to hand over all the money received so far - the 8,000 doblones (32,000 pesos)* originally sent in August in bills of exchange once Monteleón had converted them into French currency, the 100,000 in specie and coin sent from South America and the 20,000 in bills dispatched from Madrid on 18 November - to Mary on her son's behalf. Grimaldo also forwarded nineteen further bills of exchange drawn upon Amsterdam bankers worth 42,840 pesos≠ (but for reasons of secrecy referred to as a mere 24,000) for this purpose.≠≠[180] Unlike the previous instructions of 18 November, Cellamare was to inform the Regent of Spain's decision to assist the Chevalier. Philip had been faced with little choice but to trust Orléans after the latter's volte face and he now envisaged a Franco-Spanish programme in support of James as intended in the initial stages of the dependencia reservada.

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* £8,000
≠ £10,500
≠≠ Totalling in all 194,840 pesos (£48,500)

Upon receiving these orders Cellamare arranged a secret interview with Bolingbroke on the night of Saturday 12 December to arrange the transfer of the bills of exchange most recently received. By now the Spanish ambassador was none too happy about the wisdom of supplying the Jacobites with further money.[181] His anxiety arose firstly, from his fear that details of Spain's involvement in the plot might leak out to Stair owing to the total lack of secrecy on the part of the exiled court for which Saint-Germain was notorious, and secondly from his intuition that the true state of rebellion was far worse than was widely believed in Paris.[182] Bolingbroke, when pressed on this point, tried to fob off Cellamare's enquiries but after further pressure admitted that Ormonde had failed in a second attempt to resuscitate the planned rebellion in the west of England undertaken at the beginning of December, however he assured the Spanish ambassador of the Duke's determination to make another try.[183] Cellamare remained unsatisfied and had serious misgivings about handing over this, the second instalment of Spain's subsidy to the Chevalier. The firmness of Grimaldo's instructions gave the Spanish diplomat little choice but to comply with the spirit if not the letter of these, and at the end of December he supplied the exiled Stuart court with Spain's second financial contribution to the Jacobite rebellion, the sum of 42,840 pesos* in bills of exchange drawn upon bankers in Amsterdam[184] (which had been sent by Grimaldo on 2 December). In return Cellamare obtained a receipt from Mary which he subsequently forwarded to Madrid.[185]

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* Spain's first two contributions to the Jacobite rebellion, viz. 100,000 pesos (or 300,000 livres in French money) plus 42,840 pesos (128,520 livres) give a total value (in the currency of France) of 428,520 livres. This figure is cited by Jones Main Stream, 106 n.35 and Nordmann 'Louis and the Jacobites', 100 as the full extent of Philip V's financial support to the 'Fifteen. It will be seen however, (infra, pp83,84) that James received more money from Spain in the period 1715-16.

The Spanish ambassador's latest instructions concerning the handing over of Spain's financial subsidy to the Jacobite rebellion (dated 2 December) had enjoined him to provide the Stuart leadership with the equivalent in French money of the bills of exchange initially sent in August once Monteleón had returned this to Paris. In the previous orders (issued from Madrid on 18 November),[186] this sum had been earmarked for Maximilian Emanuel. When Monteleón had remitted the first instalment of these bills - 34,500 French livres* - Cellamare had felt constrained to supply it to Monasterol,[187] although when the time came to hand this over the Spanish ambassador had received the revised orders of 2 December to supply the cash equivalent of 8,000 doblones sent from Madrid on 26 August to the Jacobites. He felt constrained, however, to adhere to the previous instructions and give this sum to Monasterol, partly on account of his belief that the Jacobite rebellion was a failure, but also because he feared that a delay in the appearance of the money might cause the Bavarian envoy to investigate the reasons behind this. Accordingly, he supplied Monasterol with 34,500 livres on 21 December and, as Monteleón remitted further bills of exchange, with 13,500≠ on 2 January and 10,248≠≠ a week later (9th).[188]

Cellamare's apprehensions about the state of the rebellion were soon justified when he heard that contrary to earlier

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* £3,000
≠ £1,000
≠≠ £850

propaganda, James had not even left France until 27 or 28 December[189] (he actually sailed from Dunkirk on the 27th);[190] moreover the Jacobite leadership in Paris were unable to confirm whether he had arrived in Scotland despite their earlier boasts that he was there[191] (he landed at Peterhead in Aberdeenshire on 22 December OS/2 January NS).

The ill-luck which had bedevilled the dependencia reservada from its beginning continued after Philip V had supplied the Jacobites with money. In response to an appeal from Mar carried from Scotland to Saint-Germain by his cousin, Sir John Erskine of Alva, Mary ordered the gold from the first instalment of the Spanish contribution to be dispatched to the rebels in Scotland under the care of Berwick's son and James's nephew, the Earl of Tynemouth, a man named Bulkeley, Berwick's brother-in-law, and Erskine himself.[192] The concern at so much bullion being carried in one assignment expressed by the Chevalier[193] was justified when the ship carrying the trio and their valuable cargo hit a sandbank off the Fifeshire coast resulting in the loss of the gold.[194]

(vi) Anglo-Spanish rapprochement, and Spain's gradual disengagement from the project to assist James

On 14 December 1715 at the same time as Cellamare was distributing Spanish money for use in the Fifteen, Spain astonished Europe by concluding a new commercial treaty with Britain which was widely seen to be a declaration of confidence in the Hanoverian regime. This diplomatic coup was the result less of a calculated policy of backing both parties in the

rebellion in the hope that, irrespective of the victors, Spain would obtain British acquiescence in her Italian policy than a reflection of the power struggle within the Spanish government in which differences over the policy to be adopted by Spain towards Britain were crystallized into a violent personal rivalry between Giudice, the Inquisitor-General, and Alberoni.[195] The signature of the treaty, finally secured by means of the promise of a 14,000 pistole* bribe from George I's government intended for Alberoni, but never reaching him,[196] was a triumph for the abbé over Giudice; it also signified the adoption by Madrid of a policy towards Britain more concerned with Spain's obtaining political benefits from the established regime in London rather than relying on the eventual victory of the Stuart Pretender.

This change in Spain's relations with Britain indicated that the dependencia reservada would have to be terminated and on 16 December, two days after the signature of the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty, Philip decided that his contribution to the Jacobite rebellion was not to exceed 150,000 pesos. In a memorial to his master[198] Grimaldo pointed out that this conflicted with the instructions dispatched to Cellamare on 2 December whereby he was to hand over all the money in his

* Approx. £9,000

custody (totalling 194,840 pesos*) to a representative of James; furthermore these in turn differed from the instructions of 18 November which stated that a portion of this money - the French equivalent of the bills for 8,000 doblones - was to be supplied to the Elector of Bavaria. Grimaldo advised that Cellamare should not be issued with a further set of conflicting orders until precise details of the money handed over to Queen Mary had reached Madrid. This advice was duly heeded.[199]

The information desired by Grimaldo did not arrive in the Spanish capital until late in December[200] when the government received details of the 100,000 pesos being supplied to Mary. This did not seem to warrant a radical change to Cellamare's instructions since it appeared to confirm that none of the silver had been handed over, nor was there any mention of the receipt of the bills of exchange from Monteleón. Accordingly, on 30 December slightly amended instructions were dispatched to Cellamare. He was to hand over all the finds hitherto earmarked by Madrid as Spain's contribution to the Jacobite rebellion to Queen Mary with the exception of the bills of exchange for 8,000 doblones which had been passed through Monteleón: after arriving in Paris, these bills were to be supplied to Monasterol,

* This comprised the 100,000 pesos in specie and coinage sent from South America in the summer of 1715 and various amounts in bills of exchange: the 8,000 doblones (32,000 pesos) which Cellamare had forwarded to London to be converted into French currency, bills worth 20,000 pesos dispatched to Paris by Grimaldo on 18 November and 42,840 pesos sent on 2 December. It will be seen however, that Cellamare did not hand over all these amounts to the Jacobites.

the Elector of Bavaria's representative.[201] Only when Cellamare received these amended orders did he reveal that he had already given the Bavarian envoy bills of exchange worth 58,248 livres* which had come via Monteleón.[202]

On Sunday 12 January 1716 Cellamare saw Queen Mary. She revealed that the Jacobite leadership had informed the Pope of Philip's contribution to their enterprise[203] in what Cellamare believed to be a clumsy attempt to mediate between Spain and Rome, in a dispute concerning the proportion of Spanish ecclesiastical revenues to be remitted to the Papacy.[204] Cellamare was disturbed to hear that, in what could be construed as an attempt to excuse the relative smallness of his own donation to date (191,309 livres≠ according to William Dicconson, the treasurer at Saint-Germain),[205] Clement XI had offered to waive all claims to the revenues in dispute if Philip placed the disputed funds at James's disposal.[206] This affair concerned Cellamare partly because he adhered to his government's view that Spain owed nothing to the Papacy, but more seriously because it illustrated the total disregard for secrecy exhibited by the Jacobite high command: as Cellamare pointedly remarked to Mary, Philip V had not felt the need to inform the Pope of his contribution to the 'Fifteen, an implication (in the Spanish diplomat's view) that the exiled Stuart court should have followed suit.

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* approx. £5,000

≠ £16,000

Nevertheless Cellamare's latest instructions were precise: the silver originally sent from Peru was to be handed over to the Jacobites once it had been coined for ease of distribution, and he had agreed upon this course of action with Mary in early December. By mid-January seven of the fifteen bars of silver had been coined[207] and the Spanish ambassador was unable to withstand the pressure of Mary, Bolingbroke and the Jacobite court any longer: he handed over 10,893½* pesos, the cash equivalent of these seven bars of silver, as the third instalment of Spain's contribution to the Stuart cause.

The motives which had prompted Philip V to support the 'Fifteen financially were now seen to be based upon a complete miscalculation. The rebellion was widely recognised as a failure, the only point in doubt was when it would collapse. Owing to the deterioration in James's fortunes, Orléans had failed to assist the Jacobite rebels in the manner he had earlier indicated to Ormonde and Cellamare with the result that any hope of Franco-Spanish collaboration in the project was revealed as a mirage. Clearly Spain could not continue supplying the Jacobites with money when the Pretender could offer nothing in return, and the arrival in Madrid (on 30 January)[209] of Cellamare's information that the Jacobite leadership had leaked details of Spain's financial support to the Pope combined with pessimistic accounts of the events in Scotland prompted Philip to act. Grimaldo ordered Cellamare not to supply the Jacobites with more than 150,000 pesos in all.[210] When the Spanish ambassador received these instructions he pointed out that his

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* £2,700

earlier directions of 2 and 30 December 1715 had between them specifically stated that he was to supply James with gold specie, coinage, bills of exchange and, most recently, silver coin having a total value of 153,734 pesos,* but having involuntarily exceeded the maximum laid down he would ensure that the Jacobites did not receive the remainder of the silver promised to them.[211]

The Fifteen, which Spain had so far supported to the tune of 153,734 pesos (approximately £38,000 sterling), was about to collapse. The serious nature of the Jacobite position had become clear to James upon his arrival in Scotland at the beginning of January, and he and Mar had decided to make a final desperate attempt to obtain further foreign assistance. General George Hamilton, whom some of the rebels blamed for the defeat at Sheriffmuir, was sent to the continent as the Chevalier's special envoy. He was instructed to proceed first to France (where he was to be introduced to Orleans by Bolingbroke) and then to Spain to make a personal appeal to Philip V with Lawless as interpreter.[212]

Hamilton arrived in Paris on 5 February and conveyed the ill tidings from Scotland to Mary, Berwick and Bolingbroke.[213] His presence in the French capital, reported to the British government,[214] caused a great deal of interest. Cellamare informed his government of the widely held view that the purpose of Hamilton's mission was to obtain Orléans' consent to Berwick being placed in command of the Scottish rebels. He was therefore greatly alarmed when Bolingbroke confidentially

* The sum of Spain's three contributions to date; 100,000 pesos, 42,840 & 10,893½.

informed him that James's envoy had been instructed to proceed to Spain where, in a personal interview with Philip V, he was to request further assistance and permission to allow the recruitment of Irish troops from the Spanish army into the Chevalier's service.[215]

Cellamare was amazed at this, and wondered whether the Jacobite leadership were fully aware of the serious implications involved.[216] He reminded Bolingbroke that should the real purpose of this mission by such a notorious Jacobite become known to the government in London, this might involve Spain in war with Britain, or at the very least necessitate Philip's making a public disavowal of James which would render any further support from Spain out of the question. The Spanish ambassador thought that Bolingbroke appreciated the potential danger to the Chevalier's relations with Madrid if Hamilton proceeded with the mission as ordered, and he obtained the impression that James's Secretary of State would try to ensure that the Jacobite envoy did not leave France.[217] In spite of attempts on Bolingbroke's part to sabotage the mission by failing to introduce Hamilton to the Regent and members of the French government (with the excuse that none of these would grant a public audience),[218] Orléans heard the bad news from Scotland from General Arthur Dillon, an Irish Jacobite and naturalised French citizen who had attained high rank in the Franch army. Orléans ordered the immediate dispatch of sixty hundredweight of powder

to augment the rebels' near-exhausted stocks,* but both to Dillon and to Hamilton (who was eventually received by the Regent) Orléans was adamant in his refusal to supply French arms.[219]

Cellamare's disillusionment with the Jacobites was now complete. His main intention was to sever all connection with the movement before the indiscretions of its members resulted in Stair's discovery of the plot. Unknown to Cellamare, the British ambassador had been informed of Spain's support for the Jacobite conspiracy, but the source of his information had been Orléans, not the court at Saint-Germain. When the Regent had interviewed Cellamare on 14 November he had given the impression that he envisaged a programme of joint Franco-Spanish action in support of James, and in Madrid's response to this approach it had been decided to inform Orléans of the full extent of Spain's financial contribution to the 'Fifteen: on 2 December, therefore, Grimaldo instructed Cellamare to tell the French Regent of Philip V's decision to provide a subsidy for the Jacobite rebellion.[220] Unfortunately for the Chevalier, cooperation between France and Spain had not materialised. This was partly the fault of the Jacobites themselves, owing to their wildly optimistic claims which were soon demonstrated to be false as news of Sheriffmuir filtered back to France making clear that the Fifteen was a lost cause. The main responsibility lay in Orléans' resentment at his exclusion from the Anglo-Spanish

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* This ammunition would have been the only aid provided by the French Regent during '15, but owing to the collapse of the rebellion before its transport could be arranged it was never sent.

commercial treaty of December 1715. Although the French Regent was adept at the art of attempting to ingratiate himself with both George I and the exiled Stuart court, he was angered by what he regarded as Philip V's double game and Madrid's breach of what he had viewed as the spirit of his suggestion made to Cellamare in the middle of November that Spain should cooperate jointly with France in support of James. Orléans resolved, therefore, to use his knowledge of Philip V's involvement in the Jacobite conspiracy to disrupt the new found unity between England and Spain which prevailed after the signature of the commercial treaty. In an audience with Stair at the beginning of February, the Regent dropped a hint of what he could, if he chose, reveal of Spain's role in the plot: 'Enfin Mons. vous voila amis de l'Espagne, cependan(t) je vous assure que (le) Roy d'Espagne a fait pour le Prétendant ce que je nay plus voulu faire'.[221]

As it turned out, Orléans' disclosure was scarcely a revelation to George I's government. Following Spain's decision of 30 December to cease all financial support for James, Spanish government sources unofficially passed Bubb the news (which he relayed to London on 13 January) that Philip V had halted a project aimed at providing assistance for the Pretender.[222] This information was vague and gave no clue as to whether the alleged involvement with Jacobitism had been quashed at its inception or at a more advanced stage: it did, however, indicate that irrespective of any actions in the past, Spain would no longer support James. As a result, the Whig Ministry

was prepared to overlook any Spanish involvement with the Pretender which had taken place prior to the signature of the Commercial Treaty on 14 December.

The British government was therefore mildly embarrassed by Orléans' implied threat to disclose Philip V's alleged collaboration with James since London had no wish to disrupt its newly improved relations with Madrid. Nevertheless, Stanhope saw that the incident could be used to Britain's advantage: by informing Spain of the French Regent's disclosure and the British government's nonchalant response, it was hoped to add to the bad feeling between Philip V and Orléans and at the same time warn Spain that her involvement with the Pretender had not escaped George I's attention even if London did not propose to make an issue of it. Accordingly, Stanhope showed Monteleón the relevant portion of Stair's dispatch and, pointedly declining to comment on the veracity of the French Regent's allegations, assured the Spaniard of Britain's belief that irrespective of past actions, Spain was now a firm supporter of the Hanoverian dynasty.[223]

This cleverness on the part of Britain - a policy of trading her desire for an improvement in commercial relations with Spain against Madrid's wish to suppress her involvement with the Jacobite movement - paid off. The Spanish government was only too anxious for a partial disengagement from the Stuart cause. Spain had no wish to risk a war with Britain and, moreover, was well aware of the hazards posed by too close a collaboration with the Jacobite rebels who had exhibited irresponsibility, poor leadership and general disorganisation throughout the dependencia reservada. However, although Philip V appeared to be a supporter

of the established government in London, a complete break with James was unlikely. The reasons which had initially inclined Philip to the Jacobite cause the previous year were still valid. Alberoni's new relationship with Britain required positive results in the form of support (or benevolent neutrality) towards Spain's Italian policy; if these were not forthcoming he was quite prepared to revert to the previous Spanish policy in favour of the chief exiled Stuarts. For this reason it was not in Philip V's interest to allow the complete extinction of the Jacobite threat which could, if skilfully handled, prove an invaluable weapon against Britain. In accordance with this, the Spanish government decided upon a compromise between the need to preserve good relations with George I and the conflicting wish to sustain James when his fortunes were at a low ebb: for the time being (Grimaldo informed Cellamare on 24 February) the Chevalier was to receive no more than an amount equivalent to the value of the eight bars of silver already promised[224] but owing to the risk of a transfer of silver coinage becoming public knowledge, Cellamare was to await the arrival of bills of exchange equivalent to the estimated value of the silver, and supply the Jacobites with these.[225]

(vii) Spain and the question of asylum and pension for James

On 27 February James and Mar arrived at Gravelines after fleeing from Scotland. The Fifteen was over. On the Chevalier's subsequent arrival at Saint-Germain he was confronted by three problems which called for a speedy solution: James had to find a new place of residence, to obtain financial support and, finally, to provide his followers with a scapegoat for the failure of the rebellion.

The question of a new residence was of great importance since it was clear that after the collapse of the 'Fifteen the Duke of Lorraine would be under tremendous pressure from the British government not to readmit the Pretender: indeed, as soon as Stair heard of James's arrival in the environs of Paris, he requested Orleans both to expel him from France and to put pressure on the Duke to forbid his returning to Bar.[226] The Chevalier's need of money was as urgent as ever; besides his own personal expenses he also needed to charter ships for the rescue of the rebels remaining in Scotland who faced execution if captured by British government troops.[227]

James hoped to resolve both these problems by appealing directly to Philip V for asylum and financial support in a letter of 29 February[228] which Bolingbroke handed over to Cellamare on the night of 1 March to be forwarded to Madrid.[229] The Chevalier submitted a remarkably frank statement illustrating the weakness of his position and the dilemma facing him over the matter of his future residence. George I's pressure on Orléans meant that there was no possibility of asylum for James in France; similarly the Empire, the Dutch Republic and Portugal

were closed to the Chevalier owing to their links with Britain. James himself viewed the possibility of residence in papal territory, whether in Italy or at the papal enclave of Avignon, as a last resort owing to the effect of such an identification with Roman Catholicism upon his protestant adherents. He therefore proceeded to ask for asylum in Spain along with further financial support from that quarter, confident that Philip V could not deny these requests in a matter which, in James's opinion, so closely involved the Spanish King's own gloire:

> '...votre Majesté ne scauroit ignorer les difficultez que je trouve a l'egarde de l'endroit de ma residence, elle voit combien mon sejour en Italie, et sur les terres du Pape, seroit desagreable a ma nation, et prejuiciable a mes interets et qu'il n'y a guerre d'apparance que des puissances qui craignoit auparavant les ressentimens de l'Electeur d'Hannover veuillent a present me donner une azile chez eux, mais ce que je cher (ch) erois en vain ailleurs je demande avec instance et confiance a votre Majesté me flattant qu'en suitte d'une conduitte si genereuse a mon egarde, qu'elle ne me refusera pas tout ce qui luy reste a present a faire en ma faveur, et qu'elle voudra bien aussy continuer a me donner quelque secours d'argent pas tant pour moy meme que pour subvenir aux necessité de ceux qui ont tout perdu pour leur attachment pour moy.....J'ose dire que la gloire de votre Majesté y est un peu interesse et que son interest l'est encore plus.....'[230]

Bolingbroke, when handing over this letter, reinforced its sentiments and placed particular emphasis on the need for a quick decision on the matter of asylum for James in Spain, a solution which Bolingbroke represented as far less damaging to the Chevalier's interests than residence in the Papal States, and to back this up, he pointed out that Spain (unlike France) had made no formal pledge at Utrecht to bar James from her territory.[231]

Cellamare was amazed at such an unexpected request. He agreed that his government had not promised to refuse the Pretender admission, but attributed this omission to the obvious impracticability of such a step (involving the possibility of a renewed war with Britain) rather than an implied willingness to grant asylum, and warned that Philip was not likely to acceed to this plea.

The next few days saw great activity in leading Jacobite circles. On 3 March a scapegoat for the failure of the 'Fifteen was found. Bolingbroke, who had alienated all shades of Jacobite opinion, was dismissed[232] and replaced as the Chevalier's Secretary of State by Mar. Urgent attention had also to be paid to the problem of James's future residence since apart from Spain and the Papal States other possible sources of asylum were few. To remove Jacobite pressure on Madrid to allow the Chevalier to enter Spain Cellamare had suggested one of the Roman Catholic Swiss cantons[233] (this location was turned down by the Jacobite leadership on security grounds in December 1716[234]). Another possibility lay in James's taking the so-called 'Protestant' route to Zweibrucken, the principality within the Empire which Charles XII had inherited from his father as a personal possession.[235] After leaving Saint-Germain in early March James pressed this point to Sparre, the Swedish ambassador, at a meeting which took place in the Bois de Boulogne (possibly at Dillon's house[236]). The Swedish diplomat naturally lacked the authority to treat on so sensitive an issue but he undertook to forward the request to Charles XII.[237]

On Thursday 5 March while still in the area of the Bois de Boulogne, James held a secret interview with Cellamare.[238] In their meeting the Chevalier poured out his difficulties. He bewailed the alleged disloyalty of Berwick and Bolingbroke, his two previous intermediaries with the Spanish ambassador, and announced his intention of conducting future dealings with Cellamare through Nicolas Foucault de Magny, introducteur des ambassadeurs at the French court, a man in whom James (unlike many of his followers)[239] placed great trust. The request for asylum in Spain was repeated although Cellamare warned that he saw little hope of Philip being able to grant this on account of the anticipated British reaction to such a step. The Chevalier then proceeded to place a definite figure to the 'secours d'argent' mentioned in his letter of 29 February, namely an appeal for an annual pension of 100,000 écus.[240] Cellamare could do no more than forward these requests to Madrid although he was pessimistic about the possibility of either being granted, and the interview closed with no solution to James's difficulties in sight.

To have waited for the replies from Charles XII and Philip V required time, a commodity in short supply for the Pretender . James was rebuffed when he made a belated attempt to enter Lorraine: he thus had no choice but to accept Clement XI's offer of asylum and on 2 April arrived at the papal enclave of Avignon.[241]

For the Spaniards James's appeals were a source of considerable embarrassment since Philip was under great pressure from Britain to issue a declaration of his intention to prohibit all aid direct or indirect to the Stuart cause. At the end of January 1716 Stair

had informed Bubb of a plan to purchase arms and ammunition and ship these from Pasajes to the British Isles.[242] In keeping with the new spirit of Anglo-Spanish friendship, Stair gave the Spanish government the benefit of any doubt as to its sincerity by pointing out that had the arms been purchased in Spain this could have taken place without Madrid's knowledge. Nevertheless the British government wanted action and on 5 March (the same day as James made his appeal to Cellamare for asylum in Spain) Bubb presented a memorandum to Philip V. In this the Spanish king was requested firstly, to stop the departure of the ship at Pasajes referred to by Stair; secondly, to order all officers in the army whether of Spanish or Irish extraction not to assist the Jacobite cause in any way and, finally, to declare publicly that Spain would not support James. Philip had little choice but to acquiesce and on 23 March he issued the declaration requested by Bubb, making a public disavowal of the Stuart cause.[244]

As a result of this British pressure on Madrid, any Spanish collaboration with the Pretender had, for the time being, to be in a very low key. The request for asylum in Spain was turned down (as Cellamare had anticipated), and the news conveyed to James by Magny.[245] Similarly the Spaniards had to deny the Chevalier's request for an annual pension of 100,000 écus[246] but (in a reference to the decision of 24 February)[247] Philip announced that as a gesture of goodwill towards James he would supply a small amount of money previously earmarked as part of the Spanish contribution towards the abortive rebellion.[248] The final part of this donation was duly dispatched on 30 March and

reached Cellamare early in April. He now had two bills of exchange drawn upon bankers in Madrid together worth 2,000 doblones (pistoles), 28,000 livres in French money,* the currency in which they were payable. These, the fourth instalment of Spain's contribution to Jacobite funds in 1715-1716, were handed to Magny who forwarded them to James in Avignon via Fr Lewis Innes, principal of the Scots College in Paris, advising the Chevalier that they could be exchanged by bankers in Lyons.[250]

This was all the Pretender could expect for the present from Spain. Philip was not prepared to go beyond a promise to keep an open mind on the possibility of future financial and other support for the Jacobite cause.[251] In the foreseeable future James could be of little use to the Spanish government; any money supplied by Madrid would be in the nature of charity while the Spaniards bided their time until the Chevalier was in a position to serve as a more effective pawn against Britain. The Spanish government's immediate reaction was to disassociate itself from the importunings of the Jacobite leadership whether applied through its minions in France or Spain. Alberoni, when pressed by Lawless, refused further discussion of the matter.[252] A petition submitted by Queen Mary to the Spanish government through Cellamare requesting Madrid to grant Nicholas Geraldino, an Irish Jacobite exile who lived in St. Malo, a concession to trade between France and Vera Cruz in Spanish America was also

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* approx. £2,200

refused[253] since, besides antagonising the British government and merchant community, it would have broken Spain's monopoly of trade with her South American empire.

Philip V's desire for a reduction in his involvement with the Jacobite cause was a natural result of the rapid improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations during the Spring and early summer of 1716. On 25 May the signature of the New Asiento Treaty concluded the new commercial settlement begun the previous December.[254] James's influence at the Spanish court further declined in inverse proportion to the rise of Alberoni whom the Jacobites tended to portray in the role of a devil's advocate to Philip prepared to use his position to oppose any request for assistance to the Stuart cause made to Spain:[255] on 12 July Giudice was dismissed from his post of Governor to the Prince of Asturias (Philip's eldest son, Luis) and subsequently, with Papal approval, from that of Inquisitor-General, after which Alberoni became the virtual first minister of Spain.[256]

James's arrival in Avignon proved only a short respite. Fresh from its triumph over the Jacobite rebels, George I's government was determined to press its victory home by insisting upon the Pretender's removal to the other side of the Alps, thereby maximising his geographical distance from his potential subjects and identifying his cause still more closely with the Catholic church. Orléans desired an alliance with Britain as the best safeguard for his own position against the challenge posed by Philip V and was not prepared to follow Louis XIV's policy of conniving at the Pretender's continued

residence on the western side of the Alps. In the summer of 1716 negotiations were opened at the Hague for a treaty between England and France to guarantee the position of George I and Orléans respectively. James's shortage of money rendered him highly vulnerable to any pressure applied by the French government which, by judicious withholding of the annual pension of 100,000 livres it supplied to Queen Mary, was able to exercise a high degree of control over the Chevalier's own purse strings. The money supplied by Spain in April 1716 could only be a temporary palliative since the cost even of maintaining James's small court of penniless followers at Avignon was such that a continual reliable source of finance was required if the Chevalier was to withstand the mounting pressure for his removal supplied by Britain through the French government.

The Jacobite leadership therefore decided to put forward to Spain the argument that financial aid for James would, by enabling him to withstand this Franco-British pressure and remain in Avignon, obstruct the Anglo-Franch negotiations at the Hague. Their appeals to Philip were given an added impetus by the fact that owing to the rapprochment between George I and the Regent, he now represented their chief hope of assistance. Lawless was instructed to persuade Daubenton (for whom the Jacobites hoped to obtain ecclesiastical preferment at Rome)[257] to present this argument to Philip in order that the request should bypass Alberoni who was believed now to be a firm supporter of the Hanoverian regime.[258] The indirect method of approach was unlikely to achieve the desired result since, as Lawless soon

realised, Alberoni was too influential a figure to be ignored. Instead Daubenton advised that all appeals for aid must be channelled through Alberoni who, Mar was assured, was prepared to serve the Chevalier's interests although the Jesuit warned that for the present James could only expect clandestine aid from Spain.[259]

A more effective way of persuading Philip V to supply the Pretender with financial assistance was unwittingly provided by the British government. On 25 May/5 June 1716 George I, in his capacity as King of England, concluded with the Emperor Charles VI a treaty of mutual guarantee of the titles and possessions of each signatory (Treaty of Westminster). As Bubb pointed out, this treaty being purely defensive in no way conflicted with the Anglo-Spanish agreements of December 1715 and the following May.

The Spaniards saw the matter differently: the fact that George had signed this treaty with the Emperor made clear that Alberoni had failed in his bid to obtain British support or neutrality towards Spain's Italian claims by offering commercial concessions in return. Spanish disillusionment with the government in London increased in the period after mid-1716 and gave rise to a deep mistrust, soon manifested in Madrid's refusal to honour her side of the new commercial agreements with subsequent exasperation on the part of Britain.[260] In these circumstances, support for James became a serious possibility; in Alberoni's words 'the scarecrow that lived at Avignon might (be used to) frighten him (i.e. George I)'.[261]

Apart from the risk of a complete rupture with Britain involved in contributing to the Jacobite cause, Spain could not spare large sums of money for James. Philip was, however, willing to make a small donation to the Chevalier as a goodwill gesture. Money which would suffice for this purpose had come to the attention of the Spanish government when Cellamare submitted his annual statement of expenses in September 1716.[262] The diplomat had believed that the 58,248 livres handed over to Monasterol, the Bavarian envoy in Paris, in December 1715 and the following month represented the equivalent in French money of the 8,000 doblones remitted by the Bishop of Cadiz in August 1715. Cellamare was therefore surprised to receive further bills of exchange worth 37,113 livres* from Monteleón in April 1716, as a result of the continuing depreciation of the French currency against those of England and Spain.[263] Between then and the following Autumn Cellamare received no instructions to dispose of this sum of money, and when submitting his annual account in September 1716 suggested that it should be handed over to the Chevalier who was believed to be in serious financial straits.[264]

The reasons for this course of action seemed overwhelming in Cellamare's view.[265] The bills of exchange in question came from 8,000 doblones originally intended for James's use; moreover, had they arrived before April 1716 (the Spanish ambassador believed) the government in Madrid would have

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(* £3,100)

ordered them to be supplied to the Chevalier as part of the fourth instalment of its contribution to the Jacobite cause. Cellamare also reminded Grimaldo of Philip V's promise of the previous March to keep an open mind on the possibility of further financial support for James, and, as a final argument, pointed out that the sum in question could not be put to any other immediate use; for example it fell far short of the cost of four carriages recently ordered in France for Elisabeth Farnese[266] (subsequently given as 280,145 livres).[267]

Grimaldo replied on 12 October, giving the answer desired by Cellamare. Employing the maximum secrecy by obtaining a reliable courier to take the money to James, the Spanish ambassador was to supply the Chevalier with the 37,113 livres. The official reason for Spain's decision was (according to Grimaldo) that these came from a sum of money originally earmarked for the use of the Jacobites.[268]

The news was communicated to Mary in Paris by Cellamare[269] and to Lawless in Madrid by Alberoni.[270] Philip V's decision momentarily took the Jacobite leadership by surprise. The worsening state of the Chevalier's finances as a result of the temporary cessation in the payment of Mary's pension by the French government had prompted Mar to issue fresh instructions to Lawless. He was to request a personal interview with Philip and Elisabeth from which it was hoped that Alberoni might be excluded.[271] In his appeal he was told to restate the argument that the best means available to Spain for frustrating the proposed alliance between England and France lay in supplying

money to enable James to remain in Avignon in defiance of the combined pressure of George I and Orléans thereby, it was hoped, giving rise to suspicion between London and Paris and the collapse of the planned alliance. This was not Philip's motive for his latest contribution to the Jacobite cause. After Alberoni had become aware of Mar's proposal (owing to the ill-conceived manner in which it was brought to Madrid by a Major McPherson, a known Jacobite agent[273]), he informed Lawless of his belief that Orléans, prompted by his desire for an agreement with George I to safeguard both his position as Regent and claim to the French throne, was so determined to remove James from Avignon that no amount of money, however large, would be sufficient for James to frustrate the pressure for his departure.[274] Philip's latest contribution was no more than a reflection of Spain's view that James was a cause deserving a limited amount of financial assistance to sustain him during a period when his fortunes were at a low ebb.

Queen Mary was dissatisfied with the smallness of Philip's donation;[275] nevertheless, to the Jacobites any contribution, however small, was not to be refused, and arrangements were made for the transfer of the bills of exchange. Mary suggested that Cellamare should hand over the money to the Count of Castelblanco, a Spanish adherent of the Chevalier and the son-in-law of Lord Melford, James II's chief adviser from 1689 to 1694, whom she had empowered to convey it to her son in Avignon.[276] Cellamare heartily approved of Mary's choice as intermediary and the transfer was carried out as she had suggested: the Spanish ambassador received a receipt (dated 27 October) for the 37,113

livres,[277] and Castelblanco took the bills of exchange to Avignon where they arrived at the end of November.[278]

This drew to a close Spain's provision of money to the Jacobite cause arising from Louis XIV's request to Philip V in August 1715. By November of the following year Spain had supplied James with an assortment of bullion, coinage and bills of exchange equivalent in value to £43,500 sterling,* which

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* Spain's financial contribution to the Jacobite cause in 1715-16 may be broken down thus:

	Spanish currency	French currency	Approx. sterling equivalent
1st contribution (Dec. 1715)	100,000 pesos		£25,000
2nd contribution (end of Dec. 1715)	42,840 pesos		£10,500
3rd contribution (Jan. 1716)	10,893½ pesos		£2,700
4th contribution (Apr. 1716)		28,000 livres	£2,200
Final contribution (Oct. 1716)		37,113 livres	£3,100
		(TOTAL)	£43,500

according to William Dicconson, treasurer to the exiled Stuart court, was the largest donation to the Jacobite cause in 1715-16.[279]

Spain's financial succour to James at the time of the Fifteen had not been a success for both Madrid and the Chevalier. The Spaniards had obtained nothing from the Jacobite leadership apart from a profusion of thanks and numerous declarations of goodwill. The projected treaty between Philip V and James III to secure the latter's support for Spain's Italian policy (upon which the initial Spanish offer of financial assistance to the Stuarts had been conditional) had never materialised on account of France's refusal to co-operate followed by the gradual collapse of the rebellion. The Jacobite movement too had little reason for satisfaction with Spain's financial involvement in the Fifteen. The money supplied by Madrid was scarcely too little to be of effect but it had arrived too late to make a decisive contribution to Jacobite fortunes: in the words of Dicconson 'if he (James) had had by him, when he first projected the late expedition, half the money which has been spent in it, it might with good management have had a better effect.'[280]

SPAIN AND JACOBITISM: AN INTERLUDE

(i) Coolness between Madrid and the Chevalier

Spain's action in sending 37,113 livres to James in Avignon in autumn 1716 was followed by an interlude in Spanish-Jacobite relations, which shows a period of distinct coolness in Madrid's dealings with the Stuart cause. This frigidity was all on Spain's side since James had nothing to lose from trying to persuade the Spanish government to assist his cause. The year 1717 opened badly for the Chevalier and his interests. By article two of the Triple Alliance of Britain, France and the Dutch Republic, signed at the Hague on 4 January,[1] the French government undertook to compel James to leave Avignon and cross the Alps between the signing and the ratification of the agreement. As the Chevalier's attempts after the collapse of the Fifteen to find a more permanent refuge had already demonstrated, the only ruler prepared to offer him asylum was the Pope, Clement XI. On 6 February, therefore, James and a small entourage set off from Avignon on the first stage of a journey to a new residence in Papal territory in Italy,[2] thereby increasing that identification with Roman Catholicism so damaging in the eyes of James's Protestant adherents which the Chevalier had been trying to avoid.

James's ejection from west of the Alps was not the only setback to the Jacobite cause in the opening weeks of 1717. On 29 January O.S. the British government arrested Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister in London. It emerged that he, Sparre, Sweden's ambassador in Paris and Görtz,*[3] then acting as a roving envoy for

*Görtz was arrested at Arnhem in the Dutch Republic on 22 February as a result of pressure brought by George I, but he was released the following August.

Charles XII, had been engaged in attempts to raise money from Jacobites in return for a vague undertaking that Charles would invade the British Isles in support of James; also detained were two English supporters of the Pretender, Charles Caesar, M.P. for Hertford until 1715, and Sir Jacob Banks, a financier.[4] Whatever the seriousness of this so-called 'Swedish Plot' - the British government's motive for the arrests was not that George I and his ministers seriously expected an invasion by Sweden; it lay rather in the Whig administration's desire to convince Parliamentary and public opinion of the threat of a Swedish descent and thereby bring about a British declaration of war on Charles XII[5] - the affair illustrated the extent to which the Jacobite movement had been duped by Görtz into parting with large sums of money[6] in return for the vaguest offers of Sweden's support.

Spain, on the other hand, had everything to lose if she collaborated with the Stuart cause. Considerations of security, the need not to antagonise Britain and, to a less extent, Alberoni's personal view that Jacobitism was, politically speaking, virtually a lost cause all dictated that Madrid should adopt a marked attitude of coolness towards the Chevalier. This was only marginally due to Philip V's pledge not to assist the Stuarts and their adherents given to Bubb, the British ambassador in Madrid, on 23 March 1716. In itself an undertaking of this nature meant little to the Spanish government, especially to Alberoni (who on one occasion reportedly stated that kings were not bound to honour commitments if they deemed that the circumstances making these necessary had altered[7]), and this declaration had not

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inhibited Philip V from supplying James with money in April and October 1716.

The danger of the Jacobite issue presenting a serious security risk to Spain was forcefully illustrated by the exposure of the alleged 'Swedish Plot' in January and February 1717 O.S. News of this took the Spanish government by surprise since its diplomatic representatives had apparently failed to provide any advance warning of the arrests of Gyllenborg and Görtz.[8] Madrid's surprise was understandable. The previous October Philip V had supplied James with 37,113 livres under the impression that the Chevalier was in serious financial straits. According to the Whig administration's presentation of the Görtz-Gyllenborg correspondence* (a copy of which was sent to Madrid by Monteleón, the Spanish ambassador in London[9]), however, it appeared that at the time in question the Pretender's leading agents had been acting in concert with Gortz to bring about a Swedish invasion of the British Isles. James had omitted to inform Spain of this and, as a result, there had been a serious possibility that the apparently successful penetration of the Jacobites' ranks by the British government's intelligence service would reveal Spain's two contributions to James of April and October 1716 to George I's ministers since £8,000 had, it appeared, been sent to Sparre in Paris from the Stuart court at Avignon,[10] and this amount could well have included some of the money supplied to the Chevalier by Madrid.

Spain's ambassador in London, Monteleón, narrowly avoided

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*Extracts from this were published by the British government on 20 February O.S. to attempt to justify its breach of diplomatic immunity in arresting an accredited representative, and also to persuade the public of the existence of a Swedish-Jacobite plot.

implication in the 'Swedish Plot'. Not only did Monteleón, on account of his personal friendship with Gyllenborg, make a lone protest at the British government's alleged violation of diplomatic immunity:[11] the Whig administration also suspected the Spanish ambassador of smuggling a letter (subsequently intercepted in the post) from the arrested Swedish envoy to Görtz.[12] Whitehall considered that the Spaniard's activities following Gyllenborg's arrest were adequate reason for asking Madrid to recall him.[13] The British government did not, however, pursue this course of action and thereby add a Spanish dimension to the Swedish plot. There was a lack of conclusive evidence that Monteleón had been directly involved in Gyllenborg's conspiracy with the Jacobites; the Whig administration was also reluctant to jeopardize Anglo-Spanish relations by asking Madrid to recall its ambassador in London.

This unwillingness on the part of Britain to worsen her relations with Spain arose from the fact that these had reached a critical stage; ironically, a similar motive for Madrid's desiring a temporary halt to her use of the Jacobite issue. Despite diplomatic and propaganda successes against Jacobitism at the beginning of 1717, George I's government was not content to rest on its laurels. A serious threat to the stability of Europe lay in the continuing absence of any formal peace agreement between Philip V and the Emperor, Charles VI. The British government argued that the latter's failure to renounce his claim to the throne and territory of Spain produced instability throughout Southern and Central Europe: Philip's own sense of security was thereby imperilled, leading him in turn to persist

in his claim to the Regency and ultimately the throne of France, thereby weakening Orleans' position. London feared that the continuing hostility between the King of Spain and the Emperor might erupt into a war in which, if Philip was deemed the aggressor, Britain would be compelled by the Treaty of Westminster of May 1716 O.S. to assist Charles VI, with consequent harmful effects upon British trading and commercial interests with Spain. This was something that the Whig administration was determined to avoid, and its solution was to remove this potential threat to peace in Southern Europe by reconciling Philip V and Charles VI.

The British Peace Plan for the South, worked out by Stanhope when accompanying George I to Hanover from July to December 1716, proposed a neat solution to this problem.[14] Philip was to be mollified by Charles's renunciation of all claim to Spain, her territories and the Spanish throne: in return all Imperial possessions in Italy and the Austrian Netherlands were to be guaranteed by all signatories to the agreement (a reflection of Stanhope's determination that Britain should not bear the responsibility of defending Habsburg possessions alone). The crux of this Peace Plan for Southern Europe was, however, the use of territorial exchanges in Italy to obtain the acquiesence of both Philip and Charles to Britain's proposals: only by some form of territorial adjustment might the two rulers be persuaded to accept British mediation.

Stanhope proposed firstly, a direct exchange of the Imperial-held island of Sardinia with Sicily, ceded by Spain to Victor Amadeus II of Savoy in 1713. This would satisfy the interests of all parties to the proposed scheme except Philip V. Britain's commerce would be strengthened by the transfer of Sicily, an

island of considerable strategic importance on her trading route to the Eastern Mediterranean, from Victor Amadeus to the Emperor whose lack of a navy precluded him from acting against British trading interests. Charles VI himself would be able to join Sicily to Naples and thereby unite the so-called 'Two Sicilies'. Victor Amadeus (who had initially suggested the exchange of Sicily for Sardinia in 1716[15]) would be relieved of the burden of administering an impoverished island where his rule was widely resented. Philip V had the worst of this exchange. At Utrecht it had been stated that Sicily should revert to Spain in the event of the extinction of the Savoyard male line; if Stanhope's project went ahead and the island was transferred to the Emperor, Philip stood to lose this remote possibility of recovering a foothold for Spain in Italy. The Spanish king would, therefore, have to be mollified. London hoped to do this and obtain Philip's willing participation in the Peace Plan for the South by offering in lieu of a direct session of land to Spain, territorial compensation in Italy for the offspring of Philip's second marriage who appeared to have little chance of succeeding their father in the Iberian peninsula. It was therefore proposed that Carlos, Elisabeth Farnese's first son born in January 1716, should succeed as Duke of Parma upon the death of the last in the male line of the Farnese.[16]

The British government hoped that these peace proposals, initially submitted to the Emperor and Philip V at the end of 1716, would serve as a basis for a formal peace agreement between the two. In particular, Stanhope believed that Charles' renunciation

of all claim to the Spanish throne plus the provision of Parma to be ruled by Carlos independent of Spain would be sufficient to persuade Philip and his wife to accept the principle of British mediation with Vienna. This was too optimistic a hope. Stanhope's proposals would have involved the extinction of Philip's plan to revive Spain's Italian Empire and, since the British peace plan envisaged that all signatories guaranteed the positions of George I and Orleans in Britain and France respectively, of the Spanish king's claim to the Regency and throne of France; moreover the offer of Parma for Carlos was a poor substitute for Elisabeth's aim of securing this and Tuscany for herself and her children in their own right.

Stanhope and his government placed great reliance on Alberoni to persuade Philip and Elisabeth to accept the Peace Plan for the South in view of the abbe's role in negotiating the revised Anglo-Spanish Commercial and Asiento Treaties in 1715-1716. By the beginning of 1717 Alberoni had consolidated his position as chief minister of Spain and the most influential figure outside the Spanish Royal Family, although Grimaldo still retained nominal responsibility for foreign affairs. Alberoni realised that Stanhope's peace plan, having the strength of British diplomacy behind it, could not be ignored by Spain. This did not mean that he supported the principle behind Britain's proposals, to whit a peace agreement between Spain and the Emperor. Neither Alberoni nor the Spanish government had abandoned the joint policy of securing Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany, to which Elisabeth Farnese was heir, for her and her children, and of recovering Spain's former Italian territory, Alberoni was, however, acutely aware of

the difficulties confronting the execution of this dual policy. The Treaty of Westminster between George I and Charles VI had destroyed his initial plan to use the offer of commercial concessions to London to neutralise its opposition to Spain's Italian policy, and faced Madrid with the theoretical possibility that a Spanish attack on Habsburg possessions in Italy might compel London to come to the assistance of the Emperor. George I's offer of mediation at the end of 1716 implied that Britain was prepared to attempt to defuse the potential conflict between Madrid and Vienna.

Alberoni knew that in the political atmosphere then prevailing in Europe Madrid could not ignore the possibility of war with Charles VI and any country allied to him when executing its Italian policy. As things stood, however, Spain was not in a position to mount an offensive against Habsburg-held territory in Italy. The abbe believed that it would take time (possibly as long as three years[17]) to ensure that Spain's naval and military forces were able to carry out the prolonged campaign necessary to wrest the disputed parts of Italy from Charles VI. In April 1717 one of Alberoni's protégés, Miguel Fernández Durán, was appointed secretario de guerra y marina (Secretary for War) to coordinate the preparations for war against the Emperor.[18] José Patiño, one of the ablest administrators in Spain, was given the task of assembling a fleet to transport a military expedition to a theatre of war in the Italian peninsula.[19]

A political reason for Spain delaying any attack on the Imperial position in Italy lay in the unresolved dispute between Madrid and the Holy See, dating from Clement XI's recognition of the Emperor 'as Carlos III' of Spain in 1709. Alberoni appreciated that Spain's

policy of re-establishing a Spanish presence in Italy and creating an independent state of Parma-Tuscany for Elisabeth and her children required an understanding with Rome: the abbé's motives in aiming for a rapprochement with the Holy See were not entirely disinterested, since he hoped to obtain his own promotion to the rank of cardinal as recognition of his role in reconciling Philip V and Clement XI.[20] Despite a conciliatory gesture made by Alberoni to Rome in 1716 - in response to a request from the Pope Spanish ships were sent to assist in raising the Turkish siege of Corfu - Spain's relationship with the Papacy had by the spring of 1717 reached an impasse. Clement refused to promote Alberoni to the rank of Cardinal until diplomatic relations between Rome and Madrid had been reestablished, a Concordat aimed at regulating the proportion of Spanish ecclesiastical revenues to be sent to Rome signed, and Spain had given an undertaking to supply ships for an offensive which Clement wished to mount against the Turkish presence in the Eastern Mediterranean;[21] Philip V in his turn would agree to none of these Papal demands until Alberoni had been created a cardinal.[22]

Until these logistic and political obstacles in an attack on the Imperial presence in Italy had been surmounted, it would do little harm for Philip to ascertain the most advantageous terms he could exact in return for co-operating in Stanhope's Peace Plan for the South. Should these be deemed unacceptable, the time taken by discussion of the British proposals could be used to bring Spain's military capacity to a point of readiness which would enable her to launch an offensive against the disputed Habsburg possessions with a good chance of success.[23] Accordingly, in April 1717 Philip V indicated his willingness to accept George I's

offer of mediation.[24] Spain's own negotiator in this diplomatic process was the Marquis Beretti Landi, the Spanish ambassador in the Dutch Republic, who had made a favourable impression upon George I during the latter's stay in the Hague at the end of 1716.[25] Beretti was therefore given full powers to negotiate on Spain's behalf, even being permitted to visit London if necessary.[26]

Alberoni's apparent willingness to fall in with the British government's Peace Project meant that Spain's own contact with the Jacobite cause was to be reduced to the barest minimum, although not halted altogether. On 7 January 1717 James had written to Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese.[27] It appears that these letters were passed to Madrid via Francesco Farnese, Duke of Parma[28] who had considerable sympathy for the Chevalier which he demonstrated by 'overwhelm(ing James) with kindness',[29] when the Chevalier passed through Parma-Piacenza between 7-10 March 1717[30] on his journey from Avignon to Pesaro, a temporary refuge in the Papal States allocated by Clement XI. Following pressure from the Duke[31] Alberoni replied to James on 8 March enclosing letters from Philip and his wife[32] all (in the Chevalier's own words) 'full of complements and nothing else at all.'[33]

Alberoni had decided to terminate James's practice of maintaining a representative at the Spanish Court. In the early part of 1717 Patrick Lawless, who had held this position on the Chevalier's behalf since the middle of 1715, was appointed to an army post at Salamanca, a reminder to James that the Irishman was an officer in the service of Spain whose chief loyalty lay to Philip V, not James III.[34]

Although this move undoubtedly had an adverse psychological effect upon the Jacobite movement when its fortunes were at a low ebb - for the first time since 1705 the Pretender possessed no official representative in Madrid - in retrospect this may not have been a serious blow to James's interests. Neither Lawless nor his predecessor Toby Bourke had been successful in obtaining Spanish support for the Chevalier: the negotiations at the time of the dependencia reservada in 1715, for example, had been conducted in Paris, not Madrid; and in this and the following year James had used Cellamare in the French capital as the channel through which he communicated with Philip and Elisabeth. Upon the Chevalier's arrival at Pesaro, his temporary habitat, in March 1717, this function of James's link with the Spanish king and queen passed to Cardinal Aquaviva who looked after Spain's interests in Rome.[35] Furthermore, although Lawless was not replaced as Jacobite representative in Madrid, the Chevalier did not lack sympathisers in Spain who were prepared to use their influence in his favour if the occasion arose. Foremost among these were James's nephew Tynemouth who after his escape from Scotland had settled in Spain in July 1716 and, by permission of Philip V, had adopted the Spanish estates and title of Duke of Liria given to his father Berwick;[36] the Duke of Popoli, Governor of the Prince of Asturias, the heir to the throne;[37] Prince Pio, capitán general (Military Governor) of Catalonia who in 1716 had proposed that Jacobite refugees from the rebellion in Scotland be admitted to the Spanish armed services (but the idea was vetoed by Madrid on account of its expected adverse effect upon Anglo-Spanish relations);[38] Fr Daubenton, Philip V's Jesuit confessor, and Dr. John Higgins, one

of the Spanish king's principal medical advisers. Nevertheless, these Jacobite sympathisers, with the possible exceptions of Daubenton and Higgins, lacked any substantial influence in Spanish government circles where any decision to commit Spain to support of James's cause would be taken.

Alberoni himself held a low opinion of the political effectiveness of Jacobitism. In a letter of 3 April 1717 to his friend Count Ignazio Rocca, minister of finances in Parma, the abbé indicated that he regarded the Chevalier's situation as a lost cause, and he suggested that James might be best advised to accept what seemed inevitable, abandon his claim and become a cardinal.[39] This was only a personal view, coloured no doubt by the difficulties surrounding Alberoni's hoped-for elevation to the Sacred College; however, it boded ill for the Chevalier by indicating that Madrid's degree of involvement with the Stuart cause would not reach a level desired by James until Jacobitism had become more politically useful to Alberoni, Philip V's chief minister. This was unlikely to occur until the relationship between England and Spain had considerably deteriorated: if, for instance, Stanhope's Peace Plan for the South failed and Britain joined the Imperial side in a future war against Philip V.

In keeping with this policy of ignoring the Jacobite issue, Alberoni decisively rejected a proposal made by the Pope to the effect that Vienna and Madrid should submit to Papal mediation, and once a peace between them had been concluded, jointly support an attempt to restore James in Britain.[40] The Chevalier thus had no place in this aspect of Spain's relations with the Papacy; there was however, another way in which he could serve the interests of Philip V and Alberoni.

Chapter 2

(ii) A Red Hat for Alberoni: James's role

The possibility that the desire of the Spanish government and of Alberoni for his promotion to the rank of Cardinal might be manipulated for James's benefit was first raised in October 1716 by Lawless who was then the Chevalier's representative in Madrid.[41] Aware of the importance attached by Spain to Alberoni's elevation as a mark of prestige and, in addition, as implied Papal approval of Spanish policy towards Italy, Lawless inferred that the Jacobite leadership should approach Rome with the suggestion that a promotion of Alberoni to the Sacred College might be made conditional upon Spain's providing the Jacobite cause with assistance.[42] The idea appealed to Mar, James's Secretary of State, and he told Lawless by return that an indirect approach to the Holy See on these lines would be made.[43]

After this, it appears that no further action on the matter was taken by the Jacobite leadership until the spring of 1717, on account chiefly of James's ejection from Avignon which focused the attention of the Chevalier and his advisers upon the overriding need to secure a place of residence for him. In May 1717, however, the idea of injecting a Jacobite dimension to the question of Alberoni's ecclesiastical promotion recurred, albeit in a different form to that mooted the previous autumn. On account of the impasse then existing between Spain and the Holy See (in which the timing of Alberoni's elevation to the rank of Cardinal - before or after a Spanish-Papal Concordat - played a crucial role), it was out of the question for James to try to impose further conditions to those already laid down by Clement XI before he would give the Red Hat to Alberoni: any role the Chevalier might hope to play would be

restricted to that of an advocate on behalf of the aspiring cardinal in Rome.

In May 1717 James decided to visit the Pope to try and persuade Clement to provide a more permanent residence for him than Pesaro, and also to increase the financial support to the Jacobite court provided by the Holy See. In addition the Chevalier proposed to use his influence at Rome (which was considerable due to his status as a monarch who had been deprived of his rightful throne on account of his refusal to abjure Catholicism) in support of Alberoni's attempts to be made a Cardinal.[44] James's motives in this intervention on the abbe's behalf were financial and political: as the Chevalier told Mar

> '(I) think..it for (my)..interest to meddle in...(the attempts to persuade the Pope to give a Red Hat to Alberoni), and accordingly (am)..doing..all (I) can to forward (Alberoni's)..pretensions, in hopes that by gaining Spain's favour,..(I) may at last find..(my) own account in it...(and)...make this jaunt (to Rome) prove a solid penny...'.

James hoped that the immediate result of a successful intervention in support of the abbe would persuade Spain as a mark of gratitude to recommence financial assistance to the Jacobite cause last supplied in October 1716. Moreover such action on Madrid's part would, by implying that Spain had decided to risk defying George I by subsidising the Pretender, denote a political decision in James's favour by the Spanish government and might serve as the first stage towards a full scale strategy of Spain supporting Jacobitism. The possibility of a visit to Rome helping to solve the perennial problem of James's shortage of money, by resulting in finance from either the Pope or Spain prompted the Chevalier to override the objections of Mar and Ormonde, both of whom feared the adverse effect of the trip to Rome upon James's protestant adherents,[46] and visit Clement XI.

James arrived in Rome on 26 May[47] and lodged in a house belonging to his agent in the city, Cardinal Filippo Antonio Gualterio.[48] The Chevalier saw the Pope on 28 May and 5 June[49] and after the latter interview with Clement, James appeared confident that his entreaties on Alberoni's behalf stood a good chance of success. In a letter to the abbé[50] (probably handed over to Aquaviva for transmission to Madrid when James saw Spain's representative in Rome that evening[51]) the Chevalier made little attempt to conceal his belief that Clement would shortly create Alberoni a cardinal.[52]

James's intervention on behalf of Alberoni had by now assumed a crucial role in the proceedings surrounding the latter's hoped-for promotion. On 27 May José Molines, a former Spanish agent in Rome who had been appointed Giudice's successor as Inquisitor-General in Spain, was arrested on the orders of Prince Löwestein, Austrian governor of Milan, while crossing into Imperial territory en route to Madrid overland: his papers were confiscated and sent to Vienna (to be thoroughly studied for any indication of Spanish plans for an attack on the disputed Habsburg lands) while he was imprisoned in the castle at Milan.[53] News of the arrest, transmitted to Spain by San Felipe, Spanish envoy to Genoa,* reached Madrid on 7 or 8 June,[54] and led to immediate

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*Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, marqués de San Felipe (1669-1728), Spanish envoy extraordinary to Genoa, 1715-25. His memoirs, Commentarios de la Guerra de España e Historia de su Rey Felipe V el animoso (first published 1726, most recent edition Madrid, 1957) have been extensively cited by many Spanish historians, but tend to be rather inaccurate.

demands for retaliation. Alberoni oppcsed any hasty action which would jeopardize his whole strategy of avoiding war until Spain was militarily prepared. He was aware of the dangers which might result from any rash move, since he believed that the naval preparations in Catalonia being carried out under Fernández Durán were not sufficiently advanced to guarantee the success of an anti-Habsburge offensive at that time. Alberoni also realised that precipitate action would be playing into the Emperor's hands by driving the British government (and the Royal Navy) into the Imperial camp under the terms of the Treaty of Westminster.[55]

The abbé's motives for counselling delay were also personal since he had no wish to do anything which might antagonise the Pope at a time when the question of his own promotion to the rank of cardinal was in the balance. By mid-June Alberoni was aware of James's intervention on his behalf at Rome. This news had probably reached Madrid via the Duke of Parma who sympathised with the Chevalier and, against Alberoni's advice, corresponded directly with James irrespective of the security risks involved.[56] Alberoni wrote to Rocca, minister of finances at Parma, privately acknowledging his appreciation of the Chevalier's efforts, in terms indicating that the Parmesan court was fully aware of James's intervention, on 14 June[57] by when it seems unlikely that the Chevalier's letter of the 5th to Alberoni outlining his hopes of Clement's agreeing to raise the abbé to the rank of cardinal would have reached Madrid.[58]

Events in Rome where James was interceding on Alberoni's behalf thus began to move parallel to those in Spain where

mounting pressure on the government for retaliatory action against Charles VI spurred Alberoni to reach a compromise with Pompeo Aldrovandi, the negotiator sent to Spain by the Holy See. Following James's interviews with Clement XI, the Chevalier obtained an assurance from the Pope on 11 June that Alberoni would be created a cardinal once Aldrovandi, the papal negotiator in Spain, was satisfied that the Spanish government had complied with the Holy See's demands, and signed a Concordat.[59] James eagerly passed this news through Gualterio to Aquaviva to be forwarded to Madrid.[60] Meanwhile in Spain, negotiations between Alberoni and Aldrovandi for a Concordat opened at the Escorial to the west of the Spanish capital on 10 June.[61] With astonishing speed the two men reached agreement, and a Concordat was signed on 17 June. Although this move represented a retreat from Spain's earlier insistence that there could be no agreement with the Papacy until after Alberoni's elevation to the Sacred College, Madrid actually conceded little to the Holy See. No mention was made (for instance) of any commitment by Philip to supply a fleet for action against the Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean: diplomatic relations between Madrid and Rome were re-established, and a sum of ten per cent of all ecclesiastical revenues in Spain was to be remitted to the Spanish king.[62]

Details of this concordat were immediately dispatched to Clement in Rome.[63] The Pope was dissatisfied since the agreement omitted any mention of Spain undertaking to provide naval support against the Turks. In view of Clement XI's pledge to the Chevalier that Alberoni would be made a cardinal once a Spanish-papal Concordat was signed, the Pope informed James on 11 July

of his decision to override his objections to the Concordat and create Alberoni a cardinal on account (the Chevalier was assured) of the Pontiff's desire to pursue a course of action from which James might ultimately benefit.[64]

The following day, Monday, 12 July, Clement created Alberoni Cardinal in a consistory which took place with a marked absence of the formality appropriate to such an occasion.[65] By this time the Chevalier had left Rome, and Castelblanco, the only Spanish subject on James's entourage (who had recently been created Duke of St. Andrews in the Jacobite aristocracy[66]) conveyed the Pope's decision to James in Urbino, the residence allotted to him by Clement.[67] The news provided a considerable morale booster to the Jacobite movement after recent reverses. James's supporters exaggerated the personal animosity between the Pope and Alberoni[68] and magnified the Chevalier's role in the proceedings.[69] James himself wasted little time in informing the new cardinal of his entreaties at Rome.[70]

The fact that the Chevalier's influence with the Papacy was brought to bear on Alberoni's behalf was of considerable importance, but the most significant result of James's intercession lay in the timing of Alberoni's ecclesiastical promotion. The Chevalier's intervention broke the impasse surrounding Alberoni's desired elevation and caused Clement to create him a cardinal before Spain had retaliated against the Emperor's arrest of Molines. Philip V had decided in principle on 9 July to override Alberoni's objections to any immediate action following Molines' seizure[71] (thereby spurning a secret offer of mediation between Madrid and Vienna made by George I, and passed to the Spanish government through Beretti Landi[72]) and invade Sardinia, chosen primarily

because it was the nearest disputed Habsburg territory to Spain and, owing to the weakness of its defences, the easiest target.[73] The Spanish fleet which had been assembled in the harbour at Barcelona was divided into two squadrons. The first, under the command of Esteban Mari, a Genoese in the service of Spain sailed on 22 July; the other, led by Baltasar Guevara, a Spaniard, departed nine days later (31 July).[74]

News of Alberoni's ecclesiastical promotion reached the Spanish court between 22[75] and 25 July.[76] This assured him that there was no further need to conciliate the Pope: it also removed the most serious political obstacle to Spain's retaliation against the Emperor. James thus performed a considerable service to Alberoni, which the new cardinal acknowledged even before news of his elevation was known in Spain.[77] The Chevalier's intervention at Rome had satisfied Alberoni's honour - he was now a cardinal - and saved his political standing in Spain by removing the potential conflict between his wish for ecclesiastical preferment and the desire of an influential section of Spanish opinion for immediate retaliation against the Emperor.

In Alberoni's formal letter of thanks to James for his intervention with the Pope, written on 31 August,[78] the new cardinal stated his intention of demonstrating his gratitude for the Chevalier's intercession at Rome. This was a general declaration of intent rather than a commitment that Spain was likely to assist the Jacobite cause in the immediate future.

Despite the invasion of Sardinia (which capitulated in October), relations between Madrid and London had not so deteriorated that Spain was ready to consider using the Chevalier

as a means of attacking Britain. The Whig ministry was determined not to overreact to Philip V's aggression and risk jeopardising its commercial relations with Spain, and Sunderland, Secretary for the Northern Department, was quick to pass this message to Monteleón.[79] Instead, Britain's response to the seizure of Sardinia was to press ahead with combined diplomatic action to halt Spain's anti-Habsburg policy on the basis of Stanhope's peace plan for Southern Europe. In the autumn of 1717 representatives of Spain, France and Austria were invited to Britain to thrash out an acceptable method of mediation between Philip V and the Emperor along with guarantees for the status quo in England and France. Spain refused to participate,[80] but France was represented by Dubois, one-time tutor to Orleans, the Empire by Pentenrriedter and Britain by Stanhope. After much bargaining in the negotiations between those held at Hampton Court, a provisional settlement was reached late in November.*[81] This had to obtain the agreement of each of the governments concerned, and Dubois had to overcome the influence of the Vieille Cour, a faction in Paris (encouraged by Cellamare) which favoured an alignment between the two Bourbon powers, Spain and France.[82] For Madrid, however, the emergence of a general plan of mediation from Stanhope's diplomacy had the effect of a lighted time fuse: unless the Spanish government accepted the general principle of

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*By the terms of this, Spain was to give up Sardinia which was to be exchanged for Sicily as Stanhope had previously suggested. The Emperor was to renounce his claim to the throne and territories of Spain, and allow Parma to be ruled independently of Madrid by Elisabeth Farnese's son Carlos. If Philip V refused to accept these proposals, however, Victor Amadeus of Savoy was to receive Parma.

such mediation, a clash with Britain was inevitable. In these circumstances Alberoni would have an opportunity to honour the pledge to show his gratitude for James's intervention at Rome.

(i) Jacobite hopes of Spain

> 'I regard (you) as the best friends left to me in the world and the source from which I expect at a proper time and place my greatest consolation.'

Thus James addressed Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese when informing them of the death of his mother, Mary of Modena, in May 1718.[1] Even making some allowance for a degree of hyperbole suitable on such an occasion the Chevalier's expression does appear somewhat effusive when considering that it was addressed to the King and Queen of Spain, a country which had not been particularly friendly to the Stuart cause since the final payment of its contribution to the Jacobite rebellion in October 1716.[2] Yet despite this, and notwithstanding the fact the James's role in the elevation of Alberoni to the rank of Cardinal in July 1717 had failed to produce any noticeable thaw in Spain's lukewarmness towards the Jacobite cause, the Pretender was not prepared to give up hope of the Spanish government adopting a more favourable attitude.[3] James could hardly be blamed for this. In his position he and his followers had to rely on assistance from any power at odds with the British government, hoping that relations between the two would deteriorate to the point at which the government hostile to London would support the Stuart cause from motives of self interest. This strategy and its application to Spain was expressed by the Chevalier himself in a memorandum dated 27 January 1718 and passed to Cardinal Aquaviva who represented Spanish interests in Rome to be forwarded to Madrid:[4]

> 'They (supporters of the House of Stuart) believe in general that it is their interest as well as his Majesty's (James's) to engage the (British) government in some foreign war, as

> the only means to engage the power the (British) government is in war with, to come to the King's succour and theirs by the pressing motive of (their) proper defence...'

In Jacobite eyes this criterion of a potential enemy of George I and therefore a possible supporter of James III could be filled by either (or both) Charles XII of Sweden and Tsar Peter I of Russia as well as Philip V. While George I in the capacity of Elector of Hanover was at war with Sweden, Görtz, Charles XII's chief adviser, was prepared to dabble in Jacobite intrigues.[5] Although Russia was nominally an ally of Hanover against Sweden, relations between Tsar and Elector had deteriorated as a result of mutual suspicion. George feared Russian expansion into North Germany, and this was not dispelled even after the evacuation of Peter's troops from Mecklenburg in the summer of 1717 had removed the original cause of Hanover's concern. Peter on his part resented George's refusal to allow the British Baltic fleet to serve Russia's war aims by attacking Sweden from Finland, while George was made uneasy by the Tsar's flirtation with Jacobite sympathisers, in particular Peter's medical adviser Dr. Robert Erskine (brother of Sir John Erskine of Alva), an enthusiastic partisan of the Chevalier's cause.[6] When the possibility arose in the autumn of 1717 of negotiations between representatives of the Tsar and Görtz (to be held on the island of Lövö in the Aland archipelago situated between Sweden and Finland), there were as a result strong hopes of Russo-Swedish collaboration for the benefit of James.

These Jacobite hopes of support from Peter and Charles were not well founded. The Swedish King and Görtz aimed to use the Jacobites

as a means of putting pressure on the Russians to prove accommodating to Sweden in the peace preliminaries between the two while balancing these negotiations against overtures to George which were being carried out via an intermediary, Ernst von Fabrice*; in this way the Swedes hoped to play off the Tsar against George in order to delay the next stage of the offensive against Sweden and enable Charles to obtain better peace terms.[7] Görtz therefore had no wish to compromise Fabrice's negotiations, and Ormonde - who in mid-1717 had been sent to Northern Europe by Mar, James's Secretary of State, to use the Jacobite links with Sweden and Russia to act as an unofficial mediator between Charles XII and Peter I and to explore the possibility of James marrying a daughter or niece of the Tsar[8] - was refused permission to come to Sweden.[9] The Tsar, despite his exhortations to Ormonde relayed through Robert Erskine, had no wish to antagonise George to the extent of receiving such a notorious Jacobite as Ormonde at his court, and the Duke was forbidden to enter Russian territory with the result that his mission only took him as far as Mitau in Courland where it petered out in October 1717.[10]

Despite Alberoni's lukewarmness Spain offered the Jacobite cause better long term prospects of support than Sweden or Russia. The British government was not prepared to let the Spanish occupation of Sardinia destroy its embryo peace plan for the South. The negotiations in London between Stanhope, Dubois and Pentenrriedter representing Britain, France and the Empire, culminating in draft agreements of November 1717 and the following February - in which Spain's seizure of the island was ignored and it was specified that Sardinia was to be exchanged with Sicily as

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* Fabrice arrived in London in August 1717; his negotiations were later transferred to Lund in southern Sweden opening the following April.

in the original British proposals[11] - illustrated the Whig administration's resolve not to allow any aggression on the part of Spain to deflect it from the policy of bringing about a negotiated peace between Philip V and Charles VI on terms laid down by Britain and France. The Spanish government for its part was not prepared to back down and abandon its anti-Habsburg Italian policy. Following the successful capture of Sardinia, preparations were begun in the ports of Catalonia for a second expedition to Italy itself.[12] In view of this hardening of attitudes on both sides Spain had to regard Britain as a potential enemy. Despite the Commercial and New Asiento Treaties of 1715-16 which created an illusion of Anglo-Spanish amity, underlying differences between the two countries had remained substantial. Besides Britain's retention of Gibraltar and Minorca, George I's increasingly open alignment with the Emperor and subsequent British support for the principle of Spain's permanent exclusion from the Italian peninsula rankled deeply in Madrid and helped to ensure that the Whig government with its supposed anti-Spanish bias was the Pretender's best advocate in Madrid even if short term political considerations precluded any active support for Jacobitism.

These political reasons which inclined James to Philip V were reinforced by ties of religion and kinship which did not exist between the Pretender and the two Northern rulers. In Jacobite eyes Luis Principe de Asturias, the heir to the Spanish throne, was third in line after the Chevalier to succeed to the English crown if James died without producing a direct

heir,* a point made in the memorandum of January 1718.[13] These family links were strengthened when in mid-1718 negotiations were opened for James to marry Maria Clementina Sobieska, a cousin of Elisabeth Farnese.≠ [14]

Jacobite hopes of Spain arising from political reasons and the sense of monarchical and religious solidarity between James and Philip V were focused on three objectives: the question of asylum and careers in Spain for individual Jacobites; the possibility of obtaining weapons and some degree of covert military support and, finally, the hope that the Spanish government would supply the Pretender and his followers with money.

The first of these - the question of asylum and subsequent employment in Spain - was relatively straightforward. The Spanish government was always willing to enlist men of proven military capability in its armed services, and Jacobite sympathisers were no exception. This question of granting asylum and employment to James's supporters had not been touched on in the declaration signed by Philip in March 1716 under pressure

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* Owing to the fact that his mother, Philip V's first wife, Maria Luisa of Savoy (1688-1714), was the daughter of James's cousin Anne-Marie of Orléans (1669-1728) and Victor Amadeus II, the other Catholic claimants to the English throne were (first in line) Charles Emanuel (born 1701), the first surviving son of Victor Amadeus and his wife, and secondly, Louis XV (b. 1710), son of the Savoyard royal couple's elder daughter Marie Adelaide (1685-1712). The possibility that Luis (b.1707) might become the Jacobite contender to the English throne never featured prominently in James's approaches to Spain.

≠ Maria Clementina Sobieska (1702-35), the daughter of Prince James Sobieski (1667-1734) and Hedwig-Elisabeth-Emelia, the sister of Dorothea-Sophie, mother of Elisabeth Farnese. These family relationships could not be overemphasised, however: Prince James's wife was also the Emperor's aunt, but this did not cause Charles VI to allow solicitude for his cousin Maria Clementina to override his obligations towards George I by trying to prevent her marriage to the Pretender.

from Bubb,[15] so Spain ran little risk of alienating the British government by admitting James's followers. In August 1716 Francis Wauchope, a survivor of an abortive invasion attempt in 1708 in which he had been captured on board the ship Salisbury and spent a year in a British prison, was allowed to enter the Spanish army[16] and subsequently succeeded Col Walter Bourke as commander of one of the Irish infantry regiments,[17] the regimiento de Wauchope.* George Camocke, a former commander in the Royal Navy until dismissal on account of his Stuart sympathies in 1715, was allowed to join the Spanish navy in May 1718,[18] his request having been supported by Queen Mary and backed up by a recommendation from James himself.[19]

The possibility of using Spain as a source of weapons and covert military support for designs on behalf of the Pretender was remote and, in addition, politically hazardous as some of James's supporters living in the Basque country discovered at the end of 1717. In September Richard Barry, an employee in the Spanish government's magazines at Pasajes, the port for San Sebastian, approached the Marquis of Tullibardine, a veteran of the Fifteen then living near Bayonne, with a proposition that the

* Hitherto the custom in the Spanish army (as also in the armies of France and Britain) had been for each regiment to bear its Colonel's name, thus the regimiento de Bourke was renamed the Wauchope. This practice led to some confusion if the surname of the holder of the post changed too frequently, and a series of decrees in the late Spring of 1718 attempted to rectify this situation as far as the Spanish army was concerned by giving each regiment a permanent name. Thus by a decree of 15 May 1718 the Irish regiments were renamed: the regimiento de Castelar became the Hibernia, that of MacAuliffe the Ultonia, of Vendome the Limerick, of Comesford the Waterford and the Wauchop the Irlanda; of the two regiments of dragoons O'Nicoll's became the Dublin and Mahony's the Edimburgo (Edinburgh).

Pretender's sympathisers in the Basque provinces of northern Spain and France should purchase swords, guns and ammunition and then ship these from Pasajes to James's supporters in Scotland, along with money coined by Jacobites at a mint in Spain.[20] Tullibardine and two other Jacobite exiles in the area, Colin Campbell of Glendaruel and Brigadier Archibald Campbell, decided to take up the suggestion and money was raised though other sympathisers in the Basque country. For activity on these lines to be successful it was necessary to obtain the Spanish government's tacit approval and in addition, to prevent news of the planned arms smuggling from reaching the British government whose agents had fully penetrated the ranks of Jacobite exiles in the Basque country.[21] Tullibardine and his associates appear to have neglected both.

In December 1717 the authorities in San Sebastian attempted to arrest Barry on a charge of counterfeit coining.[22] Besides halting the proposed smuggling of arms to the British Isles, this action indirectly exposed Barry as one of George I's government's informers. To avoid arrest by the Spanish authorities he sought sanctuary in a Franciscan monastery.[23] From there Barry wrote to Colonel William Stanhope, British ambassador in Madrid, and Lieutenant-General George Carpenter, commander-in-chief in Scotland, claiming (in letters which fell into Jacobite hands[24]) to have been supplying Carpenter with intelligence reports of the activities of James's supporters in the Basque country for the past twelve months, and he offered to reveal full details of his latest clumsy attempt at arms smuggling in return for help from Colonel Stanhope and Carpenter in effecting his escape from Spain.[25]

The most telling factor likely to affect the Jacobite movement when considering the possibility of support from Philip V was the hope that the considerable financial resources which, it was widely believed, were at Spain's disposal might be supplied to James and his supporters as had happened briefly in 1715-16. The first inkling that the Pretender's followers were hoping to exploit the worsening dispute between Philip V and George I came in a memorandum sent by James Murray, a Jacobite agent in London, to Arthur Dillon, the Chevalier's leading correspondent in Paris, at the end of November 1717.[26] In this Murray showed how the apparent threat to the Whig administration's foreign policy emanating from Spain could be turned to James's advantage. He proposed that in return for an undertaking by the Spanish government to supply the Pretender with financial assistance, James's supporters at Westminster should mount a parliamentary campaign to frustrate any move by the Whig Ministry to increase the strength of the Royal Naval presence in the Mediterranean as a deterrent to Spain's anti-Habsburg Italian policy.[27] This course of action contained two fundamental weaknesses which undermined the potential effectiveness of such a strategy.

Firstly, Murray's argument was based on the premise that the Whig administration's diplomacy did not require the Emperor to abandon his claim to the throne and territorial possessions of Spain. On this false reasoning (which was understandable since the details of the British government's peace proposals were not yet generally known to those outside the Whig administration[28]), Murray proposed that the parliamentary campaign he envisaged should aim

merely at bringing pressure on George I to persuade Charles VI to renounce this claim.[29] This suggestion illustrated Murray's ignorance of Spanish as well as British policy since Philip V was not concerned whether the Emperor renounced his claim to Spain or not: his aim was to recover his country's position in Italy and there was no reason why he should be grateful to the Jacobites for bringing pressure on George I with such a limited goal in view.

The second weakness lay in the assumption that all Tory M.P.s were Jacobite sympathisers prepared to act as a unified body to further the Chevalier's interests. This point was crucial to Murray's whole argument since he inferred that if the Tory contingent in the Commons voted with the Opposition Whigs led by Walpole (whose hostility to the government was taken for granted in Murray's scenario) against any motion to increase the number of British ships in the Mediterranean, there was a good chance of defeating the Ministry's proposal. This analysis was wildly optimistic. The Jacobite contingent in the Commons numbered approximately eighty three out of the two hundred and twenty four Members classified as Tory returned in the 1715 general election,[30] and the co-operation of the remaining Tories in any strategy which furthered the Pretender's interests could not be taken for granted since their ranks contained a sizeable minority whose adherence to the principle of the Protestant Succession precluded any sustained collaboration with those who supported the Catholic Stuarts.[31]

Despite the defects in Murray's proposals, the possibility that these might be used as part of an argument to persuade Spain to assist the Jacobite cause with money did not escape the Pretender.

BIBLIOTECA MADRID NACIONAL

In the memorandum of January 1718 addressed to Philip V[32] - written in a bid to persuade Spain to guarantee to supply James with the equivalent of £100,000 to offer as a subsidy to Charles XII and Peter I by stressing the apparent inevitability of war between England and Spain - the Chevalier presented Murray's suggestion of how parliamentary action might benefit the interest of Spain as his own idea.[33] As a means of persuading Philip V to guarantee to supply the Pretender with a sum more than double the amount handed over in 1715-16[34] this was hardly an inspiring document and one particular criticism which James himself sought to counter was the absence of any reference to what he was prepared to offer Spain in return for the financial support requested. The Chevalier felt some qualms regarding this point and, in a separate letter to Gualterio who represented his interests in Rome, defended the absence of any undertaking to restore Gibraltar and Minorca (which to many Jacobite supporters such as the M.P. Charles Caesar was the very least he could offer Philip V)[35] on the ground that he did not have the power to dispose of these. Although this omission may have seemed a serious criticism of the Pretender's approach to Spain it was not likely to prove an obstacle in the event of any negotiations between the government in Madrid and representatives of the Jacobite movement. The abortive Spanish proposal for an alliance between James and Philip V in September 1715[36] had made no mention of the restoration of these as the price of Spain's financial support for the Jacobite rebellion, and two and a half years later Spanish foreign policy was even more concentrated upon the Italian peninsula when her armed forces had tasted success in Sardinia and remained capable of recovering territory in Italy

lost at Utrecht. In these circumstances Spain was unlikely to be impressed by the offer of either Gibraltar or Minorca. The British government soon discovered this fact. George I and Stanhope were prepared to make considerable sacrifices on their part to remove the potential threat of war between King of Spain and Emperor, even to the extent of sacrificing Gibraltar in return for Philip's abandoning his claim to Spain's former Italian territories. This offer was first communicated to the Spanish government by a French envoy, the Marquis de Nancré, who was sent to Madrid in March 1718 to induce Philip V to accept the Anglo-French peace plan.[37] George I's offer to restore Gibraltar to Spain in return for a sacrifice of similar magnitude on the part of Philip V - a concession at which even the Pretender had baulked - made little impression in Madrid. Instead it illustrated the determination of the Spaniards not to give in to British pressure to abandon their Italian policy. Although Philip undoubtedly regarded the loss of the Rock as a serious blow to his prestige he was not prepared to recover it on terms which implied a surrender by Spain of her legitimate claims to territory in Italy.

This much may have been in James's favour. However, the question of whether or not Spain would support the Jacobite cause did not rest upon such relatively straightforward matters as the Chevalier's preparedness to restore Gibraltar and Minorca. Jacobite hopes of assistance from Spain (and what James felt able to offer Philip V as an inducement to this end) were not likely to be the overriding factor in the process of persuading Madrid to adopt a policy of support for Jacobitism; the Spanish government would come to this decision if it believed that this kind of activity

was in its own interest as a means of retaliating against Britain. An affirmative decision might not in itself mean that Spain was ready to risk a war with Britain; Spanish support for the Pretender could be discreet, indicating that Madrid was contemplating the use of the Jacobite threat as a means of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon Britain.

The policy towards Jacobitism adopted by the Spanish government - or more accurately by Alberoni who in 1718 was the most influential figure outside the Royal Family - showed that Spain contemplated a very low key use of the Jacobite threat. James and his followers received no support other than the occasional granting of asylum and the customary notifications between royal personages of births passed to the Stuart court from its Spanish counterpart.[38] Under Alberoni Jacobitism was regarded as one factor in a jigsaw encompassing the whole of Europe, to be used by Spain to secure short-term advantage as preparations were continued for the second stage of Philip V's Italian policy, but kept at arm's length. This strategy of trying to use Jacobitism solely as a means of bringing diplomatic pressure on London was not likely to be successful in view of the Whig administration's rigidly uncompromising attitude towards anything remotely associated with the Pretender. Instead Alberoni found that, in matters concerning the Jacobite cause, it was a question of all or nothing: either total involvement with the Chevalier, carrying the attendant implication of war with Britain, or no contact. The truth of this was, as will be seen, slow to dawn on Alberoni; moreover, it ensured that despite his own lukewarmness

towards the Chevalier, Spain and the Stuarts tended to drift into a position in which Alberoni had little choice but to adopt a policy of Spanish support for Jacobitism.

(ii) Alberoni's use of Jacobitism

The cardinal factor determining the role of Jacobitism in Alberoni's foreign policy was the attitude towards Spain adopted by the British government. Although relations between the two countries were becoming more strained in the wake of the invasion of Sardinia, war was not a certainty in the immediate future despite the Pretender's allusion to the inevitability of such a conflict contained in his memorandum of 27 January. Spanish policy under the overall direction of Alberoni was to follow up the successful start to Philip V's Italian policy by mounting an expedition against territory in Italy itself. Although Alberoni was aware that the attitude of George I's government posed a potential threat to the success of Spain's anti-Habsburg policy, he hoped that Spain would be able to launch the second phase of this without having to contend with any serious opposition from London in the shape of naval assistance to the Emperor.[39]

The government in Madrid believed that it could neutralise any threat by George I's Ministry to retaliate in this way by bringing pressure to bear on the English merchant community who traded with Spain. There was substantial British investment in Spain and Anglo-Spanish trade was weighted in favour of England.[40] From this it followed that any rupture between London and Madrid would have the most detrimental effect upon the former. Monteleón, the

Spanish ambassador in London, was alert to the potential importance of this factor as a means of putting pressure on the Whig government not to intervene against Spain. As early as February 1718 he had argued that a mere threat on the part of the Spanish government to retaliate against any hostile move by George I's ministry by confiscating English investment in Spain and closing the country's ports to English ships would cause 'confusion ye declamores a toda esta ciudad'.[41] The implication of this was that the influence of those merchants engaged in trade with Spain - that section of the community who would be the first to be hit in the event of a rupture between Philip V and George I - was such that the Whig administration would have to overcome their determined opposition if it tried to pursue a policy which could jeopardise British trade with Spain. Apparent confirmation of this view came from the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Hon. Spencer Compton. In a meeting with Monteleón, held in great secrecy on 26 January/6 February, he assured the Spanish ambassador that any attempt by the Whig administration to pursue a policy which threatened to result in a disruption of trade with Spain would meet with great opposition throughout the country.[42] In itself this statement had little validity since Compton, despite his official status as Speaker, was closely identified with the Opposition Whigs under Walpole, and therefore had every motive for discrediting the ministry;[43] nevertheless it made a great impression upon Monteleón.[44]

This belief in the influence of the Anglo-Spanish merchant lobby was not entirely misplaced. The Whig administration was

aware of the potential for Spain's use of this means for putting pressure on the British government not to take any action which might lead to retaliation by the Spanish authorities; George I's ministers were, however, quite determined not to yield to such pressure.[45] In this respect the Hanoverian regime's two chief spokesmen, Stanhope and James Craggs the younger, Secretary for the Southern Department, were more than a match for supporters of Spain when it came to manipulating public and parliamentary opinion to accept the government's view.

The Whig administration's first move was to drive a wedge between the Chevalier's supporters in England on the one hand and Monteleon on the other. This task was not too difficult. Despite the British government's previous suspicions concerning the political sympathies of the Spanish ambassador,[46] he was no partisan of the Stuart cause. When writing to Alberoni in November 1717, Monteleón stated quite frankly his belief that the Pretender stood no chance of overthrowing George I without help from France which was unlikely to be forthcoming in view of the present alignment between George and the Regent Orléans.[47] During the closing months of 1717 reports spread among the Jacobite rank and file to the effect that Monteleón supported the Hanoverian claim to the English crown as opposed to that of the Catholic Stuarts.[48] The source of these was soon identified as the abbé Dubois, then in London for the Hampton Court negotiations.[49] Owing to his close identification with the British government and particularly with Stanhope, it seems probable that the rumours of Monteleón's pro-Hanoverianism had been instigated by the Whig administration with a view to arousing suspicion of Spain in general and the Spanish ambassador in particular among the ranks of

the Chevalier's supporters in England. The attitude shown by Dubois to Monteleón bears this out. During the Abbé's sojourn in London the courtesy and consideration he displayed towards Monteleón took the ambassador by surprise.[50] The motive behind this was to persuade Spain that Philip V's interests would best be served by accepting the Anglo-French peace terms:[51] this strategy was not entirely successful, but Dubois did succeed in convincing Monteleón of the sincerity of the French government in acting as an honest broker between Philip V and the Emperor.[52] This pressure on the Spanish ambassador contributed to the widespread distrust of him among the ranks of the Pretender's supporters in England. Although James Murray and Wyndham, Bolingbroke's protégé , became convinced that the rumours of the Spaniard's pro-Hanoverianism were false,[53] suspicion of him among their fellow Jacobites was never entirely removed.[54] A combination of rumour and innuendo had succeeded in depriving the Pretender's adherents in England of a channel through which their views could have been communicated to Madrid, and the incident had illustrated the ease with which it was possible to frustrate the plans of James's supporters on similar lines to the manner in which Stanhope had used Monteleón himself to persuade Ormonde to flee the country in July 1715.[55]

This lack of collaboration between Jacobitism and Spain was also found in a wider European context. Alberoni decided to turn down the course of action suggested in James's memorandum, and the Spanish rejection arrived at the Stuart court in Urbino on 19 March.[56] There were two basic causes which prompted this refusal to guarantee to supply the Pretender with money. The

first was purely practical. The Spanish government did not possess the funds to supply James with such a large amount at short notice. All Spain's financial resources were being expended on the assembly of a fleet and army in Barcelona as the next stage of Philip V's anti-Habsburg offensive. These preparations were hampered by shortages of essential raw materials and naval stores - copper, bronze, iron, timber - along with ships, arms and ammunition. Alberoni tried to overcome these in the first instance by approaching Sweden. In February 1718 Count Stanislaw Poniatowski, a Polish nobleman then in Paris who acted as a roving envoy for Charles XII, and Joachim Frederik Preis, a Swedish diplomat in the Hague, were approached on Alberoni's behalf by one of his agents, Monti, and Beretti Landi respectively, offering money in return for the sale of arms and naval supplies by Sweden to Spain.[57] Another possible source of ships and armaments was the Dutch Republic. A Spanish admiral, Antonio de Gastañeta, was sent thither on a mission to purchase ships (March-April 1718);[58] agents acting on behalf of Alberoni, principally Paolo Antonio Gozzani, a banker in Amsterdam, and his associate Andrioli, were provided with money to purchase arms and ammunition for Spain, the funds being channelled through another Amsterdam banker, César Sardi.[59] These military and naval preparations necessitated the export of a considerable amount of specie which had been brought to Spain from South America and there is evidence of an acute shortage of money by the middle of 1718 - attempts were even made to persuade owners of works of art to exchange these for foreign currency;[60] hardly the most suitable circumstances to guarantee to supply the Pretender with a large amount of money.

In addition, there were sound political reasons which precluded any Spanish contribution to Jacobite funds on the scale requested by the Chevalier, even if the money had been available. Alberoni had his own channels of communication with both Russia and Sweden and his own views as to how they could serve Spain's interests. Ever since November 1717 Beretti Landi had been in correspondence with his Russian counterpart in the Hague, Prince Boris Ivanovitch Kurakin (the Tsar's brother-in-law), in which the Spanish diplomat was kept informed of the progress of negotiations for a peace settlement between Sweden and Russia.[61] Alberoni saw this in the light of the benefits that such a rapprochement might bring to Spain; in particular he believed that in return for subsidies from the Spanish government Peter and Charles might mount an offensive against the Emperor in Germany once they had come to a peace agreement. In accordance with this Beretti Landi put the proposition to Kurakin that Spain might be prepared to subsidise the two Northern states in a policy aimed at embarrassing Vienna,[62] while in addition to offering Preis money in return for Sweden supplying Spain with naval supplies Beretti made exploratory hints regarding the possibility of an alliance between Philip V and Charles XII.[63] One thing was clear: if Spain provided the two Northern rulers with money this would be supplied direct, not passed via the Pretender.

Alberoni may have read more into the possibility of a Swedish-Russian peace than was justified in the light of the wish of both Charles XII and the Tsar to keep their options open for an agreement with George I; alternatively he may have wished to use the threat of such a junction as a means of putting pressure on George I's government in London to prove more accommodating to

Spain in the negotiations being conducted through William Stanhope, the British ambassador in Madrid, and Nancré. By the end of April 1718 Alberoni was exhibiting signs of disillusionment with regard to Russia and Sweden over the fact that the Aland conferences, first mentioned by Kurakin to Beretti Landi the previous November, had not yet opened.*[64] This made the Cardinal fear that Spain might be isolated if his plans for an alliance with the Northern courts came to nothing[65] and decided to try to mend his fences with regard to the British government.

A means to this end lay to hand in the Pretender's recent approach to Philip V and the Spanish rejection of this. Alberoni had turned down the Chevalier's request for money, and he realised that James's appeal could be turned to Spain's advantage and used as a means of reassuring the Whig administration of Philip V's desire for good relations. If the information that the Pretender had made some kind of approach to the Spanish government was judiciously leaked to William Stanhope, along with a firm assurance that James's proposals had been rejected, this might convince London of Spain's desire for good relations while obliquely reminding the Whig government that Philip V had the resources to embarrass the Hanoverian regime by dabbling in Jacobite intrigues if he chose. In this way Alberoni's dexterous use of the threat to the position of George I posed by the Pretender might put pressure on London not to push its insistence on the peace plan for the South to the point of war with Spain. In late April, therefore, in a series of interviews with Colonel Stanhope, Alberoni let slip a few veiled references to Philip V's

* The Åland Peace Congress did not open until 20 May 1718 O.S.

rejection of proposals that he should make use of his 'power to find employment for his Majesty's (George I's) troops at home..'[66]

There were two ways in which William Stanhope and his Government might respond. They could either accept Alberoni's assurances at their face value (thereby demonstrating Britain's trust in Spain) or, as was more likely, investigate their accuracy. The Whig administration had little cause for disquiet as far as Spain's relations with the Pretender were concerned. Alberoni had been correct in hinting to Colonel Stanhope that the Jacobite advances had been turned down. The Spanish government's dealings with the Chevalier concerning the memorandum had, moreover, been carried out through Aquaviva, Spain's representative in Rome, not via any Jacobite agent in Madrid[67] so any investigations carried out by William Stanhope in Spain would reveal little of what had taken place. Alberoni could, therefore, be reasonably sure that London would find no indication of Spanish involvement with the Pretender to which George I's Ministry could legitimately take exception, and the object of his exercise in leaking the substance but not the exact details of recent Jacobite overtures to Madrid would be achieved. Philip V would be innocent of any collaboration with the Stuart cause while the threat remained that Spain had the resources to sustain an insurrection in the British Isles in support of James if it so desired.

As if to emphasise the official Spanish rejection of Jacobitism in general, individual Jacobite sympathisers in Spain were ordered away from Madrid, the centre of government and of influence, and sent to places away from the limelight. On 28 April (the day after Colonel Stanhope reported Alberoni's leak to London) Liria, the

Chevalier's nephew, was ordered by Fernández Durán, the minister for war, to leave Madrid and go to Gerona, along with his regiment, the Limerick.[68] Following Camocke's arrival in Spain from France in May he was told to proceed straight to Barcelona to join the main Spanish fleet,[69] and his plans for inducing key personnel in the Royal Navy's Mediterranean squadron to defect were firmly vetoed by his superiors.[70] The Irish infantry regiments were also dispersed from where their presence might be construed as a threat to Britain; the Waterford joined the Limerick on the Pyrenean frontier with France,[71] while the Irlanda, Hibernia and Ultonia followed in Camocke's path and joined the fleet in Barcelona.[72]

This strategy of using James's recent approach to Spain as a means of reassuring the British while at the same time threatening that the Spanish government might be prepared to dabble in Jacobite intrigues, was not successful. To a certain extent Alberoni himself was to blame. He had assumed that the references to Parliamentary action by the Jacobites at Westminster with the aim of embarrassing George I's government contained in the Pretender's memorandum could serve his policy of trying to prevent the Whig administration from taking any military action against Spain. This kind of activity was a logical conclusion of the line of argument being put by Monteleón that Spain should exploit to the full her commercial card. The wisdom of relying on hopes of embarrassing the Whig administration at Westminster was, however, open to question. A percipient observer might have noted the emptiness of James's boasts of the influence and efficiency of the Jacobite contingent in the Commons as amply demonstrated by the

proceedings of 17/28 March 1718. On that day the House was presented with a message from George I requesting additional supplies to equip a fleet. Although there was little doubt that such a fleet could only be employed against Spain,[73] an address that the extra money be provided for this was carried without a division, thereby giving the Whig ministry the green light for preparing a naval squadron to be used against Spain if Philip refused to agree to the Anglo-French peace terms.[74]

Notwithstanding this reflection on the poor performance of the Jacobite contingent at Westminster, Alberoni perceived that the Pretender's allusion to the manner in which Parliament could obstruct the execution of certain aspects of the British government's foreign policy was too good an opportunity for Spain to ignore as a means of pressing home to London the message that Philip V had the capacity to retaliate against Britain. In several interviews with Colonel Stanhope over the period following the Spanish rejection of James's memorandum, Alberoni both threatened retaliation against British investment and personnel in Spain and stated quite openly his belief that Parliament could never be brought round to support any action by the Whig government which was hostile to Spain.[75] Both these themes were also expressed by Monteleon in London most forcefully in an interview with Stanhope on 23 May/3 June.[76] In the Spanish ambassador's own words he told the Secretary of State that if England showed any disposition to allow the use of the Royal Navy against Spain 'toda la Nacion Inglesa se resentiria y el Parlamento venturo haria nuestras venganzas...',*[77] and to press

* Best translated (if not literally) as 'the English Nation will resent it (i.e. the proposed Naval expedition to the Mediterranean) and our revenge will be obtained through Parliament.'

this point home Monteleón made strong hints that the Spanish authorities were prepared to retaliate against British interest and citizens in Spain.[78] The message behind these threats seemed all to clear to the Whig government: the Spaniards were threatening to use the commercial links between the two countries to intimidate London into allowing Spain to create an Italian empire at the expense of Vienna. This was not likely to have much effect upon George I's ministers who did not need to take either of these threats too seriously. Parliament was in recess[79] and the Ministry had a strategy well in hand to bring the Commons and the Lords round to its viewpoint by the start of the next session.[80] Similarly the possibility of some kind of retaliation against British traders or trading interests in Spain as alluded to by Alberoni and Monteleón had also been foreseen. William Stanhope had instructed the merchant community to prepare for such an eventuality by dispersing their assets either by removing these from the country, selling them or transferring the goods in question to nominal Spanish ownership in order to deprive the authorities in Spain of any substantial prizes in the event of a rupture between the two governments.[81]

By alluding to the possibility that the Whig administration would never be able to obtain Parliament's approval for any action against Spain, Alberoni overreached himself, besides failing to influence London in the way he intended. His statements and those of Monteleón seemed to imply that Spain was prepared to interfere in domestic British politics either by encouraging the Opposition at Westminster or dabbling in Jacobite intrigues.[82] As far as the Pretender was concerned this belief was unjustified since it implied a degree of collaboration between Madrid and the Pretender

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greater than actually existed at this time. Colonel Stanhope had already investigated the possibility of some link between Spain and the Jacobite cause. The only hint that Alberoni might be some way involved with the Chevalier lay in the British ambassador's suspicion voiced in his dispatch of 27 April that there was a Jacobite agent in Madrid whom Colonel Stanhope identified as an adventurer known as 'Baron' Waleff.[83] Although Waleff was acquainted with individual Jacobites (he had once served under Ormonde[84] and also corresponded with the Chevalier[85]) there is no evidence that he was sent by James to negotiate with the Spanish government. The Pretender did not formally appoint an agent in Madrid from the time of Lawless' departure in March 1717 until the arrival of Peter Redmond while en route to Lisbon to take up appointment as James's consul in Portugal (June 1718)[86] The ostensible purpose of Waleff's visit to Spain - to carry a message from the Duchesse du Maine, leader of the Vieille Cour faction in France, to Philip V - was a cover for his role as an agent provocateur sent by Count Gallas, the Imperial envoy to the Holy See, with the aim of incriminating Alberoni in a project for the partition of France should Louis XV die.[87] This move failed from the outset. Alberoni realised that an adventurer like Waleff would never be entrusted with matters of any importance and he wasted little time in dismissing these proposals.[88]

Despite this Colonel Stanhope's suspicion that Spain was somehow involved in intrigues with the Pretender remained,[89] fuelled by Alberoni's persistent and rather ostentatious references to Philip's rejection of James's proposals coupled with

his none too subtle hints regarding the use of parliamentary action to obstruct project upon Spain.[90] This belief in the presence of a Jacobite agent in Madrid, however unfounded, gave the government in London the impression that there was some substance to Colonel Stanhope's suspicions.[91] If the Whig Ministry believed that Alberoni's hints concerning the Pretender had merely been the tip of the iceberg as far as Spain's involvement with Jacobitism was concerned their suspicions, like those of Colonel Stanhope in Madrid, were not supported by any firm evidence that the Spanish government or its agents were acting in collusion with James and his supporters.

Manifestations of discontent with the Hanoverian regime within the British Isles had reached a fairly high level in the spring and early summer of 1718 although these were not on the scale of those which had taken place three years previously prior to the opening of the Fifteen.[92] Much of this was undoubtedly Jacobite inspired: for example on 29 June/10 July a portrait of George I on public display in Dublin was slashed,[93] and in London a statue of the monarch in Grosvenor Square was defaced.[94] The worsening state of relations between Britain and Spain, arising from Alberoni's refusal to accept the Anglo-French peace terms and the Spanish anger over the dispatch of a Royal Naval Squadron to the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Sir George Byng[95] (which sailed on 4/15 June), led to a suspicion that these and other examples of anti-government agitation may have been instigated by Madrid.[96] The Hanoverian regime's intelligence services were, however, unable to prove any definite connection between these and Spain or her known agents. Monteleón's chaplain was reported to be 'very busie.....encouraging ye Papists wth. some

wt (i.e. what) extraordinary forthwth to happen ...',[97] a piece of information which was valueless without something more definite to link it with. On 25 July/5 August police raided the home of Antonio de la Rosa, the Spanish consul, in Charles II Street, St. James[98] (this target was probably suspect on account of its proximity to the Cocoa Tree club in Pall Mall, a notorious Jacobite haunt[99]) but as far as can be judged[100] nothing was found to indicate the Spain had any connection with the current wave of anti-Hanoverian unrest.*[101]

This apparent lack of Spanish collaboration with Jacobitism in England may be explained by the fact that as late as the summer of 1718 Alberoni had still not reversed his earlier decision not to support the Pretender and his cause. At first sight this may seem surprising. The British government was unmoved by Alberoni's attempt to threaten George I with the spectre of Spanish support for the Stuart cause and did not even take the threat very seriously.[102] Instead London proceeded with its diplomatic campaign to compel Madrid to accept the British-inspired project for mediation between Philip V and the Emperor. Byng's final instructions (dated 26 May O.S.) made it quite clear that if Spain attacked any Imperial territory in Italy or Sicily he was to use all his resources to prevent the attack; moreover if Spanish forces had already landed in one of these areas he was to fight them if they refused to withdraw;[103] Byng was, moreover, told to inform Philip V of the terms of his instructions[104] - a reflection of the Whig Ministry's determination that Alberoni should be under no illusions about Britain's readiness to adhere to her

*Had the Spanish government played any part in the pro-Jacobite agitation this would probably have taken the form of payments to the Chevalier's supporters in England. The account books of Nicolas de Hinojosa, the treasurer general to Philip V from 1717-26, show no significant payments to any Spanish representative or agent in London throughout the first 9 months of 1718 either paid direct or indirect as a secret expense (gasto secreto)

treaty obligations to the Emperor (Byng's instructions were also communicated to Monteleón by Stanhope on 13/24 June[105] after the Spanish ambassador had complained that he was being kept in ignorance,[106] and to the government in Madrid by William Stanhope[107]) The other instance of the mounting diplomatic pressure being applied to Spain was illustrated by the departure of Stanhope at the end of June for Paris where he was to finalise the negotiations for the French signature of the Quadruple Alliance which had been inspired by his peace plan for the South; once this had been completed Stanhope was prepared, with the French Regent's approval, to extend his journey to Madrid in a bid to persuade Spain to accept the terms offered and abandon her policy of expansion in Italy.[108]

The message behind these mounting pressures had little effect in Spain itself. By mid-June 1718 the fleet which had been assembled in the ports of Catalonia under the direction of Patiño was ready to sail. George I's government was anxious to find out its size and destination, but owing to the lack of intelligence reports from Britain's consuls in Barcelona and Cadiz (sharply criticised by Craggs[109]) London remained largely in the dark. On 18 June the Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral Gastañeta[110] sailed from Barcelona carrying an expedition to invade Sicily. The destination had been suggested by Alberoni. Until Charles VI had signed the Quadruple Alliance by which Sicily was to be transferred from Savoyard to Habsburg control, the island remained under the rule of Victor Amadeus with whom George I had no treaty obligations. This gap whereby Spain might have been provided with a means for seizing Sicily unchecked had, however,

been foreseen by the British government: the inclusion of the island in Byng's instructions should have left the Spaniards in no doubt that, as far as London was concerned, Sicily was to be regarded as Imperial territory.[111] This meant that unless either Spain or Britain were prepared to back down and come to a compromise, it was highly likely that the two fleets would clash.

The seriousness of this was not fully grasped in Spain. Alberoni was not initially perturbed by the presence of Byng's fleet off the Spanish coast:[112] the Cardinal told Grimaldo that, in his opinion, the British fleet would not harm Spain. Byng's message conveying his instructions to Philip V reached Madrid on 10 Jully[113] and was conveyed to the King at the Escorial by Colonel Stanhope. Philip V 'reflected'[114] the contents of these, and on 15 July Alberoni issued his reply: 'Sa Majesté Catholique m'a fait l'honneur de me dire, que Monsieur le Chevalier Byng peut exécuter les ordres qu'il a du Roy Son Maître';[115] terms which the Cardinal thought were worthy of Alexander the Great.[116] In retrospect Spain's attitude may have seemed reckless in the extreme in view of the tightening diplomatic stranglehold being placed around her by Britain who in addition to being the prime mover behind the Quadruple Alliance had been instrumental in bringing about an armistice between the Empire and Turkey (the Peace of Passarovitz signed on 21 July 1718[117]) which, by remaining the threat of a Turkish attack on Habsburg territory, freed Imperial troops for service against any Spanish offensive in Italy. Spain's apparent recklessness was in part explained by Madrid's reaction to news that Stanhope, who was then in Paris to

finalize France's signature of the Quadruple Alliance,* was requesting permission to visit Spain. Alberoni was at first jubilant, viewing the news as being in the nature of a diplomatic triumph for Philip V: six months previously (he told Grimaldo) the British government had wanted to dictate the terms of the Hampton Court Conferences to the Spanish ambassador in London whereas now George I's leading minister was requesting permission to come to Madrid.[118]

This optimism arose from the assumption that Stanhope's request for a passport to visit Spain indicated that he had some important new proposal to put to Alberoni in an effort to break the impasse surrounding Philip V's refusal to agree to the terms being offered by Britain and France,[119] or, as the Cardinal told William Stanhope, to have at least suspended Byng's instructions while on his mission to Spain: in the words of the British ambassador, Alberoni 'took it for granted that...(Earl Stanhope) had sent orders to...(Byng's) fleet at least to suspend entering upon action whilst...(Stanhope was) treating for an accommodation (in Madrid)'[120] The reasoning behind 'Alberoni's air of optimism was the belief that without one of these concessions Stanhope would not have contemplated visiting the capital of a country which, given the tone of Byng's orders and the Spanish decision to invade Sicily - Gastaneta's fleet anchored off the island on 1 July and Palermo was captured two days later - would soon be at war with Britain.

Monteleon tried to obtain confirmation of Alberoni's optimistic deductions from Craggs on 10 July N S.[121] Significantly the British

*The French signed on 18 July after last minute delays by Huxelles, the minister of foreign affairs, a supporter of the policies of the Vieille Cour.

minister did not make a direct reply.[122] In effect Stanhope carried no new proposals to break the deadlock. He intended to make a personal appeal to Alberoni and Philip V to accept the terms of the Quadruple Alliance backed up by the hope that Spain would realise the weakness of her position and accept the British terms.[123] Also, contrary to the assumption held by Alberoni, Byng's instructions were not even suspended during Stanhope's visit to Madrid, and when the Secretary of State heard that Spanish troops had landed in Sicily, he ordered the admiral to use force if necessary to prevent Spain from seizing the island.[124]

Alberoni was not prepared to let his optimistic expectations of Stanhope's visit to Madrid override his desire to keep his options open with regard to an alliance between Philip V and Russia and Sweden. This could be used either as a means of putting pressure on Britain to prove more accommodating to Spain or, if this failed, to ensure that Madrid was not without allies. On 18 July he wrote to Cellamare asking him to renew his approaches to Charles XII and, if Sweden did not respond, to Russia.[125] In the Hague Beretti Landi approached both Preis and Kurakin on behalf of Alberoni with the offer of an alliance between Philip V and the two Northern Courts once these had reached a peace agreement at the Aland negotiations: as Spain's part of the bargain Philip V would undertake to supply Peter and Charles XII with a total of thirty thousand men and thirty men-of-war in return for an undertaking to launch an offensive against the Emperor in Northern Germany.[126]

Alberoni's attempts to insure against Stanhope arriving empty handed were soon justified. The British Secretary of State arrived in the environs of Madrid on 12 August.[127] In the course of the negotiations between the two men it soon became clear that neither side was prepared to make concessions, and (more seriously for Spain), that Alberoni had been mistaken in imagining that Stanhope's presence in Madrid implied that the British government had imposed a moratorium on any attempt by Byng to halt the Spanish expedition to Sicily.[128] The Secretary of State played his final card by offering the Spaniards a three months' armistice to allow Philip V to accept the Quadruple Alliance.[129] This initially appeared to make a favourable impression upon Alberoni,[130] but any possibility of a compromise was destroyed by the fall of Messina to the Spanish expedition in Sicily, news of which reached the Escorial on 18 August when Stanhope and Nancré were dining with Alberoni.[131] A week later (25 August) Philip V rejected the British proposals, and Stanhope prepared to leave Spain.[132]

By this time Alberoni's foreign policy was encountering serious difficulties. He had tried to balance the possibility of an alliance of Spain, Sweden and Russia on the one hand with attempts to prevent Britain from going to war to enforce acceptance of the Quadruple Alliance upon Spain on the other. The overtures to the Northern Courts had been regarded partly as a counterweight to the mounting diplomatic pressure and threat of naval action by George I, and also (by Alberoni's selected revelations of his approaches to Sweden and Russia revealed to Stanhope at the end of his visit.[133]) as a means of putting pressure

on London to prove more accommodating to Spain. Jacobitism had played a negative role in this strategy. The Pretender had received no support from the Spanish government since the autumn of 1716; instead Alberoni had tried to use the Stuart threat to reinforce his pressure on the Whig administration to modify its pro-Habsburg stance. In this he had been unsuccessful. Britain's alignment with the French Regent Orléans had gone a long way to neutralise the seriousness of the Jacobite threat[134] (as Monteleón observed in November 1717[135]), and Alberoni's 'intimations relating to the Pretender'[136] had proved counter-productive: they had served to increase British suspicions of Spain without persuading London to modify any part of its opposition to Spain's Italian policy.

(iii) Ormonde's approach to Spain

In July 1718 Hugh Paterson, a Jacobite living in Leyden, received a hint from Jakob Anton von Ganzinot, the Elector of Bavaria's agent in the Dutch Republic, that Beretti Landi had written to Alberoni suggesting that Ormonde (who had recently been returned to France following the failure of his mission to Northern Europe) be offered asylum in Spain.[137] In view of the worsening relations between George I and Philip V this was a fairly obvious move for the Spanish government to contemplate; nevertheless Beretti, aware of Alberoni's coolness towards Jacobitism, intimated to Ganzinot that either the Chevalier or Ormonde himself should write direct to Madrid, making the same request.[138] The Jacobite leadership were not slow to act on this

suggestion. In August Ormonde approached Cellamare in Paris with a more definite proposition than Beretti Landi may perhaps have contemplated, and Cellamare relayed this to Alberoni in a dispatch on 15 August.[139] The Duke suggested that it would be comparatively easy to mount an invasion of the British Isles on behalf of the Pretender. Two thirds of the population of England would (he believed) support such an enterprise which could be mounted using a relatively small outlay of arms and men - Ormonde put the figure at 6,000 troops carried on twelve ships, 15,000 guns and sufficient ammunition, all of which would (it might be assumed) come from Philip V. As the first step in the adoption of this strategy the Duke requested asylum at a point on the Cantabrian coast from where he himself would lead the proposed expedition to the British Isles.[140]

This course of action was in one respect similar to Berwick's request in August 1715 that Spain should supply the insurgents in the Jacobite rebellion with arms shipped direct from this coast,[141] and there was at first sight little reason, in view of Alberoni's lukewarm posture towards the Jacobite movement, why it should not receive a sharp rejection as had the proposal three years previously. Spain was not yet prepared either diplomatically or militarily for an extension of the war against the Emperor, which was being fought in Sicily, to be extended to Britain. The negotiations with the Northern Courts might, if successful, widen this conflict by opening an offensive against Austria in Northern Germany, thereby relieving the Spanish expedition in Sicily from the pressure of Habsburg troops which had been freed for service in Italy following the conclusion of the Peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718). Until some definite conclusion had been reached

from Spain's overtures to Sweden and Russia, however, the Spanish government did not wish to open a second front against George I with whom Philip V was not at war. This latter point was very important. Alberoni knew the pitfalls attendant on involvement with the Chevalier, and what Ormonde was hinting at if not actually proposing outright - a Jacobite invasion of the British Isles supported solely by Spain - would only be feasible in the event of a war between Philip V and George I. The initial Spanish response to Ormonde's proposition was, therefore, an unqualified rejection. On 29 August Cellamare was instructed to make it quite clear to the Duke that not only was he refused asylum in Northern Spain as requested, but that if he entered the country without permission he would be thrown into prison.[142]

Despite this rebuttal, subsequent events were to show that Ormonde's approach to Spain had been timed almost exactly right from the Jacobite point of view. At the time Alberoni issued his rejection, he did not know that Byng had (11 August) engaged the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro to the south-east of Sicily, capturing at least thirteen ships including the San Felipe el Real which carried the commanding admiral, Gasteñeta.[143] This was bound to alter Spain's whole policy towards Britain.

The first news of Passaro to reach Madrid was brought to Mancré, the French envoy extraordinary, by a courier on 6 September.[144] He and William Stanhope immediately told Alberoni. The Cardinal initially seemed lost for words, and to the surprise of Colonel Stanhope showed little immediate hostile reaction.[145] The British ambassador was persuaded by Alberoni that he would be best advised to keep away from the Spanish court. This counsel was not meant

as a snub: the Cardinal was aware of the strength of feeling against Britain in Spain, and wanted to avoid any incident which could push Anglo-Spanish relations beyond the brink once the news of Passaro became known.[146] The lack of recrimination towards Colonel Stanhope could also be explained by the fact that Alberoni was awaiting confirmation of the news of Byng's victory from what Spain viewed as more reliable sources: the cardinal's confidential correspondence with Grimaldo reveals that Spanish losses in the naval engagement were not yet thought to have been great.[147] Confirmation of the virtual destruction of Gastañeta's fleet by Byng reached Madrid on 12 September from the Spanish government's own informants in Genoa and Cagliari[148]; it was also brought direct from the battle zone off Sicily to Cadiz by Admiral Baltasar Guevara whose ship, the San Luis, had been dispatched to Malta before Passaro to search for some Sicilian vessels which were reported to have taken refuge in Valetta harbour, and had therefore escaped capture or destruction by the Royal Navy.[149]

The arrival in Spain of the news of Byng's victory at Passaro had a dual effect upon Anglo-Spanish relations. The government in Madrid immediately turned to possible ways of retaliating against Britain. There were two weapons readily to hand; use of the Pretender against George I, and the taking of reprisals against the section of the British merchant community in Spain who had not yet followed William Stanhope's advice of the previous June[150] and divested themselves of their business interests and property.[151]

On 12 September 1719 - the day that definite confirmation of Passaro reached Madrid - Alberoni reversed his policy towards Jacobitism. He wrote to Cellamare countermanding his instructions of 29 August whereby Ormonde was forbidden to enter Spain; now the Duke was to be told that he could not go there publicly, but would be admitted if he travelled thither alone and incognito.[152] Alberoni did not at this time enter into a commitment to support the Jacobites on the lines suggested by Ormonde. The invitation to the Duke specifying that he should come to Spain with his identity concealed was unofficial and could easily be disavowed if, despite appearances to the contrary, Spanish relations with Britain did not deteriorate to the point of war leaving Philip V free to seek a rapprochement with London. Nevertheless, Alberoni's reversal of his previous policy towards the Pretender was highly significant when viewed in conjunction with the official Spanish reaction to the news of Passaro.

This took the form of two decrees ordering the seizure of all goods and property belonging to British subjects in the country. The first of these, dated 15 September, was issued to all the military commanders in Spain;[153] the second, issued two days later (17 September) repeated this order to all the civil administrators of Spain, the Intendants.[154] The authorities in the ports of Southern Spain did not wait for official sanction in the shape of the decrees of 15 and 17 September before retaliating against Britain. Nicholas Hollway, the British consul in Malaga, had already been placed under house arrest;[155] his fellow countrymen were imprisoned and British-owned property seized at random in both

this port and Cadiz with a speed which indicated a well-prepared plan of action on these lines.[156]

This hostile Spanish reaction to Passaro seemed to portend an imminent breach between London and Madrid. Yet Alberoni's plans for an alliance of Spain, Russia and Sweden to counterbalance the Quadruple Alliance were slow to come to fruition as each side made its assent conditional upon that of the other two. In reply to Beretti Landi's offer of an alliance which had been relayed by Kurakin at the beginning of August,[157] Peter instructed his brother-in-law to reply favourably but in rather general terms without giving a specific pledge.[158] The Tsar feared that the Swedes intended to steal a march on him and conclude an agreement with George I through Fabrice; despite this, however, he had no wish to reject the Spanish proposals for an alliance since the terms offered by Beretti Landi could form the basis of an agreement between Russia and Spain in the event of a successful conclusion to the negotiations with the Swedish delegation at the Åland conferences. The Tsar had another motive for not rebuffing Spain. Following the Peace of Passarowitz, a Venetian Squadron, in which a detachment of some twenty Russian marines were receiving instruction, had been disbanded, and the government in St. Petersburg even hoped that these would be permitted to complete their training in the Spanish navy.[159] This attitude, it should be noted, did not change after the Tsar received news of Passaro. On 27 September OS he instructed Kurakin to continue to keep the negotiations with Spain running lest Alberoni should feel he had no hope of achieving an alliance with Russia and accept the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, a reflection of Peter's fear that this

eventuality would encourage the British government to implement a peace plan for Northern Europe on similar lines to that for the South.[160]

Through Preis in the Hague, Görtz tried to persuade Beretti Landi that France should be drawn into Alberoni's projected alliance between Spain and Northern Europe in order to isolate the Emperor and George as Elector of Hanover.[161] In the meantime Sweden refused to participate in the Spanish plans until Spain provided Charles XII with the subsidies previously offered. The Spanish government, for its part, was equally determined not to do this. According to what Beretti Landi told Kurakin, Alberoni feared that Görtz would trick Spain into parting with money without honouring Sweden's side of the bargain just as he had treated the English Jacobites two years previously: Alberoni therefore insisted upon a firm alliance before any money was supplied to Charles XII.[162]

While the outlook for Spain in Northern Europe remained uncertain, Alberoni seemed reluctant to face up to a complete break with Britain. Colonel Stanhope was avoiding visiting the Escorial where the Court was in residence; but the cardinal passed messages to the British ambassador through Nancré that the wave of attacks directed against Britons in Spain had been carried out contrary to his advice. He claimed to have argued to Philip V that Spanish interests would best be served by leaving the merchant community unmolested so as to deprive the Whig administration of the opportunity to arouse British public opinion against Spain. In support of this Alberoni professed to have issued a decree on 15 September ordering the release of the merchants and their

effects.[163] Colonel Stanhope interpreted this as showing that either Alberoni was deceiving Nancré, or that he was not in control of events in Spain, probably (he concluded) a combination of both.[164] This was a fairly accurate analysis. The contents of the decrees of 15 and 17 September issued to all military governors and Intendants throughout Spain had specifically stated that the effects belonging to British subjects - but not the Britons themselves - were to be seized.[165] At first sight this would indicate that Alberoni lied to Nancré in a bid to disassociate himself from the responsibility for measures against the British merchant community. Yet the harsh measures had been partially modified since on 22 September all Irishmen in Spain were declared exempt from the decrees issued the previous week,[166] as were all Englishmen who had been domiciled in the country at the time of the conclusion of peace with Britain in 1713.[167] Moreover, Alberoni may indeed have been overruled as forces beyond his control tried to push Philip V into war with Britain. It is certain that Spanish harrassment of British subjects and property in Spain did not cease following Alberoni's assurances to Nancre. The battle lines were already being drawn up; on 5 October Philip V issued a prohibition of all trade with Britain;[168] two days later privateers were authorised to attack English shipping.[169]

It was understandable that sections of the Spanish government should have felt inclined to push Philip V into taking the offensive against George I. Once the initial shock of the news of Passaro had passed, information had gradually filtered through to Spain that although Byng's victory had been a serious setback to Philip V's Italian policy, it fell short of dealing the mortal blow which would give the Spanish government no choice but to

accede to the Quadruple Alliance on London's terms. Following Guevara's arrival in Cadiz, more of the ships which had escaped capture or destruction at Passaro returned to the ports of Spain to serve (if Madrid so decided) as the nucleus of a future armada. The Spanish army in Sicily, under the command of the Marquis de Lede,[171] was as yet unaffected by the Royal Naval victory and was more than holding its own against the Sicilian defenders and the Habsburg troops ferried over to the island by ships of Byng's fleet.[172] De Lede's expedition, moreover, did not comprise the entire cream of the Spanish army. There were regiments in the Iberian peninsula containing highly experienced veterans of the War of Succession ready to hand if the government in Madrid decided to open a second front away from Italy.[173] In Spain itself the authorities had received a particularly important bonus. The shortage of finance which had bedevilled the preparations for the Sicilian expedition earlier in the year had been remedied by the arrival of a treasure fleet from South America at Cadiz on 19 August bringing (according to one unofficial estimate which Colonel Stanhope relayed to London) at least one and a half million pesos in gold coinage.[174] It is quite probable that but for the defeat of Spain's main fleet at Passaro the share of this destined for the Spanish treasury[175] would have been used towards supplying and strengthening the Sicilian expedition. Following the British victory, however, Byng had orders to intercept all naval communication between Spain and Sicily.[176] In these circumstances it was hardly practicable for the Spanish authorities to keep de Lede supplied, and the money which could have been used for this purpose was freed for other projects. Against this background an invasion of Britain on the

lines suggested by Ormonde, commanded by the Duke himself (who had been commander of the British army prior to his flight in 1715) and conveyed to Britain by a naval commander with the experience of Guevara, became a practical possibility.

(iv) The Oxford Plot

If the government in Spain needed any further inducement to back an invasion of the British Isles in support of the Pretender, this came to hand from what must have been an unexpected source. The man behind this was the Earl of Oxford, the former Tory leader who had been imprisoned in the Tower from the summer of 1715 until the dropping of charges against him as a result of the Whig split led to his acquittal two years later.[177] Following his release Oxford found himself isolated from the mainstream of the English Jacobite movement owing to the violent antagonism prevailing between him and Atterbury, the Bishop of Rochester, who had been the Pretender's chief non-military officer in England since the Fifteen.[178]

Oxford spent the summer of 1718 in London, reputedly toasting the health of the Chevalier and other exiled Jacobite leaders.[179] His real activity on behalf of James went much deeper. The Earl believed he had carte blanche from the Chevalier authorising any action which in his view might further the Jacobite cause:[180] in the words of Anne Oglethorpe, his confidante and alleged mistress, Oxford believed he possessed 'a full letter of attorney to transact to the best of his understanding for the King (James)'[181] (a claim which, incidentally, was never denied by the Pretender).

As Anglo-Spanish relations moved towards a crisis Oxford perceived that the Stuart cause could benefit from a war between the two countries if the movement's leadership made a determined effort to enlist Spain's support for the Pretender. This was hardly visionary since the same point had been made by James Murray and Charles Caesar at the end of 1717 and by the Chevalier himself in his memorandum to Philip V in January 1718; however, Oxford, possibly ignorant of other Jacobite approaches to Madrid, certainly held that he as a former Lord Treasurer had the experience and status to put this argument to the Spanish government.

The Earl's proposition was surrounded by an all-pervading veil of secrecy, and his role in the Jacobite intrigue prior to Spain's invasion attempt in 1719 has not hitherto been emphasised.[182] What Oxford proposed was, according to Anne Oglethorpe, 'so full and easy a scheme that we (the Jacobite conspirators involved in his plot) doubt not it will deserve their (the Spanish government's attention'.[183] From what subsequently took place it appears that Oxford intended to approach Madrid via a reliable intermediary with a proposition that, in return for financial backing from Spain,[184] a section of the English Jacobite movement would launch an insurrection in the British Isles;[185] moreover, as an added inducement to the Spaniards, Oxford also offered to guarantee that Parliament would approve any agreement reached between Spain and the Pretender.[186] The Earl clearly envisaged that this assurance, given by a former Lord Treasurer, would act as proof of his good intentions and convince the Spanish government that the administration of James III would honour any commitment made by the Chevalier or his agents to

Philip V (for instance concerning the restitution of Gibraltar), and not seek to evade its obligations by constitutional manoeuvring.

Only a few people were let into the secret: Anne Oglethorpe, John Menzies, the chief Jacobite agent in London, and James Hamilton, one of his subordinates,[187] along with Charles Caesar who was a close friend of Oxford's. When the British government was informed of this alleged aspect of the Earl's activity on behalf of the Pretender by Dubois in the following March, it was reported that the conspirators intended to use Matthew Prior, a former British ambassador in Paris and also a friend of Oxford's, to convey the details of their project to the Spanish government.[188] Prior dined with Oxford on at least one occasion (26 August/6 September[189]) when the latter's plot was in gestation; moreover from his period at the embassy in Paris Prior had close links with some of the former ministers of Louis XIV (especially Torcy) who were now identified with the Vieille Cour faction, and also with the abbé Gaultier, Torcy's agent in London before the conclusion of peace between England and France in 1713 and a man closely identified with Jacobite circles in Paris.[190] In the event Prior did not undertake this mission, either on account of his ill health[191] or because the conspirators judged him unsympathetic to Oxford's project.[192] Outside this group, a few other English Jacobites were partly let into the secret: Ormonde's brother, the Earl of Arran (who had been the Pretender's chief military officer in England since the end of the Fifteen),[193] Lords Orrery[194] and North and Grey.[195]

These apart, Oxford's activity remained a closed book. Dillon, the Chevalier's leading correspondent in Paris, was excluded;[196] likewise, Atterbury, the Earl's rival, was not told.[197] (Dubois later informed the British government that the Bishop was not included in the conspiracy owing to his personal vanity which caused him only to approve of projects instigated by himself.[198]) Even the Jacobite leadership in Rome was only informed sparingly and belatedly of the details of Oxford's plan much to the bewilderment of both James and Mar, the Chevalier's Secretary of State, as they strove to unravel the web of intrigue spun by the Earl from Ormonde's mission to Spain.[199]

Although the time was propitious to launch a project to secure Spanish support for a Jacobite rising in view of the imminent likelihood of a war between Spain and Britain, the task of actually finding a suitable emissary who could inform Madrid of Oxford's proposals and relay Philip V's answer to the conspirators in England proved difficult. Spain's official retaliation for Passaro - the seizure of the few British merchants and their effects still remaining in the country after William Stanhope's earlier warnings - had in turn produced an angry reaction in England and greatly eased the Whig government's task of obtaining Parliament's approval for war against Spain.[200] Against this background those who were closely identified with the Spanish government (such as Monteleón or de la Rosa, the Spanish consul) were naturally suspect in the eyes of the British authorities and therefore unsuitable for the task of intermediary between Oxford and Madrid.

The Earl believed that Guillaume d'Eon, a Frenchman who acted as the Spanish government's nominee to the board of directors of the South Sea Company, could serve as a reliable and secure emissary

who would relay the details of the plan to Alberoni and inform the plotters of Spain's response.[201] A meeting between Oxford and Eon was difficult in view of the British government's surveillance and the likelihood of a rupture of diplomatic relations between London and Madrid. Nevertheless one was arranged under the auspices of Anne Oglethorpe early in the second half of September O.S.[202] Exact details of what took place are not clear.[203] From what Anne Oglethorpe later told Mar, however, it appears that Oxford outlined his project, laying particular emphasis on the point that any agreement between the Pretender and Spain negotiated by James's agents would be ratified by Parliament once the Hanoverian regime had been replaced by the Stuarts.[204] Eon, for his part, undertook to inform the Spanish government of Oxford's proposals and the two men then decided that the conspirators were to act in accordance with the reply received from Alberoni.[205]

The embryo plot soon received its first setback. On the night of Wednesday, 24 September O.S. the British government decided to arrest Eon.[206] Its motive was ostensibly one of retaliation for the seizure of Britons in Spain;[207] however, in view of the desire that Eon's papers should be seized,[208] the administration may have had an inkling of his involvement with some of James's supporters.[209] Craggs, the minister who ordered the arrest, was however too late. The would-be quarry had fled the country with the assistance of Anne Oglethorpe and James Hamilton, a minor Jacobite agent,[210] and the British authorities merely succeeded in detaining Eon's wife when she was on the point of sailing from Dover.[211]

Although Eon's flight had deprived the British government of valuable information, his enforced departure posed a problem for

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Oxford and his fellow conspirators. There seemed little doubt that their message would get through to Madrid since Eon had assured James Hamilton that he carried sufficient weight with Alberoni to persuade the latter to play the role allotted to Spain in the embryo plot;[212] the difficulty lay in finding another reliable channel through which the conspirators could liaise with the Spanish government. A solution to this was provided by Anne Oglethorpe. She hit upon the idea of persuading her brother-in-law, the Marquis de Mezières, to approach Cellamare in Paris and ask him to fill the role of intermediary between Oxford and Alberoni previously assigned to Eon.[213] Speed was of the essence in view of the fact that Madrid would soon be informed of the project by Eon, and also because of the worsening relations between Britain and Spain.[214] On 15 October O.S. Anne Oglethorpe arrived in Calais en route to Paris.[215] As usual absolute secrecy surrounded the mission, and she explained her presence (rather unconvincingly) to Captain John Ogilvie, the Chevalier's agent in Calais (who was not a party to the conspiracy), as being occasioned by the need to tighten up on security following a leak to British government agents at the Cocoa Tree in Pall Mall;[216] three days later (18/29 October) she left Calais for the French capital.[217]

After this a blanket of silence fell upon the conspirators. Charles Caesar, who had come to London to be informed by Menzies of the turn of events following Eon's enforced departure,[218] decided to go to ground in the country, an indication perhaps that he felt that no immediate action was likely. On the morning of 10/21 October he returned to his rural home in Hertfordshire in

the company of Prior.[219] The other plotters in England, fearing the 'talk of opening of letters and .. spies',[220] similarly disappeared into the background while waiting for Spain's response to Oxford's proposals to come through Cellamare.[221]

It was at this stage that the conspiracy of Jacobites in England began to dovetail with the main intrigue between Spain and the Pretender's cause as represented by Ormonde. As far as the Jacobite movement was concerned, the realisation that there was a subsidiary plot unconnected with Alberoni's invitation to Ormonde yet involving the Spanish government caused more confusion than enlightenment.[222] Anne Oglethorpe soon realised the absence of any coherent planning. Prior to her departure from London she had asked Lord Arran to write to his brother in Paris with a view to arranging a rendezvous.[223] Unknown to the plotters in England, Ormonde had been invited to Spain and he set out from the French capital in response to this on 5 November;[224] thus when Anne Oglethorpe arrived in Paris she found that she had just missed him.[225]

Another example of the lack of liaison within the Jacobite movement soon appeared. The conspirators in England had planned to use Cellamare as their channel of communication with Philip V and Alberoni. This was a highly risky business, as Mezières soon made clear to his sister-in-law.[226] Spain's rejection of the Anglo-French peace terms* meant that war between Philip V and the

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* Philip V had finally rejected the terms of the Quadruple alliance on 20 October under the influence, it was believed, of his wife. See Leclercq II, 237; Williams, Stanhope, 319 for the statement attributed to Philip's confessor, Daubenton, that 'le-prie Dieu a du ceder a l'alcove' - 'the confessional must give way to the (pleasures of) the closet (i.e. bedroom)'.

allies, including France, was viewed as imminent. Monteleón in London had on 4/15 October received orders to leave Britain and return to Spain;[227] once he had provided George I with an assurance that he would return to England should any obstacle be placed in the way of William Stanhope who had been instructed to leave Spain,[228] he was allowed to depart, and sailed from Greenwich for the Dutch Republic on 29 October O.S.[229] It was widely expected in Paris that Cellamare (who on account of his involvement with the Vieille Cour faction opposed to Orléans was being kept under close observation by the French government's intelligence service[230]) would likewise be recalled. Oxford's intention to use Cellamare as his channel of communication with Madrid thus displayed an ignorance of political realities in the French capital, and Mezières understandably drew back from committing himself to any action which ran the risk of his becoming suspected of involvement with the Spanish ambassador.[231]

Despite this initial reluctance Mezières did approach Cellamare with his sister-in-law's proposition.[232] The diplomat realised that he was being asked to inform Madrid of a project quite separate from that involving Ormonde's visit to Spain, and through Mezières passed the message to Anne Oglethorpe that Ormonde should be informed of Oxford's proposals by Alberoni in the hope that the two different schemes could be welded together.[233] Anne agreed to this, and then went to ground while awaiting Alberoni's response.[234]

It was impossible to keep Ormonde's departure from the French capital and his destination a secret. Rumours of his impending trip to Spain were even circulating in England before Monteleón's

departure.[235] As early as 3 November (two days before the Duke actually left Paris) Stair got wind of the fact that Alberoni was expecting Ormonde's arrival,[236] and a letter written by John Walkinshaw of Barrowfield, a Jacobite in the French capital, to his brother-in-law Hugh Paterson in Leyden, confirming this fell into the hands of the British government (probably as a result of London's collaboration with the Leyden postal authorities).[237] When Stair realised that Ormonde was expected in Spain, he immediately informed Orléans and obtained a promise that the Duke would be stopped and arrested before crossing the frontier into Spain.[238] Once the administration in London was aware of Ormonde's destination and the motives behind this, it would be sure to put two and two together and draw the conclusion that Alberoni was contemplating some action against George I in the shape of collaboration with the Jacobite movement. The official line adopted by Monteleón, Cellamare and Beretti Landi was, first of all, to deny that Ormonde was going to Madrid.[239] Clearly Spain would not be able to keep the Duke's journey a secret for long once he had arrived - indeed on 17 November William Stanhope, the retiring British ambassador, reported that an important person, possibly Ormonde, was expected at El Pardo, a royal residence to the north of Madrid, that night.[240] This information was precipitate since the Duke did not actually cross the Franco-Spanish frontier until the end of November,[241] but it gave some indication of the security problem confronting Alberoni.

To meet this difficulty the Spanish authorities decided to adopt the line that Ormonde's journey was being undertaken in a purely private capacity. On the evening of Wednesday, 23 November

Aquaviva, Spain's representative in Rome, sent a note to James suggesting that he should spread the story that the visit was being carried out against his advice.[242] The Chevalier complied by expressing his disapproval of Ormonde in writing to Aquaviva,[243] while admitting in a postscript (dated 28 November) that this should be regarded merely as a feint[244] written to allay British suspicions of Spain's pro-Jacobite intentions. James knew and approved of the invitation to Ormonde to visit Madrid even if he was not fully aware of how Alberoni envisaged to support his cause. In accordance with this line of deception suggested by Aquaviva, Mar wrote to Dillon in Paris reporting that Ormonde had gone to Spain entirely of his own accord, adding that the Pretender believed that Philip V would still continue to refuse all Jacobite requests for assistance.[245]

This strategy of attempting to confuse the British and French authorities as to the real nature of Ormonde's mission was not entirely without effect. Even Stair briefly believed the story that the Pretender's supporters did not expect the Duke's visit to have a successful result.[246] In addition, a letter from Paterson to Walkinshaw expressing this sentiment and stating that James disapproved of Ormonde's trip came into the Whig Ministry's possession,[247] adding force to the deception. While Stair and the government in Paris were trying to unravel the motives behind the Duke's departure, he himself evaded arrest by the French authorities. David Kennedy (whom the British government believed to be Ormonde's secretary)[248] was arrested when about to cross the frontier into Spain,[249] but the Duke himself slipped quietly into Spanish territory and on 1 December arrived at Alcalá de Henares near Madrid.[250]

Chapter 4: SPAIN AND THE NINETEEN: THE MAIN SPANISH EXPEDITION AGAINST BRITAIN

(i) Spain's strategy in 1719

From the time of Ormonde's arrival in the environs of Madrid on 1 December 1718 confusion and uncertainty surrounded the strategy Spain intended to pursue in support of the Stuart claim to the English throne, partly because of the secrecy surrounding Spain's pro-Jacobite plan of campaign - the only account of what Madrid intended to do on behalf of the Stuarts at this time comes from Ormonde[1] - and also since Alberoni was quite clearly under considerable pressure from both the Duke and the approaches made by Oxford to increase the scope of Spain's commitment to the Chevalier. In Alberoni's first discussions with Ormonde early in December it emerged that the Spanish government did not envisage any military contribution to the Stuart cause, an indication that even at a time when relations between Philip V and George I were drifting to a point of war, Spain still drew back from openly supporting the Pretender. Instead Alberoni told Ormonde that Madrid would provide arms and ammunition for him to mount an expedition to the British Isles;[2] in addition, Spanish money would be supplied to Charles XII of Sweden if, despite his reluctance hitherto to commit himself to the anti-Habsburg strategy proposed by Madrid, he agreed to mount an invasion of Scotland, and Ormonde was informed that Patrick Lawless, formerly James's representative in Madrid, had been dispatched to Charles with a message on these lines.[3]

Within a few days of this plan of action being imparted to the Duke, however, Alberoni began a radical alteration of his government's proposed activity on behalf of the Chevalier. Under pressure from

Ormonde, the Cardinal agreed to supply arms for between two and three thousand men for an expedition to the Scottish Highlands, stipulating only that the command of this be assigned to a man of whom Spain approved. George Keith, Earl Marischal, scion of an ancient Scottish family and a fugitive from the Fifteen (who, unknown to Ormonde, was of his own volition already contemplating seeking service in the Spanish army[4]), proved a mutually acceptable choice, and Ormonde wrote requesting him to come to Spain.[5]

This commitment to a Spanish supported descent upon Scotland was not the only departure from Alberoni's original conception of how Madrid would assist the Jacobite cause against George I and his government. Within the next week Spain further committed herself to the Pretender. In part this merely reflected the pressure of events. War between England and Spain appeared imminent. For Madrid to wait for Sweden's reply to Alberoni's latest proposition would take time; moreover, in view of Charles XII's earlier tergivisations, the Spanish government could not be sure of receiving a favourable response to its proposal that the Swedes should invade Scotland. Alberoni thus sent George Ragenal, a Jacobite agent, to Charles with the message that unless he invaded Scotland he could expect no financial support from Spain.[6] Rather than risk further delay or even the possibility of no agreement with Sweden, Spain had herself to prepare for war against Britain, a situation which could remove any constraints regarding Spanish participation in Jacobite attempts to overthrow George I.

In Spain's revised plan of campaign in support of the Stuart cause (as outlined by Ormonde in a letter to James dated

17 December) it emerged that Philip V was now willing to provide a total of five thousand Spanish soldiers to invade the British Isles and pay for their maintenance for up to two months.[7] Spain's troops commanded by Ormonde (who for this expedition was appointed a capitán general in Philip V's army) were to be conveyed to a prearranged point in England on board a Spanish fleet, along with a small number of artillery pieces and fifteen thousand guns all supplied by Madrid for distribution among the Chevalier's partisans after landing.[8] Madrid's decision to ignore Sweden - this revised Spanish plan of campaign made no mention of any Swedish participation - was not due to the exigencies of the moment nor to Charles XII's unreliability. The Spanish government and Philip V in particular appeared to believe that the task of overthrowing George I was unlikely to be too difficult.

This calculation, the key to Spain's strategy for supporting James in 1719, becomes clear from two manifestos issued by the government in Madrid to explain its case for collaborating with the Jacobite cause. The first of these, dated 24 February 1719, was aimed at the Chevalier's supporters in the British Isles and a translation in English[9] was issued for distribution by Ormonde and Marischal once their respective expeditions had landed in Britain.[10] Stair, the British ambassador in Paris, made considerable efforts to procure a copy through Osmin Rollo, one of his most effective Jacobite informers, but was unsuccessful.[11] The Whig Ministry seem instead to have obtained one of the copies circulated by Marischal's party in the Highlands.[12] The second

manifesto explaining Spain's motives for collaborating with the Chevalier exists only in a draft version, dated 13 April 1719, written in French to be signed by Philip V and Miguel Fernández Durán, secretario de guerra y marina.[13] This, not hitherto analysed,[14] sheds considerable light on the Spanish government's pro-Jacobite strategy in 1719 since it was compiled to coincide with both the presence in Spain of the Chevalier and the expected landing of Ormonde's expedition in the British Isles; since this was dispersed by a storm at the end of March and subsequently abandoned, however, the declaration of 13 April was never published.

In the decision to commit Spanish military support to the Jacobite campaign against George I, Spain was apparently relying to a considerable extent on popular support for James in Britain, and for Philip V's claim as the nearest heir to Louis XV to replace Orléans as Regent of France and, if Louis died without producing an heir from his own body, as king. In the manifesto of 24 February Philip claimed to have been influenced to assist the Catholic Stuart cause by his belief in the existence of a groundswell of pro-Jacobite sentiment within the population of Britain[15] (a probable allusion to the approaches from Oxford and Ormonde in 1718, in particular the latter's confidence that two thirds of the populace in the British Isles would support an attempt to restore James[16]). Granted some allowance for hyperbole on Philip's part, this belief was not without foundation: the Whig government's intelligence services confirmed the existence of considerable support for Jacobitism in certain localities such as the West Country in March 1719[17]. Madrid did not make the

mistake of equating sympathy for the Stuarts with automatic support for any attempt in the Chevalier's favour. Philip's declaration to the people of England and Scotland was designed to turn pro-Jacobite sentiment into active collaboration with an invasion to restore James sponsored by Spain. Those who although sympathising with the Chevalier's cause might feel intimidated by the fear of possible Hanoverian reprisals were reassured in the event of a Jacobite defeat by the offer of asylum and employment befitting their social status in Spain.[18] Moreover, in the preparatory stages of the invasion at least, Alberoni only expected James's supporters in Britain to play the low-key role of supplying the invading Spanish armada with intelligence reports of the strength and positions of the Royal Navy on the Spaniards' approach to the English coast along with pilots to guide it inshore.[19]

Philip's other assumption, forcefully expressed in his draft manifesto of 13 April, was based on his estimate of the French people's loyalty towards him as the grandson of Louis XIV.[20] On the basis of this he inferred that despite the Regent's alignment with George I, France would assist Spain in her attempt to restore the Stuarts in Britain, thereby continuing Paris's tradition of support for the Jacobite cause as (Philip believed) had been practised prior to Louis XIV's death. In particular, Philip confidently assumed that any members of the French armed forces who were sent to England by the Orleans regime to defend George I*

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* Alberoni believed erroneously that the French government had offered to provide George I with troops for the defence of Britain, cf. his letter to Ormonde of 4 April 1719 (Dickson 1719, p.222): France had actually offered to supply the Royal Navy with French sailors to help it meet the threatened Spanish-Jacobite invasion.

would instead join forces with the invading Spaniards and the Chevalier's supporters within Britain to install James upon the throne: in Philip's own words 'si l'on fait passer des troupes de France en Angleterre, elle(s) juniront aux mesmes (i.e. mêmes) et aux Anglois bien intentionnés'.[21] This belief that any Frenchmen supplied by Orleans to defend George I against Spanish attack might act as a Trojan horse and side with the invaders and their Jacobite allies was partly echoed by Stair, the British ambassador in Paris. On 26 March 1719 he urged the government in London not to accept any assistance from France, since the military personnel offered could not in his view be trusted to uphold the Hanoverian regime[22] on account of the flagrant partiality for Jacobitism found throughout French society.[23] A manifesto issued by Philip V to the people of France on 27 April[24] elaborated the Spanish king's belief and Stair's fear that in a moment of crisis France would renege on Britain, her traditional enemy, and turn to Philip V, who had been born and brought up a Frenchman, and by inference his ally James III.

It will be seen, however, that this was a colossal miscalculation by Philip. Contrary to his expectation, France collaborated with her ally George I and the French troops under the command of Berwick detailed to attack Spain remained loyal to Orléans: as a result the Spanish government was faced with an invasion across its northern frontier. Nevertheless, Philip V's belief (however misplaced) that he could count on some form of French assistance in Spain's offensive against George I helps explain his projected invasions of England and Scotland. The

number of Spanish troops detailed to take part in the main attempt was relatively small (approximately five thousand[25]). If Spain was relying on her own resources and to a less extent on James's supporters, help from France and the absence of any threat of a French invasion of Spain could be decisive in tilting the balance in favour of a Spanish-Jacobite victory.

Spain intended the expeditions to England and Scotland to be regarded as a Jacobite attempt to overthrow George I, not as a Spanish invasion of Britain. Philip V's troops therefore served as auxiliaries of James.[26] This reassured Jacobites in England and Scotland that the invaders were not an alien force but soldiers serving the legitimate Stuart king. It also indicated that the Spanish plan of campaign against George I was viewed in Madrid as a serious attempt to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty. This may be stating the obvious. From a Spanish point of view it would, however, have been perfectly feasible for Alberoni to have sent an expeditionary force to Britain with the aim of embarrassing George, not overthrowing him and his government (a tactic employed by the Whig Ministry itself when sending a Royal Naval expedition to Galicia in north western Spain in the autumn of 1719[27]). James could not afford to become involved in an invasion of Britain if its instigators had no particular wish to expel the Hanoverian dynasty: any attempt in his name had to have George I's removal as its objective.

From the beginning of Alberoni's negotiations with Ormonde regarding Spain's plan to support a Jacobite attempt to overthrow George I, the Cardinal was insistent that absolute secrecy be observed while preparations for this offensive were under way.[28]

This concern for security may in one respect have hindered an effective execution of Madrid's plan for invading Britain. On account of Alberoni's fear (shared by Ormonde[29]) that any letter sent to sympathetic Jacobites in England (such as Oxford) informing them of the planned invasion would be intercepted and deciphered by the Whig government's counter-espionage service with the result that Spain's whole strategy might be exposed, little attempt appears to have been made to liaise with any of the Chevalier's supporters in England[30] as the security blackout desired by Alberoni took precedence over his wish for these to provide the invading Spanish armada with intelligence reports.

Madrid's security precautions were thorough and on the whole reasonably well adhered to. Although Ormonde's invitation to visit Spain and presence in the country made clear that Madrid was contemplating some form of collaboration with adherents of James III, little of what Alberoni planned was revealed outside Spain. On account of James (or his court) being suspected as a bad security risk,[31] the Chevalier in Rome obtained only a general account of Spain's plan of campaign from Ormonde along with an invitation for him to visit Spain.[32] Further confirmation of Alberoni's security consciousness is demonstrated by his decision to remove Ormonde from the observation of British agents in Madrid and send him not to Cadiz, the port in which Spain's expeditionary force was to be assembled, but to Valladolid which was removed from the Spanish capital and far from Cadiz yet on the route from Madrid to Corunna from where, according to the plan of campaign worked out in conjunction with Alberoni, Ormonde was to join th armada which had sailed from Cadiz and take command of the main Spanish expedition against George I.[33] This strategem was

reasonably successful from Madrid's point of view in that it helped to confuse the British government's picture of what was happening in Spain. Although London received numerous reports of Ormonde's presence there, these claimed that he was in Madrid or Bilbao;[34] with the exception of Henry Worsley, British envoy extraordinary to the Portuguese court, who in late January 1719 reported from Lisbon that the Duke had been in Valladolid for some time.[35]

(ii) Spain's military contribution

In the plan for a Spanish expedition to England worked out at the beginning of December 1718 by Alberoni and Ormonde, the latter was told that Philip V would supply him with four thousand infantrymen plus a thousand cavalry[36] (although only three hundred of these were to be supplied with horses[37] since Alberoni anticipated considerable difficulty in obtaining an adequate number of mounts in Spain). Once Ormonde had conferred with Alberoni and a joint plan of action had been agreed for a Spanish-Jacobite offensive against George I, the government in Madrid began to assemble the expeditionary force to be sent against England. Responsibility for the organisation of this, fell upon Fernandez Duran, the minister for war. The extent of the task facing him and the limited number of months (or even weeks) allotted for this purpose in accordance with the time schedule apparently envisaged by Alberoni soon became all too clear.[38]

The nucleus of the proposed Spanish invasion force was, it will be seen, provided by the garrison of Cadiz, the port from where it was proposed that the expedition should set sail for the British

Isles under the direction of Admiral Baltasar Guevara (who had avoided capture at Passaro and returned to Spain) to rendezvous with Ormonde off Corunna. According to data obtained from an inspection of weapons carried out by Joseph de Vicaria, a military official in Cadiz, in August 1718, the port's garrison consisted of five infantry regiments: the España and Santiago (both consisting of two battalions), and three single battalion regiments, the Coruna (Corunna),* Palencia and Valencia,[39] From this it may be calculated that the Cadiz garrison in the

* I propose to refer to this regiment as the Coruna in order to avoid any confusion with the Galician port after which it was named.

[39] The average batalion in the Spanish army at this period consisted of thirteen companies each comprising a captain (capitán), a lieutenant (teniente), a second lieutenant (alferez), two sergeants, a drummer (tambor) and forty seven soldiers, giving a full complement (seldom reached) of 611 men plus 78 officers/drummers, totalling 689. Every regiment also possessed a Military Staff (Planamayor) of seven personnel - the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Sergeant-Major, Adjutant-Major, Chaplain, Surgeon and Drum Major, and the second battalion in the larger regiments had a planamayor four in number - Captain, Adjutant Major, Chaplain and Surgeon. As the Spanish army was reorganised in the early Bourbon period small groups of officiales reformados (literally reformed officers) were assigned to each regiment, but in inspections they appear to have been listed quite separately from the remainder of their regiments.

summer of 1718 had a full strength of 4,186 infantrymen plus officers, a number which was insufficient to provide enough troops for the expedition to Britain on the scale intimated by Alberoni in his negotiations with Ormonde while ensuring that Cadiz was adequately defended.

Fernández Durán soon encountered difficulties when trying to increase the military presence in the port with a view to assembling the cavalry which Ormonde had been led to expect as Spain's military contribution to the invasion of England. In the period after Vicaria's inspection of August 1718, detachments from the regiments of Coruna, Palencia and Valencia had been removed from Cadiz to garrison Melilla and Alhucemas, two Spanish enclaves on the North African coast.[40] Fernández Durán's first task was to return these to the proposed port of embarcation for Britain while finding other troops to replace them[41] at a time when a considerable portion of Spain's armed forces were in Sicily, and Madrid had to take into account the possibility of attack from France. Bad weather hindered the transfer;[42] however, by 24 January 1719 it had been completed: the detachments from the Coruna, Palencia and Valencia regiments were on their way back to Cadiz with the exception of a small number of sick who were left in Malaga,[43] having been replaced in the two North African garrisons by men from the regimiento de Almansa.[44]

Another difficulty soon arose. The Limburg infantry regiment, composed mainly of foreigners and Roman Catholic deserters from the garrisons at Gibraltar,[45] was removed from the Campo, the isthmus between Spain and the peninsula containing the Rock, to Cadiz[46] with a view to joining the projected invasion force[47] but

it mutinied shortly before boarding Guevara's armada[48] and some seventy-four men deserted.[49]

In addition to the infantry detachment, two cavalry regiments, the Rosellon and Ordenes, had been detailed to join the expedition to the British Isles.[50] These faced a serious shortage of horses. Lope de Ozes, an official responsible for the purchase of these animals,[51] was given instructions to spare no expense to secure enough mounts for the cavalry in order that the departure of the expedition might not be delayed,[52] but despite all his efforts - Andalusia even as far as Granada was virtually scoured in the search for horses[53] - the deficiency was not entirely made up, and the Rosellon regiment had to embark on board Guevara's squadron lacking twenty one mounts.[54]

These difficulties explained why Alberoni had hitherto omitted to tell Ormonde when the expeditionary force was expected to be assembled and ready to sail from Cadiz.[55] It was not until 7 February that the Duke received a communication from the Cardinal intimating that Guevara's fleet was prepared to set out shortly,[56] on the strength of which Ormonde left Valladolid in the early hours of 10 February[57] for Corunna. Alberoni's information was, however, wildly optimistic since the soldiers ordered to sail to the British Isles had not even been inspected. A preliminary review of the troops took place on Wednesday, 15 February under the supervision of Vicaria.[58] This revealed that the Spanish expeditionary force consisted of four infantry regiments,[59] two of one battalion (the regiments of Coruña and Valencia) and the remainder of two battalions (the España and Portugal).[60] These had a full establishment of 3,900 men of the

rank of sergeant and below,* but owing to desertion and illness were seven hundred and seventeen men below strength,[61] and the deficiency had to be made up by soldiers from the regiments of Granada, Badajoz, Palencia and the remainder of the Limburg which by this time had been drafted into Cadiz.[62]

On Friday, 24 February Andrés Perez Bracho, acting intendant of the navy in Cadiz, carried out a more detailed review of the expeditionary force prior to embarcation.[63] The four infantry regiments mentioned above had a full strength of 3,894 men of the rank of sergeant and below[64] (a number very close to the 4,000 infantrymen which Alberoni had undertaken to supply for the invasion of England), and the remaining officers and the Planamayor (Military Staff) increased this total by three hundred and thirteen[65] giving a figure of 4,207 infantry in all. These were joined by a company of artillery from the second artillery battalion of the Spanish army, comprising fifty five gunners, two corporals, a drummer, two sergeants, a second lieutenant and a lieutenant, under the command of Captain Juan de Aria y Quiroga,[66] and the two cavalry regiments.[67]

The records of service of the officers in all these regiments show them to have possessed a distinguished fighting record. This may give an unduly favourable picture of the calibre of the Spanish contingent owing to the fact that only men with a military record better than average would be promoted, leaving the

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* The Spanish invading force consisted of six battalions, each comprising 13 companies of 50 men (2 sergeants, a drummer and 47 soldiers).

majority of soldiers in the ranks and, for the purpose of this study, unrecorded. The two cavalry regiments in particular contained many veterans from the War of Succession. For example, the Colonel of the Ordenes, Francisco Pinateli, a Catalan aged approximately thirty two in 1719, had taken part in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo (1707) and the defence of Badajoz (1705); Joseph de Xaragai, a private in 1719,[69] had joined the regiment in 1705 and been present at the battles of Almansa (1707), Villaviciosa (1710), and the sieges of Lerida (1707), Denia (1708) and Barcelona.[70]

The names of the infantry regiments appear to have been chosen arbitrarily since the officers at least were not drawn from the particular region of Spain indicated by the regiment's title. The regimiento de la Coruña, for instance, had no discernible link with the Galician port insofar as its senior personnel were concerned. Its Colonel, Juan Carvajal y Lancaster and his son Nicolás,*[71] a Captain in the regiment, came from Extremadura,[72] while the places of birth of the other officers varied from Milan[73] to Andalusia.[74] Similarly, the regimiento de Portugal was not Portuguese in the composition of its officers: these came from a variety of places throughout Spain and the former Spanish Netherlands.[75]

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* These were respectively the father and brother of José Carvajal y Lancaster (1698-1754), chief minister to Philip V and his successor Ferdinand VI.

These troops appear to have been reasonably well armed, with the exception of the Portugal regiment which, according to a weapon inspection carried out in January 1719, was considerably short of guns and bayonets,[76] although this may have been partially remedied by the transfer of men (and presumably of their guns and bayonets) which followed the inspection of 15 February. The condition of the guns possessed by these infantry regiments*[77] were roughly in the ratio two thirds reconditioned to one third new and tested,[78] apart from the Portugal regiment which, as before, was the odd one out. Its first battalion had a hundred and twenty one new and untested guns, and the second seventy five;[79] an indication of a hurried distribution of weapons to this regiment as the Spanish authorities tried to assemble the expeditionary force to sail to England within the shortest possible time.

Following the inspection of these troops on 24 February, the four infantry regiments, the company of artillery and the cavalry began boarding the ships assembled in the harbour at Cadiz. Provisions were loaded on board: 11,764 arrobas≠ of flour and 4,269 fanegas 9 celeminadas≠ of barley (according to the entry

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* The Spanish army classified guns into three categories: new (fusiles nuevos), new and untested (de ningun servicio), and reconditioned or having more than six months' use (recompuestos de mediano (media año)servicio). Bayonets were classified slightly differently: new (Baionetas nuevas), used (de servicio) or defective (de las anchas)

≠ The arroba was approximately equivalent to 11.5 kilograms or 25 lbs; the fanega to one and a half bushels, and the celeminada (the quantity of grain in a celemin) was about half a peck.

in Hinojosa's account book)[80] for which the supplier, Pedro López Ortega, was paid 203,058 reales;≠[81] and on Monday 6 March 1719 the Spanish armada sailed.[82]

The Spanish military and naval authorities in Madrid and Cadiz appear to have assembled and equipped this expeditionary force in the shortest time available. An indication of the relative speed with which the would-be invaders were dispatched may be found in the fact that some of the troops from the four infantry regiments which formed the nucleus of the expedition arrived in Cadiz after the armada had sailed. Two officers, Esteban López Ossorio, a second lieutenant in the first battalion of the España, and Francisco Carrasco, a sergeant major in the Portugal, missed the departure of Guevara's squadron by a few hours owing to contrary winds which had delayed their departure from Ceuta where they had gone on family business; although the two men immediately sailed after the expedition in a small boat, after a distance of ten leagues* they were defeated by the direction of the wind and compelled to return to Cadiz.[83]

Owing to the absence of any Spanish record of Guevara's fleet,[84] it is impossible to give full details as to the names of the vessels, their specifications, the men carried and the total number of ships it contained. Nevertheless, using correspondence relating to the return of the expedition to Spain coupled with intelligence reports which reached various British and French sources, a partial picture of the armada may be pieced together.

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* approx. 39 miles.
≠ approx. £6,350

One vessel, the 50 gun Hermione,[85] a survivor of Passaro,[86] left Cadiz on or about 27 January 1719 with the intention of sailing to Corunna to take Ormonde on board and then rendezvous with the rest of the fleet.[87] In addition, at least one of the ships under Guevara's command had been seized from British ownership in the aftermath of Passaro (the Greyhound renamed the Andalucía).[88] The admiral's flagship was the 60 gun San Luis.[89] Of the 450 men which this was able to carry,[90] it is only possible to identify two companies of grenadiers from the España regiment[91] and at least one of cavalry[92] as having definitely boarded the ship. The Vice Admiral was reported to have sailed in the Guadeloupe;[93] this and a frigate, the Rosina, carried between them seven companies of infantrymen and three of grenadiers[94] (one of which may have come from the Coruna regiment)[95] Two hundred soldiers boarded the Mercury, while more infantrymen and cavalry joined the Susanne Marie and the Vedon.[96] Men from the Rosellon cavalry regiment were divided between the Lima,[97] the frigates La Vina and Marzal, and the Dorothea;[98] soldiers of the España and Portugal regiments were accommodated on the Santa Dorothea, the Lima, San Nicolás and the San Bartolomeo;[99] and the frigate La Galera de España carried two companies of infantrymen[100] (probably from the Valencia regiment).[101] Other ships which can be positively identified as having taken part in the expedition were another survivor of Passaro, the Tolosa, originally a French vessel, the Comte de Toulouse (and Ormonde still referred to it as such[102]) which had been seized by the Spaniards and renamed, carrying fifteen companies of troops[103]; and the Rebecca.[104]

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Estimates of the size of Guevara's fleet relayed to the British and French governments and their diplomatic representatives varied considerably. An early report put the number of ships as being very high. A French sea captain called Gusqui whose ship left Cadiz on 14 February reported to the Marechal d'Estrees, president of the conseil de marine, upon arriving in Marseilles on the 26th that Guevara's fleet consisted of fifty transports escorted by eight warships, and carried thirteen thousand men.[105] This report is inaccurate regarding the number of troops in the Spanish expeditionary force (approximately five thousand); moreover, on 14 February, the date of Gusqui's departure from Cadiz, these troops had not even been inspected prior to embarcation. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the numbers of ships given - fifty transports escorted by eight warships, a total also reported to the authorities in St. Malo[106] - was likewise too high: Gusqui may have noted the entire number of ships in the harbour, not all of which would have been included in Guevara's armada.[107] Another ship which left Cadiz on 16 February, two days after Gusqui, on arriving in Genoa at the end of the month gave the size of the Spanish expedition as fifteen transports carrying approximately three thousand men escorted by three men-of-war.[108] The number of soldiers, although on the low side, approximates more closely to those which Guevara took on board than Gusqui's account, and the total of ships may be correspondingly more accurate.

Subsequent intelligence reports reaching London and Paris tend to bear out this lower figure. A Dutch ship which left Cadiz on 17 February gave the size of the armada as three men-of-war

escorting thirteen transports carrying five thousand men in all.[109] More reliable information still came from Henry Worsley in Lisbon. Through an informant in Madrid (possibly Dom Manuel Siguria, a Portuguese subject[110]), Worsley had been told that Guevara's squadron consisted of twenty seven transports carrying four thousand infantry and nine hundred cavalry escorted by seven men-of-war.[111] The number of infantrymen is very close to the total of 4,207 listed by the Spanish authorities in Cadiz and Worsley's informant, who could have received his intelligence from sources close to the Spanish government, may also be more accurate regarding the numbers of cavalry and ships.

Once Guevara's fleet had actually sailed, reports of its size reached the British government through diplomatic sources in Paris. The Portuguese ambassador in the French capital reported that it set sail on 6 March, comprised eight ships and was intended to join up with six other vessels off the coast of Galicia;[112] his Dutch counterpart gave Guevara's armada a total of twenty six ships carrying four thousand troops and its date of departure as 7 March.[113] The first of these was inaccurate regarding the Spanish fleet's size, although it gave the correct date of sailing and reported that a rendezvous (with Ormonde) off the north west of Spain was contemplated; the second, although wrong on the relatively small matter of the day of Guevara's departure, had the total of men closely approximating to the infantry regiments on board, and may also have been fairly accurate concerning the number of ships.

To a certain extent of course the precise number of vessels in the armada to the British Isles was not the most important point:

of more significance was the fact that it had sailed and that its departure was known to the British and French governments. What mattered next was the progress of its voyage and eventual destination in England.

(iii) Best-kept secret of the Nineteen

The proposed landing place of the main Spanish invasion force sent to Britain in 1719 has never been discovered, and could therefore be said to merit the sobriquet of the best kept secret of the Nineteen. The only certain clue lies in brief references in Philip V's two manifestos of 24 February and 13 April 1719 that this destination was located in England.[114] In the preparations for the expedition, the Spanish government surrounded this aspect of its plan of campaign with absolute secrecy. Even Guevara, the admiral in command of the Spanish fleet and also of its transport from Spain to the landing place in England, did not know his final destination when he sailed from Cadiz at the beginning of March: this was to be communicated to him by Ormonde after he had taken overall command of the expedition following a rendezvous between the Duke and Guevara off Coruna.[115] Alberoni's decision to make Ormonde a capitán general in the army of Philip V, thereby placing him under Spanish military discipline, ensured that his lips were sealed on the matter of the proposed point of descend in England.[116]

This secrecy meant that the British government, although aware that Spain was negotiating with Ormonde and that an invasion of the British Isles was a possibility, had no idea of the eventual Spanish destination. A warning from Dubois in January 1719,[117]

forwarded to London by Stair,[118] led Craggs to voice the fear that the Spaniards would descend upon Ireland,[119] and on the 19th (O.S.) a proclamation was issued offering a ten thousand pound reward for Ormonde's capture should he land there.[120]

The first substantial break about the destination of the Spanish invasion force came in March 1719 from the French government. The gist of the intelligence obtained in Paris was communicated to Stair by Orléans at the beginning of the month (N.S.), and immediately forwarded to London;[121] more specific details were spelt out by Dubois in a letter to Craggs dated 8 March.[122] The abbé revealed that the French government's intelligence service had prevailed upon an unidentified Jacobite[123] said to be travelling to join Ormonde in Spain to reveal all the information he possessed concerning the Spanish plan of campaign in support of the Pretender. Dubois' mysterious informant claimed that the project had been based upon Oxford's approaches to Spain, and that the destination of the Spanish expeditionary force, alleged to be in the Bristol area, had been proposed by the Earl.[124] Dubois was assured by his source that a Spanish invasion of Britain was definitely planned to take place within the next six weeks.[125] Spain's military contribution to this attempt on behalf ot the Pretender was accurately given as five or six battalions (although they were incorrectly described as being from the Irish contingent in the Spanish army[126]); these (Dubois reported), under the command of Ormonde were to sail from Cadiz, would land near Bristol and then join up with those Englishmen opposed to the Hanoverian regime to march upon London. The abbé thought there was a lot of truth in this account, and he therefore decided to

trust the unnamed informer, sending him on his journey to join Ormonde with a gratuity of 2,000 pistoles* with the promise of a considerable pension from both Britain and France if he kept up the flow of crucial information.[127]

Stair, who was a man in the front line of the Whig administration's struggle against Jacobitism, initially dismissed the feasibility of the plan of campaign attributed to Spain. His first reaction to Dubois' revelation, contained in a dispatch to Craggs dated 11 March,[128] was to view with some scepticism the abbe's story of a landing in the vicinity of Bristol and the Spaniards' hopes of attracting support from Jacobites in the area. While agreeing that the alleged Spanish plan of campaign bore the signs of Oxford's handiwork (because the project as related by Dubois' informant appeared to rest upon a wildly inaccurate estimate of Jacobite strength within the British Isles and would therefore be unworkable), Stair thought that the numbers of Spanish troops in the invading force, accurately cited by Dubois as comprising five or six battalions, were quite insufficient for the purpose of landing in the West Country, joining up with levies raised by Jacobite sympathisers, and marching on London.[129] This belief in the relative smallness of the Spanish expeditionary force and hence its unsuitability for an invasion of Britain was, Stair believed, reinforced by the report of the ship which had arrived in Genoa from Cadiz at the end of February and had been forwarded to him in Paris by Henry Davenant, the

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* approx. £1,800

British representative in the Italian port. According to this report, the armada then assembled in Cadiz only consisted of three men-of-war and fifteen transports,[130] in Stair's estimation confirming that the Spanish invading force was small.[131]

The inference of Stair's dispatch of 11 March was that if the Spanish invading force was of the size he believed, Alberoni's project was doomed to failure. In a private letter to Craggs the next day (12 March), however, the British ambassador's view of the threat to Britain from Spain had undergone a considerable change, and he described the danger facing the Hanoverian regime as being serious: 'if ye Spaniards should be able to land even with 6,000 men, they'd give .. a great deal of trouble'.[132] This reversal of attitude on the part of Stair was due to two factors. The first of these was the smallness of the standing army at George I's disposal - it transpired that the Whig Ministry could only rush four infantry battalions and under two thousand cavalry to the area where an invasion was thought to be likely.[133] Secondly, Stair believed that the story about the planned Spanish landing in the environs of Bristol was a feint intended to present the small numbers of troops loyal to George I with the impossible task of defending the seat of government in London and the West Country where the Spanish invasion was expected, while the Spaniards themselves took advantage of the dispersal of the Hanoverian regime's standing army by landing in the vicinity of Liverpool, seizing Chester and marching through what Stair described as the 'ill-affected' counties.[134]

Since the Spanish expedition was dispersed by a violent storm off Cape Finisterre in the early hours of 28 March N.S., before it reached the British Isles, the location of its planned landing cannot

be pinpointed. Stair was wise to alert London as to the possibility that the intelligence report naming Bristol could have been intended to lay a false trail. The alternative destination he himself gave (the Liverpool area) however, was probably even less likely as the invaders' landing place than that named by Dubois,[135] especially in view of a subsequent report by Stair on 8 April that if Spaniards were unable to land there they would make for the Firth of Clyde.[136] It should be noted that Philip V had stated that Spanish troos were destined for England,[137] and James too insisted on a landing there when in April 1719 Ormonde endeavoured to suggest one in Scotland if a descent further south proved impossible.[138]

After receiving the news of Spain's plan to invade Britain, the Whig administration decided upon a dual course of action: firstly, to organize defensive preparations against the Spanish design, and then to try to identify the location of Ormonde's destination. As far as the former strategy was concerned, London was determined to use both its own resources and employ those of its European allies. Since the target of the Spanish attack was believed to be the West Country, all available forces were to be rushed there.[139] This would, of course, have the effect of virtually denuding the rest of England of troops loyal to the Hanoverian dynasty, and the deficiency could not be made good until new levies had been raised, a process which would take time.[140] George I's Ministry therefore decided to appeal to their European allies to augment the number of troops at its disposal.[141]

News of France's unsolicited offer to supply French sailors for service in the Royal Navy to meet the threat of an invasion of Britain by Spain[142] reached London via Stair on 5/16 March[143] (the offer itself arrived two days later[144]). In a dispatch of 15 March N.S., Stair reported that the government in Paris had offered not only to supply the Admiralty with fifteen thousand seamen to help meet a Spanish attack, but in addition to station twenty infantry battalions on the Channel coast of France as a deterrent to Ormonde.[145] Before this dispatch was received in London, the Whig administration had already decided to accept a modified version of Dubois' offer of assistance, a mere five or six hundred French seamen.[146] The motives for this decision were twofold. It demonstrated the need to preserve national pride and demonstrate that even in the face of a threatened Spanish invasion, the Royal Navy was confident of meeting any threat to the British Isles using its own resources. It also reflected Britain's suspicion that any Frenchmen sent to England might favour James rather than George I,[147] and an impression held by both the Whig administration and Stair that hitherto the French government, despite its treaty obligations with London, had shown some lukewarmness in co-operating with Britain both in the slowness of its offensive against Philip V[148] - Berwick, the commander of the French army detailed to invade Spain, had failed to take speedy action to attack the port of Pasajes close to the Franco-Spanish frontier,[149] thereby allowing Marischal and a small body of Spaniards to sail from there for Scotland in March 1719[150] - and its failure to curtail the exodus of Jacobite exiles from France to join Marischal in the Highlands.[151]

Instead of relying on French assistance, the government in London decided to approach the Dutch States General[152] (who had supplied George I with troops during the Jacobite emergency in 1715[153]) and the Imperial authorities in the Austrian Netherlands.[154] The Whig administration calculated that between six and eight battalions of land forces would be needed.[155] Cadogan, the British envoy extraordinary in the Hague, calculated that the Dutch - the most acceptable source on religious grounds - could supply three or four battalions;[156] however Whitworth, the minister plenipotentiary to the Dutch Republic, was instructed to request that five be held ready to be shipped to wherever they were most needed in the British Isles.[157] The remaining troops would have to be obtained from the Emperor under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. On 14 March O.S. William Leathes, the British Resident in the Austrian Netherlands, was instructed to ask the Marquis de Prié, the governor, to assemble six battalions of soldiers under his command and hold them at Ostend in readiness to be transported to Portsmouth should the British government need to call them[158] (their transportation to England, when required, was to be arranged by the Royal Navy)[159] If Prié proved unaccommodating on this point, St. Saphorin, the British ambassador in Vienna, was instructed to press the Emperor to release troops for service in Britain.[160]

On Tuesday 10/21 March 1719 Parliament was informed about the threat of an invasion from Spain[161] - the Whig government had been reluctant to release details of the design hitherto lest the news lead to a run on credit.[162] Immediately the outlook improved.

The Commons voted the amounts necessary for the country's defence; and a commissioner, Samuel Buckley, publisher of the London Gazette, was sent to report on the extent of pro-Jacobite feeling in the West Country, the area which Dubois' intelligence report indicated as the most likely landing place of the Spaniards. In addition a Royal Naval squadron under the command of Admiral Sir John Norris was sent to cruise off Land's End to intercept any Spanish vessels destined for Britain,[164] and it was planned to augment this number with a further seven or eight ships commanded by the Earl of Berkeley, Lord High Admiral, within approximately a week[165] although he did not actually set sail until 29 March O.S.[166] Four regiments of troops were drafted from Ireland to the Bristol area to increase the Hanoverian regime's military presence in the West Country, and these landed in Bristol and Minehead on 27 and 28 March O.S.[167] Prayers were ordered to be said in all churches for the defence of the country against the Spanish invasion,[168] a device which publicised the potential threat to the Hanoverian dynasty throughout the kingdom.

George I's position in the country as a whole was strengthened by the news of the Dutch States General's prompt decision (24 March N.S.), in response to Whitworth's request made the previous day, to send five battalions of soldiers, totalling two thousand men, to defend the British Isles:[169] two of these battalions come from the Republic's Swiss contingent; the remainder were from the regiments of Sixma, General Huffel and Colonel Amerongen, and for the mission to Britain were commanded by Major General Keppel and Brigadier Weldern.[170] When all these measures to defend the status quo in the British Isles had been

taken, George I himself left for Hanover (11/22 May) accompanied by Stanhope and Bernstorff, the monarch's chief Hanoverian counsellor,[171] an outward demonstration of the regime's confidence that the precautions taken to thwart any landing by Ormonde were more than adequate.

Now that the Hanoverian military position in Britain had been strengthened and it seemed probable that the threatened Spanish invading force would not reach its destination without having first to do battle with the Royal Navy in the western approaches to the Channel, the Whig administration could devote more time to the task of trying to ascertain where the Spaniards intended to land, and whether there was any evidence of Jacobite collusion with their approach. Most of the information came from Buckley, the commissioner appointed to report on the extent of pro-Stuart sentiment in the West Country, the location where a Spanish landing was thought most likely, although his intelligence was supplemented by that supplied by other governmental agencies.

The customs reported movements of small amounts of arms westward from Gloucestershire to Devon.[172] Other reports indicated the discoveries of quantities of gunpowder at Newbury on 19 March O.S.[173] and at Calne near Chippenham on 3 April O.S.[174]: since both of these places were on the main highway from London to Bath and Bristol,*[175] this material may have been in the process of being conveyed from the capital to the West Country in accordance with a pre-arranged strategy on the lines reported by Dubois in his letter of 8 March. Buckley himself had several West Country Tories suspected of Jacobite leanings placed under

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* The present day A.4.

surveillance, chiefly Sir William Wyndham, Bolingbroke's protégé, the M.P. for Somerset,[176] and Sir Coplestone Warwick Bampfylde, the Member for Devon,[177] both of whom had been arrested in 1715. The commissioner was forced to conclude, however, that there was no sign of these having any plans to act in concert with a landing by Spanish troops commanded by Ormonde.[178] Buckley found no sign of any Jacobite activity in Devon:[179] if the Spanish expedition did come, he concluded that the most likely landing place would be on the coast between Minehead and Bristol[180] (a verdict in line with Dubois' information regarding the design imputed to Oxford).

The only suspicious sign in Minehead was that a large quantity of oats had been recently sold after having been stored for several months,[181] whether connected with the Spanish invasion or mere speculation in commodities was not known. In Bristol no indication of any pre-arranged scheme for a Jacobite rising came to light; the only visible signs of anti-government activity was the discovery of two chests of arms.[182] Buckley reported, however, that this could have been a pointed towards possible widespread unrest in the city since two thirds of its population included the militia were estimated as being ready to rise on behalf of the Pretender.[183] Brigadier Gore, the military commander in Bristol, felt confident of his ability to meet any threat from the Pretender's supporters.[184] Nevertheless, Buckley's reports demonstrated that a Jacobite rising in the Bristol area (a similar plan to that proposed by West Country Jacobites in 1715[185]) in conjunction with a landing by Spanish troops was feasible and stood some chance of success; London could, however, take consolation from the lack of evidence of any pre-arranged plan on the part of the Pretender's supporters in the locality to carry this out. The information

regarding a descent in this area by Ormonde may not have been false: such a landing place for the Spanish troops could have been Madrid's intention, although if so, there would probably have been no Jacobite rising concerted with their arrival since the English conspirators had no insurrection planned.

If this information was designed to lay a false trail, an alternative course for Ormonde lay in Stair's suggestion that the Spaniards planned to make for Liverpool.[186] On the surface this was quite a feasible possibility. Once the Spanish invaders had landed, they could either do as Stair suggested - gather recruits while the British government's troops were trying to cover London and the West Country[187] - or make for Denbighshire and Flintshire, the two Welsh counties where Jacobitism was strongest;[188] as a further alternative they could try to raise support among the Roman Catholics of Lancashire, some of whom (the Whig Ministry believed) had received a large quantity of bullets recently struck in Liverpool.[189]

Upon further examination, however, a Spanish landing in the vicinity of the Mersey estuary is less likely than one further south. To march down the Severn valley, although it would ultimately bring the invaders close to Oxford's own estate at Brampton Bryan on the Shropshire-Herefordshire border, was to turn the invasion into an attempt to embarrass the Hanoverian regime instead of trying to overthrow George I and his Ministry. It would take much longer for the Spaniards to reach the seat of government in London from the north-west than from the Bristol area, and this route would also give the British government time to regroup its forces and meet the rebels in a

direct confrontation. If Alberoni and Ormonde counted upon a rising staged by Oxford and his associates in another locality, this would admittedly make a Spanish landing far from London a more feasible proposition since the resultant two-pronged attack on George I would seriously hamper the administration's ability to mount a concentrated attack upon the Spaniards. A project on this scale seems unlikely in view of the relative smallness of Spain's commitments to the Jacobites, both military and financial, coupled with the almost total absence of liaison between Ormonde and those conspirators in England privy to the design. The possibility of the Spanish invaders making for North Wales would also have been a waste of their resources besides being against the basic purpose of the expedition, the overthrow of George I. Welsh Jacobitism was a phenomenon chiefly associated with personalities[190] rather than one with widespread roots in the principality. For Ormonde and Alberoni to have relied on this as the basic of a pro-Stuart rising would have been courting a disaster. Similarly, for the Spaniards to have marched into Lancashire and tried to obtain support there was scarcely a feasible objective. This course of action would have laboured under the severe psychological burden of the defeat of the previous insurrection among English Jacobites at Preston in 1715. The reliance upon James's co-religionists, the Lancashire Catholics, implied by such a move was a highly questionable step, even if it might have appealed to Spain.[191] The leadership of the Jacobite movement had to attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction between the Chevalier's refusal to abjure Roman Catholicism and his need to secure the maximum amount of

Protestant support if the Stuart dynasty was to triumph. Against this background it would have been ill-advised for Alberoni to have toyed with the idea of encouraging Catholics in Lancashire or elsewhere to rise in support of James III. This action would have possessed three serious drawbacks. It would have alienated potential Protestant support for the Chevalier besides providing the Whig government with a considerable propaganda weapon associated with the cry of the threat of 'Popery'; in addition it would have been courting military disaster on account of the smallness of the Catholic Community in the British Isles. It is also by no means certain that James' co-religionists would even have supported an invasion on behalf of the Pretender in 1719, since in the spring and summer of that year attempts were being made by the Whig Ministry to reach a modus vivendi with the leaders of this small community whereby in return for a relaxation of the penal laws, the Catholics would swear loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty and persuade the Pope to abandon what London viewed as his support for the Stuarts.[192]

In an apology for his period of office in Spain written in 1721, Alberoni claimed that the landing place of the main Spanish expeditionary force sent to England in 1719 had been located in the neighbourhood of London to coincide with an insurrection with James's supporters.[193] The British government naturally could not afford to neglect the possibility of some form of Jacobite attempt on London, either a rising from within, an external assault by a Spanish expeditionary force, or a combination of both. Reports of Stuart sympathisers in the capital collecting arms and ammunition[194] were taken seriously by the authorities; those who were found in possession of guns and

other items of weaponry were interrogated, but no connection was found with any would-be Spanish landing or Jacobite insurrection[196] as Alberoni appeared to infer was planned by Madrid. Nevertheless, the Whig Ministry decided that London would have to be defended against possible attack. Of the five battalions of troops supplied by the Dutch States-General, two from the Swiss contingent were allocated to the London area because (in the words of Stanhope) 'we (the British government) have a greater Relyance upon them on account of their numbers and discipline',[197] an indication that George I's Ministry were not convinced of the loyalty of their own troops. The Hanoverian regime's informants in London continued to be active, but the information they gathered tended to be either out of date,[198] hearsay,[199] or the work of cranks.[200] The main danger facing the British capital in the Spring of 1719 which caused most concern to the Lords Justices, the Regents appointed to govern Britain during George I's visit to Hanover, was not the possibility of a Spanish attack or Jacobite insurrection, but the threat that supplies of coal to the city from the north-east of England might be disrupted by a strike of keelmen on the rivers Tyne and Wear;[201] but as John Hedworth, M.P. for County Durham, observed, this did not become serious until May by which time any threat of an invasion by Spain had almost disappeared.[202]

On the evidence available, therefore, it is impossible to reach any firm conclusion regarding the destination in England of the main Spanish invasion force led by Ormonde. The area of the West Country close to Bristol was the location most suspected by the British government in 1719, and it could be argued that the

known facts tend to fit this. The source of this plan of campaign was, according to Dubois' informant, reported to be Oxford who undoubtedly had made some form of approach to Madrid in the latter part of 1718. The city of Bristol itself was reliably described by Buckley, the commissioner appointed to investigate the extent of pro-Stuart feeling, as a stronghold of Jacobite sentiment, albeit passive. The smallness of the Spanish invasion tends to bear out Stair's suspicions that its only possible chance of success lay in linking up with a rising staged by the Pretender's sympathisers, but the British authorities found little sign of any advance preparations for this. The discoveries of gunpowder along the main road from London to Bristol and of arms in the latter city could indicate that some of the Jacobites involved in the conspiracy had begun rudimentary attempts to assemble an arsenal in the West Country, but the difficulties of communicating between England and Spain in the wake of George I's and Orleans' declarations of war on Philip V had made impossible any preparations for an uprising on behalf of James III with the result that had Ormonde and the Spaniards landed, their arrival would not have sparked off a Jacobite insurrection. The inclusion of a detachment of artillery in the Spanish invasion fleet indicates that Alberoni's plan of campaign envisaged some form of assault on a fortified place, although from the absence of information available it is impossible to reach any conclusion as to where this might have been. A landing further north would seem unlikely on account of the greater distance from the centre of government in London, similarly the evidence to suggest a descent close to the British capital is by no means decisive

despite Alberoni's claim. The brief reference to the Nineteen in his apology of 1721 appears somewhat over-simplified: the statement that the Spaniards were aiming for a landing close to London in conjunction with a Jacobite rising may have been a distortion of Spain's intention to land her troops elsewhere - in the Bristol area seems most likely - in concert with a Jacobite insurrection, and the reference to the invaders' target being London a reflection of the fact that the Spaniards and James's supporters who joined them must have had this, the centre of government, as their eventual objective.

(iv) Collapse of the Spanish attempt

James scored a considerable success when, after a clandestine voyage from the Papal States to Spain, he landed at Rosas in Catalonia on 9 March, 1719.[203] The web of subterfuge around the Chevalier's departure from Rome spun by the Jacobite court had outwitted the British, French and Austrian governments - who were unsure whether he had gone to Spain[204] or towards Imperial territory to liberate his fiancee Clemantine Sobieska who, as a result of British pressure on Vienna, was held captive in Innsbruck by the Austrians[205] - and enabled the Chevalier to reach friendly territory. At five o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, 27 March James arrived in Madrid to be welcomed by Philip V, Elisabeth Farnese and the Spanish Royal Family.[206] His presence in the capital during the next week was the major public demonstration of Spain's involvement with the Jacobite cause. James III (as he had been officially proclaimed in the Gacota de Madrid[207]) was regally entertained[208] and, it was reported, provided with lavish

presents by his Spanish hosts[209] On 4 April the Chevalier left Madrid in the company of his nephew Liria for Coruma to await news of the progress of the main Spanish expedition to England.[210]

After Guevara's fleet left Cadiz on 6 March a blanket of silence had descended upon its progress. According to information supplied by the captain of the Galera de España, one of the vessels in the armada, the Spaniards first sailed in a south westerly direction to the Canary Islands to escort a merchantman and marl boat bound for South America (and also no doubt to mislead any British agents in Cadiz as to the armada's final destination); then Guevara turned northwards in the direction of the Galician coast[211] where he was to rendezvous with Ormonde and be informed of his fleet's destination in England. In the absence of detailed information from Spanish sources, this testimony cannot be confirmed;[212] but since Guevara did not reach the area of Cape Finisterre off the north western tip of Spain until 27 March, three weeks after leaving Cadiz, it would have been quite feasible for him to have made a detour from the shortest sea route between Southern Spain and Galicia.

In the early hours of 28 March disaster struck. A violent storm sprang up off Cape Finisterre completely scattering Guevara's fleet with the result that when the weather abated, the ships' captains were compelled to seek shelter either in the ports of north west Spain and Portugal, or return to Cadiz.[213]

The first intimation that the invasion attempt had gone seriously awry reached Coruna on 9 April when one of the vessels from Guevara's fleet - probably the frigate Galera de España -

limped into the harbour;[214] on the same day the Mercury arrived in Vigo.[215] The bad news was confirmed the next day (10 April) with the arrival of the Tolosa,[216] Rebecca and three other ships in Corunna;[217] and the Guadaloupe and Rosina in Vigo.[218] On the 11th the Susanne Marie and the Vedon appeared in the small port of Muros to the west of Vigo.[219] Four ships were reported as seeking refuge in Lisbon:[220] their passengers included three companies from the España infantry regiment, a hundred other infantrymen, fifty horses and fifty sailors, all of whom were allowed by the Portuguese authorities to march across the country to Spain.[221] One of the Spanish vessels was reported to have run aground at Faro in the Algarve.[222] The Dorothea which carried men and horses of the Rosellon cavalry regiment initially put in at Huelva in the south western corner of Spain[223] where the sick men and surviving horses were landed,[224] and then proceeded to Cadiz where it joined other survivors of the abortive armada to England: these included Guevara's flagship the San Luis which had lost its masts in the storm,[225] the San Bartolomeo,[226] Lima,[227] Santa Dorothea,[228] San Nicolás,[229] La Vina and the Marzal.[230]

The marqués de Pozoblanco, colonel of the Rosellon cavalry regiment, described the expedition's return to Spain as a 'misfortune'.[231] From the point of view of Spanish military prestige this was an appropriate description if not an understatement. The armada destined to carry the troops to invade the British Isles had been dispersed by the weather, not the armed forces of George I, before Ormonde, the commander, had even gone on board. The immediate result of the dispersal of

Guevara's fleet was to cause considerable embarrassment to the Spanish government and its ally and guest, James III, who by an unfortunate coincidence had arrived in Coruna on 17 April.[232] By this time it was clear that the Spanish design to invade England had received at best a severe setback, and at worst would have to be abandoned. The first rather optimistic view was taken by Philip V in a letter to James dated 25 April, assuring the Chevalier that the expedition would be refitted as soon as possible and then dispatched to the British Isles.[233] Alberoni, who had received information from Ormonde and Risbourg, the capitán general of Galicia, about the condition of the vessels from Guevara's armade which had returned to Corunna,[234] was not so confident. When writing to James on 26 April Alberoni was careful not to raise any hopes of a speedy resumption of the invasion attempt, and told the Chevalier that the expeditionary force could not be reequipped until August.[235]

In the circumstances this attitude was realistic. On 21 April the French army under Berwick had invaded the Spanish Basque provinces, capturing Pasajes on the 26th and destroying six vessels under construction there.[236] Although Philip V still held the illusion that a direct appeal to the French invaders in his name would cause them to desert Berwick and flock to the Spanish flag,[237] the fact remained that Alberoni and Fernández Durán, the minister for war, were now faced with an invasion of Spain itself. Against this background any attempt to refurbish Guevara's armada for an expedition to England would be allotted a very low priority. Of more immediate concern to the Spanish military authorities and

the government in Madrid was the extent of the losses of men, weapons and materials occasioned by the storm of 28 March.

The generally held view is that these losses were, on the whole, severe. Reports reaching the British government painted a lurid picture of the storm's effect on Guevara's armada. On Sunday 5/16 April a man named Christian Blacklin arrived at Minehead from Dublin where he had met one Maurice FitzGarrard who swore that on a voyage to Ireland he had fallen in with the Spanish fleet which (he claimed) was short of provisions for the horses, several of which were thrown overboard, even before it was caught in the fierce storm which had completely scattered it.[238] Information from Henry Worsley in Lisbon reinforced this view. In a dispatch of 11 April he reported the account of a man named Jordan who had recently arrived in the Portuguese port of Setubal. This man claimed that in the early hours of 17/28 March he had passed through a large fleet of ships at an estimated distance of thirty leagues from the Lizard.[239] They appeared to be in considerable distress since their crews were flinging cannon and large amounts of provisions overboard.[240]

These reports from British sources are of course suspect. Any detailed examination of the precise nature of the Spanish losses is difficult in view of the dispersal of Guevara's fleet to various points along the western and south-western sides of the Iberian peninsula between Galicia and Cadiz. The different locations of the Espana regiment serve as an example of the obstacles in the way of calculating losses, since its members were scattered between Corunna[241] and Cadiz where the colonel, the marqués de Torremaior y de Santa Cara, two companies of grenadiers and nine of

infantry landed;[242] the two cavalry regiments, the Ordenes and Rosellon, were similarly split up between the south-west of Spain and Galicia.[243]

In the light of a dispersal on this scale, attempts to analyse the extent of the losses of men, weapons and materials suffered by the Spanish forces were difficult. After the initial shock caused by the effect of the storm upon Alberoni's invasion plans, however, the Spanish military authorities in Galicia and Cadiz began a series of inspections to determine the extent of Spain's misfortune, and these, though incomplete, provide in statistical terminology a sample from which it is possible to obtain a reasonably detailed picture of Spain's losses. The general impression of these military inspections is that comparatively few Spanish soldiers actually died in the dispersal of Guevara's fleet, but there were many sick (possibly resulting from lack of food due to losses of provisions in the storm[244]): on 8 May Risbourg calculated that the numbers of these in Coruna, Pontevedra and Vigo alone were at least six hundred.[245]

The first and most detailed military inspection, that of the single battalion infantry regiment of La Coruña, was carried out by its colonel, Juan Carvajal y Lancaster, in Coruña on 7 May.[246] This is not wholly reliable largely because the company of grenadiers had been separated from the remainder of the regiment.[247] it does, however, give as accurate a picture of the Coruña's strength as could be expected under such difficult conditions. In the inspection carried out at Cadiz on 24 February prior to the departure of the expedition, the Coruña regiment was reported

to consist of 611 soldiers, thirteen drummers, twenty six sergeants, thirteen second lieutenants, lieutenants and captains, along with a military staff of seven, plus fourteen officiales reformados.*[248] On 7 May Carvajal noted that the numbers of drummers, second lieutenants and the military staff were unchanged; one sergeant was ill but the remaining twenty five were present; the number of oficales reformados had dropped from fourteen to nine,[249] while ten of the twelve captains≠ were present - of the two absent Juan Garcia Postigo was ill,[250] and the other, Pablo de Olivellas, appeared to be missing,[251] perhaps dead. The soldiers in the Coruña had fared less well. A hundred and fifty one were described as ill and thirty as convalescing[252] with only three hundred and sixty two 'present and correct'.[253] This number may have erred on the large side (Carvajal naturally wishing to present as favourable a picture as possible of the condition of his men) since an inspection of all the troops in Corwna carried out on the following day (8 May) by a military official, Juan Francisco de Castilo y Benavides, at the bequest of Risbourg, gave the number of soldiers in the Coruña fit for service as three hundred and forty five.[254] Nevertheless, if the figure of 362 soldiers in this category given by Carvajal, the colonel of the regiment, is accepted, it appears that in the inspection of 7 May the Coruña was unable to account for twenty one soldiers, one captain and five officiales

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*Or, put in another way, the regiment was at its full strength of thirteen companies each comprising forty seven soldiers, a drummer, two sergeants, a second lieutenant, lieutenant and a captain, plus the military staff.

≠ 12 captains because the thirteenth company, the grenadiers, was in Vigo.

reformados. In view of the period of almost a month which had elapsed between the time at which the first survivors had reached Corunna and the date of Carvajal's inspection, it would seem reasonable to conclude that these men were missing presumed dead.

Of all the regiments in the Spanish expedition to England in 1719 the Coruña seems to have suffered the least in the storm which dispersed Guevara's armada. On 14 May Risbourg wrote to the Duke de Bournonville, comandante general, in Salamanca, that it was the only regiment which had landed in Galicia in a fit condition to march.[255] Yet the figures of the survivors from a cross-section of the Espana regiment tend to bear out this picture of comparatively few deaths with larger numbers of sick. Three companies from the second battalion of this were inspected by Castillo y Benavides in Coruna on 8 May;[256] another four companies along with five from the first battalion were reviewed by Joseph Arrillaga, a comisario ordinario, in the town of Porrino on 17 May.[257] These figures were sent to Garcia Ramirez de Arellano, the Intendant of Galicia, and a slightly amended version of the data contained therein was drawn up and signed by him on 4 June and forwarded to Fernández Durán.[258] According to the inspections of 8 and 17 May, the twelve companies of the regimento de Espana had ninety six men described as sick and forty as convalescing,[259] yet when these had been taken into account along with three deserters and a small party of six soldiers acting as the escort for James's baggage train,[260] it can be calculated that the five companies of the first battalion were unable to account for only three soldiers and one captain, while with the seven companies from the second these figures rose only to elevan and two respectively.[261]

Assuming that they like the twenty seven men from the Coruña regiment fell into the category missing presumed dead, the number of fatalities in the España was comparatively small.

The most detailed picture of the extent of the losses of clothing and weapons caused by the dispersal of the Spanish expedition is supplied by a list of these among the first battalion of the Portugal regiment drawn up on 21 April following its return to Cadiz,[262] which tends to corroborate that the storm struck Guevara's fleet in the early hours of the morning. The main losses sustained by the Portugal came in the categories of minor objects of clothing (343 cravats, 250 shirts, 126 hats and 144 pairs of stockings being classified as lost[263]) and of kit (107 pouches, 110 belts and 73 haversacks[264]) which a soldier was likely to remove from his person when asleep, whereas losses of more fundamental items of clothing (only twenty eight pairs of breeches were described as having been lost[265]) and of weapons (upon the battalion's return to Cadiz twenty five guns and ninety five bayonets were written off[266]) which the men would keep on or close by were much less. This is consistent with a picture of the storm having struck at night, and in the resultant confusion smaller objects of clothing and kit would be lost overboard, while more substantial items kept on or close to each soldier were easier to save. A similar pattern is repeated in data of losses among the two companies of grenadiers in the two battalion regimiento de España drawn up on 23 April after their return to Cadiz.[267] The two companies were reported as having lost 69 shirts, 64 cravats and 41 caps (among minor items of clothing), but only fourteen pairs of breeches, ten dress coats and six guns.[268]

As a general conclusion it is proper to say that the losses of men from the Spanish expeditionary force, although not numerically great, were a serious blow at a time when French troops were invading the Basque region. The consequences of the dispersal of Guevara's fleet upon the shortage of manpower facing Spain were soon felt by the Spanish authorities. On 1 May Fernández Durán issued an order for the survivors of the abortive expedition who had disembarked in Coruna (principally men from the Coruna and Valencia regiments) to proceed overland to Pamplona to meet the French invasion, leaving the sick and those convalescing to garrison Galicia.[269] This directive produced an immediate protest from Risbourg, the man responsible for its execution. On 8 May, the day after the order had been received, he wrote to Fernández Durán protesting at the impossibility of such a move owing to the large numbers of sick among the ranks of these troops.[270] In the face of this objection the Spanish government had to give way, and on 3 June Risbourg was informed that Philip V had been swayed by his protest and had decided that the regiments of Coruña and Valencia should not now leave Galicia.[271] A similar conclusion could be reached concerning the losses of weapons and equipment in the storm of 23 March. These were not numerically great, but the task of replacing them at a time when Spain was under external attack caused the Spanish government considerable difficulty, besides presenting Madrid with new expense.

Chapter 5

SPAIN AND THE NINETEEN: THE SPANISH EXPEDITION TO SCOTLAND

(i) The journey to Scotland

The Spanish troops sent to Scotland in 1719 under Marischal's command described by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland as 'bigotted Votaries of the Romish-Antechrist'[1] - are the most tangible evidence of Spain's contribution to the Jacobite cause in that year, Alberoni's attempt to incite the clans to rebel as a diversion to a planned landing by Ormonde in England.

The soldiers in question, numbering approximately three hundred and eighteen in all,[2] came from the two-battalion regimiento de Galicia[3], and were commanded by Colonel Nicolás Bolaño y Castro. Little is known of him:[4] however, as with the regiments participating in the main Spanish expedition, it is possible to form an idea of the military experience of many of the officers and those privates in 1719 who subsequently rose from the ranks.

Five captains can be identified. Two were natives of Castille: Juan de Santossildes (born about 1680) had (in 1719) served in the Spanish army for twenty four years,[5] and Francisco Cervantes, aged forty nine, had joined up in 1688.[6] The other captains were Joseph de Araujo, a Galician, (thirty nine in 1719) with a record of service dating from 1704,[7] and Geronomo Escales, a Valencian born about 1685 who had served in the army for almost nineteen years.[8] The fifth captain was Peter Stapleton, an Irishman who had joined the service of Spain.[9] Five of the six lieutenants in Bolano's continent can be identified. Two were

natives of Galicia: Antonio Gayoso, born in 1689, who had a record of thirteen years military service,[10] and Fernando Rodriguez Carrecedo who had served in the army since 1705.[11] Lieutenant Tomás de Argumedo, an Andalusian, was both older (aged 56 in 1719) and more experienced since his military record went back thirty seven years,[12] and Franciso de la Torre, born in the Spanish Netherlands, had been in the army since 1686.[13] There is no background information available for Lieutenant Pedro Pazquelo other than that he was in Captain Cervantes' company.[14] Three second lieutenants were natives of Andalusia: Pedro Muñoz Navarrete, born in 1685, had a service record approaching sixteen years;[15] Sebastián de Orozco[16] and Alejandro de Zeyjas,[17] both aged thirty one, had joined the Spanish army in 1706 and 1705 respectively. Second Lieutenant Andrés de Hermosilla, born in the Spanish Netherlands, appears to have been something of a rising star in the military field: he was twenty one and had reached this rank after only five years service.[18]

The main factor to emerge from the background information available for Bolaño's detachment is that the majority of officers of the rank of sergeant and above were natives of Galicia.[19] Owing to certain geographical similarities between this area and Scotland, it may have been that the Spanish troops who joined Marischal's expedition were selected in the belief that they would be suited to the conditions of weather and terrain found in the north of the British Isles. This must remain mere speculation, however: Bolaño's contingent may have been chosen solely because the regimiento de Galicia was stationed in

Guipuzcoa in February 1719 when Marischal and his younger brother, James Keith, arrived in San Sebastian to organise the diversion to the Highlands.

Initially, preparations for the Spanish expedition to Scotland passed off relatively straightforwardly. Alberoni had provided James Keith with 18,000 crowns to cover the expenses of assembling the expedition.[20] Two ships (which may have been seized from French ownership the previous year[21]) were therefore procured by the Prince of Campoflorido, capitán general of Guipúzcoa, to transport the Spanish troops to the Highlands: the cost of these (12,000 crowns) was met by James Keith out of the money he had received in Madrid.[22] At this point the two Keith brothers parted company. James crossed into France to try and persuade some of the Scottish veterans of the Fifteen now in exile there to join his brother and use their influence to incite the Highlanders to revolt in support of James III.[23] Marischal and the Spanish troops boarded the two vessels in Pasajes, the port for San Sebastian, to take them to Scotland.

Information supplied by Liria that his father Berwick, the commander of the French army detailed to invade Spain, was reconnoitring the frontier and preparing for a campaign[24] may have persuaded the Spanish authorities that no immediate assault was likely, and that Marischal's expeditionary force could set sail: this they did in the second week of March.[25] Initially, bad weather compelled them to put into Santander,[26] but once this had passed, they had a relatively straightforward voyage. After sailing to the west of Ireland (where the two vessels may have made a brief stop[27]), Marischal's party arrived at Stornoway in

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the Outer Hebrides late in March O.S.[28]

On 19 March N.S. a small group of Jacobite supporters including Keith, Tullibardine, Glendaruel and the Marquis of Seaforth sailed from Le Havre on board a ship called the Fidele to the Highlands.[29] Thanks to lack of vigilance by the French authorities which greatly annoyed Stair,[30] the party were able to sail unhindered, and reached the Island of Lewis on 24 March (O.S.) after a voyage in which, by a stroke of luck, the Fidele had passed undetected through the Royal Naval squadron transporting troops from Ireland to the West Country as part of the military precautions against the threatened Spanish invasion.[31]

Despite the success on the part of Marischal, his brother and their separate parties in reaching Scotland, the difficulties of the Jacobite exiles and their Spanish auxiliaries were only beginning. By this time the British government, alerted by Stair to the departures of several of the Pretender's known supporters from France, was fully prepared for some form of Jacobite incursion in Scotland. On 25 March O.S. the Whig authorities informed Major General Joseph Wightman, a senior military commander in the Highlands, of Marischal's suspected presence,[32] very soon after the Earl's contingent of Spanish troops had arrived in Stornoway harbour. The same day steps were taken by London to increase the strength of the garrisons in the three key strategic points of Edinburgh, Stirling and Dumbarton.[33] As a further sign of concern for the Hanoverian regime's position in Scotland, the Whig administration asked the Dutch States-General to allow three of the five battalions

they had promised to send to Britain to sail direct to Edinburgh.[34] The request (which reached The Hague in 13 April[35]) was granted the following day: regiments led by Sixma, General Huffel and Colonel Amerongen under the overall command of Brigadier Weldern were ordered to sail to Edinburgh,[36] while two Swiss battalions commanded by Major General Keppel were to sail to London as previously arranged.[37]

Of more immediate concern to Spain were the differences of opinion concerning the progress of the Spanish-Jacobite incursion into Scotland between Marischal and the Scottish chiefs who had accompanied Keith from France. On 25 March O.S. these joined Marischal and held a council of war at Stornoway from which, it appears, the Spaniards were excluded.[38] This revealed serious differences of opinion within the Jacobite ranks. Marischal, supported by Brigadier Archibald Campbell who had accompanied him from Pasajes, wanted to march on Inverness, the nearest government-held stronghold, without delay. Tullibardine and Glendaruel on the other hand preferred to adopt a more cautious strategy and advocated that the group should remain where they were until attempts had been made to ascertain whether the Highland clans were favourable to the principle of rising in support of James III.[39] Since Marischal had been appointed commander of the expedition to Scotland by Alberoni, his wish for immediate action was in line with the strategy Spain wished the invaders to pursue. In the end a compromise agreement was reached and it was decided to sail to the Scottish mainland after a period of three days for rest and recuperation.

This decision brought a little short term benefit to the three hundred Spanish troops and their officers who were permitted to disembark after having been confined on board for forty two days.[40] The next day (26 March O.S.), however, Tullibardine staged a virtual coup. He produced a document signed by the Chevalier in 1717 naming him as James's commander-in-chief in Scotland.[41] Although Marischal must have realised that this had no relevance to the 1719 expedition,* he felt it best in the interests of the party as a whole to avoid any damaging squabble. He therefore made way for Tullibardine, while retaining his position as commander of the two ships which had brought himself and the Spanish troops from Pasajes.

As commander of the Jacobite incursion into Scotland, Tullibardine had control of the expedition's finances. Although he described the money which thus came into his power as 'publict' (sic);[41] it had almost certainly been provided by Alberoni for the subsistence of Bolaño's contingent in Scotland.[42] Although Tullibardine supplied £153-00-10d. to purchase provisions both for the Spaniards and the crews of the two ships which had come from Spain[43] and in late April provided them with wine and brandy,[44] he made extensive payments for the transport and subsistence of men which it was hoped to raise from among the Highland clans.[45] This largess was to leave the bulk of the Spanish troops in serious financial straits after their capture by the British authorities.

By now the weakness of the position facing the Jacobites and their Spanish auxiliaries was becoming clear. They were in what had become a foreign country far from home or place of exile, and

* This document referred to a plan for a rising in 1717 which, the Chevalier and some of his advisers believed, would accompany a Swedish invasion of Britain on the lines hinted at by Gyllenborg.

the chief point in their favour was that the local inhabitants, if not positively enthusiastic to espouse the cause of James III, were not actively hostile. Alberoni and Ormonde had hoped that the Scottish Jacobite chiefs would by their presence encourage the clans to rise in open revolt in support of the Catholic Stuarts. James's court at Rome had made at least one attempt to prepare the ground for Marischal's expedition by sending at the beginning of 1719 an envoy, Francis Kennedy, to alert various Jacobites in Scotland to the proposed descent.[46] Kennedy did reach his destination, but apart from informing a few Lowland Jacobites (principally Marischal's brother-in-law, the Earl of Wigton, and George Lockhart, a former M.P.) of the Spanish design[47] his mission was ineffective. The Highland clans were therefore unprepared for Marischal's landing, and despite Tullibardine's approaches, showed little signs of willingness to volunteer until they had received confirmation of Ormonde's expected landing further south.

This became clearer when Tullibardine cautiously ventured towards the Scottish mainland. On 16/27 April the Spanish-Jacobite force seized Eilean Donan castle, an old fort situated on a small island at the junction of Loch Alsh, Loch Duich and Loch Long, as a temporary headquarters and store of weapons, ammunition and provisions.[48] From here messengers were sent to various Highland chiefs[49] whose attitude towards Jacobite incursions had cooled considerably since (it appeared). they had heard of the dispersal of Ormonde's expedition in the storm at the end of March. Tullibardine now contemplated abandoning the whole project and returning to the continent,[50] but Marischal neatly thwarted this course by ordering the two

vessels which had brought him and Bolaño's contingent from Pasajes to return to Spain,[51] thereby stranding the party and giving them little option but to advance into the Highlands and try to gather support among the clans.

(ii) Two Spanish defeats: Eilean Donan and Glenshiel

On 5 May 1719 O.S. information reached the Spanish-Jacobite expedition in their headquarters at Eilean Donan that five Royal Naval men-of-war were in the vicinity.[52] This spurred Tullibardine into action. The Jacobite leaders along with the small number of Highlanders who had so far joined them and the bulk of Bolano's contingent of Spanish troops proceeded inland in a bid to raise a rebellion among the clans, while a detachment of thirty-one Spaniards - thirty soldiers and a lieutenant, Pedro Pazquelo[53] were left to guard the powder, shot and (it later transpired) amounts of grain hidden either in the castle itself, the islet alongside or various locations along the shores of Loch Duich. This small garrison was joined on 8 May O.S. by three Irishmen,* a further ten Spanish troops and Captain Peter Stapleton as officer in command.[54]

The Royal Naval men-of-war whose approach had caused the greater part of the Spanish-Jacobite force to march inland had been detailed to cruise off the west coast of Scotland in search of Jacobite rebels. The squadron comprised five vessels: the fifty gun H.M.S. Assistance[55] commanded by Captain Edward Holland,[56] H.M.S. Dartmouth (fifty four guns)[57] whose captain was Richard Eaton[58] and her sister ship the Worcester (also fifty four guns[59])

*These may have been Irish exiles who had joined the service of Spain, but it is more likely that they were in fact Scottish, cf. Infra., p.217 n.90.

captained by Charles Boyle,[60] the forty four gun Enterprise[61] whose captain was Mungo Herdman[62] and the Flamborough (twenty guns[63]) under captain Hildersley.[64] On Thursday 7 May O.S. these assembled to the west of the island of Skye.[65] A report from the Dartmouth that the two Spanish ships had left Stornoway approximately a week previously[66] (which appears to have been fairly accurate)[67] indicated that the small invading force was probably not too far away. Holland therefore ordered the Worcester, Enterprise and Flamborough to reconnoitre to the south of Skye while his ship and the Dartmouth cruised to the north and east of the island.[68]

On Saturday 9 May O.S. the three vessels detailed to sail southwards entered Loch Alsh from the sea.[69] News of their proximity to Eilean Donan caused consternation among the defenders since the castle contained little or no provisions.[70] Stapleton, the commander of the garrison, sent two groups, the first comprising three soldiers and the second two, to the main body of invaders who had now moved inland, outlining the weakness of his position and requesting that supplies of food be sent to Eilean Donan.[71] His pleas were in vain.

In the early hours of Sunday 10 May O.S. the Worcester, Enterprise and Flamborough moved nearer to the fort.[72] At eight in the morning the Enterprise anchored close to Eilean Donan,[73] while Boyle in the Worcester took up position with the castle about half a mile to the north north east;[74] an hour later the Flamborough moved abreast of the fort.[75] Boyle then sent a boat from the Worcester in the direction of the castle carrying a flag

of truce.[76] The response of the garrison was to fire upon the boat,[77] apparently before its commander had a chance to speak;[78] thereupon the three men-of-war retaliated by bombarding Eilean Donan for about an hour.[79] The bombardment continued while the Flamborough, alerted by a Spanish deserter, destroyed a Jacobite ammunition store on the shore of Loch Duich.[80] Thanks to the information this Spaniard provided, the Royal Naval assault force must have obtained a fairly accurate picture of the position of the garrison in Eilean Donan who, Pazquelo claimed, had no artillery, ammunition and, moreover, nothing to eat.[81]

Between seven and eight in the evening the bombardment ceased[82] prior to the final assault on the castle. Pazquelo reported that Stapleton, the garrison's commander, had contemplated taking advantage of this respite by laying a fuse from the castle to the neighbouring islet at low tide (expected at ten at night) in order that the gunpowder stored there might be destroyed before the British attackers could seize it.[86] This design, however, was thwarted. Soon after eight in the evening the Worcester began pounding the castle with its cannon.[87] Under cover of this Boyle dispatched an assault party in two boats, one commanded by George Weston, his second lieutenant, and the other by second lieutenant Robert Wheatley of the Enterprise.[88] After landing under the ramparts the assault party stormed Eilean Donan and, following a brief resistance, the garrison surrendered.[89]

The prisoners, forty three in number, were assembled together and then put on board the Worcester.[90] On examination by Boyle the stores of powder and ammunition in Eilean Donan were found to be considerable. He noted a total of three hundred and forty three barrels of powder,[91] about five tons of musket-shot[92] and some bags of grain.[93] In addition amounts of corn were discovered in several hiding places on the shores of Loch Duich and were promptly burnt by parties from the Worcester.[94]

The next day (Monday 11 May O.S.) steps were taken to destroy the castle. In the morning a hundred and twenty barrels of powder and some of the shot were loaded on board the Enterprise,[95] some of whose men were instructed to prepare to demolish Eilean Donan using ammunition captured from its garrison.[96] At about nine o'clock in the evening the western part of the castle was blown up;[97] the following day (12 May O.S.) the remainder of the fortifications were destroyed[98] and the whole fort razed to the ground.

The fall of Eilean Donan demonstrated that the Spanish invaders, at least, scarcely posed a serious threat to the status quo in Britain. After this success for the Hanoverian regime, the official Whig presentation of the measures taken to suppress the incursion was geared to the assumption that the Jacobite attempt would soon be defeated. Intelligence reports of the progress of the rebels and their Spanish auxiliaries which reached Edinburgh were therefore secured for evidence of their demoralisation and made public when this suited the Ministry's tactic of presenting the Spanish-Jacobite invaders as a spent force. Thus the information about the size of the

contingent of Spanish troops given after the Spaniards taken at Eilean Donan had arrived in Edinburgh to Carpenter, commander-in-chief in Scotland, by Pazquelo on 26 May O.S.[99] soon appeared in print,[100] similarly Carpenter's belief that the remaining Spaniards were expected to surrender once the Highlanders and the Jacobite chiefs had dispersed[101] appeared as a statement of fact in the London Gazette of 6 June O.S.[102] This picture of a smoothly conducted operation culminating in the collapse of the joint Spanish-Jacobite incursion after an engagement with troops loyal to George I in the pass of Glenshiel on 10 June O.S. was thus presented by the Whig administration to the public.

This view was not entirely accurate, since the British military authorities in Scotland laboured under several difficulties. There was a poor working relationship between Carpenter who was in overall charge of the suppression of the Spanish-Jacobite incursion, and Major-General Joseph Wightman, the commander of the forces entrusted with Tullibardine's defeat.[103] The two men disagreed over the strategy which Carpenter wished to pursue. Wightman had been instructed by Roxburgh, Secretary for Scotland, to march up to Inverness securing Stirling and Perth en route, and then confront the rebels and their Spanish allies.[104] To Carpenter speed was of the essence, since he believed that the Jacobite force should not be allowed time to consolidate its position and obtain support from the clans[105], a reflection of his fear that the incursion might, if unchecked, lead to a re-opening of the rebellion quelled in 1716. Wightman, however, lacked the men - he possessed approximately a thousand troops, part English and part Dutch, who

were unused to Highland warfare,[106] plus a mere hundred and thirty clansmen[107] - equipment,[108] horses[109] and provisions[110] to march speedily against the Jacobite enemy.

It is open to question whether these difficulties on the British side could have been exploited by an astute Jacobite commander. The joint Spanish-Highland force did possess several advantages. It was not short of weapons and ammunition since the small amounts initially brought from Spain by Marischal were almost certainly augmented by further supplies sent via the Dutch Republic. This route of keeping the expeditionary force reasonably well armed had been instigated by Alberoni after it had become clear in April 1719 following the dispersal of Guevara's fleet that the proposed main Spanish expedition to England would have to be abandoned. The nature of Marischal's expedition had now changed:[111] instead of being a mere diversion designed to occupy British government troops in Scotland while Ormonde landed in England, the small force of Spaniards had become the sole Spanish thrust against George I, and as a result would have to face any soldiers sent by the British authorities with the assistance only of such local support from the clans as the expedition's Highland leaders were able to muster. The size of Spain's contribution to the Jacobite attempt in Scotland was inadequate for such a purpose. It was (Alberoni later told James after having vetoed a proposal made by the Chevalier that ships be sent from Corunna to Scotland to replenish or, if necessary, evacuate Marischal's party[112]) safer and more practical to keep the Spanish-Jacobite supplied from the Dutch

Republic than from Spain. On 17 April, therefore, Alberoni wrote to Beretti Landi in the Hague instructing him to supply Marischal and those accompanying him with whatever quantities of ammunition and materials of war they asked for, obtaining the requisite money from Alberoni's Amsterdam banker, Cesar Sardi.[113]

Beretti's activities in carrying out these instructions are shrouded in mystery. In an account of expenses submitted to Madrid in February 1720 covering this period, he claimed to have obtained a thousand guns at a cost of ten Dutch florins each plus arms and ammunition at the request of a man named Terry whom the ambassador described as the Chevalier's representative in the Dutch Republic.[114] The amounts which actually reached Scotland remain uncertain, but it seems that some arms and ammunition did in fact get through to the Highlands[115] to augment the Spaniards' meagre supplies. This conclusion is borne out by information from Sir Robert Pollock, Governor of Fort William, that Seaforth was liberally distributing arms among the members of his clan between the ages of sixteen and sixty,[116] and from Wightman who had received intelligence which convinced him that the amount of armaments held by the Jacobite rebels and the Spanish troops had increased.[117]

The very hot weather then prevailing in the north of Scotland might also have been thought to favour the Spaniards.[118] Their commander, moreover, possessed the ability to choose his ground to confront the troops sent against him by the British authorities. When Tullibardine was alerted to Wightman's proximity, he decided to make a stand in the pass of Glenshiel, less than twenty miles south east of Eilean Donan.

The most important advantage possessed by the Spanish-Jacobite force lay in its numerical superiority over Wightman's troops. When (on 10 June O.S., the Chevalier's thirty first birthday),[119] the two sides faced each other in the pass of Golenshiel, it appeared that the numbers on the British side totalled in all eleven hundred - eight hundred and fifty infantry, a hundred and twenty dragoons, and some hundred and thirty Highlanders.[120] Their opponents were more numerous. An estimate drawn up for the British authorities after the battle gave their numbers as 1,595 Highlanders (including the exiled chiefs who had come from France) and 274 Spaniards, totalling 1,869.[121] The Hanoverian regime's military officials naturally had a vested interest in overestimating the size of their opponents, thereby increasing the prestige which would accrue to their own side as the victors. Nevertheless, the above figure is less than that of two thousand which Wightman gave as his estimate of the Jacobite strength in his first account of the battle written on 11 June O.S.,[122] and it therefore seems more realistic than a total reached in the initial flush of success; in addition, the compilers would have been able to obtain details of the total strength of the Jacobite side from the Spanish troops who surrendered the day after the engagement. It seems, therefore, that the figure of approximately eighteen or nineteen hundred Highland rebels and Spaniards combined is fairly accurate, indicating that the Hanoverian force was numerically inferior to that of the Jacobites and Spanish troops.

Despite these points in Tullibardine's favour, the Stuart ranks gave way after facing attack by Wightman's troops for a few hours.[123] The next morning a hurried Jacobite council of war took place. It was decided that the Spanish troops should surrender while the Highlanders and their chiefs along with Marischal, Keith, Tullibardine fled.[124] Wightman's total losses amounted to twenty five killed (a captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants and eighteen privates) and a hundred and thirty seven wounded.[125] The figure published in the London Gazette of 20-23 June O.S. was slightly less (twenty one killed and a hundred and twenty one wounded),[126] but the higher tally would appear to be the more accurate since Wightman's own account of the engagement sent to Roxburgh on 11 June O.S. gave his total of killed and wounded as approximately a hundred and fifty, a figure broadly in agreement with the first report.

Losses in the Jacobite site are difficult to evaluate on account of the rapid dispersal of the rebel Highlanders after the conclusion of hostilities. The Spaniards appear to have had no men killed in the battle, and few wounded.[128] They seem to have acquitted themselves well in the circumstances and only retreated from their position when the Highlanders' resistance had collapsed and Wightman's victory was thereby assured; similarly they were left with little option but to surrender on account of the decision of the clan leaders and Jacobite chiefs who had come from France to flee. The same could not be said of the Scottish Jacobites who were supposed to take charge of the expedition. The number of men on their side outnumbered those under Wightman; moreover, they also possessed the

considerable advantage of experience in fighting under Highland conditions prevailing at Glenshiel, which Wightman's troops who were English or Dutch lacked. After the engagement these Jacobite chiefs lost little time in deciding to flee. Tullibardine, moreover, tried to place full responsibility for the Jacobite defeat at Glenshiel and the subsequent decision to try to escape upon Marischal.[129]

(iii) Repatriation

The British government's victories at Eilean Donan and Glenshiel presented the Whig administration with the problem of what to do with the Spaniards captured in the two engagements. First to be dealt with were Pazquelo and the Spaniards taken on 10 May. After their capture they were transferred from the Worcester and put on board the Flamborough which sailed for Edinburgh, anchoring off Leith in the Firth of Forth on 22 May O.S.[130] with the exception of Stapleton who was transferred to the Enterprise[131] on 14 June O.S. and landed at Plymouth on 6 July O.S.[132]

In the short term the Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan were the responsibility of the authorities in Edinburgh who predictably made full use of their propaganda value. As noted, Carpenter interrogated Pazquelo who proved a ready source of information about the Spanish expeditionary force, and on 28 May O.S. the Spaniards were removed from the Flamborough and marched through Edinburgh to the castle.[133] Actual responsibility for the future of Pazquelo's troop, however, lay in London with the Lords Justices, the Regents appointed to govern Britain during George I's stay in Hanover. These were

not long in coming to a decision. In their meeting of 28 May O.S. it was decided that the Spanish prisoners taken at Eilean Donan were to be shipped to the Cantabrian coast in the north of Spain and there landed, except for the officers whom it was proposed to retain for use in any future exchange of British prisoners captured in Spain.[134] This condition was, it will be seen, waived probably because the Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan numbered only one lieutenant (hardly the basis for a successful exchange of prisoners); instead, the Lords Justices hoped that Madrid would reciprocate their gesture in returning Pazquelo's troop, by releasing an equivalent number of British subjects detained the previous autumn during the measures against Britain's interests in Spain in the aftermath of Passaro.

The Regents' decision, approved by George I,[135] may appear a generous move since Britain was at war with Spain, and the remaining Spaniards in the Highlands were as yet undefeated. It was, however, based upon sound political reasoning. The basic rationale behind it was expressed by Carpenter in a letter to Roxburgh dated 6 June O.S.[136] The Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan would (he argued) spread such an unfavourable account of their experiences in Scotland after returning to Spain that, it might be hoped, soldiers in Philip V's armed forces would mutiny if ordered to participate in another expedition on behalf of the Jacobite cause.[137] This was perhaps an exaggeration, but the fact remained that the experience of the Spaniards who had been participants in the siege of Eilean Donan was hardly calculated to give them a favourable impression of the Catholic Stuart cause

which had motivated their expedition to Scotland. By the end of May Pazquelo's detachment appear to have been thoroughly demoralised: in the words of Carpenter, uttered after his interview with the Lieutenant on 26 May, the Spaniards were 'miserable creatures who do not give much credit to their cause'.[138] The ultimate target of the Lords Justices, however, was not the regular soldiers of the Spanish army but the government in Madrid who would learn at first hand of the defeat suffered by their troops within a comparatively short period of its having taken place. This would serve as another blow for Spain in addition to those being inflicted on her soldiers by Berwick in the Basque country - Pasajes had fallen at the end of April and the frontier fortress of Fuenterrabia was under siege by the French from the end of May (N.S.) onwards, capitulating on 16 June - and a warning of further defeats which lay in store if Philip V failed to make peace.

Once it had been decided to return Pazquelo and his detachment to Spain, little time was lost in carrying out the necessary formalities. On Thursday, 4 June O.S. the Spanish prisoners of war were removed from Edinburgh castle to board the Flamborough in Leith[139] to sail to the Nore on the first stage of their journey to a Spanish port. On account of the state of war existing between George I and Philip V, the Spaniards could not be returned to Spain on board a Royal Naval vessel; instead, after arriving at the Nore, Pazquelo, and his detachment were transferred to a civilian merchant vessel, the Ann, in the early hours of 11/22 June.[140] Joseph Manesty, its master, was provided with a special

passport signed by Thomas Colby, a Commissioner of the Navy, and John Fawler, a comptroller of the victualling[141] authorising the Ann to carry the Spanish prisoners to Corunna or another port in Spain where they were to be handed over to the authorities.[142] Manesty was instructed to inform any Spanish governmental official with whom he came into contact that George I's ministry expected Madrid to reciprocate by freeing an equivalent number of Britons held in various parts of Spain at the earliest opportunity.[143]

The Ann sailed from the Nore on or about 12/23 June - before news of the Spanish defeat at Glenshiel had reached London[145] - and arrived in Corunna at eleven in the morning of Monday 17 July.[146] As soon as Risbourg heard of the ship's presence, fearing that it had been sent by the British government to reconnoitre the port, he ordered one of his officials accompanied by a wounded Irish soldier from the Spanish army (to act as interpreter) to board the vessel.[147] After Manesty had explained the purpose of his mission, these escorted him ashore so as to prevent the spread of the news of the Spanish captives. There Manesty repeated his story to Risbourg,[148] and as proof of his bona fides showed the passport issued by the Admiralty officials, a copy of which was retained by the Spaniards.[149] Once his credentials had been established, the Spanish prisoners of war were handed over in exchange for an official receipt,[150] and the following day (18 July) the Ann departed for England.[151]

The return of Pazquelo's troop to Spain signalled the beginning of Madrid's disengagement from supporting the Jacobite

cause. The Chevalier's whole future in Spain as a guest of Philip V had already been called into question following the French invasion of the Spanish Basque provinces in late April 1719. If the Spanish government made peace with Britain and France and accepted the terms of the Quadruple Alliance (and the tide of war in the north of Spain made it clear that this would have to be done sooner or later), then the Pretender must leave the country. It is possible that a hint to this effect may have been passed to Madrid by the Dutch Republic:[152] at the end of April Timon Connock, an aide de camp to Philip V who acted as a Jacobite agent while also informing the Spanish government of the activities of James's supporters within Spain,[153] reported to the Chevalier that Alberoni had been closeted with the States-General's newly appointed ambassador in Madrid,[154] Willem Maurits van Cats, seigneur de Colster. While this does not prove that the Dutch ambassador insinuated to Alberoni that James should be asked to leave Spain as the first stage in making peace, he may well have done so. Irrespective of any outside pressure, however, James's position as a guest of Philip V was becoming untenable once the impossibility of resuming the invasion of Britain had removed the rationale behind the Chevalier's presence in Spain. Fortunately for both the Spanish government and the Jacobite movement, James was soon provided with a reason which enabled him to leave Spain while giving no indication that his departure may have been desired by Madrid. When in Santiago (where James visited the shrine of his patron saint[155]) in June, the Chevalier heard the news of the escape on the night of 28-29 April of his fiancee Clementina Sobieska from

captivity in Innsbruck to Papal territory.[156] This provided an opportunity to return to Italy in order to consumate his marriage, and on 27 July (shortly after the Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan had returned to Spain) he set off from Lugo on the first stage of his journey.[157]

Despite appearances, the Lords Justices' decision to return Pazquelo and his troop thus had no effect upon James's departure from Spain. It did, however, indirectly benefit Britain's war aims. When writing to Roxburgh on 6 June O.S., Carpenter had expressed the hope that after their return to Spain the Spaniards might relate such an unfavourable picture of their expedition to Scotland that other Spanish soldiers would mutiny if ordered to participate in another attempt on behalf of the Jacobite cause.[158] This proved partly accurate. In the early autumn of 1719 Spanish troops (who had been assigned to sail to Brittany on an expedition under Ormonde's leadership in support of Breton rebels against the Orléans administration.[159]) mutinied in the port of Santander. Although this had no connection with Jacobitism, Ormonde's role as commander may have automatically identified it with the cause of James III in the eyes of those Spaniards ordered to participate, leading them to mutiny rather than face a repetition of what had befallen their compatriots in the Highlands.

After Glenshiel the British government had to deal with the two hundred and seventy four Spaniards captured as a result of the engagement.[160] The Lords Justices were not long in reaching a decision as to the future of this second detachment of Spanish prisoners. In their meeting of 23 June O.S. it was decided that

they should march overland from Inverness (where they had initially been taken after Glenshiel[161]) to Plymouth to be shipped to Spain from there,[162] a procedure similar to that employed in the repatriation of those captured at Eilean Donan. Steps were accordingly taken by the authorities in the Scottish capital to implement these instructions.[163]

Before Bolaño's detachment had even arrived in Edinburgh en route to Devon, however, news reached Carpenter, the commander in chief in Scotland, that on 2 July O.S. the Lords Justices had reversed their decision to return the Spanish troops to Spain: instead these were to remain in Edinburgh until further notice.[164] The man responsible for this change of policy was George Treby, Secretary for War.[165] In the Regents meeting of 2 July he had put forward two arguments for retaining the Spaniards in Britain for the time being. Firstly, he cited the trouble and cost of supplying an armed escort for the Spanish troops during their journey to Plymouth.[166] This was only a question of detail, and could easily have been solved had the administration wished. As the second reason for abandoning the original proposal to repatriate the Spaniards without delay, Treby referred to the possibility that Bolaño's contingent might be approached by Jacobite sympathisers on their journey to the West Country, thus providing the Spaniards (and ultimately the government in Madrid) with what the Hanoverian regime viewed as an exaggerated picture of the extent of support for the Catholic Stuarts within the British Isles.[167] Although this was a significant admission since it revealed a fear of an extent of pro-Jacobite sentiment much greater than that

normally admitted by the Whig government, it was hardly an overriding motive for retaining the Spanish prisoners who could, for instance, have been shipped direct from Scotland to Plymouth as was done with Stapleton.

A more substantial argument for retaining Bolaño and his men in Britain was indirectly hinted at in another item discussed by the Lords Justices in their meetings of 23 June and 2 July O.S.[168] In his dispatch of 28 June N.S. Stair, the British ambassador in Paris, had suggested that a small Royal Naval expedition should be sent to the coast of Galicia in north west Spain.[169] This would serve a twofold purpose. The Spanish shipping located in this area could be destroyed - an argument which particularly appealed to the Lords Justices,[170] and it would also have the effect of a second front against Spain, thereby assisting the operations of the French army commanded by Berwick in the Basque country.[171] By 2 July O.S. - the date on which the Regents decided to keep the Spaniards captured at Glenshiel in Edinburgh - this project was only in embryo, and George I's approval had to be sought.[172] Nevertheless, the possibility of a British operation against the coast of north west Spain gave Bolaño and his contingent a potential value as hostages to be exchanged with any Britons who were subsequently captured in Galicia.

Another motive for retaining the Spanish prisoners in the British Isles was more in the nature of psychological tactics. George I and Philip V were at war and the expedition to Scotland undeniably a hostile act on Spain's part. The rationale behind the decision to return Pazquelo's detachment was sound enough: these

were expected to act as agents for discouraging Spain from repeating an enterprise in support of the Jacobite cause. To send all the contingent from the regimiento de Galicia back to Spain within a short period of their capture could, however, have unfavourable consequences for the Whig Ministry since the Spanish government might interpret this act as a sign of weakness on the part of George I and even feel encouraged to mount another expedition against the British Isles.

Bolaño and the Spaniards captured at Glenshiel arrived in Edinburgh on Saturday 11 July 1719 O.S.[173] A full check was made of their numbers, two hundred and seventy four in all: the Colonel (Bolaño y Castro), five captains, five lieutenants, six second lieutenants, eleven sergeants, eighteen corporals, six drummers, two hundred and twenty one privates and the Colonel's servant.[174]

Since it was envisaged that the Spaniards' stay in Edinburgh might be relatively long, arrangements had to be made for their upkeep. It was estimated that to feed and provide the Spanish captives with subsistence would cost £7-19-4d. per day.[175] Carpenter believed that the best solution was for him to provide Bolaño with the money for this purpose in return for bills of exchange.[176] The Spaniard agreed,[177] and undertook to write to Beretti Landi, Spanish ambassador in The Hague, and Spain's diplomatic representative who was geographically closest to Scotland, asking him to guarantee the sums involved,[178] and Bolaño supplied Carpenter with the first bill of exchange (worth £200) guaranteed by Beretti on 28 July O.S.[179]

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Carpenter had initially suggested to Roxburgh that the Spanish prisoners of war should be allowed to wander through Edinburgh freely as (he assured the Secretary for Scotland) had been the case with British soldiers held captive in Spain during the War of Succession.[180] Once Bolaño had arrived in the Scottish capital, however, Carpenter informed London that on account of the possibility of some of the Spanish prisoners trying to escape by sea, he had decided that only the officers and their attendants should be allowed parole [181] while the remainder were confined in the castle.[182] In the beginning the Spaniards' stay in Edinburgh was not too unpleasant and by all accounts they made a favourable impression upon the city's population.[183] After a while, however, the position of the Spanish prisoners deteriorated owing to the shortage of money - Carpenter advanced a further £200 but Bolaño, in a letter to Roxburgh, complained that the amount received so far from the commander-in-chief (£400) was barely sufficient to feed and pay his men up to the end of August;[184] the dampness of Edinburgh castle[185] and the resultant sickness among the Spaniards[186] resulted in medical expenses, an additional cost for Bolaño,[187] and in the deaths of two of their number.[188]

This situation was unsatisfactory to the Spaniards and to their gaolers, chiefly Wightman who was responsible for them during the absence of Carpenter in Bath for the cure of a back ailment.[189] Any usefulness that may have been served by retaining the Spanish soldiers in Scotland seemed to have passed by the beginning of September O.S. The prisoners' morale was low: 'the

Spaniards begin to grow very sulky under their confine(men)t' Wightman wrote to Charles Delafaye, secretary to the Lords Justices, on the 1st.[190] The money previously advanced to Bolano by Carpenter* had almost run out and Wightman, fearing that the Spanish captives might become a drain on his own pocket, requested Delafaye to ascertain what the Regents intended to do with the prisoners.[191]

Even the proposed British expedition to Galicia had ceased to be an overriding reason for detaining Bolano's detachment in Edinburgh. Owing to the fear that the recently suppressed Jacobite activity in Scotland might flare up again, George I in Hanover had not given his approval to the Lords Justices' design until mid-July (O.S.), after the Regents in London had agreed not to return the Dutch troops until any British soldiers who accompanied the expedition to the north west of Spain arrived back in England.[192] The preparation and assembly of the Royal Naval force further delayed its departure. By mid-August Berwick, the commander of the French army in the Basque provinces of Northern Spain, decided that the proposed British expedition could be of little help in relieving any Spanish pressure on him, largely because Philip V's armed forces presented him with little difficulty: the only possible military objective (in his opinion) would be an attack on Corunna or Cadiz. This was, however, beyond the capabilities of the small Royal naval force which was being fitted out for this purpose in Portsmouth. By the time this actually sailed, it consisted of one-man-of-war of seventy guns and a motley assortment of frigates and bomb

* £400 according to my calculations.

vessels, and had become solely a punitive expedition with no military objective: the four thousand soldiers on board under the command of Lord Cobham were ordered merely to spread terror throughout the area.[193]

The Lords Justices' reply to Wightman's query regarding the future of the Spanish captives was dated 10 September O.S.[194] These were to be transported back to Spain once their commander had given an undertaking that the expenses incurred by the British authorities in the maintenance of the Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan and at Glenshiel and also in returning both groups to Spain would be reimbursed by the government in Madrid.[195] When Wightman put these terms to Bolaño, he proved willing to sign an undertaking that Spain would repay George I's Ministry all the costs of subsisting his own and Pazquelo's men during their respective confinements in the British Isles.[196] He flatly refused, however, to put his signature to anything which could be interpreted as implying that the government in Madrid would be responsible for the costs of transporting his men back to Spain, telling Wightman that to do so was against the honour of a Spanish soldier (since it implied that the signatory was unable to bear the deprivation of imprisonment in the cause of his king) and therefore merited severe punishment.[197] The Lords Justices found this scruple hard to understand,[198] yet they did not think Bolaño's refusal sufficient reason to justify the continued detention in Scotland of all the Spanish contingent captured at Glenshiel.[199] Instead, they proposed to ship the Spaniards back to Spain with the exception of Bolaño who, as long as he refused to sign the required undertaking, was to remain in

Edinburgh as a hostage to ensure the repayment by the Spanish government of all expenses incurred by the British authorities in maintaining and subsequently repatriating the men from the regimiento de Galicia.[200] Wightman and Brigadier George Preston, the deputy governor of Edinburgh castle placed considerable moral pressure on Bolaño to reconsider his attitude and thereby ensure his own freedom along with that of his men.[201] Their motives for this were not entirely altruistic since Wightman had advanced Bolaño fifty pounds of his own money towards the subsistence of the Spaniards when the £400 provided beforehand by Carpenter had run out,[202] and Preston had been ordered by the Lords Justices to advance money to Bolaño.[203] Both men were no doubt apprehensive that once the Spanish prisoners had left Edinburgh for Spain, the Regents might decide to abandon their insistence that Madrid should accept financial responsibility for the maintenance and repatriation of its subjects, release Bolaño and write off the money spent on the prisoners of war, with no recompense for those who had privately advanced sums for the Spaniards' subsistence.

This may have been the reason which prompted Wightman in late September (O.S.) to suggest a possible compromise to solve the impasse resulting from Bolaño's refusal to sign any undertaking committing the Spanish government to reimburse the Whig Ministry for the repatriation of the Spanish prisoners from Scotland. He put to Bolaño the proposition that the British authorities should sell him a ship to take his men back to Spain.[204] This would have the same practical effect as the course of action previously suggested by the Lords Justices, since in both cases the bill for

transporting the Spaniards back to Spain would ultimately be paid by the government in Madrid; Wightman's proposal was, however, ostensibly a transaction between Bolaño and himself to be concluded before the Spaniards left Britain,[205] and therefore implied no obligation on the part of Philip V to reimburse George I for the cost of repatriating the Spanish prisoners of war.

By this time Bolaño was quite receptive to any attempt by his gaolers to find a solution which would enable him and his men to leave Britain with a clear conscience on his own part. The amount of illness among the Spaniards in Edinburgh castle was increasing; the numbers of dead had risen to five and he told Beretti Landi that he did not relish the thought of spending winter in Scotland.[206] Once Wightman had made this suggestion, Bolaño overcame his scruples about Madrid's liability for the cost of repatriating his men. He wrote to Beretti on 30 September O.S. asking him to obtain the necessary authorisation for the transaction from the Spanish government, along with an undertaking that any bills of exchange he made out to the British authorities in Edinburgh for this purpose would be honoured.[207] In Bolaño's next letter to Beretti written ten days later (10/21 October), he reported that his gaolers estimated the cost of the ship (in Spanish currency) as more than 6,000 pesos.[208] Both Beretti and Monteleón, the former Spanish ambassador in London who had remained in the Dutch Republic ever since being ordered to leave Britain the previous November, thought that this cost was somewhat excessive,[209] nevertheless, Bolaño's request was forwarded to Madrid.[210]

It was ironic that at the time when Wightman was concocting a scheme which would enable Bolaño and his troops to leave Britain

for Spain with their honour satisfied, the Spanish government had begun taking steps to ensure that funds were made available for their continued maintenance in Edinburgh. Beretti had written to Fernández Durán on 14 September enclosing Bolaño's letter of 15/26 August which gave a good picture of the conditions prevailing among the Spanish prisoners in Edinburgh.[211] On 1 October a memorandum was therefore issued in the name of Philip V outlining the procedure to be followed concerning the subsistence of Bolaño's men.[212] The Spanish government now accepted the responsibility for providing for its subjects kept prisoner in Edinburgh and, besides commending Beretti for his earlier action in supplying Bolaño with bills of exchange, the memorandum authorised him to provide Bolaño with whatever money he required; moreover (Beretti was assured) any letters of exchange issued to this end would be promptly honoured by Hinojosa, the treasurer general in Madrid.[213] Following this directive, Beretti supplied Bolaño with a further £200 in the form of a bill of exchange drawn upon Hinojosa for the maintenance of the Spanish prisoners of war[214] along with 300 doblones* for the Colonel's own needs supplied through the Amsterdam banker César Sardi.[215] In addition, it appears that Monteleón also provided Bolano with a £200 bill of exchange for the subsistence of his men on or about 20 October.[216] This was not all. On 7 November 1719 Hinojosa instructed Juan Bautista Grifoni (probably a banker in Madrid) to send a bill of exchange for 17,100 reales≠ to Sardi for the continued maintenance of the Spaniards held captive in Edinburgh.[217]

* approx. £290 ≠ approx. £500.

Meanwhile in Britain arrangements were being put into operation for the repatriation of the Spanish prisoners. The ship to convey the Spaniards home sailed from the Thames on 9 October O.S.[218] for Leith to take on board Bolaño and his contingent. At this late stage in the proceedings a slight hitch arose. Bolaño had established that the purchase of the ship to take his men to a Spanish port would cost £434-7-6d.,[219] a sum considerably less than the 6,000 pesos mooted earlier. The bills previously sent to Edinburgh by Beretti and Monteleón were only intended to cover the cost of the prisoners' subsistence, not any charges relating to their voyage to Spain, and Bolaño's insistence on this appeared to cause Preston some irritation.[220] Any possible delay in the departure of the Spanish troops from Edinburgh was, however, averted when Preston himself agreed to lend Bolaño the money for the cost of the ship (£434-7-6d.) with the bills of exchange recently received from Beretti for the maintenance of the Spaniards as security for the repayment of this loan by Spain's ambassador in the Hague.[221] Once this formality had been completed, the Spanish prisoners sailed from Leith on 27 October/7 November[222] and were taken to Corunna.[223]

Spain's role in the Jacobite expedition to Scotland in 1719 was now over save for the remaining financial issues. These were soon resolved. Late in December Beretti Landi paid from his own pocket the £434-7s.-6d. owed to Preston for the cost of the vessel to repatriate Bolano and his men, the sum being passed through William Dundas, a banker in Rotterdam.[224] Beretti experienced some difficulty in obtaining reimbursement for both this and the amounts he had previously sent to Edinburgh for the

maintenance of Bolaño's troops[225] since the treasurer general apparently queried the sums involved.[226] This did not last long. In response to a directive from Philip V, Hinojosa remitted a bill of exchange worth 117,645 reales* to Beretti on 15 February 1720,[227] a sum which although considerably more than the amounts paid out by the ambassador on behalf of Bolaño was certainly intended to cover these and his efforts to supply Marischal and Tullibardine with weapons and ammunition the previous year.[228]

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* approx. £3,700

Epilogue and Conclusion

Repatriation of the Spaniards captured at Glenshiel brought the Nineteen to a close. It also ended the phase of Spain's active use of the Jacobite issue in her relations with Britain. Politically speaking, this policy had scarcely been a success for Madrid, and the reasons for its failure are not hard to find.

The first - and most serious - weakness underlying Spain's use of Jacobitism arose from the short-term political considerations which dictated Madrid's support of James. The conditions initially laid down by Spain as a prerequisite for contributing to the Jacobite rebellion in 1715 - primarily an offensive and defensive alliance with James directed towards the recovery of Philip V's territories in Italy lost at Utrecht and support for Elisabeth Farnese's claim to Parma and Tuscany - were all waived as under the pressure of events, Madrid supplied the largest contribution to the Jacobite cause at the time of the Fifteen without preconditions in the hope that the rebellion would be successful and the political benefits desired by Spain would follow as a matter of course. Having provided James with money towards the cost of the Fifteen, Spain felt constrained to continue to do so with the limited aim of ensuring the Chevalier's survival as a political force.

The Spanish government's intervention in 1719 was equally a response to short term political objectives, since the rapid deterioration in relations with Britain had given Madrid little choice but to collaborate with Jacobitism in attempting to overthrow George I. Alberoni seriously considered intervention in an attempt to place James on the English throne in retaliation

for the destruction of a large Spanish fleet by the Royal Navy off Cape Passaro (11 August 1718), news of which reached Madrid the following month. Owing to Alberoni's previous policy of downgrading the significance of the Jacobite issue to Spain, Madrid's decision to support an attempt to overthrow the Hanoverian regime in Britain suffered from a complete absence of forward planning.

The Spanish government's sudden switch to a policy of backing Jacobitism at the end of 1718 thus displayed all the signs of being hastily adopted. The absence of any plan of campaign on James's behalf which Spain might have been able to bring into immediate operation forced Madrid to rely on the approaches made by Ormonde and Oxford. The arguments put forward by the former, passed to Spain through Cellamare in Paris, coupled with Oxford's approaches to Madrid via his reputed mistress, Anne Oglethorpe, and Eon, Spain's representative on the board of the South Sea Company, possessed a superficial appeal. There was undoubtedly widespread dissatisfaction with the Hanoverian regime in Britain, and in certain localities much pro-Stuart sentiment existed: moreover, the Whig Ministry only possessed a small army to defend its position if confronted with a Jacobite rising with foreign military support. The real picture was, however, less favourable to Jacobitism. Sympathy for the Chevalier's cause within Britain was generally passive since those who had the inclination to support James were easily overawed by the Hanoverian regime and the efficiency of its security services. The problem of George I's apparent military weakness could rapidly be resolved by obtaining troops to defend

his position in Britain from the Dutch Republic and, under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, from the Emperor and France.

For Spain to have stood any chance of successfully overthrowing George I in 1719, speed was of the essence: to whit, a military-naval expedition assembled as quickly as possible to sail to its destination in Britain without delay and landing preferably in concert with some form of pre-arranged unrest executed by James's adherents. Although Fernández Durán, the Spanish minister of war, assembled Spain's expeditionary force with the maximum speed possible in the circumstances, the fact that Madrid had only recently decided to mount such an expedition in support of James meant that none of the advance preparations so essential to a plan of campaign requiring a speedy conclusion had been started sufficiently far in advance. When the two Spanish expeditions set sail for the British Isles in March 1719 they were therefore too late to stand any chance of success. Spain and her Jacobite collaborators had lost any element of surprise, so that even had Ormonde and the main Spanish expeditionary force landed in England they were unlikely to have found any noticeable evidence of Jacobite activity concerted with their arrival, as the absence of any pro-Stuart activism among the Highland clans following Marischal's descent in Scotland demonstrated. In this respect the dispersal of the main Spanish armada in a storm, although humiliating to Spain from a psychological viewpoint, may have been a blessing in disguise which saved Madrid from defeat at the hands of forces loyal to George I in England. Although the Spanish fleet's dispersal resulted in small losses of men, and varying amounts of equipment had to be thrown overboard, Ormonde avoided the ignominy of a

military defeat as befel Marischal's small force.

Another reason for the failure of Spain's use of Jacobitism against Britain lay in the fact that by supporting James, Madrid appeared to be allowing its heart to rule its head; in other words, considerations of religious solidarity and sentiment for the Chevalier overrid awareness that Jacobitism on its own was virtually ineffective: this sense of religious solidarity provides the only logical explanation for Spain's attempt in the autumn of 1715 to insist on the re-establishment of Catholicism in Britain as a precondition of her supporting James. The weakness of Jacobitism as a political force may not have been apparent in 1715 when Spanish assistance to the rebellion was first requested. It was, however, crystal clear by the time of the rising's collapse that the Jacobite movement of itself lacked the leadership and resources to mount a serious challenge to George I. Numerous observers - Ormonde before his flight to France, Bolingbroke and, later on, Monteleón - realised that to stand any chance of success James needed a considerable amount of foreign support.For practical purposes this meant active intervention on the Chevalier's behalf by France who, alone of European powers, possessed the advantages of geographical proximity to the British Isles, the resources necessary to back a sustained campaign in support of James and, in addition, a sizeable contingent of Jacobite exiles within her frontiers. The second rank of European powers, such as Sweden and Spain, were each unable to fill the role of principal foreign backer of a Jacobite rising. The Spanish government implicitly realised this in August 1715 with its initial insistence that

France should participate in the scheme for backing a rebellion aimed at installing James on the English throne. On account of Louis XIV's refusal to risk direct French involvement, however, this condition was watered down to an understanding that France would provide diplomatic support for Philip V's Italian policy and, by implication, indirect assistance to the Chevalier. Louis' death and the assumption of power by Orléans meant that even this indirect French role in the Fifteen never materialised. Spain was isolated when she provided financial to James: indeed, Philip V was saved from the consequences of his assisting Jacobitism - a breach in diplomatic relations and possibly war with Britain - by Alberoni's policy of trying to use commercial concessions to the British government as a means of obtaining London's acquiesence in Spain's Italian policy. The Anglo-Spanish Commercial treaty of Dec. 1715 meant that the Whig government, flushed with its success in defeating the Jacobite rebellion, was prepared to overlook such evidence of Madrid's collaboration with the Pretender as was brought to its attention; while the money supplied to James by Spain sank (almost literally) without trace.

The lesson of 1715-16 - that the Jacobite movement was of itself incapable of successfuly overthrowing George I: foreign support (which Spain was unable to provide on her own) was a prerequisite for James's success - was totally ignored by Madrid in 1719. When the normal political constraint of not antagonising Britain was removed on account of the state of war between England and Spain, considerations of religious sentiment and sympathy for the Chevalier's position came to the

fore. On arrival in Madrid in March 1719 James was greeted by the Spanish royal family in a way reminiscent of Louis XIV's receiving James II in 1689 and correspondingly feted. The religious motif was illustrated by the tone of an anonymous greeting to the Chevalier to honour his presence in Spain which, by stressing James's role as the Catholic challenger to George I's Lutheranism, revived the language of the Counter Reformation.[1]

The influence of religion in persuading Madrid to support the Chevalier's cause rarely assumed much significance: to the Spanish government the Jacobite issue remained primarily political, not religious. The collapse of Madrid's flirtation with Jacobitism in 1719 therefore had considerable political results. The most significant of these was Philip V's formal acceptance of the Quadruple Alliance (17 Feb. 1720): Spain's involvement with the Jacobite cause in 1719 had been to no avail politically, and Philip was compelled to accept the terms of the agreement which he had scornfully rejected eighteen months previously.

The defeat of the Nineteen had one important casualty. On 5 December 1719 Alberoni was abruptly dismissed from office by Philip V and exiled: the rest of his life was spent in Italy and he never returned to Spain. To say that the collapse of Madrid's attempt to invade Britain in support of James actually caused Alberoni's fall would be to accord the Nineteen an unwarranted degree of importance. The defeat of Spain's attempt to restore the Chevalier was one more reverse for Alberoni, making

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it politically expedient for Philip V to remove him from office as the scapegoat for Spain's defeats at the hands of Britain and France (thereby granting one of the allies' principal demands). Alberoni's political career had, to a certain extent, been made and broken by his handling of the Jacobite issue. His adroit use of the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty in 1715 had, by enabling Spain to extricate herself from the consequences of financially supporting the Fifteen, greatly increased his stature with Philip V and helped him to become chief minister of Spain; in 1719, however, Alberoni's handling of Jacobitism - the debacle of the Nineteen - had contributed to the destruction of his political career. In January 1721, a little over a year after Alberoni's exile, his protégée Fernández Durán (under whose direction Spain's attempted expedition to England in 1719 had been assembled) was dismissed on a charge of misusing government money. Although this accusation may have been true, it is impossible to avoid the impression that Alberoni and Fernández Durán, the two men in Spain responsible for the implementation of Madrid's pro-Jacobite strategy in 1719, had been made scapegoats for its failure.

Those Jacobites who had taken part in Madrid's attempt to overthrow George I in 1719 received better treatment at Spain's hands. After the collapse of the Nineteen Ormonde, Marischal and James Keith all obtained employment in the Spanish army.

Following the Chevalier's return to Italy in the late Summer of 1719, his relations with the Spanish royal family reverted to

the pattern of routine contact as practised prior to the end of 1718.

The two royal houses of Stuart and Spanish Bourbon regularly corresponded with each other; James received a small pension from Madrid; in addition, the Spanish royal family made considerable attempts to resolve the marital disputes which arose between the Chevalier and his wife, Maria Clementina, in the early 1720s.[2]

Spain's political use of the Jacobite issue in the period 1715-19 fitted clearly into Madrid's general foreign policy of this period. The Spanish government was endeavouring, without allies, to redraw the map of Mediterranean Europe which emerged at Utrecht to suit the policies of Philip V. To this end Spain mounted isolated acts of defiance: some of these were straightforward attempts to seize territory claimed by Philip - the invasions of Sardinia in 1717 and Sicily the following year; the financial assistance supplied to James in 1715 and the military support given four years later were indirect attempts to secure Spain's goals in Italy by depriving the Emperor of George I's support and, in the event of a Jacobite success, to secure British backing for Philip's Italian policy. With Spain's acceptance of the Quadruple Alliance in 1720 Madrid reverted to the use of diplomacy to attain its aims.

Spanish support for Jacobitism did not disappear in the years after 1720, but Madrid became far less open in assisting the Stuart cause. The British government's presentation of an alleged Jacobite plan for an insurrection in 1722, the so-called 'Atterbury Plot', implied that Spain was closely involved in the

conspiracy: the extent to which this was true, or a mere fabrication based on Madrid's attempt to restore James in 1719 requires further research. In 1745 rebellion in Scotland, troops from the Irish contingent in the Spanish army were permitted to serve as volunteers for Charles Edward,[3] the Chevalier's elder son (born in 1720): after the Jacobite defeat at Culloden, Madrid had to pay the British government a large sum as ransom for their repatriation to Spain.[4] In March 1747 Charles Edward visited Madrid to request money from Ferdinand VI, son of Philip V who had died the previous year. Under pressure from Ferdinand's chief minister, José Carvajal y Lancaster (whose father and brother had taken part in the attempted Spanish expedition to England in 1719), Charles's pleas were refused and he was ordered to leave Spain without being permitted to see Elisabeth Farnese[5] who, twenty eight years previously, had welcomed his father to Madrid.

INTRODUCTION

Footnotes (to pages 6-12)

1 Jacobitism has long been a popular field of research in British history, and its bibliography is extensive. Of recent works dealing with the domestic significance of James's cause after 1713, the most noteworthy examples are Jones, G.H., The Mainstream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Foord, A.S. His Majesty's Opposition 1714-1830 (Oxford, 1964), pp. 70-92; Baynes, J. The Jacobite Rising of 1715 (London, 1970); Fritz, P.S. The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975)

2 The European aspect of Jacobitism after 1713 had, prior to the 1950's, been dealt with in relation to the general diplomatic background of the period in the works of Lémontey, Baudrillart, Wiesener, Armstrong, Bliard; Bourgeois, Diplomatie Secrète; Leclerq and Michael

3 Mar's account of the 1719 Jacobite attempt and the events preceding it, entitled 'A Distinct Abridgement of Some Materiall Poynts Relateing to Scotts Affairs' is printed in Kington Oliphant, T L The Jacobite Lairds of Gask (London, 1870), pp. 450-66; the part of it describing the Spanish-Jacobite expedition to the Highlands in 1719 also appears in Terry, C.S. The Chevalier de St. George and the Jacobite movements in his favour. 1701-20 (1901), 474-94.

4 The fact that the regulations of the Royal Archives do not permit research students to consult the Stuart MSS. (See Forster, Margaret The Rash Adventurer (London, 1973), XIV) has not seriously handicapped me since the whole collection is on microfilm in the University of London Library. In addition MSS up to the end of 1718 have been calendared in seven volumes by the Historic Manuscripts Commission (1901-23), and the most important of those relating to 1719 have been printed in Dickson, op. cit.

5 Louis' motives in recognising James Edward as King were twofold: firstly, as insurance for France in the event of the Stuart dynasty being restored to the English throne, and secondly, to avoid any implication that James was not his father's legitimate heir; cf. Hatton, R.M. 'Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs' in Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, ed. Rule, John C. (Columbus, Ohio, 1969), p. 180.

6 Torcy, Louis XIV's foreign minister, offered to expel James from France in the preliminary peace negotiations at the Hague in May 1709 - Goubert, Pierre Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen, trans. by Anne Carter (London, 1970), 259.

7 For James's correspondence with the Spanish king and queen, before 1715, cf. Historic Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of Stuart Papers (abbr. HMC Stuart) vol. I, pp. 161, 175, 188, 196, 197, 206, 213, 217, 244.

8 For Bourke (c.1675-aft. 1741), a native of Limerick, cf. Morel Fatio, A Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, vol. XII, Espagne (ii), (Paris, 1898), 298 n.1; MacSwiney, V.A.M. Two Distinguished Irishmen in the Spanish Service: Sir Toby Bourke and Dr. John Higgins (Dublin, 1939), 5-12; Walsh, Micheline Spanish Knights of Irish Origin (Dublin, 1960 -) I, 34. Bourke's credentials from James on the occasion of his appointment as the Chevalier's representative at the Spanish court are in HMC Stuart I, 200. Bourke was apparently a paid correspondent of the French government in Spain until 1715 - Kamen, Henry The War of Succession in Spain (London, 1969), 86 n.7.

9 For Higgins (1676-1729), cf. MacSwiney, Two Distinguished Irishmen, 16; Hayes, R. Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France (Dublin, 1949), 125 (the date of Higgins' death is incorrectly given as 1721).

10 The Irish contingent in the Spanish army comprised in all eight battalions each of 650 men; it was, however, frequently under strength and the numbers in these battalions had to be made up using other non-Spaniards. For the Irish regiments in Spain, cf. Oman, Prof. C.'The Irish Troops in the Service of Spain, 1709-1818', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (abbr. J.R.U.S.I.) 63 (1918), 1-8; Mac Swiney, V.A.M. 'Notes on some Irish Regiments in the service of Spain and Naples in the Eighteenth Century', Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy xxxvii (Dublin, 1927) section C,170-72; Forde, Frank 'The Ultonia Regiment of the Spanish Army', Irish Sword XII (46), (1975), 36-40.
Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy 'Une elite insulaire au srvice de l'Europe: les Jacobites au XVIIe siècle', Annales Economies Sociétes Civilisations XVIII (5) (1973), 1097-1122 chiefly deals with the fields of employment followed by Jacobite exiles in France, but pp. 1104-1110 refer to several of these who attained high rank in Spain.

11 The significance of Spain's Italian policy in relations with Britain in the period after Utrecht is dealt with by Martin, Miguel 'The Secret Clause Britain and Spanish Ambitions in Italy 1712-31', European Studies Review (abbr. E.S.R.) 6 (1976), 407-25 (this amplifies and extends the relevant portion of the writer's Ph.D. thesis, 'Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and Spain 1711-1714' (1962)).

12 Martin, E.S.R. 6, p. 411.

13 For the Princess des Ursins' expulsion from Spain, cf. Armstrong, Edward Elisabeth Farnese "The Termagant of Spain" (London, 1892), 25-28; Bertoli, Maria Esther 'Elisabetta Farnese e la Principessa Orsini', Hispania XV (1955), 582-99.

14 Britain's trade with Spain and Spanish America is described in Michael, Wolfgang England under George I The Beginnings of the Hanoverian Dynasty, trans. by A. &G.E. MacGregor (2 vols., London, 1936-39), I, 266-69; and in more detail by McLachlan, Jean O. Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750 (Cambridge, 1940), 3-29, 46-67.

Footnotes (to pages 19-21)

1 Berwick to James, 22 June 1714, Saint-Germain, H.M.C. Stuart I, 328

2 For the Jacobite disarray at the time of Anne's death, cf. Handasyde, Elizabeth Granville the Polite (Oxford, 1933), pp. 138-39; Trevalyan, G. M. England under Queen Anne (London, 1934), III, 292-95.

3 Berwick to James, 14 Dec. 1714 & 6 Jan. 1715, Saint-Germain, H.M.C. Stuart I, 337, 342;
Handasyde 139.

Barbara Villiers (c1663-1735), widow of Edward Villiers 1st Earl of Jersey (c1656-1711): She fled to Paris in 1713 in order to escape her creditors.
The most recent biography of Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) is Dickinson, H.T. Bolingbroke (London, 1970).

4 Petrie, Sir Charles The Marshal Duke of Berwick (London, 1953), pp. 299-300.

5 Fieldhouse, H.N. 'Bolingbroke and the d'Iberville Correspondence, August, 1714 - June 1715, English Historical Review (henceforth abbr. E.H.R.) LII (1937), p. 677 n1: d'Ibenville to Torcy, 12 Sept. 1714, Archive Affaires Etrangeres (A.A.E.) Angleterre v. 252 f182; Nordmann, C.J. La Crise du Nord au début du XVIII e. siècle (Paris, 1962), p. 39 Lawless was a native of Kilkenny (Walsh, Spanish Knights I, 49) who had entered the service of Spain becoming an unofficial Spanish agent in London during the preliminaries to the peace of Utrecht. He was Spain's diplomatic representative in Paris from 1720-25, and ended his career as governor of Majorca; cf. the brief biography of him in Recueil...Espagne III, 423-24.

6 Nordmann, Crise, 39 n 27.

7 Ibid, 16-17, 39; Hatton R. M. Charles XII (London, 1969), p. 404.

8 Berwick to James, 10 March 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 351.

9 Berwick to James, 17 and 22 Feb. 1715, ibid., 348, 349.

10 Lémontey, P. E. Histoire de la Régence et de la minorité de Louis XV (Paris, 1832) II, 385: d'Iberville to Torcy, 10 Feb. 1715.

11 Jones, G.H. The Main Stream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 125; Nordmann, Crise, 39 n 27: Macray, W.D. Correspondence of Colonel Nathaniel Hooke (London, 1870-71) II, 449.

Notes to pages 22-23

12 Nordmann, Crise, 39n29: Lémontey II, 385; Gregg, G.E. 'The Protestant Succession in International Politics 1710-1716' (London University, unpublished PhD Thesis, 1972) p. 271n 112: d'Iberville to Louis XIV, 28 Feb. 1715, A.A.E. Correspondence Politique (C.P.) Angleterre, 266 ff 262-67.

13 Nordmann, Crise, 42 n 45.

14 Isidora Casado Avezada de Rosales, marqués de Monteleón (1664-1733), Spanish ambassador in London 1712-18.

Vellingk's credentials as envoy dated 3/14 Feb. 1715, are in A.G.S. Est. leg. 6662

15 Mac Swiney Two Distinguished Irishmen, 6n. 25: Burke to Cardinal Filippo Antonio Gualterio (1660-1728), (a partisan of the Chevalier's who was given the title of Protector of the English Nation by Pope Clement XI) 23 Feb., 6 May & 3 June 1715,
B.M. Add. MSS. 20,307 ff. 285,301 & 303; Nordmann, Crise, 45 n. 57.

16 Berwick to James, 4 March 1715, Saint-Germain, H.M.C. Stuart I, 350 (cited by Nordmann, Crise, 45 n 57).

17 Berwick to James, 7 Apr. 1715, Saint-Germain, H.M.C. Stuart I, 356 'I have this right on account of ... Bou(r)k(e's) journey being quite put off.'

18 Mac Swiney, Two Distinguished Irishmen, 6 n 26. Bourke's memorandum to Philip V, 22 Jan. 1720, A.G.S. Est. leg. 6660 gives Bourke's date of departure from Madrid as 16 June; Nordmann 45 (n57) as 15 June.

19 Nordmann 39-42; Gregg 273

20 Stuart Papers (unpublished) Windsor Castle, abbr. W.S.P. I have consulted the microfilm of these Mss. in the University of London library, each reel of which corresponds to a volume, thus reel 44 equals vol. 44. WSP 44 f. 80 is entitled 'An account of what money was advanced by Foreign Princes or lent by particular persons for ye King's use', compiled by William Dicconson, treasurer to the Jacobite court, on 29 August 1719, and dealing with contributions to the Chevalier's cause between 1715-17 Although it contains some inaccuracies (for example, as far as the Spanish contribution is concerned - of n. 279 below) many of Dicconson's figures can be corroborated from other sources.

WSP 44 f.82 is a copy of this account along with an explanation of the abbreviations and cant names therein, which I have employed in subsequent details of the financial contributions of Philip V and others in 1715-16.

Jones 106n35 has obtained similar information from 'An Account....' of March 1716 in the Carte Mss., Bodleian Library, Oxford; v 211 f 323-4. That in the Windsor Stuart Papers, however, appears to contain greater details of the money involved.

James Brydges (1674-1744), Paymaster General of the British Army, 1705-13, created Duke of Chandos 30 April 1719. In the left hand column the date of these gifts is stated to be 'Ju 10' 1714, perhaps 10 June, the Chevalier's birthday. Jones 107n38 states that 'Johnson'/Kenyon collected £5,000 without mentioning the source of the contribution.

21 WSP 44 f80. 'Mr. Stonor's money towards the restoration' is first mentioned in Mary's letter to Dicconson, 31 May, 1715, HMC Stuart III, 536. Here 'Mr. Stonor' is given as the cant name for Philip V.

The Spanish king had, however, neither given nor promised any money towards the Jacobite rebellion at this stage. In W.S.P. 44/82 the collector of this sum is named as John Talbot Monro (1678-1758). Precise identification of him is difficult: he may have actually been Dr. John Talbot Stonor (using the name Monro), a Catholic priest who was consecrated Vicar Apostolic of the Midland District in 1716. Stonor was reputed to favour an accommodation with the Hanoverian regime (A History of the County of Oxford, ed. Mary D. Lobel, vol. VIII (London, 1964), in the series The Victoria History of the Counties of England, p. 175), but this did not necessarily preclude collaboration with the Jacobites, a task for which Dr. Stonor would have been well suited on account of his pastoral activity among the Catholic population of the Chilterns.

22 Dicconson's Account
WSP 44 f.80
For Marlborough's donation of Leclercq, Dom H Histoire de la Régence pendant la minorité de Louis XV (Paris, 1921-22), I, 250n12: Lémontey 1,88, Berwick to Torcy, 24 August 1715; Gregg, 274. Dicconson (WSP 44/80) refers to the Duke as 'Lord Ch(urchill)

23 Dicconson's Account, WSP 44/80. Catherine (?1697-1785), the widow of Thomas 7th Lord Petre (d. 1713) was rejected as a possible bride for James in 1717 - Jones, Main Stream, 131

24 Dicconson's Account, W.S.P. 44/80
For Webb's donation of HMC Stuart I 370, Berwick to James, 21 June 1715. James, 2nd Baron Waldegrave (1685-1741) was the son of Henrietta Fitzjames (1667-1730), like Berwick the offspring of James II's liaison with Arabella Churchill, Marlborough's sister.

25 Dicconson's Account, W.S.P. 44/80.

26 Ibid.
This sum was made up as follows:

	French currency	English currency
Donations from		
England	(245,545 Livres)	£20,490
Duke of Lorraine	308,610 "	(£25,700)
Clement XI	191,308 "	(£16,000)
Skiddy	2,500 "	(200)
Gordon	8,000 "	(650)
Arbuthnot	8,000 "	(650)
	763,963 livres	£63,690

27 Gregg 278 n. 174; Dicconson's Account (W.S.P. 44/80) states inaccurately that Crozat supplied a total of 50,000 crowns to the Jacobites.

28 Berwick to James, 18 June 1715, Marly, H.M.C. Stuart I, 368

29 On the question of Scotsmen in the service of Sweden, cf. Sinclair, the Hon. George A. 'The Scottish Officers of Charles XII', Scottish Historical Review (abbr. S.H.R.) XXII (1924), pp. 178-92; Berg, J. & Lagercrantz B. Scots in Sweden (Edinburgh. 1962) (published in conjunction with an exhibition of the same name held at the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh in 1962).

30 Nordmann, Crise, 26-27, 40-41.

31 Berwick to James, & 15 July 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 372,373; Nordmann, Crise. 40-41; Gregg, 278.
The other half of Crozat's loan, 50,000 crowns, was remitted to England where it was converted into £9,346 - Dicconson's Account (W.S.P. 44/80); Jones, Main Stream, 107.

32 Nordmann, Crise, 42 n.44.

33 Hatton Charles XII, 416 n.28: H.M.C. Stuart I, 421,429

34 Berwick to James, 18 June 1715, Marly, H.M.C. Stuart I, 368.

35 For the British government's pressure on Bolingbroke to discredit himself by fleeing the country, cf. Shennan, J.H. & Margaret 'The Protestant Succession in English Politics, April 1713 - September 1715' in William III and Louis XIV (op. cit.), pp. 266-67; Dickinson, Bolingbroke, 134-36.

36 Robert Harley (1661-1724), created Earl of Oxford 1711 Lord High Treasurer 1711-14. Oxford's political activities after the death of Queen Anne in Aug. 1714 have only been dealt with very briefly in the most recent research about him: Hamilton, Elizabeth The Backstairs Dragon: A Life of Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford

(London, 1969), pp. 278-79; McInnes, A. Robert Harley, Puritan Politician (London, 1970); Gregg, argues that Oxford was more pro-Jacobite than Bolingbroke (the opposite of the accepted view); Biddle, Sherla Bolingbroke and Harley (London, 1975) does not progress beyond 1714.

For Oxford's Jacobite intrigues in 1718, see Infra, Chapter 3.

37 Nordmann, C. J. 'Louis XIV and the Jacobites' in Louis XIV and Europe ed. R. M. Hatton (London, 1976), 100n. 101: Shennan 'Protestant Succession' William III and Louis XIV, 267-68.

38 Carpio, Maria Josefa España y los ultimos Estuardos (Madrid, 1952), pp. 12-14, cited by Shennan, op. cit, p. 268 n.72 & Gregg 283 n.217. The Shennans discount a story in H.M.C. Egmont Diary I, 400-01 cited by Williams, A. F. B(asil) Stanhope: A Study in eighteenth century War and Diplomacy (Oxford, 1932), p. 173 n.3 & Sedgwick, R. (ed.) The History of Parliament The House of Commons 1715-54 (London, 1970), II 351 n.2) to the effect that Stanhope used his brother-in-law, Robert Pitt, M.P., to convey a similar warning to Ormonde.

39 This is the argument put forward by the Shennans, op. cit, p. 268. Nordmann 'Louis and the Jacobites' p. 101 n.103, points out, however, that the British government's assumption of Monteleon's ignorance of the European dimension to the forthcoming Jacobite rebellion was false.

40 Nordman 'Louis and the Jacobites' p. 100 implies that at the time of Stanhope's overture to Monteleón, the diplomat was aware of Madrid's plan to assist the Pretender. It will be seen, however - sections (ii) & (iii) below - that no serious approach was made to the Spanish government on James's behalf until mid-August.

41 This information had been passed by the Duke of Orléans, nephew of Louis XIV, to Stair. The British ambassador believed, however, that the rebellion was imminent whereas it had been postponed for two months until mid-September; nevertheless Stair's information (which reacted London in the early hours of 20/31 July) enabled the Whig Ministry to take prompt measures against the Jacobite threat, cf. Michael I, 144-47; Gregg 282 n. 211: Stair's Journal, 28 July 1715; Leclercq I, 249-50.

42 Jones, Main Stream, 106 n.34: Dangeau, Marquis de Journal du Marquis de Dangeau (Paris 1854-60), XVI, 9 (Philippe de Courcillon, marquis de Dangeau (1638-1720), author of a journal (virtually a diary of Louis XIV's engagements) between 1682-1715); Thornton, Percy The Stuart Dynasty (London, 1890), 372.

43 Memorial enclosed in Ormonde's letter to Mar. 27 Dec. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 534; Jones, Main Stream, 107; Gregg 284 n.223: Bolingbroke's Memorial of 13 August 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 528-29.

44 Memorial enclosed in Ormonde's letter to Mar. 27 Dec. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 534.

45 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 August 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg 3494, cited by Carpio, 18-20 8 Gregg 286 n.242.

Cellamare's letter of 12 Aug. comes from a small section of correspondence in this legajo entitled:

'Reservado, s(obr)e el socorro dinero q(ue) el Rey hizo al Rey Jacome de Inglaterra el ano de 1715 y correspondenzia con Chelamar (Cellamare) s(obr)e esta materia' (Private, concerning the aid of money that the King (of Spain) gave to King James of England in 1715 and correspondence with Cellamare about this affair).

Antonio de Giudice, Duke of Giovenazzo and Prince of Cellamare (1657-1733), Spanish ambassador in Paris 1715-18.

José Grimaldo (1660-1733), created a marqués in 1714, was secretario de estado (Spanish minister for foreign affairs) 1714-24.

46 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Carpio 18 n.17: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

50 Ibid.

51 Bolingbroke to James, 15 Aug. 1715, Paris printed in Mahon, Lord History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, lengthened to the Peace of Versailles (London, 1836-54), I, appendix p. xvi; Ormonde's Memorial (Dec. 1715), H.M.C. Stuart I, 534.

52 Carpio 18 n.17: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

53 In his letter to Grimaldo of 12 Aug. (A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494). Cellamare described the French view of Spain's proposal contribution thus: 'con pequena centella que se introduzca suele causarse un incendio incapaz de apagarse aun por sus mismos fomentadores'- the introduction of such a small spark could well cause a conflagration incapable of being put out on their own (i.e. by the British).

54 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

55 Carpio, 19: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

56 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.; Berwick to James, 13 Aug. 1715, Paris, H.M.C. Stuart I, 389.

59 Carpio 19: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

60 Lémontey I, 89.

61 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 12 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

62 Ibid.

63 Stair's principal informant at Saint-Germain was George Higgons, brother of Thomas Higgons, James's chief adviser prior to the appointment of Bolingbroke. In Stair's dispatch to James Graggs the Younger (Secretary for the Southern Department), 18 June 1718, P.R.O. SP.78/161f.328 (extract printed in Haile, Martin Queen Mary of Modena Her Life and Letters (London, 1905), 515, App. D), the British ambassador's informant at Saint-Germain was identified as 'le frere du Higgens, Secretaire du prétend(an)t'. Murray, J.J. 'Sweden and the Jacobites in 1716'. Huntington Library Quarterly (abbr. H.L.Q.) VIII (1945), 263 n.23, citing Lang A., A History of Scotland (Edinburgh and London, 1907) IV 260-61, states (incorrectly) that Thomas Higgons himself was Stair's informant at Saint-Germain.

Stair's penetration of the Jacobites' ranks is dealt with by Fritz, Paul S. 'The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715-1745', Historical Journal XVI (1973), pp. 279-80 and the same author's work The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975), p. 53.

64 James to Bolingbroke, 25 Aug. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 402. The Viscount thought that James should indicate his knowledge of the request to Spain in a letter to Philip - ibid., 411.

65 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

66 Carpio 20-21: Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494 (cited by Gregg, 286 n. 244).

67 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

68 Information contained in a note enclosed within the above: this also stated that a messenger, Juan Fernández Lieneres, was paid 100 doblones (£95) to convey Grimaldo's letter to Cellamare.

69 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

70 George Bubb, Methuen's successor, to Robert Pringle, Under-Secretary to the Southern Department, 19 & 26 Aug. 1715, Madrid, S.P. 94/84.

71 Along with this letter is enclosed an anonymous missive from 'You know who' to 'Don Carlos' of the same date, 26 August. From the references therein to those active in Jacobite circles in Paris (e.g. Lady Wal(de)-grave (Waldegrave's mother), Mrs. Trant (Olive Trant, a woman of Irish extraction, believed to be the Duke of Orleans' mistress), Mrs. Oglethorp(e) (Eleanor Oglethorpe, d. 1732) & Mrs. (actually Miss) Fanny' (Oglethorpe), her daughter it seems that the writer was familiar with these and their intrigues, but whether the letter was genuinely intercepted or merely unimportant correspondence planted by Lawless in a bid to mislead Bubb is not clear.

For the Oglethorpe family, many of whose members were extremely active Jacobites cf. Ettinger, AA James Edward Oglethorpe Imperial Idealist (Oxford, 1936) pp. 55-69.

72 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

73 Ibid., postscript.

74 Ibid., Cellamare's account of expenses for the period 18 June 1715 to 31 July 1716, submitted on 7 Sept. 1716 and enclosed in his despatch to Grimaldo of that day, AGS Est. leg. 4323 (henceforth abbr. Cellamare's account). This provides an invaluable source of information for the Spanish ambassador's financial transactions with the Jacobites.

75 I have found no trace of the Bishop's original orders to Cellamare to supply this money to the Jacobites, but in his dispatch to Grimaldo of 9 Sept. 1715 (AHN Est. leg. 3494) the Spanish ambassador confirms that he had received these orders; further details of the transaction may be found in Cellamare's account, 7 Sept. 1716 (AGS Est. leg. 4323).

76 Cellamare's account (Sept. 1716), A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323; Details of the fund of 134,000 pesos are also found in AGS Secretaria y Superintendencia de Hacienda (abbr. SSH), leg 1'Avisos...a la secretaria de Estado', f 2 'Dinero rezivido por el senor Principe de Chelamar del que vino de Indias', details of the money submitted by Cellamare in the autumn of 1715. The ambassador's original statement is f.3 of this legajo but is in a very poor condition; f 2 is a more legible copy.

Diego Morcillo (1642-1730), Archbishop of Charcas 1711-22. At this time he was the acting viceroy owing to the absence of the Prince of Santo Buono, but he was described by Cellamare as the Viceroy.

Juan Andrés de Uztariz (1656-1718), Presidente (Governor) of Chile, 1707-17. Boucher may have been related to Charles Nicolas de Boucher who (1706) married Susanne, daughter of Nicolas Bazard, Controleur-General des rentes de l'Hotel de Ville de Paris - Dictionnaire de la Noblesse, (19 vols.,Paris, 1863-76) XII, 649.

77 Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria 1679-1726 (b.1662) was the brother of Philip's mother, Maria Anna of Bavaria (1660-90). Philip's motives for supplying his uncle with this amount of money are at this stage unclear, in A.G.S. SSH leg. 1 the sum in question was described as an 'aborno de anualidad al Duque Elector de Baviera' - an annual payment; and Cellamare was instructed to hand it over to Ferdinand-Augustin de Solar, comte de Monasterol, the Bavarian envoy in Paris, for the Elector - Cellamare's account (Sept. 1716), A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

I have been unable to trace Grimaldo's original orders to Cellamare to hand this money over to Monasterol, but the ambassador in his dispatch to the minister of 9 Sept. (AHN Est. leg. 3494) confirms that such instructions had been received.

78 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

79 Cf. Bolingbroke to Torcy, 14 Aug. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 392: '...si nous pouvons obtenir de l'argent de L'Espagne et des troupes de la Suede...je ne regarderay pas nos affaires comme de'sesperees'.

80 Carpio, 22: Grimaldo to Cellamare, 21 Aug. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

81 Bolingbroke to James, 3 Sept. 1715, Paris, H.M.C. Stuart I, 411. The Viscount wrote 'I did not ask, neither did the Duke of Berwick tell me, what is the nature of the propos'd Treaty. In the state of your affairs your Majesty has little to lose by (the) Treaty; and yet I think it prudent not to admit any thing which may hereafter be an incumbrance to you, or which might at present, if known, prove prejudicial to your interest at home'.

82 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, AHN Est. leg. 3494; Bolingbroke to James, 3 Sept. 1715, Paris, HMC Stuart I, 411 Berwick to James, 1 Sept. 1715, HMC Stuart I, 412.

83 On 20 August Berwick had informed Cellamare that in return for Spain's assistance 'apres son retablissement le Chevalier ferait pour le Roi Catholique tout ce qui serait possible sans revolter la nation anglaise', quoted by Noromann, 41 (no source given) as evidence of the willingness of certain Jacobite leaders to contemplate the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca.

84 'Poder y plenipotenzia al Principe de Chelamar para volver al hrono de Inglat(err)a al Rey Jacobo' (Power & plenipotentary to the Prince of Cellamare to return King James to the throne of England), 16 Sept. 1715, enclosed in Grimaldo to Cellamare, 16 Sept. 1715, Madrid, AHN Est. leg. 3494.

85 'Poder y plenipotenzia.....; 16 Sept. 1715, AHN Est. leg. 3494).

86 Ibid. Grimaldo's original draft of the terms of Spain's allegiance with James referred to the restoration of Roman Catholicism first in Ireland and then in England, but the latter was altered to 'todo el regno' (the whole kingdom).

87 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, AHN Est. leg. 3494.

88 Ibid.

89 Williams, Stanhope, 89-91, Kamen, War, 49

90 Baudrillart, Alfred Philippe V et la Cour de France (Paris, 1890), I, 671-72; II, 211: Philip V to Cellamare, 19 May 1715, A.A.E.C.P. Espagne 245, ff. 45-69; Bliard P. Dubois Cardinal et Premier Ministre (1656-1723) (Paris, 1901) II 5n.1 cites reference for Philip's instructions to Cellamare as A.A.E. C.P. Espagne 282 ff. 2 et seq.; Carpio 3-4: Secret instructions to Cellamare, 19 May 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

91 Carpio 25-26: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

92 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

93 Ibid.; Berwick to James, 1 Sept. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 412 The accounts of this meeting supplied by Cellamare and Berwick broadly agree.

94 Berwick to James, 1 Sept. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 412

95 Baudrillart I, 680;

96 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

97 Ibid.

98 For a discussion of the rivalry between Philip V and Orleans, and the effect of this upon Franco-Spanish relations in the period after the Regent's coming to power cf. Leclercq I, 227-43.

99 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494; Cellamare's Account (Sept. 1716), A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

100 Cellamare's Account (Sept. 1716) A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323. Carpio 24n24: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Sept. 1715;

101 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 16 Sept. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

102 For the Jacobite strategy behind the rising cf. Gregg 279-81.

103 Carpio 27n27: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 16 Sept. 1715. A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

104 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 16 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

105 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 23 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Bolingbroke to James, 21 Sept. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 421, printed in Mahon I, app. XXIV.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 James to Bolingbroke, 23 Sept. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 424.

115 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 23 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 30 Sept. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Carpio 29n.31: Montelkón to Grimaldo, 12 Sept. 1715, A.G.S. Est. leg. 6830.

122 Michael, I, 167n.4: Dispatch of Johann Philip Hoffman, the Austrian resident in Britain, 27 September 1715, Vienna Archives.

123 Carpio 30n.34: Monteleón to Grimaldo, 26 Sept. 1715, A.G.S. Est. leg. 6830.

124 Ibid., 29n.31: Monteleón to Grimaldo, 12 Sept. 1715; A.G.S. Est. leg. 6830, 31n.35; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 3 Oct. 1715, A.G.S. Est. leg. 6831.

125 'A king without a throne is like an alchemist without sugar;' Nordmann 45n.60: Drei, Giulio Alberoni (Bologna, 1932), 33.

126 Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese, 56 nn. 182: (Franceso Farnese, Duke of Parma to Alberoni) 12 March 1715 and (Alberoni to the Duke of Parma), 15 Apr. 1715, Archivi di Stato, Naples, Carte Farnesiane 58.

127 Bubb to Stanhope, 30 Sept. 1715 (10 p.m.), Madrid, S.P. 94/84, cited by Michael I, 275n.3; also cf. Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese, 71-73; McLachlan, 67-69.

Jan Willem, Baron van Ripperda (1680-1737), Dutch envoy extraordinary to Spain, July-Oct. 1715; Dutch ambassador, 30 Oct. 1715-15 Feb. 1718. He subsequently gained the favour of Philip V and was first minister of Spain until he fell into disgrace (1726), and ended his life in Morocco.

128 On 16 Sept. 1715 he wrote to Stanhope 'il n'y a ni gouvernement ni force ni Argent ici', PRO S.P.94/84.

129 Methuen to Stanhope, 19 Aug. 1715, Madrid; S.P. 94/84; Bubb to Stanhope, 26 Aug. & 16 Sept. 1715. S.P. 94/84.

130 Congreve, governor of Gibraltar, to ? Nicholas Holloway, Consul in Malaga enclosed in Holloway to Stanhope, 17 Sept. 1715, Malaga, S.P. 94/212) Hills, G. Rock of Contention (London, 1974), 239n5; British Museum Egerton Mss (abbr. B.M. Eg.) 2170 ff 210R,260,283.

131 Nicholas Herne, consul in Alicante, to Stanhope, 28 Oct. 1715, Alicante, S.P. 94/212;
Admiral Baker to Bubb, 4 Sept. 1715 OS, off Port Mahon. B.M. Eg. 2170, f118.

132 Bubb to Baker, 13 Oct. 1715, B.M. Eg. 2170 f.208.

133 Bubb to Gosselin and Lordell, British merchants in Bilbao, 28 Oct. 1715, B.M. Eg. 2170f.256.

134 For these negotiations, cf. Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese, 71-74; Michael I, 275-79; McLachlan, 66-71.

135 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 7 Oct. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

136 Ibid.

137 Carpio 35 n.40: Giudice to Grimaldo, 13 Oct. 1715, A.G.S. Est. leg. 6831.

138 A.G.S. S.S.H. leg. 1 f 2 (Documentation concerning the specie and coinage sent to Cellamare from South America in 1715) refers to the receipt of these instructions for the disposal of the 100,000 pesos from Grimaldo, dated 28 Oct. 1715.

139 Bolingbroke to James, 7 Oct. 1715, Paris, H.M.C. Stuart I, 432.

140 James Radclyffe 3rd Earl of Derwentwater (1689-1716). His mother Lady Mary Tudor was the illegitimate daughter of Charles II and one of his mistresses, Lady Mary Davis (Davies).

141 Handasyde, 145; Petrie, Sir Charles' The Jacobite Activities in South and West England in the summer of 1715', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Abbr. T.R.H.S.) 4th Series, 18 (1935), pp. 95-96; Gregg 280nn. 190&191: d'Iberville to Torcy 17 July & 23 Aug. 1715 (N.S.), A.A.E. CP Angleterre 273 ff. 270-78

142 James to Bolingbroke, 10 Oct. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I.

143 Cellamare expressed this opinion of Bolingbroke's attitude in his dispatch to Grimaldo of 13 Jan. 1716, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323; Michael I, 169 attributes a similar view to Orleans.

144 Gregg 29ln.293: Bolingbroke to James, 2 Nov. 1715, printed in Mahon I, app. XXXVI.

145 Berwick to James, 10 October 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 432; James to Bolingbroke, 10 Oct. 1715, ibid, 434.

146 Gregg. 288-89.

147 Bliard, Dubois I, 123n.2: Bolingbroke to James, 21 Sept. 1715, Mahon I, app. XXIX.

148 Bolingbroke (Letter to Sir William Wyndham) Works (1809 ech) I,78; (Leclercq I, 258n.44, citing St. Simon (Memoires, edn. Chéruel, VIII, 307) describes the Regent as "avec addresse, nageoit entre deux ecuix".

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149 Wiesener, L Le Régent, L'Abbé Dubois et les Anglais (Paris, 181-99) I, 28; Leclercq I, 246.

150 Ormonde to James, 21 Oct. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 442, cited by Wiesener I, 116; Leclercq I, 253n. 26 and Nordmann 48n. 73.

151 Wiesener I, 124n.1: Berwick to James, 3 Nov. 1715 printed in Thornton, P. The Stuart Dynasty (London, 1890), 409, also cited by Leclercq I, 258n.45; Gregg 293n. 323: Berwick to James, 4 Nov. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 452.

152 The most spectacular of these was an attempt on the part of Colonel Lewis Charles Douglas (who for patriotic reasons preferred to be known as Charles Douglas) to kidnap James at Nonancourt near Dreux, foiled by the vigilance of Mme Lospital, wife of the innkeeper - cf.

Lemontey I, 96; Dalton, C. George the First's Army 1714-27 (London, 1910-12) I, 17-34; Jones, III.
A list of Stair's payments to Douglas in Nov. & Dec. 1715 is in S.P.78/160f.17, cited by Dalton I, 22n.3.

153 James to Fr. Lewis Innes, Principal of the Scots College in Paris, 15 Nov. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 456; Wiesener I, 190; Leclercq I, 258; Seton, W. 'The Itinerary of King James III, October to December 1715', Scottish Historical Review (henceforth abbr. S.H.R.) XXI (1924) p. 257; Gregg, 293.

154 Bolingbroke to James, 20 Oct. 1715, Paris, H.M.C. Stuart I, 440.

155 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 28 Oct. 1715, Paris. A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494: Carpio (41n.49) citing this dispatch gives a resume of the contents of the meeting between Mary and Cellamare. Dangeau, Journal, XVI, 207 (entry for 9 Oct. 1715) noted that Cellamare's wife had recently died in Rome.

156 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 28 Oct. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

157 Ibid.

158 Bolingbroke to James, 8 Nov. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 454. For Daubenton (1648-1723), Philip's confessor from his accession until 1705 and again from June 1715 until the priest's death, cf. Baudrillart II, 239 & Cuesta, Maria Luisa 'Una vida inedita del primer director effectivo de la Biblioteca Nacional', Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos LXV (1958), 413-438.

159 Thomas Crawford, Secretary at the British Embassy in Paris, to Pringle, 27 & 28 Nov. 11 Dec. 1715; S.P. 78/160/142, 144, 159, Gregg 293n.324: Crawford to Pringle, 23 Nov. & 5 Dec. 1715, S.P. 78/160/141, 153.

160 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 18 Nov. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494. Carpio 42-43 gives an outline of what took place during the first part of the interview; Nordmann 48n. 73, citing Carpic, states incorrectly that the meeting took place at the chateau of Vincennes in Villeroy's presence; Cellamare's dispatch makes it clear that he saw Orleans privately at the Regent's residence (?the Palais Royal?) the day following his visit to Villeroy at Vincennes.

161 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 18 Nov. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494. Bliard, Dubois, I, 123 n.4 cites a letter from Cellamare to Grimaldo of the same date relating Orléans' attempt to put pressure on Spain to provide James with money (A.A.E. (C.P.) Espagne 282f.48): this may be a copy of that in A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

162 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 18 Nov. 1715, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.

165 A.G.S. S.S.H. leg. 1f2

166 The date of receipt of Cellamare's dispatch to Grimaldo, 28 Oct. 1715, was 11 November - A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

167 Grimaldo to the Bishop of Cadiz, 16 Nov. 1715, Buen Retiro, A.G.S. S.S.H. leg. 1 f 1; also ff. 2 3 'Dinero ....que vino de Indias'. cf his account, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

168 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 18 Nov. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494; Cellamare's Account (Sept. 1716), A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

169 Cf. the reports of Felix Cornejo, the Spanish consul in Paris, Oct. & Nov. 1715, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4321. On 4 Nov. 1715 Cornejo gave Grimaldo a wildly optimistic report of the progress of the Jacobite rebellion which arrived in Madrid on 15 Nov., three days before Grimaldo wrote to Cellamare authorising him to hand over the money to the Jacobites. According to Cornejo's dispatch of 4 Nov., Ormonde had triumphantly landed in England, and both Bristol and Glasgow had declared for James, all of which were false.

170 Instructions issued by James, 10 Oct. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 531.

171 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

172 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 & 9 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

173 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 16 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494, cited by Carpio 4 8n.56.

174 Cellamare's Account..., Sept. 1716, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323. This is corroborated by Dicconson in WSP 44 f.80: 'From the King of Spain in Ingots of gold piastres and bills, 2 (/13) Dec 1715, 300,000 livres'; i.e. the equivalent of 100,000 pesos or crowns.

175 Mary's receipt of 13 December was enclosed with Cellamare's dispatch to Grimaldo of 16 Dec; both are in AHN Est. leg. 3494.

176 James to Bolingbroke, 12 Dec. 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 473.

177 Ibid.

178 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 16 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

179 Date of receipt of Cellamare's Dispatch of 18 Nov. (marked on the reverse), A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494.

180 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 2 Dec. 1715, Madrid, A.H.N. Est. leg. 3494 (cited by Carpio 44n.52); Cellamare's Account, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

181 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 23 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

182 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 30 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

183 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 23 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

184 Cellamare's Account..., Sept. 1716; A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323. Cellamare to Grimaldo, 30 Dec. 1715. A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323. This amount was described by Dicconson as 128,520 livres, the equivalent in French money of 42,840 pesos - W.S.P. 44/80.

185 AGS Est. 4323, Queen Mary's receipt, dated 20 Dec. 1715, enclosed along with Cellamare to Grimaldo, 6 Jan. 1716; the transaction is also noted in Cellamare's Account. The date on the receipt indicates that it was written in advance of the transfer; Dicconson states that this amount was received at Saint-Germain on 8 Jan. 1716 - WSP 44 f.80.

186 Cf. p61 n.168 above.

187 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 Jan. 1716, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

188 Ibid. This was the first intimation regarding the handing over of this sum to the Bavarians to reach Madrid. Cellamare's Account (A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323), along with which were enclosed Monasterol's three receipts, states this money, totalling 58,248 livres in all, was handed over on the days mentioned in the text. It would seem that this was all the money the Elector received from Philip V: in July 1717 Monasterol was still endeavouring to obtain payment from Cellamare who refused to discuss the matter; Cellamare to Grimaldo, 19 July 1717, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4326.

189 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Jan. 1716, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

190 Seton 'Itinerary of James III', S.H.R. XXI (1924), 266.

191 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 30 Dec. 1715, Paris, A.G.S. Est. leg. 4323.

192 Bolingbroke, Works (1809 edn.) I,75. Erskine (c1673-1739) was well connected in Jacobite circles. Besides his relationship to Mar, he was married to Catherine, sister of John Sinclair, Master of Sinclair, another of the rebels. James Fitzjames, Earl of Tynemouth (Tinmouth) (1696-1738), better known by his Spanish title of Duke of Liria. Positive identification of Bulkeley is difficult: from a letter written to Mar after Bulkeley's return to France in April 1716, (H.M.C. Stuart II, 117), however, it appears that his initial was F, and in 1718 he was described as Berwick's brother-in-law (Ibid, VI, 584). This would indicate that Bulkeley was the brother of Anna Bulkeley, Liria's stepmother, whom Berwick married in April 1700.

193 James to Bolingbroke, Christmas Day 1715, H.M.C. Stuart I, 476: 'I am sorry the young factor (Tynemouth) is not yet gone and begin to be uneasy that so many mantles (money) are sent by Martel's (Mar's) cousin (Erskine)'.

After seeing James sail from Dunkirk on 27 Dec., the Chevalier's valet, a man named O'Flanagan, returned to Saint-Germain via Dieppe where '(he) thought to overtake Sir John Areskin who was to conduct ye money to Scotland, and who (Flanagan) intended to tell that the King's opinion was, that all ye money should not be ventured in one ship, but sent on two as more secure... (Flanagan) found Sir John Areskin parted, and so continued..to St. Germain' - Seton, 'Itinerary of James III', S.H.R. XXI (1924), p. 266.

194 Berwick, Duke of Memoirs of the Marshall Duke of Berwick written by Himself (London, 1779) II, 244-245. A Spanish translation of this is in Berwick y Alba, Duque de El Mariscal de Berwick (Madrid, 1925), 84 & Carpio, 74. Taylor, A & H 1715: the story of the Rising (London, 1936), 144 relate this tale from British intelligence reports in the PRO S.P. Dom. Scotland 54/11 nos. 33 & 38. Further references to the incident are in H.M.C. Stuart I, 487, 490; IV. 26-27 'Abstract (by Dicconson) of what money has been laid out on account of the King's late expedition...sent by Sir John Erskine 222 pounds weight of gold (a weight corresponding to that noted by Cellamare in his account of the specie sent from South America, A.G.S. S.S.H. leg. 1 f° 2)....';
Sinclair, J. Memoirs of the Insurrection in Scotland in 1715 (Edinburgh, 1858), 356; Hull, Ninian 'A Side Light on the 1715', S.H.R. XVII (1920); 232; Warrand, D, More Culloden Papers (Inverness, 1925), 87.
Admittedly these do not prove that the gold (if any) lost at sea was that supplied by Spain, but the similarity in the

weight of the bullion in question plus the fact that Dicconson, the Jacobite treasurer, refers to no other comparable donation of gold to the Stuart cause at this time makes it seem plausible that the gold supplied by Philip V was lost at sea off the Scottish coast.

195 For the Alberoni-Giudice antagonism cf. Bourgeois, Emile La Diplomatie Secrète au XVIIIe siècle: Ses Debuts (Paris, 1909-10). II (Le Secret des Farnèse), 175-79.

196 For the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty, cf. Armstrong, 73-74; Michael I 277-80; McLachlan, 68-70. The main points of the Treaty were
1 - The removal of the offending articles of the 1713 treaty.
2 - British merchants were to pay the same rate of duty as Spanish subjects.
3 - Both Britain and Spain agreed to accord the other 'most favoured nation' treatment in commercial affairs.
4 - Duties payable by British subjects were lowered to the levels prevailing in 1700.

197 Bubb to Stanhope, 9 & 15 Dec. 1715, Madrid, SP. 94/84; Henry Arthur (the banker in Madrid handling the transaction) to Stanhope, 15 Dec. 1715, S.P. 94/84; Bubb to Stanhope, 9 Dec. 1715, Madrid, B.M. Eg. 2170 f312; Armstrong 73; Michael I, 278; McLachlan, 67.
The brothers
Henry and Francis Arthur (or Arther), two bankers based in Paris, were Jacobite supporters, cf. Mary to Dicconson, 21 Oct. 1715, HMC Stuart I, 441; Peter Redmond (a Lisbon merchant and active partisan of the Chevalier) to Mar, 26 Jan. & 27 June 1718, Ibid., v, 405 &VI, 586; Hayes, Irishman, 6; Kamen, War, 73.

198 AGS Est. leg. 4323. Undated memorial in Grimaldo's handwriting. The recipient is not stated but a reference to V(uestra) Mag(esta) d (Your Majesty) indicates that it was addressed to Philip himself.

199 AHN Est. leg. 3494, Grimaldo to Cellamare, 16 Dec. 1715, Madrid.

200 Cellamare's dispatch of 16 December (AHN Est. leg. 3494) bears no indication of the date of receipt, but on the reverse is written (in Grimaldo's handwriting) that the reply was sent on 30 Dec.

201 Grimaldo's draft reply of 30 Dec. 1715, AHN Est. leg. 3494.

202 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 Jan. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

203 Ibid., cited by Carpio, 66n.10.

204 For the Spanish-Papal dispute of Baravdon, Alfred. La Maison de Savoie et la Triple Alliance (Paris, 1896), 200-204.

205 Dicconson's Account - WSP 44 f.80: according to this Clement XI supplied James with a further 123,100 livres on 6 April 1716. Nordmann 55n.118 & Gregg 287n.255 state that the Pope gave 50,000 écus to the Jacobite cause in Dec. 1715; Dicconson's Account makes no mention of this. For Clement XI's previous contributions cf. p24n.26, above.

206 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 Jan. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

207 According to Cellamare's Account...(AGS Est. leg. 4323) the coining of these was completed on 15 Jan. 1716.

208 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 27 Jan. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323 (cited by Carpio, 69), Cellamare's Account (AGS Est. leg. 4323). This amount is described by Dicconson (WSP 44 f.80) as '7 piggs of silver which made 10893½ piastres when produced at the mint'. Queen Mary's receipt in AGS Est. leg. 4323, dated 2 March 1716, was enclosed in Cellamare's dispatch to Grimaldo of 9 March. No reason was given for the delay before the ambassador received the receipt.

209 Date of receipt of Cellamare's dispatch of 13 Jan. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

210 Ibid., Cellamare to Grimaldo, 17 Feb. 1716, Paris. This refers to a letter written. Grimaldo's letter of 3 Feb. as containing these instructions.

211 Ibid., Cellamare to Grimaldo, 17 & 24 Feb. 1716, Paris.

212 James to Bolingbroke, 2/13 Jan. 1716, Kinnaird - printed in Mahon I, app. p xl; Mar to Bolingbroke, 3/14 Jan. 1716, Kinnaird, H.M.C. Stuart I, 485.

213 Hamilton to James, 13 Feb. 1716, Paris, HMC Stuart I, 502.

214 Crawford to Pringle, 10 Feb. 1716, Paris, S.P. 78/160/212.

215 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 10 Feb. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

216 Ibid.

217 Ibid.

218 Jones, Main Stream, 116.

219 Ibid. Hamilton did not proceed on the second stage of his projected journey; after leaving Paris he retired to Blois - HMC Stuart II, 86. His failure to go to Spain probably owed more to the collapse of the '15 which obviated the purpose of his mission than to any delaying tactics on the part of Bolingbroke.

220 Grimaldo to Cellamare, 2 Dec. 1715, Madrid, AHN Est. leg. 3494.

221 Stanhope to Bubb, 6/17 Feb. 1716, London, SP 104/136 Carpio 83n.26: Monteleón to Grimaldo, 20 Feb. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 6834. According to Stanhope, Stair's reply to Orleans exhibited a total lack of interest: 'I don't

say the contrary, but now we are nevertheless very well assur'd that the Court of Spain is very far from doing anything in favour of the Pretender'.

222 Bubb to Stanhope, 13 Jan. 1716, Madrid, SP 94/85, & BM Eg. 2171 f5.

223 Carpio 83n.26: Monteleón to Grimaldo, 20 Feb. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 6834.

224 AGS Est. leg. 4323 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 March 1716. This refers to the receipt of these instructions sent by Grimaldo on 24 Feb.

225 Cellamare's Account..., Sept. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323. This mentions two bills of exchange, together worth 28,000 French livres, sent by Grimaldo on 2 & 30 March 1716, and later handed over to James's representative in late April, cf. p.83, below.

226 Stair to Bubb, 9 March 1716, Paris, B.M.Eg. 2171 f.159; Stair to Orleans, 9 March 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 6834 cited by Carpio 82n.25.

227 Another motive for effecting their rescue lay in the fact that many of James's supporters still in Scotland after the collapse of the rebellion were highly experienced soldiers (such as Tynemouth) whose loss the Chevalier could ill afford. Tynemouth himself escaped from Scotland to the Dutch Republic and thence to France where he was immediately dismissed from his army post under pressure from Stair - Jones, Main Stream, 114; Nordman, Crise, 53. Berwick then instructed him to settle in Spain where by arrangement with Philip V he was permitted to take his father's title of Duke of Liria and associated lands.

228 James III to Philip V, 29 Feb. 1716, HMC Stuart I, 514-15.

229 AGS Est. leg. 4323 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 March 1716, Paris; cited by Carpio 85n.29 where the date is incorrectly printed as 2 May.

230 James to Philip V, 29 Feb. 1716, HMC Stuart I, 514-15.

231 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 March 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

232 Cellamare, anxious that Bolingbroke might reveal his inside knowledge of Spain's complicity in the Jacobite plot to the British, sought and obtained an assurance of the Viscount's silence in a secret interview on the night of Friday 20 March Cellamare to Grimaldo, 23 March 1716, Paris; AGS Est. leg. 4323, cited by Carpio 94n.39 where the date of the dispatch is incorrectly stated to be 23 May.
Crawford gleefully told Bubb that Bolingbroke had achieved the dubious distinction of being in disgrace with both Stuart and Hanoverian courts at the same time - Crawford to Bubb, 27 March 1716, Paris, BM Eg. MS. 2170 f.190.

233 AGS Est. leg. 4323, Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 March 1716, Paris.

234 Jones Mainstream 123n.1: HMC Stuart III, 325-6; Carte MSS 257 ff.6-10.

235 According to Cellamare this approach was recommended by Orléans - Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 March 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

Owing to Zweibrucken's position as an Imperial fief James would have also required Vienna's approval if he was to reside there, and in view of Charles VI's relationship with Britain this was unlikely to have been forthcoming.

236 Haile, Mary, p. 476 and James, p. 219 states that James's meeting with Sparre took place at the home of Mlle. de Chausseraye, one of Orleans' mistresses.
Nordmann, Crise, 53nn. 104,105 gives Dillon's house as the location of the interview.

237 Murray 'Sweden and the Jacobites in 1716', HLQ VIII, 261n.10: Ormonde to James, 17 March 1716, HMC Stuart II, 20: Nordmann, Crise, 53n.105: Sparre to Mullen, 9 March 1716, Gallica Riksarkivet (i.e. Swedish State archives).

238 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 March 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323, cited by Carpio, 91 (where the date of writing is inaccurately given as 9 May); Saint-Simon, Duc de Mémoires, ed. A. Boislisle (Paris, 1879-1928)XXX, 41-43; Haile, Mary, 476 & James, 219 (where the location of James's interview with Cellamare is, like that between the Chevalier and Sparre, given as Mlle. de Chausseraye's house); Leclercq I, 265n.78: Lemontey I, 97; Nordmann 53n.106: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 March 1716, AAE CP Espagne 282f.52.

239 Nicholas-Joseph Foucault, 2nd Marquis de Magny (1677-1772) Fanny Oglethorpe called Magny a 'madman' - Gregg 289n.272: HMC Stuart VI, 118.

240 Nordmann 53n.106: AAE CP Esp. 282 f.52, Cellamare to Grimaldo, 9 March 1716.On Bolingbroke's instructions Lawless had also requested this amount in an interview with Alberoni at the Escorial - HMC Stuart II, 119-20.

241 Michael I, 203, Jones 124n.2; Nordmann, Crise, 54

242 Stair to Bubb, 27 Jan. 1716, Paris, B.M. Eg. 2171 f.79b.

243 Bubb to Stanhope, 9 March 1716, Madrid, S.P. 94/85; the memorial of 5 March is in B.M. Eg. 2171 ff. 228-29.

244 (BM Eg. 2171 ff. 234-35) Grimaldo to Bubb, 23 March 1716, San Lorenzo el Real (The Escorial). Two copies, one in Spanish and the other in French are in S.P. 94/85 ff. 91,93. There is a copy in AGS Est. leg. 6836, cited by Carpio 85n.28 but wrongly dated as 23 May.

245 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 30 March 1716. AGS Est. leg. 4323. This states that Philip's refusal was communicated to Cellamare by Grimaldo on 16 March. This reference is cited by Carpio 94n.40, but the date is misprinted as 30 May.

246 Carpio: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 April 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

247 Cf. n.224 above.

248 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 April 1716, Paris; AGS Est. leg 4323 Cellamare's Account..., Sept. 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

249 Cellamare's Account..., AGS Est. leg. 4323. Mary's receipt, dated 27 April 1716, enclosed in Cellamare to Grimaldo, 4 May 1716, AGS Est. leg. 4323. Dicconson refers to a Spanish donation of 2,000 pistoles on 1 July 1717 (WSP 44 f.80), this must refer to a later contribution, unless he wrote the wrong date.

250 Magny to James, 18 April, 1716 HMC Stuart II, 98 Magny to Robert (James), 25 April 1716, Paris, Ibid, 118. According to Magny one of the bills was worth 1,100 pistoles, the other 900.

251 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 13 April 1716, AGS Est. 4323, cited by Carpio 94 n.42 (where the legajo number is misprinted as 4353).

252 HMC Stuart II, 119-20 Lawless to Mar, 27 April 1716, Madrid.

253 Cellamare To Grimaldo, 16 March 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323 (Geraldino's memorial was enclosed with this); Lawless to Mar, 27 Apr. 1716, HMC Stuart II, 121.

Geraldino (Fitzgerald) was, in the words of Thomas Crawford, secretary at the British embassy in Paris, 'a famous partisan of the Pretender...a considerable Merchant att St. Malo' - Crawford to Joseph Addison, Secretary to the Southern Department 1717-18, 17 Nov. 1717, Paris, S.P. 78/161/153. James had met Geraldino at the latter's home in the Faubourg St. Servan, St. Malo, during the Chevalier's stay in the Breton port in Nov. 1715 - Seton 'Itinerary of James III', SHR XXI, 257;

Stair claimed that the Pretender owed Geraldino 150,000 livres (£12,500) as a result of the merchant's activities on behalf of the Jacobite cause in 1715 - Stair to Addison, 24 Nov. 1717, Paris, S.P. 78/161/158.

254 For details of this treaty and the negotiations preceding it, cf. McLachlan, 71-73.

255 Duras (Lawless) to Mar, 20 July 1716, HMC Stuart II, 296; Mar to Lawless, 4 Aug. 1716, Ibid, 326.

256 This news was not entirely bad to the Jacobite interest since Giudice's replacement as inquisitor general was an ardent supporter of the Chevalier, the Duke of Popoli (Rostain Canteloni Stuart, 8th Duke of Popoli, 1651-1723), who, it appears, claimed to be a descendant of the Stuart line - Duras (Lawless) to Mar, 13 July 1716; when subsequently receiving the Chevalier's compliments, the Duke was described by Lawless as being 'so touched that he had the tears in his eyes all the while he spoke' - ibid. II,349.

257 Duras (Lawless) to Mar, 20 July 1716, Madrid, HMC Stuart II, 296.

258 326 Mar to Lawless, 4 Aug. 1716, Avignon, Ibid, 326.

259 Lawless to Mar, 21 Sept. 1716, Madrid. Ibid., 456-457. The Jesuit told Lawless that whatever was done for James must be carried out 'in so private a manner that one hand does not know what the other does...'

260 McLachlan, 74; Béthencourt Massieu, Antonio Patiño en la política internactional de Felipe V (Valladolid, 1954), 23-24.

261 Armstrong, Elisabeth 78n.1: Neapolitan Archieves, Carte Farnesiane, 20 April 1716.

262 Cellamare's Account, AGS Est. leg. 4323; Cellamare to Grimaldo, 7 Sept. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

263 Cellamare's Account, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

264 Cellamare to Grimaldo, Sept. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

265 Ibid.; Cellamare's Account, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

266 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 7 Sept. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

267 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 8 March 1717, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4326.

268 Draft of Grimaldo's reply to Cellamare's letter of 7 Sept. AGS Est. leg. 4323; Cellamare to Grimaldo, 26 Oct. 1716, noting the arrival of these instructions dated 12 Oct. 1716.

269 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Nov. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

270 Lawless to Mar, 3 Nov. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 171.

271 Mar to Lawless, 21 Oct. 1716, Ibid, 117.

272 Mar to Lawless, 14 & 21 Oct. 1716, ibid., 81, 117; Lawless to Mar, 19 Oct. 1716, ibid, 99.

273 Nordmann 148n.28: Lawless to Mar, 3 Nov. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 171

274 Lawless to Mar, 3 Nov. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 171

275 Mary to Mar, 6 Nov. 1716, Saint-Germain, ibid, 182. James's mother described the money as a 'duck in his (the carrier's mouth from Ker (Philip V). It is but a little one; however it is better than non, and I hope Mar will follow.'

276 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 & 16 Nov. 1716, Paris. José de Bozas, Count of Castelblanco, was, according to Bubb, a native of Spanish America.
(Bubb to Addison, 9 Aug. 1717, Madrid, S.P. 94/87; BM Eg. ff.79482) who had married Melfort's daughter, Mary: after her death in 1713 he had obtained a papal dispensation to marry her sister Frances.

277 Queen Mary's receipt dated 27 Oct. 1716, encl. in Cellamare to Grimaldo, 2 Nov. 1716, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4323.

278 Mar to Lawless, 3 Dec. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 288.

279 According to Dicconson's account, WSP44/80 (which incidentally, omits Spain's final donation of 37,113 livres and therefore understates the total value of Philip V's contribution to Jacobite funds in 1715-16), the second largest amount to reach James at this time came from the Pope (314,379 livres - £26,200 - in all) followed closely by the 25,717½ louis d'or (308,610 livres - £25,700) from the Duke of Lorraine.

280 'Proposals by Mr. Dicconson (for James's financial affairs), April 1716', HMC Stuart IV, 31.

Footnotes (to pp.89-95)

1 The Triple Alliance and the negotiations preceding it are covered by Bliard I, 141-252; Leclercq I, 342-419; Williams, Stanhope, 200-29; Hatton, R.M., Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714-1721 (London, 1950), 115-43.

2 Twigge, R.W., 'Jacobite Papers at Avignon', S.H.R. X (1913), p. 71; Jones, Main Stream, 129.

3 Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 149-52.

4 For the Gyllenborg affair, cf. Chance, J.F. 'The Swedish Plot, 1716-17' E.H.R. 18 (1903), 81-106; and the more recent Murray, J.J. 'Sweden and the Jacobites in 1716', Huntington Library Quarterly (abbr. H.L.Q.) VIII (1945), 259-76; & the same author's 'The Görtz-Gyllenborg Arrests - A Problem in Diplomatic Immunity', Journal of Modern History (abbr. J.M.H.) XXVIII (1956), 325-37.
For Charles Caesar, cf. the biography by Eveline Cruickshanks in History of Parliament I, 513-17.

5 Murray, J.M.H. XXVIII, 326.

6 Approx. £5,000 sterling (Murray, H.L.Q. VIII, 270 n.54) plus 50,000 crowns (£12,000) in French money (ibid., 271 n.63).

7 Williams, Stanhope, 282

8 (Grimaldo ?) to Cellamare, 18 May 1717 Segovia, AGS Est. leg. 4774. This dispatch contained the minutes of the meeting of the Consejo de Estado (Council of State, the body which advised Philip V in the field of foreign affairs) for 11 May 1717 in which Spain's diplomatic representatives were requested in future to keep Madrid informed of any Jacobite intrigues.

9 Letters which passed between Gyllenborg and Baron Gortz..., extracts printed by the British government; copy in AGS Est. leg. 6837.

10 Murray, H.L.Q. VIII, 270 n.52.

11 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 15 Feb. 1717 N.S., AGS Est. leg. 6837; Michael I, 306 n.4: Political State XIII, 147-54; Murray, J.M.H. XXVIII, 327 n.7: Historical Register IV, 66-67.

12 Methuen to Bubb, 4 Apr. 1717 O.S., Whitehall, B.M. Eg. 2174 f.95.

13 Ibid.

14 For details of Stanhope's Peace Plan for the South, cf. Baudrillart II, 269-74; Wiesener II, 41 ff; Bourgeois II, 240-46; Williams, Stanhope, 273-81; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 159-62.

15 Williams, Stanhope, 275-277.

16 Ibid. 277-79; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 159.

17 Legrelle, A., La Diplomatie Française et la succession d'Espagne (6 vols., Braine-le-Comte, 1899) VI, 253; Harcourt Smith, S. Alberoni or the Spanish Conspiracy (London, 1943), 155.

18 Maldonado Macanaz, Joaquin 'El Cardenal Alberoni', Revista de España 83 (1881), 158; Baudrillart II, 244; Wiesener II, 86; Bourgeois II, 184; Escudero, J.A. Los Secretarios de Estado y del Despacho 1474-1724 (Madrid, 1969) I, 304. There is no adequate biography of Fernández Durán: brief details can be obtained from an entry in Diccionario de Historia de Espana (ed. G. Bleiberg, Madrid 1968-69) II, 54: he was created marqués de Tolosa in 1719 and dismissed from his government post on a charge of financial impropriety in Jan. 1721.

19 Armstrong, 80-81; Legrelle VI, 243-45; Bourgeois II, 189-94; Leclercq I, 454-55; Castagnoli, P II Cardinale Giulio Alberoni (Piacenza-Rome, 1929-31) I, 224-28; Harcourt Smith, 131-134. For Patiño (1666-1736) see Rodríguez Villa, A Patiño y Campillo (Madrid, 1882), 12-47; McLachlan 146-54; Bethencourt Massieu, A Patiño en la política internacional de Felipe V (Valladolid, 1954) is a study of Spanish policy in the reign of Philip V as exercised by Patiño.

20 For a good account of Spanish-Papal relations between 1709-1717 and Alberoni's attempts to improve these, cf. Baraudon, A La Maison de Savoie et la Triple Alliance (1713-1722) (Paris, 1895), 200-12.

21 Baraudon 204-05; Castagnoli I, 267 n.34.

22 Ibid.

23 Among the large selection of works dealing with Alberoni and his foreign policy, those most worthy of consideration are Maldonado Macanaz, Revista de España 83 (1881), 154-58, 163-65, 289-317, 433-60; Armstrong, 58-125; Bourgeois II, passim; Leclercq I, 449-70; Castagnoli I, 224-79; Williams, Stanhope, 204-11, 273-337; Harcourt Smith, 155-203; Taliani de Marchio, F. El Cardenal Alberoni (Madrid, 1953), 32-36.

24 Bubb to Methuen, 12 April 1717, Madrid, S.P. 94/86, copy in B.M. Eg. 2174 f.117; Williams, Stanhope, 279; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 160 n.3: Charles Whitworth (Ministry Plenipotentiary to the United Provinces) to the Earl of Sunderland (Secretary to the Northern Dept.), draft, private; 18 May 1717, B.M. Add. MSS.37364.

25 Methuen to Bubb, 4 Apr. 1717 O.S., Whitehall, B.M. Eg. 2174 f.95. Lorenzo Versuzo, Marchese di Beretti Landi (d.1725), a Mantuan, was Spanish ambassador in the Hague, 1716-21

26 The private instructions for Col William Stanhope, Bubb's successor as Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Madrid, dated 17 Aug. 1717 O.S., S.P. 104/137, referred to Beretti having these powers; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 160 n.3.

27 There is no trace of letters from James to the Spanish king and queen of this date in H.M.C. Stuart. However on March 1717 both Philip V and his wife wrote to James acknowledging having received letters from James dated 8 Jan. 1717 - H.M.C. Stuart IV, 108, 109.

28 Castagnoli I, 263-64.

29 James to Alberoni, 5 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 318.

30 John Paterson (a member of the Chevalier's entourage) to Mar, postscript dated 7 March and letter of 10 March, ibid., 104, 113; Haile, James, 235.

31 Castagnoli I 264n.26: Alberoni to the Duke of Parma, 22 Feb. 1717; Duke of Parma to Alberoni, 19 March 1717, Archivo di Stato (Naples), Farnesiane, fasc. 57/1.

32 Giuseppe (Alberoni) to James, 8 March 1717, HMC Stuart IV 108; Philip V to James, 8 March, ibid. 108; Elisabeth Farnese to James, 8 March, ibid. 109.

33 James to Mar, 19 May 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 253.

34 James to Queen Mary, Dillon and Mar, 27 March 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 140; Lawless to Ormonde, 26 May 1717, Salamanca, Ibid., 279.

35 Giuseppe (Alberoni?) to James III, 8 March 1717, Madrid, Ibid. 108; James to Aquaviva, 14 May 1717, ibid. 243 ; James to Alberoni, 5 June 1717, Rome, Ibid. 318. Francisco Aquaviva (or Acquaviva) (1665-1725) was Spain's representative in Rome from 1716-25. At this time, however, he possessed no official status as a diplomat owing to the breach between Madrid and Rome.

36 Duras (Lawless) to Mar, 17 & 31 Aug. 1716, HMC Stuart II, 349, 397. For Liria (1696-1738) cf. Berwick y de Alba, Duque de El Duque de Liria (Madrid, 1951), II-15.

37 Rostain Cantelmi Stuart, 8th Duke of Popoli (1653-1723) claimed to be descended from a branch of the Stuart family cf. Lawless to Mar, 13 July 1716, HMC Stuart II, 276. For Popoli's alleged devotion to the Chevalier and the Jacobite cause, cf. Lawless to Mar, 17 Aug. 1716, ibid. 349.

38 Ibid. 400, 434, 457 Francisco (known as Prince) Pio of Savoy, d. 1723.

39 Bourgeois, E. Lettres Intimes de J.M. Alberoni (Paris, 1892), 531, letter CCCCLXI.

40 For this cf. Baudrillart II, 267-70; Baraudon 184-90; Leclercq I, 463; Castagnoli I, 259-68, 281-87.

41 Lawless to Mar, 5 Oct. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 24.

42 Ibid.

43 Mar to Lawless, 14 Oct. 1716, HMC Stuart III, 81

44 James to Mar, 5 June 1717, Rome, HMC. Stuart IV, 318; James to Ormonde, 12 June 1717, ibid. 342.

45 James to Mar, 5 June 1717, ibid. 318.

46 Michael II 151n.5: Mar to James, 14 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 351; 152n.1: Ormonde to James, 20 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 370.

47 (Aquaviva) to (Grimaldo), 1 June 1717, AGS Est. leg. 4774; James to Mar, 28 May 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 280.

48 (Aquaviva) to (Grimaldo), 1 June 1717, AGS Est. leg. 4774.

49 Ibid.; same to same, 8 June 1717, AGS Est. leg. 4774.

50 James to Alberoni, 5 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 318

51 Aquaviva to Grimaldo, 8 June 1717, AGS Est. leg. 4774.

52 James to Alberoni, 5 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 318.

53 Armstrong, 84-85; Baudrillat, II, 274-75; Baraudon, 207; Leclercq I, 466-67; Castagnoli, I, 273; Williams, Stanhope, 281; Harcourt Smith, 156.

54 The date of receipt of San Felipe to Grimaldo, 29 May 1717, AGS Est. leg. 4776 carrying the news of Molines' arrest, was endorsed 8 June on the cover; however, a minute in Grimaldo's handwriting, dated 9 June, and his dispatches to the marqués de Villamayor, Spain's envoy in Turin and to San Felipe of 16 June (all in AGS Est. 4776) give its date of arrival as 7 June.

55 Armstrong, 84-86; Baraudon, 208; Bourgeois, II, 246; Leclercq I, 466-67; Castagnoli, I, 273-79, Wiesener, II, 92-95 deals with Alberoni's correspondence on this issue with Popoli (who advocated immediate retaliation against the Emperor) from B.M. Add. MSS. 20,425.

56 Castagnoli, I, 282 n.22.

57 Bourgeois, Lettres Intimes, 544, letter CCCCLXXII.

58 It seems unlikely that James's letter of 5 June could have reached Madrid by the 14th since it appears from AGS Est. leg. 4774 that Aquaviva's correspondence took approximately a month to arrive in the Spanish capital, although on occasions letters sent by express courier could reach Spain in a much shorter time.

59 James III to , 11 June 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 337.

60 Above letter endorsed '..given by Cardinal Gualterio to Cardinal Aquaviva on behalf of his Majesty (James)'.

61 Baraudon, 210

62 For the terms of the Concordat, cf. Baraudon 210-11; Castagnoli I, 281.

63 Baraudon, 211.

64 Clement XI to James, 11 July 1717, BM Add. MSS 20292 f.116; also in HMC Stuart IV, 445.

65 Jones, Main Stream, 137 n.79.

66 James to Mar, 19 May 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 253.

67 James to Castelblanco, 15 July 1717, BM Add. MSS. 20292 f.117.

68 Jones, Main stream, 137.

69 Mar to James, 16 July 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 456; Wiesener II, 156 n.1: Gualterio to Queen Mary, 13 July 1717, BM Add. MSS. 20295f.151.

70 James to Alberoni, 15 July 1717. BM Add. MSS. 20292 f.123; Wiesener, II, 156n.1.

71 Bourgeois, II, 257n.3.

72 Private instructions to Col. William Stanhope (Bubb's successor as British Ambassador in Spain); 17 Aug. 1717 O.S., S.P. 104/137; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 163 n.2. For Beretti Landi's role in this, cf. Wiesener II, 90 n.1.

73 Armstrong, 86; Wiesener, II, 92-95; Harcourt Smith, 157-59.

74 For the Spanish expedition to Sardinia in 1717, cf. de la Mina, marque's Expedicion de Cerdeña y Sicilia (1755) (MSS. 10524 in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid), ff. 17-25; Maldonado Macanaz, 'Alberoni', 289-92; Fernández Duro, C. Armada Española (Madrid, 1895-1903), VI, 135-38.

75 Baraudon, 212.

76 Bubb to Addison, 26 July 1717, S.P. 94/87; Castagnoli, I, 286.

77 Alberoni to James, 12 July 1717, BM Add. MSS 20312 f. 24.

78 Alberoni to James, 31 Aug. 1717, HMC Stuart IV, 556

79 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 16 Aug. 1717, AGS Est. leg. 6838.

80 Baudrillart, II, 285; Wiesener II, 111; Bourgeois II, 246; Williams, Stanhope, 283.

81 For the Hampton Court Conference and the outline settlement of 22 Nov. N.S., cf. Baudrillart II, 285-89; Bliard, 279-93; Williams, Stanhope, 286-88; Michael, I, 340-43.

82 There is a good account of the political role of this faction in Baudrillart, I, 671-72. Its principal adherents were the Duchesse du Maine, wife of one of Louis XIV's legitimised sons; Torcy, foreign minister at the time of Louis' request to Philip V to provide the Jacobite cause with money in 1715; Villeroy, governor to Louis XIV, and Huxelles, then Orléans' foreign minister.

Notes (to pp.113-16)

1 James III to Philip V, May 1718, H.M.C. Stuart VI, 499. Queen Mary died on 7 May 1718 N.S.

2 Cf. pp.81-4 of Chapter 1.

3. James to Alberoni, 7 Jan. 1718, B.M. Add. MSS. 20,292 f. 178; copy in H.M.C. Stuart V, 374.

4 Memorial for Cardinal Aquaviva to be forwarded to the King of Spain, 27 Jan. 1718; English translation in H.M.C. Stuart V, 616-20 from the original in French in B.M. Add. MSS. 20,292 f. 184 (a copy is in B.M. Add. MSS. 20295). James's covering letter to Aquaviva is in HMC Stuart V, 410. For an analysis of the memorandum see Wiesener II, 157-58; see Leclercq II, 517 n79; Jones, Mainstream, 138n81; Nordmann 147n24.

5 For Jacobite involvement with Sweden after the 'Swedish Plot' had been exposed in Feb. 1717, see Jagerskiold S.A. Sverige och Europa (1937), pp. 423-440 (for this I am indebted to a translation carried out for the late Alwyn Parker (1877-1951), former Librarian of the Foreign Office); Nordmann 102-21, 143-68, 176-86.

6 Nordmann 104-07, 111-114, 143-68, 180-86. For Robert Erskine 1677-1718) cf. Paul, Rev. Robert (ed.) 'Letters and Documents relating to Robert Erskine, Physician to Peter the Great, 1677-1720', Miscellany of the Scottish History Society II (Edinburgh, 1904), pp. 373-430; Bruce M.W. 'Jacobite Relations with Peter the Great', Slavonic Review XIV (1936), pp. 343-62. Sir John Erskine's role in the '15 was dealt with on p.67 of Chapter 1.

7 Hatton, Charles XII, 445.

8 Nordmann 104 n.41. HMC Stuart IV, 241 & V, 553-54.

9 Nordmann, 144.

10 Ibid. 144-145. Mitau is Mitwa in present-day Poland.

11 As far as Spain was concerned, the main points of this were that Philip V would have to recognise the Emperor's position in Italy and then evacuate Sardinia; in return Parma Piacenza and Tuscany were to be created into an independent (i.e. of Spain) duchy for Carlos, Elisabeth's first son:

For the negotiations leading up to this, see Williams, Stanhope, 283-89; Michael I, 341-45.

12 There seems no satisfactory Spanish account of these. There are some details in MSS. 10,524 of the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid (henceforth abbr. B.Nac. 10,524) (This is the Mss. of Marques de la Mina, Expedicion de Cerdena y Sicilia (Barcelona,

BIBLIOTECA MADRID NACIONAL

1755)), ff. 74-75, 80-85; Maldonado Macanaz, J'El Cardenal Alberoni', Revista de España, 83 (1881), p. 308 touches on these, as does Fernández Duro, op. cit., VI, 140.

13 References as note 4, above.

14 For the history of James's courtship and eventual marriage to Clementina (not solemnised until September 1719), cf. du Hamel be Breuil, Jean (Count) 'Le Mariage du Pretendant', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique IX (1895), pp. 53-96; Gardiner, A.S. & Beckett J. 'The Escape of Princess Maria Clementina Sobieska', The Stewarts (Journal of the Stewart Society, Edinburgh), XIV (2), (1973) pp 57-71, deals with Clementina's detention in Innsbruck by the Austrian authorities in response to pressure applied by Great Britain in Vienna (October 1718), and her subsequent escape in April 1719.

15 Cf. p.32 of Chapter 1.

16 Duras (Lawless) to Mar, 17 Aug. 1716, HMC Stuart II, 349; for Wauchope's involvement in the 1708 attempt, see Jones, Mainstream, p. 85.

17 Oman, op. cit., p. 5.

18 William Stanhope (the British Ambassador in Madrid) to James Craggs the Younger (Secretary for the Southern Department), 6 June 1718, Madrid, P.R.O. SP 94/88; HMC Stuart VI, 432, 490,500.
For Camocke (1666-1722), cf. Tunstall, Brian (ed.), the Byng Papers, III (London, Proceedings of the Navy Records Society, 1932), xxi-xxv, 61-63; Cranmer-Byng J.L. (ed.) Pattee Byng's Journal (The Journal kept by Pattee Byng (1699-1747), son of Admiral Sir George Byng, during the Sicilian campaign of 1718-20). (London, Proc. Navy Records Soc., 1950), xxvii.

19 Cellamare to Grimaldo, 3 Jan. 1718, Paris, AGS Est. leg. 4329; the Chevalier's recommendation was enclosed along with this dispatch. For Camocke's admission to the Spanish navy, cf Osmin Rollo to Stair (no date, marked received 11 Apr. 1719), SP 78/163 f. 303. For Rollo, one of Stair's informers, see Fritz, Historical Journal 16, p. 279.

20 Barry to Tullibardine, 18 Sept. 1717, Hendaye, H.M.C. Stuart V, 58-59; same to same, 18 Sept. 1717, San Sebastian, ibid., 59-61.
William Murray, Marquis of Tullibardine (d. 1746). As the eldest surviving son of the Duke of Atholl he was heir to the title, but debarred in Britain owing to the Act of Attainder passed after the '15. After his father's death he was occasionally referred to as the 'Duke of Atholl' in Jacobite circles.

21 Cf. SP 35/14 f. 34.

22 Tullibardine to Dillon, 8 Dec. 1717, HMC Stuart V, 263.

23 Ibid.

24 Barry to William Stanhope, 4 Dec. 1717, HMC Stuart VI, 199
Barry to Carpenter, no date, ibid., 200.
Two items of intelligence reaching the British government may have emanated from Barry. On 21 Oct. 1717 as Joseph Addison Secretary for the Southern Department from Apr. 1717 - March 1718) wrote to Stair (SP 104/29) informing him that Major-General Alexander Gordon, another veteran of the '15, was in hiding near Bordeaux. Since this intelligence had come from the Earl of Roxburgh, Secretary of State for Scotland, it may have been passed to him by Carpenter from information supplied by Barry.

There is also an unsigned and undated memorandum addressed to Carpenter stressing the reasons behind Spain's support for the Pretender (SP 35/14 f.22): from a reference in this to an alleged Jacobite proposal to coin money in Spain it is possible that the author was Barry. This memo is located among correspondence for 1718 but since it is addressed to 'Lord' Carpenter - a status which the commander did not attain until May 1719 - it may have been written after the latter date.

25 HMC Stuart VI, 199 & 200.
It appears that Barry fled from his place of sanctuary to Leyden in the Dutch Republic in March 1718 - ibid., 148.

26 James Murray's memorandum, 24 Nov./5 Dec. 1717, HMC Stuart V, 602-03; enclosed in Murray to Dillon, same date, ibid., 255.
For Murray (c1690-1770), the second son of David Murray, 5th Viscount Stormont, cf. the biography by Eveline Cruickshanks in History of Parliament (ed. Sedgwick), II,283. To distinguish him from other Jacobites with the same surname, he is frequently referred to as James Murray of Stormont.

27 H.M.C. Stuart V, 602-03.
The issue of an increase in the British naval presence in the Mediterranean had arisen following the arrest of the Earl of Peterborough, an eccentric member of the Upper House, by the Papal authorities on a charge of plotting to assassinate the Pretender (Sept. 1717). The Whig government threatended to send a squadron to bombard Civitavecchia unless the Earl was released. Austrian mediation brought about Peterborough's release in December 1717 and the threat was not carried out. It was, however, widely appreciated in London that an increased Royal Naval presence in the Mediterranean could equally be used against Spain if she continued her aggression against the Emperor as against the Papacy.

28 Cf. Gibbs 'Parliament and the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance', William III and Louis XIV (op. cit.) pp. 291-93, esp. 293n27 for when the details first became public.

29 HMC Stuart V, 602: 'This measure (The British government's peace plan for the South)...is contrived with no other intention but to support the Emperor in possession of the King of Spain's estate in Italy without demanding of him to quit his pretensions to Spain. If this could be prevented and proper measures taken to oblige the Duke of Hanover (George I) to use his interest with the Emperor to renounce, it is very obvious of what service it would be to the King of Spain's designs...' (!)

30 The figure of 83 'Jacobite' M.P.s in the 1715-22 Parliament is from History of Parliament (ed. Sedgwick), I, 109-13 Note XL. This is a list of those M.P.s and peers believed to be potential supporters of a Jacobite rising drawn up in 1721 (W.S.P. 65/10 & 65/16). The Tory total of 224 (against 341 Whigs) is calculated by W. Speck 'The General Election of 1715', E.H.R. XC (1975), 518n2; Sedgwick, I, intro. i, p. 19, puts the number of Tories as 217.

31 For a list of these, referred to as 'Hanoverian Tories' or 'Whimsicals', cf. Cruickshanks, Eveline G 'The Tories and the Succession to the Crown in the 1714 Parliament', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 46 (1973), pp. 184-85. Appendix A, where their number is put as 53. The whole question of the Parliamentary performance of James's supporters in relation to the rest of the opposition parties, is dealt with in Foord A S His Majesty's Opposition 1714-1830 (Oxford, 1964), pp. 70-3, 82-92.

32 References as note 4, above.
In a separate document circulated within the Jacobite movement, the Chevalier admitted to his supporters (but not to Philip V) that in view of the pro-British sympathies of the Orleans administration in France and what was described as the uncooperative attitude of the Papacy, Spain was the only power to whom James could turn for financial support - James's reflections on the memorandum, 27 Jan. 1718, HMC Stuart V, 620.

33 '...the true notion his Majesty (James) has of the justice and great prudence of his Catholic Majesty (Philip V) has moved him to recommend to..(his supporters in England) to do their best in Parliament...'.

The Pretender did, however, admit that the memorandum was partly inspired by Murray : James's reflections..HMC StuartV, 620; also cf. Mar to Dillon, 29 Jan. 1718 Ibid., 414' The King sends now to Queen Mary a paper concerning that to be sent to the King of Spain, partly on what James Murray suggests in his memorial..'.

34 By my own calculations (p.90*, Chapter 1) Spain supplied the Jacobites with the equivalent of approx. £45,500 sterling.

35 James to Gualterio, 26 Jan. 1718, HMC Stuart V, 408-09; for Caesar's advocacy of restoring Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, cf. ibid., 331-32.

36 Cf. p.37 of Chapter 1.

37 Nancré carried three proposals which, it was hoped, would persuade Philip to agree to the peace terms put forward by England and France.
I - a French offer to guarantee the succession of Parma and Tuscany to Carlos.

II - An offer of French diplomatic support for the return of Gibraltar to Spain (it appears that, initially at least, William Stanhope in Madrid was ignorant of George I's preparedness to restore the Rock).

III - a guarantee by Orléans to support Elisabeth in the Regency of Spain upon Philip V's death.

For Nancré's mission cf. Baudrillart II, 308-20; Recueil... Espagne II, 281 nn. 7 & 8; Bliard I, 396-403; Lecercq II, 500-13; on George I's offer of Gibraltar, see Conn 34n.13; Hills, Rock, 246.

38 Philip V to James III, 31 Mar. 1718, HMC Stuart V, 234. This announced the birth of a daughter, Maria Ana Victoria, to Elisabeth Farnese.
Aquaviva to Grimaldo 26 Apr. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 4778 acknowledged receiving a dispatch from the latter dated 31 Mar. enclosing a letter from Philip to James which Aquaviva forwarded to the Stuart Court at Urbino: this may well have been the communication in HMC Stuart V announcing this royal birth.

39 For Alberoni's policy towards Britain in the period after the invasion of Sardinia, see Maldonado Macanaz, 306-11; Baudrillart II, 304-05; Wiesener II,160 (a particularly good explanation); Castagnoli I, 311-27; Bethencourt Massieu, op. cit., 23-24.

40 For Anglo-Spanish trade in the period after 1713 and the way in which it benefited Britain more than Spain, cf. McLachlan, 4-22 (esp. 19-20), 46-77; Bethencourt Massieu, 11, 23-24.

41 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 7 Feb. 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6841. The expression is best translated as 'disorder and protests throughout this city'.

42 Ibid., postscript in cipher. Compton was not named; Monteleon described his interview with 'el orador de la Camara Vaja (i.e. Baja)' - literally the Speaker of the Lower Chamber. For Compton (? 1674-1743), Speaker from 1715-27, cf. the biography by R. Sedgwick in History of Parliament I, 568-69.

43 Sedgwick I, 568.

44 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 7 Feb. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6841.

45 Gibbs, William III and Louis XIV, 292-303.

46 Methuen to Bubb, 4 Apr. 1717 O.S., Whitehall, B.M. Eg. 2174 f.95-95b.

47 Monteleón to Alberoni, 8 Nov. 1717 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

48 Murray's memorandum, H.M.C. Stuart V, 603: 'I should have before now employed a proper person to talk with Marquis Monteleón upon it (the memo.) but..I have received a hint that he is corrupted by the Duke of Hanover, and therefore it is not safe to undertake a thing of that kind till one is sure of this fact, one way or another..'.

49 James to Gualterio, 26 Jan 1718, H.M.C. Stuart V, 409; Mar to Dillon, 10 March 1718, Urbino, ibid., VI, 126.

50 Monteleón to Alberoni, 31 Jan, 21 & 28 Feb. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

51 Monteleón to Alberoni, 7,21 March & 9 Apr. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6839; Eliard II, 320n8: Cellamare to Grimaldo, 14 May 1718, AAE Corr. Pol. Esp..282 f.169.

52 Ibid., II,394 nn2 & 3.

53 Mar to Dillon, 10 March 1718, Urbino, HMC Stuart VI, 126.

54 Abraham (John Menzies, the Chevalier's chief agent in London) to James III, 19 June 1719 O.S., London, W.S.P. 44/2.

55 Cf. p27-8nn 38-40 of Chapter 1, above.

56 H.M.C. Stuart V, 616; cited by Wiesener II, 59n2; Bourgeois II, 313; Jones I38n81.

57 Jägerskiöld 424 n 1; Nordmann 152 nn 45 & 46. The best account of Spain's involvement with Sweden (and Russia) in 1717-18 is in Nordmann, 150-53; 159-67; 178-86. This topic has not been adequately dealt with on the Spanish side; the article by Sanchez Diana, J.M. 'Relanciones de España con Suecia en el siglo xviii', Hispania XII (88), 1962, pp. 590-624, deals mainly with Spanish-Swedish relations later in the century.

58 Details of the mission may be obtained from correspondence in AGS Est. leg. 6188: from this one can gather that Gasteñeta arrived in the Republic on 4 March (Gas. to Alberoni, 10 March 1718, The Hague), and left after the middle of April (same to same, 15 April 1718, The Hague), and left after the middle of April (same to same, 15 April 1718, The Hague). There is a brief biographical sketch of Gastañeta in Fernández Duro, op. cit., VI, 147.

59 Details of the funds supplied for this purpose may be found in the account books of Nicolás de Hinojosa, tesorero general (treasurer general) from 1717-26. The reference for these at Simancas is Dirección General del Tesoro inventario No. 7, legs. 1-4; 'Cargo y data de las cuentas del tesorero D. Nicolás de Hinojosa' (henceforth abbr. as AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg..).

The method of entry in these consists of date, followed by recipient, then the amount and finally the reason for payment. In certain cases this category is referred to as gasto secreto (secret expense). There are further details of payments under this classification in a small account book kept by Hinojosa, entitled gastos secretos, AGS Guerra Moderna (henceforth abbr. G. Mod.) leg. 2356. Details of payments to Spanish agents in the Dutch Republic in 1718-19 are to be found in AGS DGT Inv. 7 legs. 1-3. The names of Sardi, Andrioli and Gozzani occur throughout these and AGS Est. lets. 6185, 6186 and 6188. From Beretti Landi's letters to Alberoni of 10 Feb. & 24 March 1718 (Est. leg. 6188), it appears that Andrioli was charged with the specific purpose of buying munitions; this fact was confirmed by Charles Whitworth, Ministry Plenipotentiary to the Dutch Republic, in March 1719, cf. SP 84/265 ff. 255-58, Sardi, Andrioli and Gozzani were under continuous surveillance by British agents in the Republic, cf. SP 84/264 f. 293; 84/265 ff. 23,255-58.

60 Hamilton E.J. War and Prices in Spain 1651-1800 (New York, 1969, 2nd edn.), 148n24: AHN Sala de Alcades de Casa y Corte, lib. 1304e. fo.266.

61 Nordmann 160 n.89.

62 Ibid.

63 Jägerskiöld 424 n.9.

64 Ibid., 424 n.5: Cellamare to Beretti Landi, 20 May 1718. A.A.E. Corr. Pol. Esp., 277; & Olivar (Beretti's secretary) to Preis, 19 May 1718, Swedish State Archive (Riksarkivet) Holland.

65 Jagerskiold 424n6: Alberoni to the Duke of Parma, 3 May 1718, A.A.E. Corr. Pol. Esp., 269.

66 William Stanhope to Lord Stanhope, 27 April 1718 N.S., Madrid, SP 94/88; a copy of this from the Stair papers is printed by Graham, J. Murray Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount and the First and Second Earls of Stair (2 vols., Edinburgh & London, 1875), II, 353-54, and cited from this by Leclercq I, 517n80; Jones 139n82; Nordmann 149n32.

67 Cf. note 4, above.

68 Marqués de Castel Rodrigo (Capitán-General of Barcelona) to Fernandez Durán, 5 May 1718, Barcelona AGS G. Mod. 1645, was written to protest at the order of 28 April on the grounds that Gerona was already over-garrisoned. A contributory reason for Liria's removal from Madrid was the recent involvement of his brother-in-law, the Duke of Veraguas, in an anti-Alberoni conspiracy (cf. Maldonado Macanaz, 295-96; Baudrillart II, 253-55). It should be noted, however, that Liria himself viewed the prospect of going to Gerona with some favour owing to its relative proximity to Bordeaux where his father, Berwick, had been posted, cf. Liria to Berwick, 25 Apr. 1718, Madrid, printed in Petrie, Sir C. (ed.) The Duke of Berwick and his Son (London, 1951), p. 80. Despite this, it seems that Liria did not actually arrive in Gerona until September 1718,

possibly owing to his reluctance to take up his duties as commander of the Limerick which was reputed to be the worst regiment in Spain - Liria to Alberoni, 20 July 1719, Gerona, Archivo de la Casa de Alba (Madrid), 'Cartas de Alba y Liria', caja 154.

69 Camocke to Dillon, 29 May 1718 HMC Stuart VI, 490.

70 A translation of a memorandum on these lines was sent to Aquaviva (Ibid., VI, 397-99), and the Chevalier ordered Camocke to present the project to the Spanish court (ibid., VI,500); for the Spanish rejection cf. James to Aquaviva, 11 Aug. 1718, ibid., VII,132. Despite this Camocke did write to Admiral Byng asking him to desert: Byng to Craggs, 12 May 1719 N.S., Naples, SP 43/57 f.12; Camocke's letter, dated 14 Oct. 1718 is enclosed (f.13).

71 Oman, op. cit., p. 6.

72 Ibid., Mac Swiney 'Irish Regiments' (1927), 172 n. 76: Order of battle of the Spanish army, enclosed in William Stanhope to Stanhope, 4 July 1718, SP 94/88.

73 This point was made by Walpole, cf. the references cited by Gibbs, William III and Louis XIV, p. 293 n.23.

74 Ibid., references for p. 293 nn. 22 & 24.
As soon as Monteleón heard of the Whig administration's intention to send a 'Royal Naval Squadron to the Mediterranean, he had suggested to Alberoni that he should be recalled to Madrid in protest if it sailed (Monteleón to Alberoni, 21 March 1718 N.S., London, AGS: Est. leg. 6839).

75 William Stanhope to Craggs, 6 June 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88.

76 Monteleón to Alberoni, 6 June 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839. He probably made this threat in response to a hint from Alberoni, but I have found no proof of this among MSS. in Spanish archives.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.
This threat was also repeated by Monteleón in an interview with Craggs, Stanhope and Sunderland, the Lord President of the Council, on 13/24 June - Monteleón to Alberoni, 27 June 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

79 The House rose on 21 March O.S., and the next session opened on 11 November O.S.: Sedgwick, I, 132 appendix iv.

80 Gibbs, William III and Louis XIV, 292-303.

81 William Stanhope to Craggs, 6 June 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88; Craggs to William Stanhope, 26 June 1718 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/138. Under the Commercial Treaty with England, the Spanish government was supposed to allow a period of three months grace after an outbreak of hostilities with Britain to allow the British merchant community to vacate Spain before taking any action against their interests.

82 Craggs to Col. Stanhope, 23 June 1718 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/138.

83 Col. Stanhope to Stanhope, 27 Apr. 1718, SP 94/88; Annals of Stair II, 353-54, etc.
Blaise Henri de Corte, 'Baron' Waleff (1652-1734).

84 Ibid.

85 Waleff to James, 20 Apr. 1718, Madrid, H.M.C. Stuart VI, 335. In this Waleff was requesting a recommendation from the Pretender in support of what he described as a family matter involving Alberoni. This may have been a reference, couched in typical Jacobite terminology, to some activity by Waleff carried out for the Chevalier, but there is no other evidence that James had entrusted Waleff with any mission on his behalf.

86 When passing through Spain Redmond hoped to 'put Cardinal Alberoni on his mettle, to do something to gain eternal fame for himself in the King's affairs' (Redmond to Mar, 26 Jan. 1718, Rome, HMC Stuart V, 407). For Redmond's journey to Spain, Cf. ibid., VI, 177, 184, 584-86 (for his arrival in Madrid); ibid., VII., 483 (James to Ormonde, 2 Nov. 1718, reference cited by Dickson, W.K. 'The Jacobite Attempt of 1719', Publications of the Scottish History Society XIX (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 8n2) for the Pretender's claim that Redmond was never appointed a Jacobite agent in Spain. This may have been technically true; however, James himself had sent a memorandum to Redmond on 23 March 1718 (HMC Stuart V, 177) instructing him, when in Madrid, to try to revive the project for purchasing arms in Spain for use by James's supporters in Britain, first mentioned by Richard Barry in Sept. 1717 - cf. nn 20-24, above.
There is a brief biograhy of Redmond (relying mainly on material in the Stuart Papers) by J. R. Redmond 'Military and Political Memoirs of the Redmond family during the Jacobite era in the service of France, Portugal, the Empire and Spain', Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society (2nd series), 27, pp. 73-77. Although Redmond had been appointed by the Chevalier to a position in Portugal, he remained in the Spanish capital until Feb. 1719. His arrival in Lisbon on the 16th of the month was noted by Henry Worsley, the British ambassador - Worsley to Craggs, 18 Feb. 1719, SP 89/27.

87 Baudrillart II, 330-31
On 8 April 1718 Fanny Oglethorpe, an active figure in Jacobite circles in Paris, wrote to Mar suggesting the employment of a mysterious person who was in secret correspondence with somebody in Spain who, it was believed, would be able to exercise influence upon Alberoni (HMC Stuart VI, 276). Since there appears to be no further mention of this matter in the Jacobite correspondence, this suggestion does not appear to have been acted upon. It is, however, possible that Waleff was the person Fanny Oglethorpe had in mind, owing to his association with the Vieille Cour and his visit to Madrid.

88 Baudrillart II, 331.

89 William Stanhope to Craggs, 6 June 1718, SP 94/88.

90 Ibid.

91 Craggs to Col. Stanhope, 23 June 1718 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/138.

92 The article by Sir C. Petrie, 'The Jacobite Activities in South and West England in the summer of 1715', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, 18 (1935), pp. 85-106 exaggerates the extent of anti-government unrest in 1715 (cf. Gregg, op. cit., p. 272 n108). For Jacobite unrest in London from 1715-19 cf. Rudé, G. Hanoverian London 1714-1808 (London, 1971), pp. 185-87, 207.

93 Political State XVI, 70-72; O'Callaghan J.C. History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France (Glasgow, 1870), pp.317-18.

94 Ibid., 317-18. No source is given, nor is the date mentioned, but the incident at Dublin (n.93 above) is stated to have taken place at about the same time, which places this incident in late June-early July.

95 For an account of Byng's voyage to the Mediterranean, cf. Williams, Stanhope, 302-04, 451-55 App. C; Pattee Byng's Journal, pp. 1-13.

96 Michael II, 163.

97 Anonymous report to Charles Delafaye (Under Secretary, Northern and Southern Depts.), Thursday evening. 1718 O.S., SP 35/12 f.85.

98 'From the Spanish Ambassador relating to the Constable in Turtle Fields', SP 100/56 f. 298; f.300 is a memorandum written by Monteleon in Spanish protesting at the police action.

99 For the Cocoa Tree as a well-known Jacobite rendezvous, cf. Foord 86 n.3: Timbs, John Club Life of London (London, 1866), I,81. The Cocoa Tree was located (from c.1698-1757) on part of the site now occupied by the Royal Automobile Club, numbers 88-90 Pall Mall - Survey of London XXX, The Parish of St. James Westminster (London, 1960), part I, 364,461. The fact that it was such a notorious Jacobite haunt, however, made some of James's supporters wary of using it to conduct the Chevalier's business on account of the likelihood of British government spies having the club under surveillance - Foord, 86.

100 This conclusion has been reached from negative evidence arising from the absence of any official protest to Spain about de la Rosa's conduct which would certainly have been made if the police raid been successful; and also from the fact that (see n.101 below) Spain was not collaborating with the English Jacobites to the extent of supplying them with money.

101 This conclusion emerges from a study of the material in AGS DGT Inv. 7 lets. 1,2 & 3 (Hinojosa's account books - leg. 4 deals with post-1720) There is only one possible exception. On 14 August 1718 Gozzani, the Amsterdam banker who also served as one of Alberoni's agents, was paid 179,760 reales (approx. £5,500 sterling). According to Hinojosa's account (AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1) this was for 280 'piezas de Artria. de Fierro' (literally 'pieces of iron artillery') which had to be brought from London (according to Hinojosa this was the first payment on account of a total of 839,520 reales - £25,000 - for all the 280 items). In view of the worsening relations between Spain and Britain which would have made the purchase of such weaponry in London very hazardous, this may have been a 'cover' for funds destined for the English Jacobites since the sum in question could have eventually been payable in London, although in view of Spain's general attitude towards the Pretender and his cause in mid-1718 I am inclined to think that this money was intended for Spanish armaments. Hinojosa's supplementary account book dealing with secret payments (AGS G. Mod. 2356) contains no entries for the first ten months of 1718 directed to any Spanish representative in the British Isles.

102 Craggs to William Stanhope, 23 June 1718 O.S., SP 104/138.

103 For Byng's instructions cf. Williams, Stanhope, 303 n.3.

104 Ibid., 303-04; 451-52 (App. C): Byng to William Stanhope, 20 June 1718 NS.

105 Monteleón to Alberoni, 27 June 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

106 Monteleón to Alberoni, 20 June 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

107 Williams, Stanhope, 304 n1.

108 For Stanhope's mission to Paris, cf. Wiesener II, 180-202; Williams, Stanhope, 298-301.

109 Craggs to Shallet, British consul in Barcelona, & to Martin Westcombe, his counterpart in Cadiz, 26 June 1718 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/138.

110 The second rank of commanders of this Spanish fleet included Guevara, Mari and Carnocke (qq.v) and the expedition was accompanied by Patiño.

111 For good measure Stanhope repeated this to Monteleon in the interview of 13/24 June - Monteleón to Alberoni, 27 June 1718 N.S., AGS Est. leg. 1639.

112 Alberoni to Grimaldo, 5 July 1718, San Lorenzo (the Escorial), B. Nac. Ms. 2171 f. 68.

113 Williams, Stanhope, 452 App. C: William Stanhope to Byng, 16 July, 1718 N.S., Madrid.

114 Alberoni wrote to Grimaldo informing him that Col. Stanhope had been told that Philip wanted to 'make reflection'. ('hacer reflexion') on the contents of Byng's instructions - Alberoni to Grimaldo, 10 July 1718, San Lorenzo, B.Nac. 2171 f. 64.

115 Printed in Williams, Stanhope, 452 App. C.

116 Alberoni to Grimaldo, 13 July 1718, San Lorenzo, B.Nac. 2171 f.101.

117 This, carried out as a result of British mediation, halted hostilities between the Turks and the Imperial army under Prince Eugene, and also between the Ottomans and the Venetians.

118 Alberoni to Grimaldo, 14 July 1718, San Lorenzo, B. Nac, 2171 f. 100.

119 Monteleón to Alberoni, 11 July 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

120 William Stanhope to Stanhope, 1 August 1718, SP 94/88; also cf. Col. Stanhope to Craggs, 1 Aug. & 13 Nov. 1718, SP 94/88.

121 Monteleon to Alberoni. 11 July 1718 N.S., London, AGS Est. leg. 6839.

122 Ibid.

123 Williams, Stanhope, 306-08.

124 As Williams Stanhope, pp. 305 has pointed out Stanhope's action in going to Spain after issuing this order shows more about his personal courage than political wisdom: had the Spaniards been aware that he was issuing orders to Byng, there was a real risk that the British minister might have been held as a hostage. It could also be argued, however, that Stanhope's decision to proceed to Madrid following the issue of this order illustrated a degree of contempt for Spain.

125 Jägerskiold 424 n.9: Alberoni to Cellamare, 18 July 1718, A.A.E. Corr. Poll. Esp., 278. In August Cellamare and Schleinitz, the Russian minister in Paris, drew up a draft of a prospective alliance between their respective rulers - Nordmann 163 n.107.

126 For the offer to Kurakin cf. Castagnoli I, 338 n.11: Kurakin's letter to the Tsar (dated 2 Aug. 1718) informing him of the Spanish proposal, Archivio Collegio Alberoni (Piacenza), Epist. I, I, pp. 4-6. Nordmann 163 n. 108 refers to Kurakin submitting this project to Peter in a letter of 8 August, also in the archives of the Collegio Alberoni. For the approach to Preis, cf. Jägerskiold, 434.

127 Williams, 306-07.
Stanhope was lodged in the castle of Fresnada (now demolished) close to the Escorial.

128 For Stanhope's visit to Spain cf. his dispatches to Craggs of 15,22 & 26 Aug. (SP 94/88), William Stanhope's letter to Craggs, 26 Aug..SP 94/88, and Stanhope's letter to Stair, 2 Sept. 1718, Bayonne, SP 78/162 f.112-13: also Williams, Stanhope, 306-08.

129 This was a reference to the period of three months' grace allowed to the Spaniards under the terms of the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance to join the alliance; after the expiry of this time limit attempts would be made by the signatories to compel Spain to accept the alliance. The period was set to run from 2 Aug. (the date on which Pentenrriedter, the Imperial emissary, signed the treaty in London). In point of fact the Dutch Republic, the fourth party in Stanhope's original Peace Plan, never signed (see Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 198-205): however rather than allowing this to prolong the three month period indefinitely, the British government held that the time limit allowed to Philip should expire at the beginning of November 1718.

130 Alberoni asked for details of this to be given in writing - Alberoni to Stanhope, 19 Aug. 1718, Escorial, SP 94/88; and the British Secretary immediately complied - Stanhope to Alberoni, 19 Aug. 1718, Fresnada, SP 94/88.

131 Stanhope to Craggs, 22 Aug. 1718, SP 94/88. The Jacobite agent Redmond reported that Stanhope had ironically described the capture as Spain's most praiseworthy action since the discovery of the New World (H.M.C. Stuart VII, 190, cited by Williams, Stanhope, 307 n.1). Alberoni's reaction was to wonder whether this news had given his two guests indigestion - Alberoni to Grimaldo, 18 July 1718 San Lorenzo, B.Nac, 2171 f.32.
The arrival of this news did not in itself cause Alberoni to reject all suggestion of a compromise with Britain. Stanhope put the information concerning the three months' armistice to the Cardinal on the following day (19 Aug. - cf. n.130, above); nevertheless, the news of the Spanish success in Sicily was decisive in tilting the scales against a peaceful solution of the problem caused by Spain's attitude to the Quadruple Alliance irrespective of Alberoni's own viewpoint concerning an agreement with Britain.

132 Stanhope to Craggs, 26 Aug. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88.
For the Spanish side of the final collapse of Stanhope's mission, cf. Alberoni to Beretti Landi, 29 Aug. 1718, Annals of Stair, II, 360-61 (According to a note in Alwyn Parker's papers, this came into Stair's possession probably as a result of its being intercepted by the French intelligence service who passed it to the British ambassador in Paris).

133 Williams, Stanhope, 307.

134 British suspicions of France's latent partiality towards the Stuart cause had not, however, entirely been removed as will be seen in the next Chapter: in March 1719 the Whig government turned down Orleans' offer of French naval assistance

against the threatened invasion of the British Isles launched by Spain, following warnings from Stair that the French sailors who had been sent to Portsmouth might act as a fifth column in support of the Pretender and his Spanish allies - Wiesener III 50-51.

135 Cf n. 47 above.

136 The expression was used by Co. Stanhope in his letter to Craggs, 6 June 1718, SP 94/88.

137 Paterson to Mar, 19 July 1718, Leyden, HMC Stuart VII, 62. Van Ganzinot was not actually named in this letter for reasons of security; however, according to Bittner and Gross, Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder, II, (Zurich, 1950) he was the Bavarian agent in the Dutch Republic from 1716-41.

138 H.M.C. Stuart VII, 62.

139 Castagnoli I, 338-39, n.14: Cellamare to Alberoni, 15 Aug. 1718, letter in cipher, A.A.E. Corr. Pol. Espagne, 279.

140 Ibid.

141 Cf. p. 31 of Chapter 1.

142 Castagnoli I, 339n.15: note appended to Alberoni's letter to Cellamare of 29 Aug. 1718, A.A.E. Corr. Pol. Esp. 278. This said (in cipher): 'Dira al Duque de Ormonde que el Rey de España, no solamente no le permite de vivir en ninguna parte de Viscaya, pero que si sera tan atrevido de venir a España, le hara poner en la carzel' - 'Tell the Duke of Ormonde that the King of Spain not only forbids him to (come to) live in any part of Vizcaya, but if he should be so bold as to come to Spain, he will be thrown into prison'. The fact that this was in cipher and was later countermanded (see below, n.152) indicates that it was a 'real' message as opposed to a counterfeit one intended to mislead the British and French governments.

143 For a Spanish view of the battle, cf. B.Nac. Ms., 10,524 ('Memorias ..de la Marqués de la Mina) ff. 170-80; Fernández Duro (whose account is based on this) VI. 161-62 gives lists of the Spanish losses.

144 William Stanhope to Craggs, 12 Sept. 1718, SP 94/88; Leclercq II, 231.

145 William Stanhope to Craggs, 12 Sept. 1718, SP 94/88.

146 Ibid.

147 Alberoni to Grimaldo, no date, B.Nac. 2171 f. 19 refers to the arrival of news from Aquaviva in Rome that only a few Spanish ships had been lost and that some English vessels had put into Naples very badly mauled.

148 Alberoni to Grimaldo, 12 Sept. 1718, B.Nac. 2171 f.18 stated that the news of Passaro had just arrived;
Alberoni to Friar Salvador Ascanio (Spain's agent in Florence), 12 Sept. 1718;
Col. Stanhope to Craggs, 12 Sept. 1718, SP 94/88.

149 Consul Russell (in Cadiz) to Col. Stanhope, 19 Sept. 1718, Cadiz, encl. in Col. Stanhope to Earl Stanhope, 26 Sept. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88. For Guevara's mission to Malta and his subsequent return to Spain, cf. Maldonado Macanaz 'Alberoni', 315; Fernández Duro VI, 144.

150 Cf. n.81, above.

151 The British ambassador hoped that not many Britons fell into this category - Col. Stanhope to Craggs, 28 Aug. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88: '..it is very possible the Spaniards may not think it worth breaking the Treaties for the seizing what little is left'; this sentiment was echoed in a letter to Stanhope written by Dassault (a French official in Bayonne ?), dated 6 Sept.; SP 78/162 ff. 142-44.

152 Castagnoli I, 339 n.15: Alberoni to Cellamare, 12 Sept. 1718, A.A.E. Corr. Pol., Esp., 279.

153 A copy of this is in AGS Est. leg. 6842.

154 Copy also in AGS Est. leg. 6842. For the Spanish Intendants, cf. Kamen, Henry 'El estableciento de los intendentes en la administracion espanola', Hispania XXIV (1964), pp. 368-95 (App. II, pp. 385-88, gives a provisional list of the Intendants during the reign of Philip V).

155 Hollway to Col. Stanhope, 13 Sept. 1718, encl. in Col. Stanhope to Earl Stanhope, 19 Sept. 1718, SP 94/88.

156 Consul Russel to Col. Stanhope, 19 Sept. 1718, Cadiz, Hollway to same, 20 Sept. 1718, Malaga, John Sinker to same, 20 Sept. 1718, Malaga; all three enclosed with Col. Stanhope to Stanhope, 26 Sept. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88.

157 Cf. n.126 above.

158 Castagnoli I, 338, n.12: Peter I to Kurakin, 5 Sept. 1718, Arch. Coll. Alb., Epist., I, pp. 8-11.

159 Peter to Kurakin, 13 August 1718 O.S., ibid., I, p. 3 no. 5; also his letters to Kurakin of 27 Nov. 1718 O.S., (p.5 no. 7), and 11 Dec. O.S. (p. 8 no. 8). This aspect of Russia's involvement with Spain is covered by Fernández Guillón, Julio 'Los guardias marinas rusos que envió a estudiar a Cádiz el zar Pedro el Grande en 1719', Revista General de Marina (Madrid), 182 (1972), pp. 511-518.

160 Peter to Kurakin, 27 Sept. 1718, St. Petersburg, printed in the Kurakin Papers (published in Russian in 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1890-92), I, p. 4/5, No. 6. (For extracts from these papers I am indebted to a translation carried out by G.C. Wheeler for the late Alwyn Parker in 1932.)

BIBLIOTECA MADRID NACIONAL

161 Jägerskiöld 432 n.8; for Gortz' expressing this view, Nordmann 153n52.

162 Kurakin to Peter I, 3/14 Oct. 1718, The Hague, Kurakin Papers, I, 329-40.

163 Col. Stanhope to Stanhope, 5 Oct. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88.

164 Ibid.

165 Nn. 153, 154 above.

166 Amendment to the above decrees, 22 Sept. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6842. John Sinker to Col. Stanhope, 20 Sept. 1718 (SP 94/88) noted that even 'Romans' (presumably Irish Catholics) had not been exempted from the initial seizure of British subjects and property.

167 Amendment of 22 Sept. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6842.

168 Copies of this, in Spanish and English, enclosed in Col. Stanhope to Craggs, 17 Oct. 1718 N.S., Madrid, SP 94/88.

169 Copy (enclosed along with the above) of Philip V's decree to the 'Correxidore' (i.e. Corregidor - Chief Magistrate) of Vizcaya.

170 Fernández Duro, VI, 162 gives a total of 16 ships in addition to Guevara's San Juan which escaped from Passaro. The precise number which returned to Cadiz is not clear but it seems certain that several of these made their way back. As early as August 1718 Ascanio, Spain's agent in Florence, was spreading the story that another Spanish fleet would soon put to sea comprising survivors of Passaro and ships seized from British merchants (Ascanio to Alberoni, 26 Aug. 1718, Florence, AGS Est. leg. 7756). Stair in Paris feared that the Spanish naval authorities would waste little time in assembling another squadron from the ships which had escaped capture and destruction by Byng - Stair to Vice-Admiral Cornwall, 1 Oct. 1718, Paris, SP 78/162 f. 198.

171 Juan Francisco Nicolás Bette, Marqués de Lede (1667-?1725). Maldonado Macanaz, 'Alberoni', p. 310 states that he was born in Flanders.

172 For the Spanish side of the war in Sicily, cf. B.Nac. Ms. 10525 (vol. II of the Marqués de la Mina's memoirs). ff. 1-8,33-35.

173 Cf. infra., chapter 4, pp 171-77.

174 Anon. information (in Spanish), dated 22 Aug. 1718, SP 94/88. A sterling equivalent of this amount would be approx. £350,000. Cellamare was reported by Stair as claiming that the fleet had carried the equivalent of 300 'milliones de France' (Stair to Craggs, 30 Aug. 1718, SP 78/162 f.87). This must have been bravado on Cellamare's part and should not be taken too seriously: even if the denomination of money he referred to had been the livre and not the larger écu (equivalent to the peso with an exchange rate of approx. four to the pound sterling) this would have given a value of some £20 million to the 1718 South American treasure fleet.

175 In the absence of detailed research it is impossible to place a precise figure on the amount from this treasure fleet which went to the Spanish government. Col. Stanhope reported to Earl Stanhope on 5 Sept. (SP 94/88) that Alberoni had ordered that all the silver brought from South America should be handed over to the Government, the owners being compensated with bills of exchange. It may be worth noting that the account books of Hinojosa, the treasurer general to Philip V, from Oct. 1718 onwards (AGS DGT Inv. 7 legs. 1&3) show large transfers of money from the Spanish government to its agents and representatives in Europe, mostly in the Dutch Republic.

176 Stanhope's instructions to Byng (Copy), 19 Sept. 1718, Paris, SP 78/162 f.171-73; Duplicate sent 24 Sept., Ibid., f.175.

177 For the role of the dissident Whig opposition in securing the dropping of charges against Oxford, cf. Plumb, J.H. Sir Robert Walpole (2nd. edn., London, 1972), I, 254-56.

178 Oxford's activities after the death of Queen Anne in 1714 have, as stated in note 36 of Chapter 1, only been briefly dealt with in the most recent biographies of the Earl. There is a good account of the Atterbury-Oxford division in Foord, pp. 83-84; this is brought up to date in the most recent biography of the Bishop - Bennett, G.V. The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688 - 1730: the Career of Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester (Oxford, 1975).

179 Hugh Thomas, a Jacobite agent in London, to Mar. 1/22 Sept. 1718, London, HMC Stuart VII, 316.

180 Oxford to James III. 8/19 Oct. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 409.

181 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, Paris, ibid., 538.

182 There are two principal sources for this aspect of Oxford's activity on behalf of the Chevalier.
I - The intelligence reports relating to Oxford's actions presented by Craggs, 8 March 1719, Paris, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 37-40, printed in Dickson '1719, op. cit., pp. 224-27, Appendix letter 21 (Extracts from this are in SP 78/163 ff. 159-60), a letter from Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163 ff. 171-72 - this is NOT the letter from Stair to Craggs of this date printed in Dickson, 1719, pp. 229-32; also Craggs to Stair, 16 March 1719 O.S., SP 104/30. Although this correspondence has been extensively utilised by numerous writers, principally Michael II, 189-96, and Jones, Mainstream, 139-43, little emphasis has been placed on Oxford's involvement.

II - Correspondence from the Jacobite side, principally that printed in vol. VII of HMC Stuart. The chief Jacobite account of the Earl's activity is to be found in Anne Oglethorpe's letter to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718 (ibid., 538-40), the first substantial information the Stuart court received of what was being concocted by Oxford and his fellow conspirators.

In addition there is a reference to Oxford's strange conduct in latter months of 1718 contained in an intercepted Jacobite letter written on 29 Dec. 1718 (the date was given as 1719, but from various references contained therein, it was clearly written in 1718) - B.M. Stowe MSS. 232 f.169. The only possible reference to this in Spanish MSS. is contained in B.Nac. 11145 'Carta de un Cardenal a el Marqués Graneli escrita desde Roma a 19 de Julio de 1721 sobre asuntos del Cardenel Alveroni' (Letter from a Cardinal to the Marquis Graneli written from Rome 19 July 1721 about affairs relating to Cardinal Alberoni). This is a defence of Alberoni possibly written by the Cardinal himself: f.31b estates that, at the time the invasion of Britain was undertaken by Spain, Alberoni understood that a sizeable body of James III's supporters in the neighbourhood of London were ready to stage a rebellion as soon as the Spaniards landed. This may be nothing more than an attempt by Alberoni (or a close associate) to shift the responsibility for the invasion on to a non-Spanish party; however, in view of the way that Oxford's conspiracy progressed there may be some truth in this assertion.

183 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 538-39.

184 I deduce this from the fact that on 7 Dec. 1718 Hinojosa was instructed to send Monteleón a bill of exchange worth 180,768 reales (approx. £5,500) as a gasto secreto. AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 3. Monteleón had by this time left London owing to the breaking off of diplomatic relations between England and Spain and was in the Dutch Republic, and, moreover, Hinojosa was aware of this: on 23 Nov. he had been ordered to send a letter of exchange for £71½ sterling to pay to Monteleón in Amsterdam (AGS G. Mod. 2356) (This can be identified as payment for a clock costing £68 bought in London for Philip V and his wife plus £3-10 shillings to send it to Spain - monteleón to Grimaldo, 24 Oct. 1718, AGS Est. leg. 6841). From this it seems probable that the sum made payable to Monteleón in London on 7 December was not intended for him personally but rather for another party, perhaps Oxford.

185 This was the information given by Dubois in his letter to Craggs of 8 March 1719 (references as n.182 above), and the statement in B.Nac.11145 f.31b tends to bear this out; however it could have referred to the projected invasion involving Ormonde, and Oxford may have required Spanish money but not troops.

186 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. & 19 Dec. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 538 & 647.

187 John Menzies to Capt. John Ogilvie (Mar's correspondent in Calais), 24 Oct. 1718 O.S., HMC Stuart VII, 520; James Hamilton to Mar, 8/19 Nov. 1718, London, Ibid., VII, 551.

188 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719; Dickson, 1719, p. 224-27, App. letter 21.

189 Prior to Lord Harley (Edward Harley, Oxford's eldest son and successor as second Earl), 26 Aug/6 Sept. 1718, Westminster. Hist. MSS. Commission Calendar of MSS. of the Marquis of Bath preserved at Longleat (abbr. HMC Bath) III,455.

190 Gaultier to Prior, 20 Oct. 1718 N.S., Paris, Ibid., III, 461-62.

191 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719: Dickson 1719, App. letter 21. Prior suffered a gastric upset in August 1718 - Prior to Lord Harley, 26 Aug. O.S. & 30 Aug. O.S., HMC Bath III, 455,457; Atterbury to Prior, 27 Aug. 1718 O.S., Bromley, Ibid., III,456.

192 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719. Prior's biographer, C.K.Eves Matthew Prior Poet and Diplomatist (New York, 1939), p. 402 states that he was always lukewarm towards Jacobitism.

193 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 539. Charles Butler, 2nd Earl of Arran (1693-1758); for his position in the hierarchy of the English Jacobite movement, cf. Foord, 83.

194 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 540. Charles Boyle, Earl of Orrery (1676-1731).

195 Castelblanco to David Nairne, the Pretender's Secretary, 28 Jan. 1719, Avignon, WSP 41/75. William, Lord North and Grey (1678-1734).

196 For the effect of this exclusion, cf. Mar to Dillon, 29 Nov. 1718, Rome, HMC Stuart VII, 579-80 - there were only references to Ormonde's visit to Spain and no mention of the plot involving Oxford; the exhortation that Dillon should be kept in the dark was made by Anne Oglethorpe in her letter to Mar of 14 Nov. Ibid., VII, 540.

197 Atterbury's latest biographer, Bennet, op. cit., does not touch on the question of whether the Bishop may have been involved in any intrigue with Oxford in 1718.

198 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719.

199 Mar to Anne Oglethorpe, 13 Dec 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 624-25.

200 For the proceedings in Parliament in November 1718, the culmination of a sustained propaganda exercise by the Whig administration to win over Parliamentary and other influential opinions to the view that war with Spain was necessary, cf. Gibbs, William III and Louis XIV, 298-303. War was not actually declared on Spain until 17/28 Dec.

201 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 538-39; Eon identified - James Hamilton to Mar, 8/19 Nov. 1718, Ibid., VII, 550-51.

202 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, ibid., VII, 538-39; for the approximate dating of this meeting, not mentioned in the above, cf. n.206 below.

203 Anne Oglethorpe's letter is vague regarding what took place, and I have found no letter from Eon giving his side of the story among the archives at Simancas.

204 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 539.

205 Ibid.
The conspirators probably envisaged that Eon would have informed the Spanish government and received its response by letter.

206 Samuel Buckley (Writer of the Gazette) to George Tilson, Under Secretary Northern and Southern Departments, 'Wednesday night', SP 35/12 f.186. Some difficulty arose in the wording of the warrant since it was apparently not certain whether Eon enjoyed diplomatic status - cf. Tilson to (?Buckley), 24 Sept. 1718 O.S., SP 35/12 f.187. The attempt to arrest Eon enables one to date his meeting with Oxford (n.202 above); according to Anne Oglethorpe this took place just before the British authorities moved against Eon.

207 Craggs to Eon, 25 Sept. 1718 O.S., Hampton Court, SP 104/255.

208 SP 35/12 ff. 186-87.

209 Since the beginning of Sept. 1718 the British government had received three anonymous warnings that Spain was plotting some form of collaboration with the Pretender - SP 35/12 ff. 34,152,172.

210 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart 538; Hamilton to Mar, 8/19 Nov. 1718, ibid., VII, 550-51.

211 Mme. d'Eon to (?) September 1718, SP 78/162 f. 193; Monteleón to Craggs, 28 Sept. 1718 O.S., London, SP 100/56 f. 304.

212 Hamilton to Mar, 8/19 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 551 'Deonn ...assurred me his interest was good with Alberoni, and that he would use his utmost endeavours for the King's (James's) service...'.

213 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII,539.

Eugene Marie de Béthisy, Marquis de Mezières (1656-1721) married Anne's sister Eleanor (1684-1775) in 1707.

214 For these cf. p. 159* & nn. 227,228 below.

215 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 16 Oct. 1718 O.S., Calais, HMC Stuart VII,396.

216 Ibid.
There was good reasoning behind the conspirators' decision not to inform Ogilvie of the plot since he had been Oxford's leading Jacobite informer between 1705-08 - Hamilton, 70; McInnes, 82-83.

217 Ogilvie to Mar, 29 Oct. 1718 M.S., Calais, HMC Stuart VII, 465.

218 Menzies to Ogilvie, 24 Oct. 1718 O.S., Ibid., VII, 520; Prior to Lord Harley, 4/15 Oct. 1718, Westminster noted that Caesar had just arrived in London.
(HMC Bath III, 460)

219 Prior to Lord Harley, 9/20 Oct. 1718, ibid. III, 461.

220 Menzies to Mar, HMC Stuart VII, 520.

221 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 19 Dec. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 647.

222 Mar to Anne Oglethorpe, 13 Dec. 1718, Rome, Ibid. VII, 624-25; Anne was requested to be more specific about the English conspiracy in order that 'he (James) may understand it the better, and make his actions & C. square with it'.

223 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, ibid. VII. 539. This rendezvous was totally unconnected with Ormonde's journey to Spain.

224 Dickson 1719, intro. p. vii n. 3: Dillon to Mar 15 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII,
Alberoni's instruction that Ormonde should travel to Spain incognito was heeded; according to information later supplied by Dubois, the Duke travelled in the disguise of a valet - Dubois to Stanhope, 15 March 1719, Paris, B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 f. 257.

225 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 541.

226 Ibid.

227 Monteleón to Craggs, ?, 15 Oct. 1718 N.S., London, SP 100/56 f. 165.

228 Monteleón to Craggs, 18 Oct. 1718 N.S., London, SP 100/56 f.173. Cf. Calendar of Treasury Books, January-December 1718 XXXII (part II) (London, 1957), p. 597 for authorisation to Sir Clement Cotterell, Master of Ceremonies, to pay Monteleón £1,000 as a farewell present from George I (order dated 20 Oct. 1718 O.S.).

229 For the date of Monteleón's departure, cf. a report in the Amersterdam Gazette of 22 Nov. 1718, B.M. Stowe MSS. 231 f.235.

230 Stair to Stanhope, 3 Nov. 1718, Paris, SP 78/162 f. 285; Baudrillart II, 344.

231 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, Paris, HMC Stuart VII, 540.

232 Ibid.;
Mar to Anne Oglethorpe, 13 Dec. 1718, ibid., VII, 624-25.

233 Ibid., Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, ibid., VII, 539.

234 Anne Oglethorpe to Mar, 14 Nov. 1718, ibid., VII, 539-40; same to same, 19 Dec. 1718, ibid. VII,647.

235 Monteleón to Alberoni, 15 Dec. 1718, The Hague, AGS Est.leg. 6839.

236 Stair to Stanhope, 3 Nov. 1718, Paris, SP 78/162 f.285.

237 Walkinshaw to Paterson, 9 Nov. 1718, B.M. Stowe MSS.232 f.151. This letter may have been passed to the British government through Slignet, the postmaster in Leyden. For his collaboration with London in tracing Jacobite mail, cf. Fritz, Hist. Journ. XVI, 273 n.52.

238 Stair to Craggs, 8 Nov. 1718, Paris, SP 78/162 f.292; Stair to Jean de Robethon, George I's secretary, 9 Nov. 1718, Paris, B.M. Stowe MSS. 231 f. 225.

239 Monteleon to Fernández Durán, 31 Oct. 1718 N.S., London, AGS. Est. leg. 6839 Monteleón to Alberoni, 15 Dec. 1718 N.S., The Hague, AGS Est. leg. 6839; Dickson 1719 intro. p. xxviii n2: Political State XVI, 532 (this information about Beretti Landi's denial of Ormonde's journey to Spain came from the report of Cadogan and Whitworth to Stanhope, 2/13 Dec. 1718, The Hague, SP 84/265 f.237);
n.3: Stair to Craggs, 29 Nov. 1718, SP 78/162.

240 Col. Stanhope to Stair, 17 Nov. 1718, Madrid, SP 94/88; p.s. of Col. Stanhope to Craggs, 26 Nov. 1718, Bayonne, SP 94/88.

241 Exactly when Ormonde crossed into Spain is not clear. He arrived near to Madrid on 1 Dec; see n. 250 below.

242 Aquaviva to James III, 23 Nov. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 562.

243 James to Aquaviva, 23 Nov. 1718, ibid. VII, 559.

244 Same to Same, 28 Nov. 1718 (postscript to the above), B.M. Add. MSS. 20,292 f.219, HMC Stuart VII, 561.

245 Mar to Dillon, 29 Nov. 1718, Rome, ibid. VII, 579-80.

246 Paris, SP 78/162 f.444 'Je crois que le Duc d'Ormond doit revenir bientôt d'Espagne, peu content de sa negotiation'.

247 Paterson to Walkinshaw, 29 Dec. 1718 (incorrectly dated as 1719), B.M. Stowe MSS. 232 f. 168-69.

248 Kennedy was thus described in Stair to Addison, 21 Sept. 1717, SP 78/161 f.135.

249 General Alexander Gordon to Mar, 8 Dec. 1718, Bordeaux, HMC Stuart VII, 615.

250 Ormonde to Alberoni, 1 Dec. 1718, Alcala, B.M. Add. MSS. 33,950 printed in Dickson 1719, p. 4 letter 1.

Spain and the Nineteen:

The main Spanish expedition against Britain

Notes (to pp.163-65)

1 The principal source for these discussions between Alberoni and Ormonde is a letter written by the Duke to James on 17 Dec. 1718 relating what had taken place. Dickson 1719 pp. 15-17, letter XIII, prints this from Ormonde's letter book, B.M. Add. MSS. 33,950. The letter itself in the Stuart MSS. is printed in HMC Stuart VII, 644-45. Ormonde's letter to James of 17 Dec. 1718 provides the only account of the Duke's negotiations with Alberoni in Dec. 1718 and forms the basis of most accounts of the preparations for the '19; cf. Michael II, 189-90.

2 Michael II, 189.

3 Ormonde to James, 17 Dec. 1718, Dickson 1719 15-17 (cited by Michael II, 189 nn. 3 & 4); HMC Stuart VII, 644-45.

4 Mar to Marischal, 1 Sept. 1718, HMC Stuart VII, 231 George Keith, 9th (or possibly 10th) Earl Marischal (1693-1778), had acted as the Chevalier's host after James's landing in Scotland at the end of Dec. 1715 O.S. For his biography cf. Cuthell, E.E. The Scottish Friend of Frederick the Great, the Last Earl of Marischal (2 vols., London 1915).

5 Ormonde to Charpentier (cipher name for Marischal), 8 Dec. 1718, Dickson 1719 p. 9, letter VII.

6 Ormonde to James 17 December 1718, Dickson letter XIII; HMC Stuart VII, 644-45. For Bagenal's role in previous Jacobite intrigues involving Sweden see Nordmann, Crise, pp. 119 & 184 Little is known about Bagenal other than that he was born in Ireland and in later life became a knight in the Spanish order of Santiago - Walsh, Spanish Knights II, 7 n.47.

7 Ormonde to James 17 Dec. 1718.
The two month time limit was not an indication that the invasion was expected to be completed so quickly but it reflected Ormonde's belief that once the Spaniards had landed in England they would be able to seize money held by the British Customs and use this for subsistence - Ormonde to Alberoni, 31 March 1719, Dickson p. 99, Letter XCI.

8 Ormonde to James 17 Dec. 1718. For the location of the armada's destination in England, cf. p.182 n. 114 below.

9 'A copy of the King of Spain's Declaration translated from the Spanish Original', SP 43/60 f.134. The existence of such a manifesto is confirmed by Tindal, N. The Continuation of Mr. Rapin de Thoyras's History of England from the Revolution to the Accession of King George II (2nd edition, London, 1751) II,583; Rousset de Missy, J. Histoire de cardinal Alberoni et de son ministere (The Hague, 1720) II,234-36, cited by Nordmann, Crise, 203 n. 26; Rousset de Missy, J. Istoria del cardinal Alberoni (Amsterdam, 1720), 34, cited by Meijide Pardo, A La invasion inglesa de Galicia en 1719 (Santiago de Compostela, 1720), 26 n.3. Carpio citing San Felipe Comentarios..(p. 302 of the 1957 edn.) refers to such a manifesto issued by the Spanish king for distribution within the British Isles but gives little information as to its content, and my own research at Simancas has failed to reveal a Spanish original of this. There seems no reason to doubt the authenticity of the translation in the PRO on account of the similarities in phraseology between it and Philip V's draft declaration of 13 Apr. 1719, see below n.13.

10 Ormonde to Alberoni, 17 March 1719, Dickson pp. 84-5, letter LXXX.

11 Osmin Rollo to Stair (no date, but received by the British ambassador on 11 Apr. 1719 N.S.), SP 78/163 f.303 For Rollo cf. Fritz, Hist. Jour. XVI (1973), p. 279.

12 SP 43/60, the bundle of MSS. containing the English translation of this manifesto, contains correspondence exclusively concerned with the Jacobite incursion in Scotland in 1719. In More Culloden Papers II (ed. Duncan Warrand, Inverness, 1925), 201-02 is printed an anonymous letter to Duncan Forbes, the advocate-depute in Edinburgh, dated 26 June 1719 O.S. 'I herewith send you (a) copy of the King of Spain's Declaration, in favour of the pretender and his friends in Britain, it was found in the Rebels Camp..'; almost certainly that referred to above. There is no trace of any other copy in the P.R.O. nor, to my knowledge, have any historians (Dickson, Wiesener, Michael) found such.

13 'Declaracion des motifs que le Roy Catholique a eu pour apuyer les droits du Roy Jacques a la Couronne d'Angleterre' (Declaration of the motives of the Catholic King (Philip V) for supporting the rights of King James to the throne of England), 13 Apr. 1719, Madrid, A.G.S. Guerra Moderna, Supplemento (henceforth abbr. G. Sup.) leg. 263.

14 There is no mention of this Spanish manifesto in support of the Pretender in any of the reports of British ambassadors and diplomats for the period, April - May 1719 in the P.R.O. and in the established works of Lemontey, Baudrillart, Wiesener, Bourgeois, Leclercq, Williams Stanhope, and Michael.

15 SP 43/60 f. 134: 'What has confirm'd Me in this Design is that I am well inform'd that many of these Nations (i.e. the populace of England and Scotland where the two Spanish expeditions were destined to land) have a particular Inclination for..(James), and a..desire to acknowledge him for their Sovereigne'.

16 Castagnoli I, 339 n.14.

17 See infra, p.191 n. 183.

18 SP 43/60 f. 134: '..if then contrary to all probability my Enterprise shou'd not succeed, and in case of any of King James's faithful subjects shou'd be obliged to leave their native country, I declare.....that I shall give to all officers the same Emploiments they had in England, or Scotland, either by sea or land, and all the private Men I shall receive, and entertain as my own subjects'.

19 Ormonde to Ezechiel Hamilton (a Jacobite agent sent by Ormonde to contact some of James's leading supporters in England in March 1719) 7 Feb. 1719, Dickson p. 54, letter XLV; Ormonde to Alberoni, 10 Feb. & 17 March 1719, ibid. pp. 59 (letter LXIX) & 88 (letter LXXXII); Ormonde to Redmond Everard (another Jacobite agent), 15 May 1719, ibid. p. 123, letter CXV.

20 Draft Spanish manifesto of 13 Apr. 1719, AGS G. Sup. leg. 263.

21 Ibid.

22 Stair to Craggs, 26 March 1719, Paris (Private letter), B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 106-08.

23 Stair to Craggs, 20 March 1719 (Private letter), B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 96-97: '..ye Byass of all this nation (France) towards ye pretender is inconceivable...'.

24 Baudrillart II, 363 n. 3.

25 See infra, p.175

26 Philip's declarations of 24 Feb. 1719 (SP 43/60 f. 134) & 13 Apr. 1719 (AGS G. Sup. leg. 263).

27 See infra. chapter 5.

28 Ormonde to Peter (i.e. James), 22 Dec. 1718, Dickson p. 20, letter XV; HMC Stuart VII, 661-62.

29 Ormonde to James, 22 Dec. 1718, Dickson, letter XV; HMC Stuart VII, 661-62. 'There cannot be too much care taken to keep the Secret. Shou'd any account of it be sent to England, and the letters be intercepted, the cypher may be easily found out'.

30 The Jacobite agent Ezechiel Hamilton did reach London; he seems, however, to have accomplished little there and after a brief stay left on 4/15 March - cf. Ormonde to Alberoni, 17 Apr. 1719, Dickson p. 113, letter CII.

31 Ormonde to Dillon, 9 Dec. 1718, Dickson p. 11, letter XI.

32 Ormonde to James, 22 Dec. 1718, Dickson letter XV, HMC Stuart VII, 661-62.

33 Ormonde to Alberoni, 4 Jan. 1719, Dickson p. 26, letter XX.

34 Stair to Jean de Robethon, secretary to George I, 29 Dec. 1718, Paris, B.M. Stowe MSS. 231 f. 253; Dubois to Craggs, 16 Jan. 1719 (Extract), SP 78/163/154 said that Ormonde had been in Madrid until recently when he had gone to Bilbao (Stair to Robethon, 16 Feb. 1719, B.M. Stowe MSS. 231 f. 267 claimed that Ormonde was in the latter city); Stair to Robethon 12 March 1719, B.M. Stowe MSS. 231 ff. 284-85 said that the Duke had been in Madrid until 25 February when he left for Cadiz; in a letter to Craggs of 15 March (SP 78/163/202-03) Stair repeated this information and gave as its source a letter allegedly written by Ormonde's wife to Harry Stirling, a Jacobite agent: since these details were false, the letter referred to by Stair, if it existed at all, must have been written to deceive the British government.

35 Worsley to Craggs, 24 Jan. 1719, Lisbon, SP 89/27. Shortly after this Worsley was, ironically, rebuked by Craggs for the unreliability of his intelligence reports with the observation 'I have observed that your Lisbon accounts of Spanish affairs have proved very uncertain' - Craggs to Worsley, 3 Feb. 1719 O.S., SP 104/113.

36 Ormonde to James, 17 December 1718 (references as n.1 above).

37 Ibid.

38 For security reasons Ormonde's correspondence with James relating to the details of Spain's expedition to England made no mention of when this was expected to take place. The first definite indication as to timing comes in Ormonde's letter to Alberoni of 10 February (Dickson p. 59, letter XLIX) which reveals that the Duke was leaving Valladolid that day under the impression that the main Spanish armada was due to set sail from Cadiz at about the same time.

39 Information noted in the inspection of weapons of the troops in Cadiz carried out by Vicaria on 17 Jan. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

40 (Fernández Durán?) to Carlos Carrafa, Capitán general in Malaga, 13 Dec. 1718, El Pardo, AGS G. Sup. leg. 133.

41 Ibid.

42 Joseph de Caisarus Morio to Fernández Durán, 19 Jan. 1719, Alhucemas, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.
Caisarus Morio cannot be identified precisely, but he may have been an officer in the regimiento de Almansa which replaced the detachments from the Coruña, Palencia and Valencia regiments in the North African garrisons.

43 Carrafa to Fernández Durán, 24 Jan. 1719, Malaga, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

44 (Fernández Duran ?) to Carrafa, 13 Dec. 1718, El Pardo, AGS G. Sup. leg. 133 Caisarus Morio to Fernández Durán, 19 Jan. 1719, Alhucemas, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

45 Information in anymous letter, endorsed (with date of receipt ?) 28 Sept. 1718, AGS G. Sup. leg. 133.

46 Information from Vicaria's weapon inspection of 17 Jan. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

47 Petition of Felipe Boulee, a captain in the Limburg, no date, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.
On 9 Dec. 1718 Hinojosa, the treasurer general in Madrid, had authorised the payment of 23,438 reales for 130 dress coats for the Limburg - AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1. The regiment had also been supplied for new weapons - in the weapon inspection of 17 Jan Vicaria noted that it possessed 611 new guns and bayonets (AGS G. Mod. leg 1646).

48 Boulee's petition, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

49 Vicaria to Fernández Durán, 27 Feb. 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646. This legajo also contains a file marked 'sobre el atentado falta de obed(ienci) a del Reg(imien)t(o) de Limbourg' (about the offence of lack of obedience of the Limburg regiment).

50 These two cavalry regiments can be identified as having taken part in the Spanish expedition to England in 1719 from a study of the hojas de servicio (records of service) of their officers. These provide an invaluable source of information as to the age, length of military service with brief details of the principal engagements at which the officer was present and, in some cases, character sketches. The hojas de servicio for the Ordenes regiment is AGS G. Mod. leg. 2472, and for the Rosellon AGS G. Mod. leg. 2473. Those who took part in the 1719 expedition were described in their hojas as having participated in the 'embarco de Escocia' or 'expedicion de Escocia' (embarcation/ expedition for Scotland). I do not feel, however, that this should be regarded as an indication that the destination of the main Spanish attempt was Scotland. Gossip in Cadiz in March 1719 apparently gave the landing place as this (cf. Ormonde's letter to Connock of 16 March, and Dickson p. 83, letter LXXVIII 'it's talk'd off at Cadiz that this expedition is for Scotland...'), and the fact that the armada never reached Britain probably gave rise to a belief among Spaniards that it had been destined for Scotland, and this was believed by the Spanish military officials who compiled the hojas de servicio for the Rosellon in December 1725 and for the Ordenes at the same time and again in Dec. 1732.

51 Marqués de Pozoblanco (Colonel of the Rosellon cavalry regiment) to Fernández Durán, 13 June 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

52 Lopé de Ozes to Fernández Duran, 30 Jan. 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

53 Lopé de Ozes to Fernández Duran, 10 Jan. 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646 Juan del Castillo y Ventimilla (I have been unable to identify him) to Fernandez Duran, 11 Jan. 1719, Antequera (near Granada), AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

54 Pozoblanco to Fernandez Duran, 13 June 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

55 Cf. Ormonde to Alberoni, 4 Jan. 1719, Dickson, p. 26 letter XX.

56 Ormonde to Ezechiel Hamilton, 7 Feb. 1719, ibid. 54, letter XLV.

57 Ormonde to Alberoni, 10 Feb. 1719, 2 a.m., ibid. 59, letter XLIX.

58 'Mapa del estado de los seis Vattallones de Infanteria que....se deven embarcar...en la revista de inspeccion que les passe en 15 de este presente Mes...' (Chart of the state of the six infantry battalions due to embark....from the inspection which took place on the 15th of this month), signed by Joseph de Vicaria and dated 19 Feb. 1719, Cadiz (henceforth abbr. Inspection of 15 Feb. 1719), AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid. The regimiento de Portugal had been drafted into Cadiz in Jan. 1719 to replace the Santiago which had gone to the North African garrison of Ceuta.

61 Ibid.

62 'Relazion del Numero(s)...que se sacaron de los regimientos de Infanteria de Granada, Vadajoz, Palencia y Limburg.. para completar los 6 vatts. que se embarcon' (Account of the numbers...taken from the infantry regiments of Granada, Badajoz, Palancia and Limburg...in order to complete (the strength of) the six battalions which were embarking), 17 Feb. 1719, Cadiz, signed by Vicaria, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

63 Report of Perez Bracho, Intendiente-General en interin de la Marina de España, encl. in Perez Bracho to Fernández Durán, 11 March 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Although Perez Bracho's report mentioned two cavalary regiments as having taken part in the inspection of 24 Feb., he gave no details of these, not even their names or the total numbers present. The two regiments concerned can be identified as the Rosellon and Ordenes from the hojas de servicio of their officers (cf. n. 50 above), but in the absence of more detailed information - and my searches at Simancas failed to reveal any details of the cavalry content in the 1719 expedition - it is impossible to give their numerical strength. Since the number of infantrymen Alberoni had undertaken to provide (4,000) approximated to the total of the infantry regiments noted by Perez Bracho in the inspection of 24 Feb. however, the total strength of the cavalry contingent may have been close to the figure of a thousand, that promised by Alberoni in his negotiations with Ormonde in Dec. 1718.

68 His hoja de servicio (AGS G. Mod. leg. 2472), drawn up in Dec. 1732 gave his age as 46 then.

69 But a sergeant in Dec. 1732 when his record of service was compiled, hence his inclusion in the hojas de servicio for the Ordenes (AGS G. Mod. leg. 2472).

70 There were two sieges of Barcelona by the armies of Philip V during the war of Succession; the first in 1706 (when the city held out) and the second, resulting in its capitulation, in 1714. Xaragai's hoja does not specify at which he was present, but if the above military actions as listed in his record of service are taken in chronological order it would probably have been the latter.

71 The statesman was the son of a Juan Carvajal y Lancaster, created Duke of Linares by Philip V in 1724 (Sain Simon, Memoires, ed. Boislisle, VIII, 139 n.9). He was, moreover, born in the Extremaduran province of Caceres (Diccionario de la Historia de España, 1969 edn., I.750), and since Nicolás de Carvajal y Lancaster was described in his hoja de servicio as having been born in Extremadura (AGS G. Mod. leg. 2547), it seems that the father and brother of José, the future chief minister of Spain, took part in the attempted expedition to England in 1719.

72 Hoja de servicio for Captain Nicolás Carvajal y Lancaster dated 30 April 1723, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2547 (hojas de servicio for the regimiento de La Coruña).

73 Information in the service records of Captain Miguel de Robles and cadet (in 1719 but second lieutenant in 1723) Bernado San Vicente, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2547.

74 Hoja de servicio of Captain Juan Gutierrez, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2547.

75 Hojas de servicio of the Portugal regiment (both battalions), AGS G. Mod. leg. 2460.

76 Weapon inspection of 17 Jan. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

77 Ibid. By regiments I am referring to the España, Portugal, Coruña and Valencia: from the information available it is not possible to discover details of weapons possessed by those men from the other four regiments who were drafted into the expeditionary force after the inspection of 15 Feb.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1, entry dated 12 Apr. 1719.

81 Ibid.
According to intelligence reports reaching the British government, Guevara's armada carried enough provisions for thirty three days (information of William Maxwell, mariner of Boston New England, and of William Blayer, a London mariner, both dated 29 March 1719 O.S., Bristol, S.P. 35/15 ff. 136,135, mentioned but not cited by Michael II, 195): I am, however, unable to judge whether these amounts of food would have been sufficient for this or a longer period.

82 Francisco de Varas to Fernández Durán, 25 July 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646 (it is not possible to identify de Varas precisely, but since this letter dealt with the payment of troops in the expedition to England, he may have been a paymaster or equivalent).
The date of Guevara's departure as 6 March was also given by Orleans, the French Regent (Stair to Craggs, 22 Mar. 1719, SP 78/163/230); Henry Worsley (Worsley to Craggs, 18 March 1719, Lisbon) and the Portuguese ambassador in Paris (SP 78/163/276).

83 'Relaz(i)on de ..ofizial(es)...que servian .. a los seis vatt (alone) s de Infanteria ....q(uienes)..no se pudieron embarcar con sus regim(ien)tos' (Account of officers..who served in the six Infantry battalions (in the expedition to the British Isles) who were unable to embark with their regiments), carried out by Joseph de Vicaria, 8 March 1719 Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

This was carried out in response to orders, probably from Fernández Durán - a slip of paper to this effect enclosed in the above Relazion... may have been written by the minister of war.

84 I could find no trace of the expedition to the British Isles in 1719 in the sección de marina (naval section) at Simancas: legajo 429 in this, listed in the Guia del Investigador to the archive as 'Expediciones de Europa' between 1720-32 contains nothing of relevance for 1719.

85 Information supplied by Captain Philip Cavendish (commander of the Sallee squadron) in Gibraltar to Admiral Sir George Byng, March 1719, printed in Pattee Byng's Journal, 61.

86 Listed by Fernández Duro, Armada Española, VI, 161, a table giving names and specifications of the Spanish ships in the expedition to Sicily in 1718 which had escaped capture or destruction by the Royal Navy at Passaro.

87 Richard Butler (Ormonde) to the Major (Ezechiel Hamilton), 7 Feb. 1719, Dickson p. 54, letter XLV. This information was reported to London by Henry Worsley, British ambassador in Lisbon, in his dispatch to Craggs of 27 Feb. 1719, SP 89/27.
Worsley stated that the Hermione had left Cadiz on its mission under sealed orders to be opened forty miles at sea (this information is mentioned by Dickson p. 54 n. 4 but no source is given); Ormonde's letter of 7 Feb. provides no indication as to the accuracy of this.

88 Information of Capt. Cavenish to Adml. Byng, Pattee Byng's Journal p. 61; corroborated by William Maxwell, the New England mariner, upon his arrival in Bristol at the end of March (O.S.) 1719 - S.P. 35/15 f.136.

89 Cavenish's information, Pattee Byng's Journal p. 61; Fernández Duro, VI 161 lists the San Luis as being commanded by Guevara.

90 Ibid.

91 Marqués de Torremaior y de Santa Cara, colonel of the regimiento de España, to Fernández Durán, 6 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

92 Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 19 Apr. 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

93 'Report as to the dispersion of the Spanish fleet', 13 Apr. 1719 (W.S.P. 43/48): Dickson p. 246, letter 38.

94 Ibid. Both ships were reported as being in Vigo.

95 'Relazion de la gente effectiva que tiene el regim(ien)to de..la Coruña' (Account of personnel fit and able - literally 'effective people' - in the regiment of La Coruña) Signed by its colonel, Juan Carvajal y Lancaster, 7 May 1719, Corunna, noting that the regiment's company of grenadiers were in Vigo, encl. in Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138.

96 Report as to the Dispersion of the Spanish fleet, 13 Apr. 1719: Dickson 246, letter 38.

97 Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 25 Apr. 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

98 Enclosed in Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 19 Apr. 1719, Seville, AGS. G. Mod. leg. 1646.

99 Vicaria to Fernández Duran, 15 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

100 Report as to the dispersion of the Spanish fleet by the captain of the frigate La Galera de Espana, 9 Apr. 1719 W.S.P. 43/42: Dickson 243, letter 36.

101 Ormonde to Alberoni, 9 Apr. 1719, Corunna, 105, letter XCVI noted the arrival of troops from this regiment on board a ship which had arrived that day: although this vessel was not named, it may well have been the Galera de España.

102 Ormonde to Alberoni, 10 Apr. 1719, Corunna, B.M. Add. MSS. 33,950: Dickson 106 letter XCVI.
Fernández Duro refers to the 30 gun Tolosa commanded by Jose Goicoechea capable of carrying 200 men (VI,161) as one of the Spanish vessels which escaped capture or destruction by Byng at Passaro in Aug. 1718.
A report sent to the Marechal d'Estrees, president of the French conseil de Marine, from St. Malo dated 3 March 1719 (copy enclosed, SP 78/163/157) stated that a French ship, the Grande Comte de Toulouse, seized by the Spaniards was in the expedition, but this information omitted any details of when seizure had occurred.

103 Report as to the Dispersion of the Spanish fleet, 10 Apr. 1719, W.S.P. 43/44: Dickson 245, letter 37.

104 Ibid.

105 Examination of Capt. Gusqui, dated 26 Feb. 1719, forwarded to London by Dubois 22 Mar. 1719, S.P. 78/163/155.

106 Information to d'Estrees, 3 March 1719, S.P. 78/163/157; cf. Dubois to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f.64: Dickson 227, app. letter 22.

107 The captain of a vessel from Martinique which left Cadiz on 4 or 5 March made a similar error - Stair to Craggs, 2 April 1719, Paris, S.P. 78/163/271-73.

108 Davenant to (Craggs), 28 Feb. 1719, Genoa, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 80; Davenant to Stair, 28 Feb. 1719, SP 78/163/181-82; the same information was repeated by Henshaw, British consul in Genoa, in a letter to Craggs of the same date - B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f.80.

109 Henshaw to Craggs, 28 Feb. 1719, Genoa, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f.80.

110 This man, one of two of Worsley's informants in the Spanish capital, was identified in Worsley's letter to Craggs of 7 March 1719, SP 89/27.

111 Worsley to Craggs, 27 Feb. 1719, Lisbon, SP 89/27. He repeated this information to Louis Houwens, the Dutch Resident in the Portuguese capital, who relayed the news to his government - encl. in Whitworth to Stanhope, 3/14 March 1719, SP 84/265/271-72.

112 SP 78/163/276, encl. in Stair to Craggs, 2 Apr. 1719, SP 78/163/271-73.

113 SP 78/163/277, encl. in Stair to Craggs, 2 Apr. 1719, SP 78/163/271-72.

114 SP 43/60 f. 134, English translation of the manifesto of 24 Feb. 1719 'Many strong reasons have made me resolve to send into England....'; AGS G. Sup. leg. 263, draft of manifesto (in French) dated 13 Apr. 1719, with reference to French troops sent to England deserting and joining with 'mesmes (mêmes - mine, i.e. Spanish) et aux Anglois bien intentionnés..'

115 Ormonde to the marqués de Risbourg, capitán general of Galicia, 2 March 1719, Dickson 73, letter LXVII: 'il (Guevara) ne scauroit pas ou je destine d'aller...'; Ormonde to Guevara, 3 March 1719 and 20 March: Dickson 74-75, letter LXVIII & 89, letter LXXXV.

116 On this point, cf. the letter written by Philip V to the Chevalier on 14 Jan. 1720, W.S.P. 45/136: '...si il (Ormonde) ne luy a rien escrit de la dernière dont il estiot chargé c'a esté a cause du grand sécret que je luy avois fait recommander...'.

Although the expedition referred to was an abortive attempt by Spain (under Ormonde's command) to ferment unrest in Brittany in Sept. 1719 (not that to the British Isles on behalf of James), Philip's letter to the Chevalier. stresses the point that as a commander in the service of Spain, Ormonde would have to obey directives regarding the secrecy of what he did laid down by Madrid, and his first loyalty lay to the Spanish king, not to James III.

117 Dubois to (Craggs), 16 Jan. 1719, Paris (extract), SP 78/163/154: Dickson 223-24, letter 20.

118 Stair to Craggs, 21-22 Jan. 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/17-18, received in London 15th (O.S.).

119 Craggs to Stair, 17 Jan. 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30.

120 Historical Register XIII, 44; Fritz, Jacobitism, 56n.17. 56n.17.

121 Stair to Craggs, 4 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/126-27.

122 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719, Paris, BM Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 37-40, printed (with a few omissions) in Dickson pp. 224-27, letter 21. The most significant extracts have been copied and may be found in the PRO (SP 78/163/159-60), and also in B.M. Stowe MSS. f. 81.
Dubois' letter to Craggs of 8 March 1719 is the source of the most widely held view as to the destination of the Spanish expedition being the West Country, cf. Michael II, 193 n. 1; Jones, Mainstream, 141-43.

BIBLIOTECA MADRID NACIONAL

123 Dickson 225 n. 1 cited by Fritz Jacobitism 54 n.12, wonders if this was the so-called 'Baron' Waleff who had served under Ormonde during the War of Succession and in April 1718 had tried at the instigation of the Austrian authorities to incriminate Alberoni in a project for removing from office the French Regent Orleans.

Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese, 120 n. 2 & Nordmann, Grise, 204 n. 31 (citing Belando, N Historia Civil de España (Madrid, 1744) & Carpio, 118 (where the name is misspelt Wacle) name Waleff as having betrayed Alberoni's design to the British government. Although Waleff's involvement with the Austrian intelligence service makes such action possible, he does not seem to have been the Jacobite whom Dubois persuaded to reveal details of Spain's plan of campaign against George I: letters which Ormonde wrote to Alberoni from Valladolid on 25 Jan. & 8 Feb. 1719 (Dickson, letters XXXII & XLVIII) indicate that between these dates Waleff was in Valladolid.

McLachlan 212 n. 118 (cited by Nordmann, Crise, 204 n. 31 & Fritz, Hist. Jour. 278 n.90) identifies a man named John Pringle from Seville who, many Spaniards believed, obtained a consular patent from Britain as a reward for having informed London of Spain's planned invasion in 1719.

124 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719, references as n. 122 above.

125 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719, references as n. 122 above.

126 The regiments of infantrymen comprising the Spanish expedition, the España, Portugal, Coruña and Valencia, could in no way be described as Irish: none of their officers entered in the respective regiments' hojas de servicio appear to have possessed names indicating Irish descent. Of the five Irish infantry regiments in the Spanish army, in early 1719 the Irlanda, Hibernia and Ultonia were in Sicily and the Limerick and Waterford on the frontier between Catalonia and France - Oman, op. cit., p. 6.

127 Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719: Michael II, 193 n. 1; Stair to Craggs, 12 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/199.

128 Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/173-79.

129 Ibid. (cited by Michael II, 193 n.3).

130 For Davenant's report (cited n. 108, above), cf. Stowe Mss. 247 f. 80, SP 78/163/181-82.

131 Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/173-74.

132 Stair to Craggs, 12 March 1719, Paris, privat letter, SP 78/163/197-200.

133 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, the British ambassador in Vienna, 8 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 f.262-64; Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, Sp 104/30: printed in Dickson, 234-36, letter 28.

134 Stair to Craggs, 12 March 1719, Paris, private letter, SP 78/163/197-200.

135 This is discussed on pp. 192-3 below.

136 Stair to Craggs, 8 Apr. 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/287-88.

137 See n. 114 above.

138 Ormonde to Alberoni, 5 Apr. 1719, Dickson 102-03, letter XCIV; Ormonde to James, 5 Apr. 1719, WSP 43/33 (copy from Add. MSS. 33,950; Dickson 104, letter XCV); Alberoni to Ormonde 4 Apr. 1719, WSP 43/31: Dickson 222, letter 19; Michael II, 192.

139 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 8 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 ff. 262-64; Craggs to Stair, 9 March O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30: Dickson 234-36, letter 28.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Dubois to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 64; printed in Dickson 227, letter 22 (copy in SP 78/163/210, cited by Wiesener III, 50 n.2); Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/173.

143 Date of receipt of Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, SP 78/163/173.

144 7/18 March 1719, date of receipt of Dubois to Craggs, 11 March 1719, Stowe MSS. 247 f. 64.

145 Stair to Craggs, 15 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163 (cited by Wiesener III, 50 n. 4 & Michael I, 195 n.1); Stair to Craggs, 20 March 1719, Paris, private letter, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 97; Wiesener III, 50 n.4: Stair to Craggs, 20,26,29 March & 19 Apr. 1719, SP 78/163.

146 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 8 March 1719 O.S., B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 ff. 262-64; Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., SP 104/30: Dickson 234-36, letter 28; Wiesener III 51 n.1: Craggs to Stair, April 1719: Annals of Stair II, 108.

147 Stair to Craggs, 20 March 1719, Paris (Private letter), B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 96-97.

148 Craggs to Stair, 16/27 March 1719, Whitehall, SP 104/30, Stair to Craggs. 26 March 1719, private letter, BM Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 106-08.

149 Berwick to Stair, 17 Jan. 1719, Bordeaux, SP 78/163/33.

150 Craggs to Stair, 16/27 March 1719, Whitehall, SP 104/30.

151 Stair to Craggs, 11 & 20 March, 1 Apr. 1719, SP 78/163/173-79; 221; 258; same to same, 10-11 Apr. 1719, private letter, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 128-32; Craggs to Stair, 16/27 March 1719, Whitehall, SP 104/30.

152 Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., SP 104/30: Dickson, 234-36, letter 28; Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 192 n. 3: Stanhope to Whitworth, 13 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/83.

153 Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 81-86.

154 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 8 March 1719 O.S., B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 ff. 262-64; Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30.

155 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 8 March 1719 O.S., B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 ff. 262-64.

156 Ibid.

157 Memorandum to the States General, 23 March 1719 N.S., SP 84/265/318-19 submitted by Whitworth encl. in Whitworth to Stanhope, 24 March 1719, the Hague, secret letter, SP 84/265/316-317.

158 Instructions for William Leathes from George I, 14 March 1719 O.S., SP 77/68/24-26.

159 Ibid., Leathes to George Tilson, under secretary of state, SP 77/68/27.

160 Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 8 March 1719, B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 ff. 262-64.

161 Wiesener III, 49; Michael II, 194.

162 Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30: Dickson 235, letter 28.

163 Buckley's reports to Stanhope are in SP 35/15, and to Craggs in B.M. Stowe MSS. 247.

164 Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30: Dickson, 235 letter 28, cited by Michael II, 194 n. 5.

165 Craggs to Stair, 9 March 1719 O.S., SP 104/30: Dickson 235, letter 28 Michael II 194n. 6: Instructions for Berkeley, 23 March 1719 O.S., SP 44/220.

166 Craggs to Stair, 30 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30.

167 Ibid., Craggs to Norris, 31 March 1719 O.S., SP 44/221/20; Craggs to Berkeley, 31 March 1719 O.S., SP 44/221/21.

168 Dated 24 March O.S., SP 35/15/117.

169 Whitworth to Stanhope, 24 March 1719, the Hague, open and secret letters, SP 84/265/312-13; 316-17.

170 Whitworth to Stanhope, 31 March 1719, the Hague, secret letter, SP 84/265/344.

171 Craggs to Stair, 14 May 1719 O.S., SP 104/30; Political State XVII, 496.

172 Report of H.M. Customs to Stanhope, 11 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/73; Excise Office to Stanhope, 13 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/81.

173 W. Terry to (Stanhope?), 29 March 1719 O.S., Reading, SP 35/15/134.

174 George Duckett and others to Stanhope, 3 Apr. 1719, Chippenham, SP 35/16/3.

175 Fritz, Jacobitism, 56

176 Buckley to Stanhope, 14 March 1719 O.S., Dorchester, SP 35/15/82;
Buckley to Craggs, 14/25 March 1719, Dorchester, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 ff. 102-03.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

179 Buckley to Stanhope, 18 March 1719 O.S., Bridgewater, SP 35/15/101;
Buckley to Craggs, 15/26 March 1719, Bridgewater, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 117, cited by Fritz, Jacobitism, 57 n. 22.

180 B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 117.

181 Customs at Minehead to Custom House, London, 4 Apr. 1719 O.S., SP. 35/16/10.

182 T. Swales (Land Carriage Officer) to (Stanhope ?), 26 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/124.

183 Buckley to Craggs, 21 March/1 Apr. 1719, Bath, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 119-21:
Buckley to Stanhope, 21 March 1719 O.S., Bath, SP 35/15/112; cited by Fritz, Jacobitism, p. 57 n. 23.
Buckley's conclusion regarding the extent of Jacobite sentiment in Bristol is mentioned by Williams, Stanhope, 325 n.2.

184 Buckley to Craggs, 21 March/1 Apr. 1719, Stowe MSS. 247 f. 119-21, & to Stanhope, same date, SP 35/15/112.

185 Handasyde, 145; Petrie 'Jacobite Activities', 90.

186 Stair to Craggs, 12 March 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/197.

187 Ibid.

188 Thomas, P.D.G. 'Jacobitism in Wales', Welsh Historical Review I (1963), 287. For the possibility of a Spanish landing in Wales, cf. Craggs to Marlborough (Master-General of the Ordnance), 23 March 1719 O.S., SP 44/119/265, referring to so-called 'hostile ships' putting in at Milford Haven (for reconnaisance purposes?); Berwick y de Alba, Duque de El Duque de Liria (Madrid, 1951) p. 15 states that the Cadiz expedition of March 1719 was destined for Wales but gives no source for this. (It is possible that Liria may have obtained a hint that some form of Jacobite uprising was being plotted in Wales through family links - his stepmother Anna Bulkeley, Berwick's second wife, was distantly related to Richard 4th Viscount Bulkeley of Baron Hill in Anglesey (1682-1724), M.P. for the island 1714-15 & 1722-24, a prominent Welsh Jacobite (cf. Thomas, 286).
In addition Sir George Barlow, the M.P. for Haverfordwest between May - July 1715 and another Welsh supporter of the exiled Stuarts, was reported as being implicated in pro-Jacobite activity in March 1719 - J Hamerton (an informer) to William Talbot, Bishop of Salisbury, 21 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/113.

189 Stanhope to the Mayor of Liverpool, 23 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 44/120/45.

190 Thomas, 'Jacobitism in Wales', 279.

191 One of the conditions which Spain had attempted to impose as a precondition for assisting the 1715 Jacobite rebellion had been a commitment by James to restore Catholicism in Britain, an indication perhaps that the Spanish government partly regarded support for Jacobitism as a form of religious crusade: see p.37 of Chapter 1.

192 Michael II, 57-63;
Grose, C. L. A Select Bibliography of British History 1660-1760 Chicago, 1939) lists (no. 1513) a 40 page pamphlet by Baldwin, Summerfield The Catholic Negociation of 1717-19 (Washington, 1926) which I have been unable to consult.

193 B.Nac. Madrid, MSS. 11145 'Carta de un cardenal ...sobre asuntos del Cardenal Alveroni' (Letter from a cardinal... about affairs of Cardinal Alberoni) f. 31b.

194 Information of T. Bayles (or Baylis) to (Stanhope ?), 14 Jan 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/11; information of David Lloyd to (Stanhope ?), 12 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/79.

195 'Examination of John Hawkins, Gunsmith, of the Minories, about the sail of guns', 11 March 1719 O.S., SP 35/15/75.

196 Hawkins claimed that the guns and powder in his possession were for sale solely to merchants trading along the West African coast (ibid.), and, since there is no trace of further action against him, it would appear that his explanation was accepted.

197 Stanhope to Whitworth, 30 March 1719 O.S., SP 104/83.
The remaining Dutch troops were sent to Scotland - see infra., p. 211

198 Examination of John Watterer, a carpenter, 6 Apr. 1719 O.S., SP 35/16/8. According to this, Watterer and another carpenter named Stephenson had been requested eighteen months previously to supply horses for use in a Jacobite insurrection in the London area.

199 Anon. to (Stanhope ?), 25 Apr. 1719 O.S., SP 35/16/35. This information concerned a Mrs. Jones of Bedford Court (Covent Garden ?) who in conjunction with her neighbour, a Jacobite activist called Mrs. Story, had heard from a non-juring clergyman named Amis reports that Inverness had fallen to the rebel forces in the Highlands, and that there would be a general Jacobite rising throughout the British Isles within three weeks.

200 cf. James Craggs the elder (Postmaster General) to Craggs the younger, 3 July 1719 O.S., SP 35/17/7.
Along with this were enclosed two letters written by a man named Minshull, one to the Pretender and the other to Alberoni, which had been intercepted by the British postal authorities. These outlined schemes for restoring the Catholic Stuarts, one of which referred to an insurrection in London. Minshull's proposals had, however, been submitted to Mar, James's chief adviser in 1718 and rejected (cf. H.M.C. Stuart VII, 222,287-88). Suggestions by one who sent letters to the Pretender and Alberoni through the ordinary post under the cover of an address of a merchant in Leghorn, moreover, can hardly be taken seriously.

201 John Hedworth to (Craggs ?), 17 May 1719 O.S., Durham, SP 43/57/3; William Ettricke, Collector of the port of Sunderland, to Craggs, 16 May 1719 O.S., SP 43/57/4; Hedworth to (Craggs ?), 15 May 1719 O.S., Durham, SP 43/57/5; Minutes of the meeting of the Lords Justices (the council of Regents appointed to administer Britain during the absence of George I in Hanover), 21 May 1719 O.S., encl. in Charles Delafaye, secretary to the Lords Justices, to Stanhope, 23 May 1719 O.S., SP 43/61/8.

For John Hedworth (1683-1747), M.P. for Co. Durham 1713-47, cf. the biography by R. Sedgwick in History of Parliament II, 125-26; for William Ettricke (1661-1735), cf. Surtees, R. The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham (4 vols., London, 1816-40), I (part ii), p. 238.

202 Hedworth to (Craggs ?), 15 May 1719 O.S., Durham, SP 43/57/5.

203 Dickson 219-20 letter 17: Alberoni to Ormonde, 18 March 1719; W.S.P. 42/103 (cited by Michael II, 192 n.1); Carpio, 123 n.19: James to Philip V & to Elisabeth Farnese, 11 March 1719, A.H.N. Est. leg. 2478, ap. 3, nos. 1 & 2.

204 The view that Spain was James's destination was held by Sinzendorff, the Austrian Chancellor (St. Saphorin, British ambassador in Vienna, to Stanhope, 22 Feb. 1719, SP 80/38), Dubois (Dubois to Craggs, 8 March 1719, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 38, printed in Dickson, letter 21; extract in SP 78/163 f. 159) and Orléans who fairly accurately reported that the Pretender was making for Barcelona (Stair to Craggs, 23 & 25 Feb. 1719, Paris, SP 78/163 ff. 82 & 92).

205 This belief was purposely fostered by Dillon, James's chief agent in Paris (Stair to Craggs, 8 March 1719, SP 78/163 f. 164). Stair was highly scentical (Stair to Craggs, 11 March 1719, SP 78/163 f. 171), but after a mistaken report of James's arrest in Milan while en route to Austria, Stanhope was temporarily convinced that the Pretender had travelled northwards (Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 6 March 1719 O.S., B.M. Add. MSS. 35,837 f. 260).

For Clementina's detention in Innsbruck and her escape in April 1719, cf. Gardiner & Beckett, op. cit., pp. 58-62.

206 Alberoni to San Felipe, 27 March 1719, Buen Retiro (a royal palace in Madrid, now mostly demolished), A.G.S. Est. leg. 5445. He wrote an identical letter to Salvador Ascanio, Spain's agent in Florence (Carpio 125 n.22), and a similar one to his friend Rocca, minister of finances in Parma, the following day, printed in Bourgeois, Lettres Intimes, 628 (letter DLV) cited by Castagnoli I, 361 n. 21, Nordmann 202 n. 23.

207 A copy of the Gaceta de Madrid of 21 March 1719 containing this proclamation was enclosed along with Stair's letter to Craggs, 8 Apr. 1719; S.P. 78/163/290;
Henry Worsley's dispatch to Craggs of 2 Apr. (S.P. 89/27) said that a copy of this edition of the Gaceta de Madrid was enclosed; it does not, however, appear to be there.

208 Carpio 127 (n.27) prints the contents of a seven course banquet in James's honour served at Alcolea, Guadalajara (between Zaragoza and Madrid). This was probably served on 24 March (when Carpio, 125 n. 23, estimates that the Chevalier was in this locality) before James's arrival in Madrid; if a meal of this size was provided in a provincial town, however, any banquet in the Chevalier's honour in Madrid would probably have been considerably more lavish.

209 O Callaghan, Irish Brigades, 316 (citing as his source 'Continental and British publications of the day') states that during James's stay in Madrid Philip V presented him with 25,000 pistoles (approx. £24,000), a silver plate service worth 60,000 crowns (presumably pesos, therefore worth in the region of £15,000), and Elisabeth Farnese gave him a magnificent diamond. The only confirmation of this alleged largesse on the part of Philip V and his wife which I have found in the Spanish archives is an entry in Hinojosa's account book (A.G.S. D.G.T. Inv. 7 leg. 1), dated 18 Sept. 1719,

for 'el importe de una vaxilla de plata que entrego p(ar)a el Rey de Inglaterre' (for the total (cost) of a silver plate service handed over to the King of England), payment - 58,931 reales 10 maravedis (approx. £1,850) - to be made to the marqués de Montesacro. This may have been the service referred to by O'Callaghan and Montesacro was not actually paid for providing it until Sept.; if so, however, it cost approx. 7,500 pesos/crowns, only a fraction of the amount reported.

210 Carpio 129 n. 32: James to Philip V & Elisabeth Farnese, 6 Apr. 1719, Benavente, A.H.N. Est. leg. 2478, ap. 3, nos. 3 & 4.
Liria accompanied his uncle, the Chevalier, from the time of James's arrival in Catalonia in March 1719 until the end of May when James gave his nephew permission to return to his regiment - Liria to Alberoni, 27 May 1719, Madrid, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138; Duque de Alba, Liria, 15-16.

211 'Report as to the Dispersion of the Spanish Fleet by the captain of the Frigate La Galera de España', 9 Apr. 1719, W.S.P. 43/42: Dickson, 243, letter 36; this information is mentioned by Michael, II, 195 but is not atributed to a specific source.

212 As with the details of the ships etc. in Guevara's armada (cf. n. 84 above), I was unable to discover any accounts of its voyage after having sailed from Cadiz at Simancas or A.H.N. in Madrid.

213 'Relacion de las Prendas que se hecharon al agua el dia 28 de Marzo..' (Account of the garments thrown into the water on 28 March (1719)), Cadiz, 23 Apr. 1719, A.G.S. G. Mod. leg. 1646. (A list of garments etc. lost by the two companies in the España regiment, signed by its colonel, the marqués de Torremaior y de Santa Cara,)
; Worsley to Craggs, 11 April 1719, Lisbon, SP 89/27;
'Report...by the captain of the Galera de España' : Dickson, 243 letter 36; Michael II, 196.

214 Ormonde to Alberoni, 9 Apr. 1719, Corunna, Dickson 105, letter XCVI mentioned the arrival of a ship bringing the news of the dispersal of Guevara's armada in a storm but omitted to mention the name of the vessel in question; the account of the captain of the Galera de España (Dickson, 246, letter 36) is dated 9 Apr. the day he arrived in Corunna, so his may well have been the ship which brought the disagreeable news.

215 'Reports as to the dispersion of the Spanish fleet', 13 Apr. 1719 W.S.P. 43/48: Dickson 246, letter 38.

216 Ormonde to Alberoni, 10 Apr. 1719: Dickson, 106 letter XCVI; 'Report as to the dispersion of the Spanish fleet', 10 Apr. 1719, W.S.P. 43/44: Dickson, 245 letter 37.

217 Ibid.

218 'Report...Spanish fleet', 13 Apr. 1719, W.S.P. 43/48: Dickson 246, letter 38.

219 Ibid.

220 Alberoni to James, 16 Apr. 1719, W.S.P. 43/58: Dickson 246, letter 39; confirmed in Poyntz to Craggs, 21 Apr. 1719, Lisbon, S.P. 89/27.

221 Manuel de Torres to Fernández Durán, 23 May 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646; to Craggs 21 Apr. 1719, SP 89/27.

222 Poyntz to Craggs, 28 Apr. 1719, SP 89/27.

223 Pozoblanco (Colonel of the Rosellon regiment) to Fernández Durán, 19 June 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

224 Ibid.

225 Statement of the marqués de Torremaior y de Santa Cara, colonel of the España Regiment (two companies of which had been on board the San Luis), 23 Apr. 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646; Thomas Crawford, Secretary at the British embassy in Paris to Temple Stanyan, Under Secretary of State, 30 Apr. 1719, Paris, SP 78/163/348; Ormonde to Marischal, 9 May 1719, Lugo, Dickson 119, letter CX.

226 Vicaria to Fernandez Duran, 15 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

227 Ibid., Pozoblanco to Fernandez Duran, 25 Apr. 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

228 Vicaria to Fernández Durán, 15 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646: 'Estado de los offiz(iale)s... soldados y cav(allero)s q(uines h) an ilegado a Cadiz y en q(ue)navios' (Account of officers.., soldiers and cavalry who arrived in Cadiz (i.e. from Guevara's fleet) and in what ships), encl. in Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 19 Apr. 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

229 Vicaria to Fernández Durán, 15 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

230 'Estado de los ofiziales.....', encl. in Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 19 Apr. 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

231 Pozoblanco to Fernández Durán, 19 Apr. 1719, Seville, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646: 'Considerando a S(u)M (ajestad) distintamente y informado de la desgrazia de n(uest)ro viaxe' - (With regard to informing his majesty precisely about the misfortunes of our voyage..).

232 Jackson (British Consul in Oporto) to Craggs, 25 Apr. 1719, Oporto, SP 89/27 (information regarding the Pretender's arrival in Corunna on the 17th obtained through an unnamed informant); Ormonde to Alberoni, 17 Apr. 1719, Dickson, 112-13, letter CII; Carpio 130 n. 33: James to (Philip V), 21 Apr. 1719, Corunna, A.H.N. Est. leg. 2478, ap. 3, no. 5.

233 Philip V to James, 25 Apr. 1719, Buen Retiro, W.S.P. 43/68: Dickson, 248-49, letter 40.

234 Ormonde to Alberoni, 9 - 10 Apr. 1719, Dickson, 104-06, letter XCVI. In this Ormonde said that Risbourg, the capitán general of Galicia, was forwarding full details of the condition of the returning ships and troops on board to Alberoni. The footnotes in Dickson, pp. 105-06 infer that these items of information were in fact the actual 'Report... by the captain of the Galera de España', W.S.P. 43/42: Dickson 243, letter 36, and similar reports of 10 Apr. (W.S.P. 43/44: Dickson 245, letter 37) and 13 Apr. (W.S.P. 43/48: ibid. 246, letter 38). My own searches of the correspondence from Galicia to Madrid in 1719 at Simancas have failed to bring to light any such reports from Risbourg to Alberoni; it is, therefore, impossible to conclude whether these items in the W.S.P. are copies of actual reports sent to the Spanish government, although this could well be the case.

235 Alberoni to James, 26 Apr. 1719, Madrid, W.S.P. 43/73: Dickson 250-51.

236 For Berwick's offensive against Spain and the attack on Pasajes, cf. Baudrillart II, 363-64; Bliard II, 56; Leclercq II, 316-22; Michael II, 100.

237 Cf. his manifesto to the French army invading Spain of 27 Apr. 1719, signed Philippe de France, Baudrillart II, 363 n. 3.

238 Extract of a letter from T. Blake, collector of the Custom House at Minehead, 8 Apr. 1719 O.S., encl. in Clarkesse to Delafaye, 10 Apr. 1719 O.S., Custom House, London, S.P. 35/15/16.

239 Worsley to Craggs, 11 Apr. 1719, Lisbon, SP 89/27.

240 Ibid., Michael II, 196.

241 'Estado de cinco compañias de Primer Battalon del Reximiento de Infanteria de España ... (&) .. de siete companias de segundo Bat(tal)on del Reximien)to ..de España', signed by Garcia Ramirez de Arellano, the Intendant of Galicia, and encl. in his letter to Fernández Durán of 4 June 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

242 Torremaior to Fernández Durán, 6 May 1719, Cadiz, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

243 (Fernandez Duran ?) to Pozoblanco, draft of order, dated 8 May 1719 (ordering the survivors of the Ordenes and Rosellon cavalry regiments in the Cadiz area to march overland to Galicia to join up with the remainder of men from these) AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646; Lope de Ozes (identified on p. 174 n. 52 , above) to Fernandez Durán, 29 May 1719, Port St. Mary (Cadiz), AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646.

244 'Report ... Spanish fleet', 10 Apr. 1719, WSP 43/44: Dickson 245 letter 37.

245 Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, AGS G Sup. leg. 138.

246 'Relaz(io)n de la gente effectiva que tiene el regim(ien)to de..la Coruna' (transl. n. 95, above), 7 May 1719, encl. in Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138.

247 Ibid. These were in Vigo, and although Carvajal admitted that he had no idea of the numbers of sick among their ranks, he nevertheless assumed that the company possessed its full number of men fit for service (47 soldiers, a drummer, two sergeants, a second lieutenant, lieutenant and captain - total 53), and added this total to those counted in Corunna.

248 See above, n. 63.

249 'Relazion.....', 7 May 1719, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138.

250 Ibid. Captain Garcia Postigo's hoja de servicio compiled in 1723 is in AGS G. Mod. leg. 2547: he was born in Andalusia in 1682, joined the Spanish army at the beginning of 1709, and a comment written on the bottom of his hoja indicated that he was worthy of promotion-'capaz de meior empleo'.

251 'Relazion...', 7 May 1719, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138. Since Olivellas was not included among the names in the hojas de servicio for the Coruna regiment drawn up in 1723 (the first after 1719) he must have either been transferred from the Coruna, left the army or died by that date; his absence from Carvajal's review of 7 May 1719 lends credence to the last possibility.

252 Ibid.

253 Carvajal gave the total of soldiers as 409 but this included the 47 privates from the grenadiers' company in Vigo.

254 'Revista de 8 Mayo a los Rexim(ient)os..de la Corona y Valencia' (Review of the Infantry regiments of La Coruña and Valencia, 8 May (1719)), encl. in Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, A.G.S. G. Sup. leg. 138; the same data was also included among the details of troop inspections sent to Fernández Durán by Ramirez de Arellano, the intendant of Galicia, on 4 June 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

255 Information in Duke of Bournonville to Fernández Durán, 24 May 1719, Salamanca, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138. Miguel José de Bournonville (?1672-1752), created Duke of Bournonville 1715, comandante general of old Castille, 1715 - ?

256 Review of three companies from the second battalion of the regimiento de España carried out by Castillo y Benavides, 8 May 1719, Corunna included among the data 'Estado de cinco companias de Primer Battalon del Reximiento de España...' (see n. 241, above, for full title), AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360; a summary of this was enclosed in Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138.

257 Review of troops in the town of Porrino (south of Vigo close to the frontier with Portugal) carried out by Joseph de Arrillaga, 17 May 1719, encl. in 'Estado .....', AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

258 'Estado de cinco companias de Primer Battalon ...&.. siete companias de segundo Bat(al)on del Rexim(ien) to de España', signed by Ramirez de Arellano, 4 June 1719, Corunna, and encl. in his letter to Fernández Durán, same date, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360. The differences between the enclosed accounts of the troop reviews and the figures given by the intendant in his letter of 4 June are very slight; for an instance of such, cf. n. 260 below.

259 'Estado.....', dated 4 June 1719, & reports of the reviews by those who carried them out encl., AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

260 'Estado.....', 4 June 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360. The information about the absence of these six soldiers as an escort party for 'S(u) M(ajestad) Bretanica' (His British Majesty) was included among the data signed by Ramirez de Arellano on 4 June, not in that of the original review of 8 May.

261 A calculation reached from the data in n. 258, above.

262 'Relazion de las armas y Prendas del Vestuario que an faltado al primer Vattallon de Portugal' (Account of the arms and items of clothing lost by the first battalion of the Portugal regiment), dated 21 Apr. 1719, Cadiz (the signature on the bottom of this, presumably that of the military official who certified these data as accurate, is indecipherable), AGS. G. Mod. leg. 1646.

263 'Relazion de las armas y Prendas del Vestuario.....', 21 Apr. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1646. It is, of course, possible that the losses of these items of clothing, particularly the breeches, may have indicated that the wearer was dead, but the evidence as to the extent of fatalities available is not adjequate to justify such a conclusion.

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 'Relacion de las Prendas que se hecharon al agua el dia 28 de Marzo.....en las dos companias de Grenaderos del Regimiento de Infanteria de España' (Account of the garments thrown into the water on 28 March...from the two companies of grenadiers of the Espana infantry regiment), signed by the marqués de Torremaior y de Santa Cara, the colonel of the regiment, Cadiz, 23 Apr. 1719, AGS. G. Mod. leg. 1646.

268 Ibid.

269 Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138. This letter contained a protest at the terms of the order issued by the minister of war on 1 May.

270 Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 8 May 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138.

271 (Fernández Durán ?) to Risbourg, order'exde.' (expedito) 3 June 1719 AGS G. Mod. leg. 1654.

Footnotes (to p.207)

1 Letter relating to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, S.P. 43/60/4.

2 This figure - 6 companies, each of 50 foot soldiers plus 3 officers - was that which Alberoni undertook to supply according to James Keith, Marischal's younger brother: A Fragment of a Memoir of Field Marshal J. Keith, written by himself (Edinburgh, 1843), 41. It is corroborated in Colin Campbell of Glendarvel (a Jacobite who joined Keith and Marischal in Scotland) to Alberoni, 29 Apr. 1719 O.S., W.S.P. 43/85, and by a Spanish Lieutenant (identified as Pedro Pazquelo, see infra, nn. 48 & 53) in testimony given after his capture to the British authorities in Scotland - Gen. George Carpenter, c-in-c. of H.M. forces in Scotland, to the Duke of Roxburgh (Secretary for Scotland), 26 May 1719 O.S., S.P. 43/60/47.

3 Information from the hojas de servicio of the Galicia infantry regiment, drawn up in Apr. 1720, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2574. San Felipe, Comentarios ..., p. 304 of 1957 edn., claims that these troops came from the regimiento de León. This can be demonstrated as being false by both the data in the hojas de servicio of the Galicia regiment, and by the testimony of one of the captains, an Irishman called Peter Stapleton who had joined the service of Spain: in this (S.P. 35/17/30), given to the British authorities after his capture, he stated that the Spaniards sent to Scotland were from the regimiento de Galicia.

4 I could find no entry for Bolaño y Castro in the hojas de servicio for the Galicia regiment, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2574, indicating that he had left the regiment by the time the records of service were compiled in Apr. 1720. Nordmann 204 n.40 cites B. Nac. Ms. 18, 712 as being Bolaño's journal; regrettably, however, it appears that this reference is incomplete or inaccurate, since it is impossible to trace this document from information given.

5 Hoja de servicio of Captain Santossildes (dated Apr. 1720), AGS G. Mod. leg. 2574.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 There is no trace of Stapleton among the hojas de servicio of the Galicia regiment at Simancas, but he can be positively identified as having taken part in the expedition to Scotland in 1719 from the information he gave to the British authorities after his capture, SP 35/17/30.

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10 Hoja de servicio of Lt. Gayoso, AGS G Mod. leg. 2574.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 For identification of Pazquelo, see below n. 48 & 53; his record of service is not to be found amongst those of the regimiento de Galicia compiled in Apr. 1720 because he was transferred to another infantry regiment, the Zaragoza, after returning to Spain in July 1719.

15 Hoja de servicio of Second Lt. Munoz Navarrete, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2574.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Of 19 men of the rank of sergeant and above in the service records for the regiment dated Apr. 1720, twelve were described as having been born in Galicia; in addition, six out of the nine who had been promoted from the ranks by the time the service records were compiled had been born in this area.

20 Keith, Fragment, 41; Dickson, (intro.) xlii.

21 Stair to Craggs, 22 March 1719, SP 78/163/232.

22 Keith, Fragment, 41-42.

23 Ibid.

24 Liria to Jacinto de Pozobueno (a military official) 16 Feb. 1719, Gerona, AGS G. Mod. leg. 1657.

25 Reports of the Spaniards' date of departure from Pasajes vary from the 8th (Spanish Lieutenant (Pazquelo)'s statement to the British authorities, Hist. Reg. IV, 281, Pol. State XVII, 501-02) to the 12th (Spanish Officer's account of the Scottish expedition, WSP 43/128) or 13th March (Alberoni to Ormonde, 18 March 1719, WSP 42/103: Dickson 220 letter 17).

26 Stapleton's examination, SP 35/17/30; Ormonde to James, 27 March 1719, Corunna, Dickson, 95 letter LXXXVII; Ormonde to Alberoni, 27 & 31 March 1719, Corunna, Dickson, 96 letter LXXXIX, 99, letter XCI.

27 Report of a Custom House Officer of Co. Mayo sent to Stair by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, dated Blacksod, Co. Mayo, 21 March 1719 O.S., Annals of Stair, II, 117-19; cf. Stair to Craggs, 29 Apr. 1719, Paris, private letter, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 160.

28 Their precise date of arrival is unclear; it appears that they reached the Isle of Lewis a few days before their rendezvous with James Keith and the Scottish Jacobite exiles who had accompanied him from France, which took place on 25 March O.S.

29 Keith, Fragment, 44-45; for Stair's intelligence about the departures of Jacobite exiles from France, cf. his dispatch to Craggs of 20 March 1719, SP 78/163/221-22.

30 Stair to Craggs, 26 March 1719, Paris, private letter, B.M. Stowe MSS. 247 f. 106-07; Michael II, 198 n.2; Craggs to Stair, 16/27 March 1719, Whitehall, SP 104/30.

31 Keith, Fragment, 45; Dickson, (intro.) xlIV.

32 Roxburgh to Wightman, 25 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP. 55/8/175.

33 Roxburgh to Brigadier George Preston, Deputy Governor of Edinburgh Castle, 25 March 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP.55/8/176.

34 Stanhope to Whitworth, 30 March 1719 O.S. Whitehall, SP 104/83; Roxburgh to Wightman, 31 March 1719 O.S., London, SP 55/8/181.

35 Whitworth to Stanhope, 14 Apr. 1719, The Hague, open letter, SP 84/266/49.

36 Ibid., Whitworth to Stanhope, 14 Apr. 1719, The Hague, secret letter, SP 84/266/55.

37 Whitworth to Stanhope, 14 Apr. 1719, The Hague, open and secret letters, SP 84/266/49 & 55.

38 Keith, Fragment, 46-47; Dickson, xliv.

39 Ibid.

40 Keith, Fragment, 47.

41 'Account of the publict money layd out by the Marquess of Tullibardine beginning at Stornoway the 30th March 1719 (O.S.)'; in the MSS. collection of Charles Stirling-Home-Drummond Moray Esq., printed in HMC Report X, part I, pp.123-25, no. 114 (henceforth abbr. Tullibardine's 'Account..') The first entry in this is dated 30 March (O.S.) and the last 3 June (O.S.).

42 I deduce this from a letter written by Beretti Landi to Tullibardine dated 29 Sept., The Hague, in the above collection, printed in H.M.C. Report X, part I, p. 123, no. 113. On 8 Feb. 1720 Beretti Landi wrote to Fernández Durán (AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565), reporting that Tullibardine had taken charge of 5,000 doblones (£4,800) which he had sent from the Dutch Republic to Marischal the previous year, and to all intents and purposes Tullibardine had vanished.

43 'Item to Mr. Zachary (?) for provisions to the Spanish ships and troops as per account...£153-00-10d.': Tullibardine's 'Account..', HMC Report X (i), p. 124.

44 'April the 25th O.S. ...To wine and brandy bought for the Spanish troops...£33-14-03d.: Tullibardine's 'Account..' ibid., 124.

45 The majority of payments entered in Tullibardine's 'Account..' were to Highland chiefs. Although many of these were small, at a rough calculation it may be estimated that the Spanish troops sent to Scotland in 1719 received in all some £200 from the money paid out by Tullibardine as against more than £350 distributed to various chiefs.

46 Taylor, Jacobite Court at Rome, p. 20 n. 1.

47 The Lockhart Papers ed. A. Aufrere, (London, 1817), II, 17.

48 'Declarazion del Theniente Dn.Pedro Pazquelo .. del regim(ien)to de Galizia, y de los que han embiado a Escozia' (Declaration of Ltd. Pedro Pazquelo .. of the regiment of Galicia, and of those sent to Scotland), henceforth abbr. Pazquelo's Declarazion,) dated Corunna, July 1719 (precise date not given), AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.He gave the date of arrival at Eilean Donan (spelt Irlandona in the previous Declarazion) as being 27 Apr. NS. to the British authorities after being captured, and his account given to Carpenter on 26 May O.S. (SP 43/60/47) appeared in Hist. Reg. IV, 281 and Pol. State XVII, 501.

49 Dickson, intro. xli-ii.

50 Fragment, 47.

51 Ibid., Alexander McDonell, Laird of Glengarry (a man suspected by the British authorities of harbouring pro-Jacobite sentiments) , to the Duke of Atholl (Tullibardine's father), 5 May 1719 O.S., Invergary, SP 43/60/13.
The Fidele, which had conveyed Keith and his party to Scotland to France, had already returned to Honfleur - Stair to Craggs, 8 Apr. 1719, SP 78/163/285; Michael II, 198 n.1.

52 Dickson, intro. xliv
Cf. the entry in Tullibardine's 'Account..' for 8 May (O.S.), HMC Report X (i), p. 124, a payment of nine shillings to three messengers for carrying news of the three Royal naval vessels.

53 Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

54 Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.
The date on which these joined Pazquelo and the original Spanish garrison in Eilean Donan can be identified as 8 May (O.S.) from the fact that, according to the lieutenant, it was two days before the British ships attacked the castle (10 May O.S.).

55 This was originally built in 1650. Merriman, Cdr. R.D. Queen Anne's Navy (London, publns. Navy Records Soc. 1961), app. VI, p. 367.

56 The log book of the Assistance kept by Captain Holland is in the P.R.O. Adm(iralty) 51/4118 part 13. Holland received his first commission in the Royal Navy as a lieutenant in 1696, became a captain in 1708 and died either in 1724 or 1736 - The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy 1660-1815 (London, 1954), II, 451.

57 The Dartmouth was built in 1698 in the Southampton area (there is some doubt as to exactly where - cf. Merriman, 367; Mariner's Mirror (henceforth abbr. MM) 49 (1963), p. 279) - with specifications of 681 tons, 280 man and 54 guns (Merriman, 367).

58 For the log of the Dartmouth kept by Capt. Eaton, Cf. PRO Adm. 35/229 pt. 5.

59 Both the Worcester and Dartmouth were built in the Southampton area in 1698 - MM 49 (1963), 279. The specifications of the former were 689 tons, 280 men and 54 guns (Merriman, 369).

60 For the log of the Worcester kept by Boyle (a leading source of information about the engagement at Eilean Donan), cf. PRO Adm. 51/1057 pt. 11. Boyle became a captain in Jan. 1711 and died in June 1720 - Commissioned Sea Officers I, 94 (his death is also noted in the Worcester's log.)

61 This was built in 1709 at Plymouth (Merriman, 389), and rebuilt in 1718 at Chatham with specifications of 703 tons, 250 men, 44 guns (M.M. 33 (1947), p. 278).

62 For the log of the Enterprise kept by Herdman, cf. PRO Adm. 51/312 pt. 3. Herdman became a captain in Jan. 1713 and died either in 1727 or 1728 - Commissioned Sea Officers II, 433.

63 Built at Woolwich in 1706 with specifications 276 tons, 115 men and 20 guns - Merriman, 370.

64 For the log of the Flamborough kept by Hildersley (or Hildesley), cf. PRO Adm. 51/357 pt. 8 Hildersley received his first commission as a captain in September 1716 superannuated as a Rear-Admiral in 1747. He died in 1771 - Commissioned Sea Officers, II, 440.

65 Entry in the Assistance log book for 7 May (O.S.), Adm. 51/4118.

66 Entry in the Dartmouth's log, 6 & 7 May (O.S.), Adm. 35/229.

67 See above, n. 51.

68 Entry in the Assistance log for 7 May O.S., Adm. 51/4118.

69 Flamborough log, entry for 9 May (O.S.), Adm. 51/357.

70 Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

71 Ibid.

72 Entries dated 10 May (O.S.), logs of Worcester (Adm. 51/1057) Enterprise (Adm. 51/312) and Flamborough (Adm. 51/357).

73 Enterprise log dated 10 May O.S., Adm. 51/312.

74 Worcester log, 10 May 1719 (O.S.), Adm. 51/1057.

75 Flamborough log, 10 May 1719 O.S., Adm. 51/357.

76 Entry for 10 May 1719 O.S. in the Enterprise (Adm. 51/312. Flamborough (Adm. 51/1057.) The British government's account of the attack on Eilean Donan, based upon Boyle's narrative in his log, appears in Hist. Reg. IV, 280-81 & Pol. State XVII, 500-01; these are the source of the account of the engagement in Dickson, xlvii.
In the main Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360, an account of the assault on Eilean Donan from the defenders' side, generally confirms Boyle's story, although there are slight discrepancies between the two.

77 Worcester log (Adm. 51/1057), Enterprise log (Adm. 51/312), Flamborough log (adm. 357); corroborated in Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G.Mod. leg. 2360; Hist. Reg. IV, 280; Pol. State XVII, 501.

78 Flamborough log, Adm. 51/357

79 Enterprise log (Adm. 51/312); Flamborough log. (Adm. 51/357) corroborated by Pazquelo in his Declarazion, AGS G Mod. leg. 2360.

80 Flamborough log (Adm. 51/357); Worcester log (Adm. 51/1057) - this formed the basis of the account of the siege of Eilean Donan published in Hist. Reg. IV, 281; Pol. State XVII, 501. The Flamborough makes no mention of the Spanish deserter, but the Worcester's reference to such is corroborated by Pazquelo in his Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

81 Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360. This may have been an exaggeration, since stores of powder and grain were found after the garrison surrendered.

82 Pazquelo claims that it ceased at 7 in the evening (Declarazion) Boyle gives the time as half past seven (Worcester's log, Adm. 51/1057) and Herdman as eight o'clock (Enterprise log, Adm. 51/312).

86 Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

87 Worcester log Adm. 51/1057.

88 Ibid. Enterprise log, Adm. 51/312.
The general details are corroborated by Pazquelo (Declarazion) he states that the two boats attacked the castle from both sides which is quite feasible.

89 Worcester log, Adm. 51/1057 Enterprise log. Adm. 51/312 Hist. Reg. IV, 280; Pol. State XVII, 500-01.
Pazquelo claimed that the garrison defending Eilean Donan only capitulated after the British attackers had threatened to put them all to the sword if they continued to resist (Declarazion). This was almost certainly intended to convince the Spanish authorities that the Spaniards had only capitulated under duress; and should not be taken too seriously.

90 This total of 43 (41 Spaniards, a Scottish rebel and Stapleton) was that given by Boyle in the Worcester's log (Adm. 51/1057), and corroborated by Hildersley (Flamborough log, Adm. 51/357); the figure of 41 Spaniards was also confirmed by Pazquelo (Declarazion). The total published in Hist. Reg. IV, 280; Pol. State XVII, 501 was 43 men plus a captain and sergeant.the discrepancy may be due to the capture of a couple of rebels close to Eilean Donan.

91 Worcester log, Adm. 51/1057 Hist. Reg. IV, 281, Pol. State XVII, 501. Pazquelo in his Declarazion said that there were approx. 300 barrels.

92 Worcester log (Adm. 51/1057), printed in Hist. Reg. IV 281, Pol. State XVII, 501.

93 Worcester log, Adm. 51/1057; Hist. Reg. IV, 280. Pol. State XVII, 501. This contradicts Pazquelo's statement that the castle's defenders possessed no food (Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360).

94 Worcester log, Adm. 51/1057 pt. 11; Hist. Reg. IV, 280; Pol. State, XVII, 501.

95 Enterprise log, entry for 11 May 1719 (O.S.). Adm. 51/312.

96 Ibid.

97 Entry for 11 May 1719 (O.S.) in the Worcester (Adm. 51/1057), Enterprise (Adm. 51/312) and Flamborough (Adm. 51/357) logs. Boyle's published version of the incident (Hist. Reg.IV, 281; Pol. State XVII, 501) merely said that the Enterprise had blown the castle up.

98 Entry for 12 May O.S. in the Worcester log, Adm. 51/1057.

99 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 26 May 1719, Edinburgh, S.P. 43/60/47.

100 Hist. Reg. IV, 281; Pol. State XVII, 501-02; cited by Dickson, intro. xli n.2.

101 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 26 May 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, S.P. 43/60/37; Carpenter to Wightman, 31 May 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, S.P. 43/60/57.

102 Hist. Reg. IV, 282; Pol. State XVII, 622.

103 This probably arose from Wightman's belief that he had been inadequately remunerated during his period of service as acting commander-in-chief in Scotland between 1712-14 (Dalton, George I's Army, I, 48-49), and his resentment at what was tantamount to a demotion.

104 Roxburgh to Wightman, 21 Apr. 1719 O.S., S.P. 55/8; Carpenter to Roxburgh, 14 May 1719 O.S. SP 43/60/20.

105 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 30 May 1719 O.S., SP 43/60/40.

106 Michael II, 199. For the Dutch States General's decision to send troops to Scotland, see above p.211.
It appears that a further eight companies from Amerongen's regiment were sent from Edinburgh to Inverness at the end of May 1719 (SP 43/60/45) but these arrived too late to take part at Glenshiel (SP 43/60/70).

107 Col. Clayton to Carpenter, 19 May 1719 O.S., Inverness, SP 43/60/25.

108 Clayton to Roxburgh, 22 May 1719 O.S., Inverness, SP 43/60/38.

109 Wightman to Carpenter, 31 May 1719 O.S., Inverness, SP 43/60/64.

110 Clayton to Carpenter, 19 May 1719 O.S., Inverness, SP 43/60/25; Clayton to Roxburgh, 22 May 1719 O.S., Inverness, S.P. 43/60/38; Wightman to Carpenter, 26 & 29 May 1719 O.S., SP 43/60/46 & 55.

111 Alberoni to James, 26 Apr. 1719, Madrid, W.S.P. 43/73: Dickson 250, letter 42.

112 Ormonde to Timon Connock, 29 Apr. 1719, Dickson, 116 letter CVI; Alberoni to James, 28 June 1719, Campo de Cirasso, WSP 43/137: Dickson, 255 letter 47.

113 I have found no trace of this letter at Simancas, but the gist of what Alberoni wrote may be discerned from Beretti Landi's letter to Fernández Durán, 8 Feb. 1720, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

114 Account of Beretti Landi's expenses (for the year 1719), encl. in his letter to Fernández Duran of 8 Feb. 1720, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

The cost of these was subjoined to some of the expenses incurred by the ambassador in providing for the subsistence of the bulk of the Spaniards sent to Scotland in 1719 after their capture following the battle of Glenshiel, and cannot therefore be precisely calculated.

115 Hatton, Diplomatic Relations, 194.

116 Pollock to Carpenter, 23 May 1719 O.S., SP 43/60/53.

117 Wightman to Carpenter, 2 June 1719 O.S., Inverness, S.P. 43/60/70.

118 Wightman to Carpenter, 26 May 1719, O.S., Inverness, SP 43/60/46;
Bishop Gadderar to Bishop Campbell, 7 Nov. 1719 O.S., London, letter from private collection: printed in Dickson, 296, letter 86: according to this, even some Spaniards found the heat in Scotland excessive.

119 James Abercrombie, a British officer, wrote to Roxburgh on 11 June O.S. (SP43/60/78) claiming that Wightman began the attack when the Jacobites were celebrating James birthday: this may, however, have been written for anti-Stuart propaganda purposes.

120 Wightman to Roxburgh, 11 June 1719 O.S., Glenshiel, SP 43/60/81; Wightman to Carpenter, 11 June 1719 O.S., Glenshiel, SP 43/60/80: this letter was not sent owing to what Wightman claimed to be the presence of fugitives from the Jacobite side who made the task of communicating with Edinburgh through the Highlands too dangerous (Wightman to Carpenter 17 June O.S., S.P. 43/60/119); Michael II, 199.

121 Names and numbers of rebels at Glenshiel, SP 43/60/142.

122 Wightman to Roxburgh, 11 June 1719 O.S., Glenshiel, SP 43/60/81.

123 The battle at Glenshiel is well-known from the accounts in Hist. Reg. IV, 283-85 and Pol. State XVII, 623-27; Keith, Fragment, 151-52; Mar's 'Distinct Abridgement' in Terry, Chevalier de St. George, 474-95; Terry, C.S. 'The Battle of Glenshiel', S.H.R. II (1905), 412-23; Michael II, 199-203; and nothing new has come to light during my searches in Spanish archives.

124 Wightman to Roxburgh & to Carpenter, 11 June 1719 O.S., Glenshiel, SP 43/60/81 & 80; Hist. Reg. IV, 285, Pol. State XVII, 627.

125 List of killed and wounded at Glenshiel (on the British government side), SP 43/60/115.

126 Cited by Dickson, p. lii n.2.

127 Wightman to Roxburgh, 11 June 1719 O.S., Glenshiel, SP 43/60/81. This figure was repeated in Craggs' letter to William Stanhope (the former British ambassador in Madrid who was accompanying Berwick's army on its campaign in Northern Spain) of 22 June O.S., SP 104/30.

128 I deduce this from the fact that the British government's documentation concerning Bolaño's detachment after their capitulation (SP 43/60/80, 81, 120, 142) makes no mention of any Spaniards being mortally wounded at Glenshiel, and says very little about their numbers of wounded. Further confirmation

that the Spanish fatalities were small or non existent may be deduced from the fact that the tally of Bolaño's men plus that of the Spaniards captured at Eilean Donan closely approximate to the number which left Spain in March 1719 .

129 Tullibardine to Mar, 16 June 1719 O.S., WSP 43/134; Dickson 273, letter 62.

130 Entry in the Flamborough's log, 22 May 1719 O.S., Adm. 51/357 Hist. Reg. IV, 281 & Pol. State XVII, 501 say that the Flamborough carrying the Spaniards arrived in Leith Road on 23 May (O.S.).

131 Entry in the Enterprise log, 14 June (O.S.), Adm. 51/312.

132 Ibid., entry for 6 July. This explains how Stapleton came to be interrogated by the authorities in Plymouth (SP 35/17/30, Examination of Stapleton, 14 July O.S.).

133 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 28 May 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 43/60/58; Hist. Reg. IV, 281, Pol. State XVII, 501.

134 Minutes of the Lords Justices' Meeting of 28 May O.S., encl. in Delafaye to Stanhope, 29 May 1719 O.S., S.P. 43/61/16.

135 Stanhope to Delafaye, 23 June 1719 O.S., SP 43/1f. 224.

136 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 6 June 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, S.P. 43/60/72.

137 Ibid.

138 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 28 May 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 43/60/58.

139 Entry in the Flamborough's log, 4 June 1719 O.S., Adm. 51/357 pt. 8; Cockburn (Lord Justice Clerk) to Roxburgh, 4 June 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 43/60/74.

140 Flamborough log, entry for 11 June (O.S.), Adm. 51/357 pt. 8.

141 A Spanish translation of this is enclosed in Risbourg's letter to Fernández Durán, 20 July 1719. AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

For Thomas Colby (c1670-1729), a Commissioner of the Navy from 1717-28 & M.P. for Rochester, 1724-27, cf. Jackson, Sir G Naval Commissioners 1660-1760 (1889), pp. 4, 42, 69 & the biography of A.N. Newman in History of Parliament I, 565; John Fawler held the post of Comptroller of the Victualling, 1717-44 - Jackson, 42,69.

142 Passport for Manesty (Spanish translation), AGS G. Mod. 2360.

143 Ibid.: '..la misma Cantidad de los subditos de S.M. Que fueron tomados prisioneros por los espanoles, fuesen demandadas en lug(a)r de ellos quando se le ofresiere la ocasion' (the same number of the subjects of his majesty (George I) who were taken prisoner by the Spaniards were requested in place of those (Spanish captives) when the occasion arose). (these words were underlined).

144 I deduce this from the fact that Capt. Manesty, in a statement made to the Spanish authorities after his arrival in Corunna on 17 July, stated that his voyage from the Nore had taken 25 days (encl. in Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 20 July 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360), which would indicate that he left on 12/23 June. The period of a 25 day voyage from England to Spain ending on 17 July is corroborated by Lt. Pazquelo in his Declarazion, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

145 The first report of Glenshiel reached Whitehall on Tuesday 16 June O.S. (Roxburgh to Stanhope, 16 June O.S., SP 43/60/75); the news was confirmed by Friday 19th (Roxburgh to Stanhope, 19 June O.S., SP 43/60/77); and publicised - Abraham (John Menzies, the Pretender's chief agent in London) to James, 19 June 1719 O.S., WSP 44/2: encl. with this (WSP 44/4) was a pamphlet giving the British government's account of Glenshiel.

146 Pazquelo's Declarazion, AGSG Mod. leg. 2360; Risbourg to Fernández Durán 20 July 1719, said that the Ann arrived in Corunna at midday on 17 July.

147 Risbourg to Fernández Durán, 20 July 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

148 Ibid.

149 Copy enclosed in the above, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

150 Risbourg to Fernandez Durán, 20 July 1719, Corunna, AGS G. Mod. leg. 2360.

151 Ibid.

152 Carpio 137 refers to such a diplomatic approach, but gives no source.

153 Connock's role as a double agent informing the Spanish government of the presence of Jacobites in Spain may be illustrated by his letter to Fernández Durán, 13 Dec. 1719, AGS G. Sup. leg. 138 in which he told the Spanish minister of Ormonde's whereabouts in Madrid.
In Hinojosa's account book (AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1) there is an entry dated 29 Dec. 1718 for a payment of 6,000 reales (approx. £200) to Connock for 'gratificazion' (gratuity/ reward); possibly in connection with his role as an agent of the Spanish government.

154 Connock to James, 28 Apr. 1719, Madrid, WSP 43/77: Dickson 252, letter 43.

155 James to Philip V, 15 June 1719, Lugo, AHN Est. leg. 2478 ap. 3 no. 8; Carpio 142 n. 47: James to Philip V, 3 July 1719, Santiago, AHN Est. leg. 2478 ap. 3, no. 11.

156 Wiesener III, 82.

157 Ormonde to Alberoni, 26 July 1719: Dickson, 149, letter CLIV; Ormonde to Connock, 26 July 1719, ibid. 150, letter CLV.
James sailed from Vinaroz north of Valencia on 14 August and arrived in Italy at the end of the month.

158 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 6 June 1719 O.S., SP 43/60/72.

159 For the abortive Breton exploit which ended in a mutiny of those Spanish troops ordered to participate in Santander on 25 Sept. 1718, cf. Baudrillart II, 377-95; Bourgeois III, 68-71; Carpio 144 n. 52: correspondence between Alberoni, Ormonde and his second in command, Blas de Loya, AGS G. Sup. leg. 263.

160 For the figure of 274 Spanish prisoners of war, cf. SP 43/60/142 (the list of men on the Jacobite side at Glenshiel drawn up for the British authorities in Edinburgh); Carpenter to Roxburgh, 11 July 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 43/60/160.

161 Wightman to Delafaye (Secretary to the Lords' Justices), 30 June 1719 O.S., Inverness, SP 54/14/60: Dickson, 277, letter 66.

162 Minutes of the Lords Justices Meeting of 23 June O.S., SP 43/61/92, encl. in Delafaye to Stanhope, 23 June 1719 O.S., SP 43/61/90. Hofman, the Austrian resident in London, reported that this suggestion was inspired by the administration's desire to prove the falsity of reports that the story of a Spanish invasion was a fabrication on the part of the Whig ministry in order to obtain more money from Parliament, Michael II 204 n.4.

163 Carpenter to Delafaye, 27 June 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/58: Dickson 274, letter 64.

164 Minutes of Lords Justices meeting 2 July 1719 O.S., SP 43/62 encl. in Delafaye to Stanhope, 3 July 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 43/62.

165 Delafaye to Stanhope, 3 July 1719 O.S., SP 43/62.

166 Ibid.

167 Ibid.

168 Minutes of the Lords Justices' meetings of 23 June O.S. (SP 43/61/92) & 2 July O.S. (SP 43/62).

169 Craggs to Stair, 27 June 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 104/30; Minutes of Lords Justices' meeting of 23 June O.S., SP 43/61/92. Craggs also claimed to have been the instigator of this plan, cf. Michael II 108 n.1.
For an account of the Royal Naval expedition to Galicia (Oct. - Nov. 1719), see Michael II, 107 - 11; Meijide Pardo, op. cit., 41-131

170 Minutes of their meeting of 23 June O.S. (SP 43/61/92) when the matter was first broached.

171 Michael II, 108 n. 2: Craggs to Stanhope, 30 June 1719 O.S., SP 43/57

172 Minutes of the Lords Justices' Meeting 2 July 1719 O.S., SP 43/62; Craggs to Stanhope, 30 June 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 44/269A.

173 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 11 July 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 43/60/160.

174 SP 43/60/161
The discrepancy between the number of 274 Spaniards who were reported in June as having taken part in the engagement at Glenshiel (SP 43/60/142) and the 273 who were counted in Edinburgh on 11 July led Carpenter to assume that the odd one had disappeared en route to Edinburgh (SP 43/60/160). This seems unlikely: a more plausible explanation is that Bolaño's servant was first listed as a soldier (SP 43/60/142), whereas upon arrival in Edinburgh he was correctly regarded as a civilian.

175 Account of Expediture on Spanish prisoners, encl. in Wightman to Delafaye, 29 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/82: Dickson 292-93, letter 83.

175 Account of Expenditure on Spanish prisoners, encl. in Wightman to Delafaye, 29 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/82: Dickson 292-93, letter 83.

176 Carpenter to Delafaye, 7 July 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/63: Dickson 278, letter 68.

177 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 11 July 1719 O.S., Edinburgh SP 43/60/160.

178 Ibid.

179 Item in 'Account of Expenditure on Spanish prisoners', SP 54/14/82: Dickson, 293, letter 83.

180 Carpenter to Roxburgh, 9 July 1719 O.S., SP 43/60/157.

182 Bolaño to Roxburgh, 12 Aug. 1719 (O.S.?), SP 43/60/194.

183 Bishop Gadderar to Bishop Campbell, 7 Nov. 1719 O.S.: Dickson 296, app. letter 86; Lockhart Papers II, 23-24 (cited by Michael II, 204 n.5).

Harcourt Smith, Alberoni, 197 claims that the Spaniards' good looks and manners had such an effect upon the female population of Edinburgh that the British authorities deemed it advisable to ship them to Spain as quickly as possible. He gives no source for this interesting revelation, and the facts surrounding the repatriation of Bolaño's men show that their reputation as Don Juans (if any) had no bearing whatsoever upon the British government's decision to send them back to Spain.

184 Bolaño to Roxburgh, 12 August 1719, SP 43/60/194.

185 Ibid.

186 Bolaño to Beretti Landi, 15/26 Aug. 1719, Edinburgh, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Carpenter to Delafaye, 19 Sept. 1719, Bath, SP 54/14/87: Dickson, 290, letter 81.

190 Wightman to Delafaye, 1 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/78: Dickson 283, letter 74.

191 Ibid.

192 Delafaye to Stanhope, 7 July 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 43/62; Craggs to Stanhope, 7 July 1719 O.S., Whitehall, SP 44/269A; Michael II 108 n.5: Stanhope to Delafaye, 14 July 1719 O.S., SP 43/2.

193 Michael II, 110 n.2: William Stanhope to Craggs, 3 Sept. 1719, SP 94/232, Meijide Pardo, 61-70.

194 Wightman to Delafaye, 17 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/80 (referring to his having received the Lords Justices' decision of 10 Sept.): Dickson 285, letter 76.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

198 Wightman to Delafaye, 29 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/82: Dickson 291, app. 82.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 Wightman to Delafaye, 17 Sept. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, S.P. 54/14/80: Dickson 285, letter 76.

203 Ibid.

204 Bolaño to Beretti Landi, 11 Oct. 1719 N.S., Edinburgh, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

205 Ibid.

206 Bolaño to Beretti Landi, 7 Oct. 1719 N.S., Edinburgh, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

207 Bolaño to Beretti Landi, 11 Oct. 1719 N.S., Edinburgh, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

208 Bolaño to Beretti Landi, 21 Oct. 1719 N.S. Edinburgh, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

209 Beretti Landi to Fernández Durán, 2 Nov. 1719, The Hague, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

210 Bolaño's letters to Beretti of 11 and 21 Oct. 1719 were encl. in this.

211 Beretti Landi to Fernández Durán, 14 Sept. 1719, The Hague, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

212 Memorandum dated 1 Oct. 1719, Madrid, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565. Since Beretti Landi's correspondence regarding the subsistence of the Spaniards in Edinburgh had been carried out with Fernández Durán, this document was probably written by the Spanish secretary for war.

213 Memorandum dated 1 Oct. 1719, Madrid, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

214 Beretti Landi to (Fernández Durán?), 26 Oct. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

215 Ibid.
this amount was entered in Beretti's account of his expenses during the year 1719 (most of these appear to have been clandestine relating either to shipments of arms and ammunition to Scotland, or similar material to Spain), encl. in his letter to Fernández Durán of 8 Feb 1720 AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

216 I deduce this from a statement written down the side of Fernandez Duran's letter to Hinojosa, the Spanish treasurer general, dated 31 Jan 1720 (AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565), probably in the latter's writing, to the effect that he had just sent a £200 letter of exchange to Monteleón to reimburse the marquis for providing this amount of financial assistance to the Spaniards in Edinburgh on 20 October 1719 (N.S.?)

217 AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1 (Hinojosa's account book), entry dated 7 Nov. 1719.

218 Preston to Delafaye, 22 Oct. 1719, Edinburgh, SP 54/14/84: Dickson, 295, letter 85.

219 Beretti Landi to (Fernandez Duran?), 23 Nov. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565 mentioned having received a letter from Bolaño dated (24 Oct)/4 Nov. containing this information.

220 Preston to Delafaye, 22 Oct. 1719 O.S., Edinburgh, SP 54/14/64: Dickson, 295 letter 85.

221 Beretti Landi to (Fernández Durán ?), 23 Nov. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

222 Beretti Landi to Fernández Durán, 23 Nov. 1719, The Hague, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565; Bishop Gadderar to Bishop Campbell, 7 Nov. 1719 O.S.: Dickson 296, letter 86.

223 I have been unable to obtain any precise information from Spanish MSS. as to the date and place where Bolaño and his detachment arrived back in Spain. Meijide Pardo, 32 says that a British vessel brought the captives to Corunna towards the end of 1719.
Fernandez Duran to Hinojosa, 31 Jan. 1720, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565, mentioned that Bolaño had by then arrived in Madrid.

224 Beretti Landi to (Fernandez Duran?), 28 Dec. 1719, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565. Dundas had also supplied money to Jacobite exiles - Stowe MSS. 232 f201.

225 Beretti Landi to Fernández Durán, 11 Jan. 1720, The Hague, AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565.

226 Ibid.

227 In Hinojosa's account book (AGS DGT Inv. 7 leg. 1) there is an entry for 15 Feb. 1720 authorising Juan Bautista Sánchez de Orellana (a banker ?) to pay Beretti 117,645 reales (approx. £3,700).

228 Note on Fernández Durán's letter to Hinojosa of 31 Jan. 1720 (AGS G. Mod. leg. 4565) to the effect that a payment of 1,192 ducados (doblones, approx. £1,100), owed to Beretti for his assistance to the prisoners in Edinburgh, would be paid.

Epilogue and Conclusion

Notes (to pp.245-48)

1 This, entitled 'Enhorabueras, que da un Ingerio en nombre de los Cortesanos a la Majestad del Rey de Inglaterra Jacobo III...' (Greetings to his majesty King James III of England from a suitably gifted individual in the name of (Philip V's) courtiers), B. Nac. MSS. 10912, is printed in Carpio.

2 Spain's relationship with James from 1720 onwards is covered by Carpio, pp. 154ff. Philip V's decision to pay a small pension to the Chevalier is dealt with on p. 154, n. 4.

3 For this, see Carpio, 287-90.
AGS, G. Sup., leg. 475 is entitled 'Expedicion de Escocia (1745)'

4 AGS SSH leg. 4 (No. 51) covers the repatriation of Spain's 'volunteers' in the Forty Five.

5 Terry C.S., The Young Pretender (London, 1903), 130-33; Carpio, 293-97; Forster, Rash Adventurer, 197-201

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legs.4564 : Cartas de Italia y otras partes (letters from Italy and other parts).

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138 : 'Ano de 1719.Correspond(enci)a y f(ec)hos de diferentes negocios y puntos del Reino' (Correspondence concerning different matters from different points in the kingdom) - amplifies the contents of G.Mod. leg.1654.

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